


the  
**samkṣepaśārīraka**  
**of sarvajñātman**



N. VEEZHINATHAN















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THE  
SĀṂKṢEPAŚĀRĪRAKA  
OF  
SARVAJÑĀTMAN







# THE SAMKṢEPASĀRĪRAKA OF SARVAJÑĀTMAN

CRITICALLY EDITED

WITH

INTRODUCTION, ENGLISH TRANSLATION  
NOTES AND INDEXES

BY

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## F O R E W O R D

Dr N. Veezhinathan, Lecturer in Sanskrit at this Centre, worked as Research Scholar from 1960 to 1963 in the Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, Poona, and wrote his doctoral thesis on the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman. The thesis earned for him the Ph. D. Degree of the University of Poona in 1964. He joined this Centre as Lecturer in 1964. My own observation of his thesis and the encomiums it has received from scholars who had occasion to see it made me feel that the thesis was a distinctively valuable contribution to scholarship in the field of Advaita and that its publication would do credit to any institution that sponsored it, more so to an institution like this Centre which has devoted itself to study and research in Advaita Vedānta for the past forty years. Accordingly, it was recommended for publication by this Centre, and, thanks to the publication grant made available by the University Grants Commission to the Centre and the facilities provided by the University of Madras, it is now being published as No. 18 in the Madras University Philosophical Series.

The *Samkṣepaśārīraka* is an important classic in the Advaita tradition, being a full metrical summary of the central teachings of Śrī Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. The importance of the work for a student of Advaita is evident from the fact that it has eight commentaries, as Dr Veezhinathan has identified in his Introduction. The author of the work, Sarvajñātman, himself occupies a position of eminence in the line of preceptors following Śrī Śaṅkara, having been, according to tradition, ordained by



the Bhagavatpāda himself and nominated to succeed him and Suresvara in the central *Śrī Kāmakoti-Piṭha* at Kāñcī.

The present work is a Critical Edition and English Translation of the classic, with a detailed Introduction, Notes, and Indexes. In the Introduction, Dr Veezhinathan discusses systematically the basic issues of Advaita Vedānta, such as *Brahman*, *māyā*, *adhyāsa*, *jīva*, *Īśvara*, *jagat*, and *mokṣa*, and brings out the special contribution made by Sarvajñātman to the development of Advaita thought. The text has been definitively edited after collating several manuscripts. The translation is faithful and readable. The notes add to information and clarify subtle points. The four detailed Indexes render the edition highly useful to scholars.

I have great pleasure in commending this work to serious students of Advaita.

Madras

February 25, 1972

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN



## P R E F A C E

The present Critical Edition of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, a work on Advaita Vedānta, with Introduction, English Translation, Notes and Indexes, represents the research work completed under the guidance of the late Dr A. Sankaran, M.A., Ph.D., Assistant Editor, Sanskrit Dictionary Department, and Honorary Professor of Sanskrit, Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, Poona, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Poona. The *Samkṣepaśārīraka* is a work of Sarvajñātman the disciple of Suresvarācārya; it sets forth, in verses, the views of Śrī Śaṅkara as expounded in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*. It contains 1240 verses and is divided into four Adhyāyas.

The edition of the text of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* is based on the following manuscripts :

- T<sub>1</sub> A paper manuscript in Devanāgarī script (No. 7121) of the Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library. The following five manuscripts also belong to this library.
- T<sub>2</sub> A palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu script (No. 7122)
- T<sub>3</sub> A palm-leaf manuscript in Grantha script (No. 7123)
- T<sub>4</sub> A paper manuscript in Devanāgarī script (No. 7124)
- T<sub>5</sub> A paper manuscript in Devanāgarī script (No. 7125). This contains only the third and fourth Adhyāyas.



T<sup>c</sup> A paper manuscript in Devanāgarī script (No. 7126)

Six commentaries on the work are available and they have also been used in editing the work. Of the six commentaries, two are yet unpublished.

M<sub>1</sub> *Sambandhokti* by Vedānanda: a transcript of a palm-leaf manuscript (R. 2919) belonging to the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. This contains the text also.

M<sub>2</sub> *Siddhāntadīpa* by Visvaveda: a transcript of a manuscript [R. 1558 (b)] belonging to the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. This contains only the commentary. The author of this commentary gives only a summary of each verse, and so the correct reading of the text cannot be fixed with the help of this commentary. The present edition owes to it not more than one variant reading.

B<sub>1</sub> The Kāsī Sanskrit Series edition of the commentary — *Sārasaṅgraha* of Madhusūdanasarasvatī.

B<sub>2</sub> The Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts edition of the commentary — *Tattvabodhinī* of Nṛsiṃhāśrama.

P<sub>1</sub> The Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series edition of the commentary — *Subodhinī* of Puruṣottama.

P<sub>2</sub> The Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series edition of the commentary — *Anvayārthaprakāśikā* of Rāmatīrtha.

The present thesis consists of three parts. The first part, the Introduction, again, is divided into two sections. In the first section, I discuss the life, date, and works of Sarvajñātman. In the second section, I discuss the basic



doctrines of the Advaita Vedānta according to Sarvajñātman : (i) the Nature of the Ultimate Reality, (ii) Nescience (*māyā-avidyā*), (iii) Superimposition (*adhyāsa*), (iv) the Individual soul and God (*jīva* and *Īśvara*), (v) the Phenomenal World (*jagat*), and (vi) Liberation (*mokṣa*). And, in the end, I have given an evaluation of Sarvajñātman's contribution to Advaita Vedānta. The second part presents the text with an English translation. Explanatory notes are added wherever necessary. In the notes are provided the identification of the authors presupposed and references to the texts cited and implied. The third part consists of an alphabetical index of quotations, an index of the views of other authors referred to and implied in the text, an index of terms used in the text, and an index of the verses of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*.

This edition of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman, who was a younger contemporary of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya and who, under the fostering care of his preceptor Suresvarācārya, adorned the great *Kāmakoti-piṭha* at Kāñcī as its head, I humbly dedicate to His Holiness Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī Śrīpūjyapādāḥ, the present head of that hoary Śaṅkarite Institution at Kāñcī. All my activities in the pursuit of my study of Advaita and publications relating thereto have been possible only through the benign grace of His Holiness who remains ever for me as my inspiring Light and Guide. I offer my most respectful homage at the lotus-feet of His Holiness.

I offer my most respectful salutations to His Holiness Śrī Anantānandendra Sarasvatī Svāmī of the Upaniṣadbrahmendra Maṭha at Kāñcī for the inspiration and guidance I have always received at His feet.



To Dr S. M. Katre, the former Director of the Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, Poona, I express my sincere gratitude for providing me with all facilities to carry on my research work there.

To the authorities of the University of Poona, I am thankful for permitting me to work for the Doctorate degree of the University of Poona and also for granting me permission to publish the present thesis.

I express my sincere thanks to Brahmas'rī T.S. Srinivasa Sastri of the Dictionary Department, Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, Poona, for suggesting to me this Advaita Classic for my thesis and for teaching me the text.

I express my deep sense of gratitude to my esteemed Professor the late Dr A. Sankaran for his kind guidance at every step.

To Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan, Director, Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, I am now, as in the past, greatly indebted not only for recommending this work for publication under the auspices of the Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, but also for kindly scrutinizing the entire typescript before it was sent to the press and for his kindness in having written a Foreword to this work. My obligations to him are indeed great.

To my friend and colleague Dr T. P. Ramachandran, I offer my grateful thanks for the encouragement he gave me at every stage in the printing of this work and for rendering valuable help in seeing the work through the press.



I am thankful to the authorities of the University of Madras for sanctioning the publication of this work under the auspices of the Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy and to the University Grants Commission for the permission to utilize their grant.

I thank the Ramayana Printing Works for the care they have bestowed on the printing of this work.

Madras

February 29, 1972

N. VEEZHINATHAN



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Ait.,</i>	<i>Aitareyopaniṣad</i>
<i>AP</i>	<i>Anvayārthaprakāśikā</i>
<i>ARR</i>	<i>Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa</i>
<i>AS</i>	<i>Advaitasiddhi</i>
<i>Bh.G.</i>	<i>Bhagavadgītā</i>
<i>Bh.G.B.</i>	Śaṅkara's <i>Bhāṣya</i> on the <i>Bhagavadgītā</i>
<i>Bṛh.,</i>	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad</i>
<i>BS</i>	<i>Brahmasūtra</i>
<i>BSB</i>	Śaṅkara's <i>Bhāṣya</i> on the <i>Brahmasūtra</i>
<i>Chānd.,</i>	<i>Chāndogyopaniṣad</i>
<i>Kaṭh.,</i>	<i>Kaṭhopaniṣad</i>
<i>Muṇḍ.,</i>	<i>Muṇḍakopaniṣad</i>
<i>PP</i>	<i>Pañcaprakriyā</i>
<i>S</i>	<i>Subodhinī</i>
<i>SB</i>	<i>Siddhāntabindu</i>
<i>SLS</i>	<i>Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha</i>
<i>SS</i>	<i>Sārasaṅgraha</i>
<i>SS</i>	<i>Samkṣepaśūriraka</i>
<i>Śvet.,</i>	<i>Śvetāśvataropaniṣad</i>
<i>Taitt.,</i>	<i>Taittirīyopaniṣad</i>
<i>TB</i>	<i>Tattvabodhinī</i>
<i>V</i>	<i>Siddhāntadīpa</i> of Viśvaveda
<i>Ved</i>	<i>Sambandhokti</i> of Vedānanda
<i>VK</i>	<i>Vedāntakalpalatikā</i>



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## Part I : INTRODUCTION







# INTRODUCTION

## I

### SARVAJNĀTMAN—HIS LIFE AND DATE

In order to preserve the Advaitic tradition for the benefit of posterity, Śrī Śaṅkara established monastic institutions in various parts of India. Badarī, Dvārakā, Purī, Śrīṅgagiri, and Kāñcī were the important ones among them. Of these, the institution at Kāñcī is the foremost and is termed the *Kāmakoti-piṭha*.<sup>1</sup> Śrī Śaṅkara himself assumed the headship of this *piṭha*. Ordained as *sannyāsin* by Śrī Śaṅkara himself, Sarvajñātman was nominated successor to the *Kāmakoti-piṭha* with Suresvara—his preceptor, as his protector.

In the *Jagadgururatnamālāstava*, a work giving the list of succession of the ācāryas of the *Kāmakoti-piṭha* composed by Sadāśivabrahmendra who flourished in the 16th century, there occurs the statement that Sarvajñātman vanquished the Jains.<sup>2</sup> Ātmabodhendra Sarasvatī in his commentary *Suṣamā* on the above work deals with the life of Sarvajñātman. Sarvajñātman was a native of a village called Brahmadeśa on the banks of the river Tāmraparṇī. His father's name was Vardhana. During Śrī Śaṅkara's tours of victory (*digvijaya*), Vardhana and his disciples were defeated; but Vardhana's son Mahādeva

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1. *Preceptors of Advaita*, Edited by Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan, The personal Bookshop, 10, Congress Buildings, 111, Mount Road, Madras, 1967, pp. 429-67.

2. *Jagadgururatnamālāstava*, Śrī Kāmakoti Kośasthānam, Francis Joseph Street, Madras-1, 1962, p. 46.



who was only seven years old at that time carried on the philosophical discussion for three days longer; but on the fourth day he had to yield to the great Advaita teacher. He, then, expressed his intense desire to become a *sannyāsin*. Śrī Śaṅkara initiated him into the *sannyāsāśrama*, bestowed on him the name *Sarvajñātman* and chose him as his future successor to the *Kāmakoti-pīṭha*. Sarvajñātman functioned as the head of the *pīṭha* under the fostering care of Suresvara.<sup>3</sup>

Suresvara's association with the *Kāmakoti-pīṭha* is well known. The *Śivarahasya* dealing with the life of Śrī Śaṅkara states that Śrī Śaṅkara brought from Kailāsa five *sphaṭika* liṅgas which are known as *Yoga-liṅga*, *Bhoga-liṅga*, *Vara-liṅga*, *Mukti-liṅga* and *Mokṣa-liṅga*.<sup>4</sup> Ānandagiri's *Śaṅkaraviṇaya*, the manuscript of which is available in the Rāma Tāraka Mutt Library, Vārāṇasī, and which is recognised by the orientalists as the most authentic biography of Śrī Śaṅkara states that Śrī Śaṅkara visited Kāñcī, consecrated the *Śrīcakra* in the temple of Kāmākṣī, established the *Kāmakoti-pīṭha* and asked Suresvara to be in charge of it by worshipping the *Yoga-liṅga* there.<sup>5</sup> It further states that Śrī Śaṅkara consecrated the *Mukti-liṅga* at Kedāra, *Vara-liṅga* at Nīlakanṭha-kṣetra,<sup>6</sup> and the *Bhoga-liṅga* at an institution near Śrīngagiri on the banks

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3. *ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

4. *Śivarahasya*, Mahārajā Jayacāmarājendra Granthamālā Series, No 32., Mysore, 1950, IX, xvi, 44.

5. ...*nijāvāsasyogyaṁ maṭhamapi parikalpya tatra nijasiddhāntaṁ advaitaṁ prakāśayitūṁ antevāsināṁ suresvaramāhūya yoganāmakaṁ liṅgaṁ pūjaya iti tasmai datvā tvamatra kāmakoti-pīṭham adhiśa iti vyavasthāpya śiṣyajanaiḥ paripūjyamānaḥ śrī paramaguruḥ sukhamāsa*, Chapter, 65.

6. *kedārakṣetre ekaṁ muktiliṅgākhyāṁ pratiṣṭhāpya...*, Chapter, 55. ....*nīlakanṭhesvaraṁ natvā tatra varanāmakaṁ liṅgaṁ pratiṣṭhāpya .....*, *ibid.*



of the river Tuṅgabhadra.<sup>7</sup> And, during his last days at Kāñcī, Śrī Śaṅkara directed Suresvara to send the *Mokṣa-liṅga* to Cidambaram.<sup>8</sup> It was with Suresvara that Sarvajñātman adorned the *Kāmakoti-piṭha* for seventy years and then himself for forty-two years.<sup>9</sup>

Sarvajñātman wrote three works entitled *Samkṣepa-sārīraka*, *Pañcaprakriyā*, and *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa*. In all these three works, he refers to the name of his preceptor as Devesvara.<sup>10</sup> Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha in their commentaries on the *Samkṣepa-sārīraka* identify Devesvara with Suresvara on the basis of the identity of the meaning between the words *deva* and *sura*.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, in the *Samkṣepa-sārīraka*, Sarvajñātman upholds the view that

7. ....*śriṅgagirisamīpe tuṅgabhadratīre cakram nirmāya....., nijamaṭham kṛtvā.....*Chapter, 62.

.....*tadanantaram padmapādākhyaṁ kañcit śiṣyaṁ pīthādhyakṣaṁ kṛtvā bhogaṇmakam liṅgaṁ tasmin pīṭhe nikṣīpya.....*Chapter, 63.

8. ....*tadanantaram samīpastham indrasaṁpradāyānuvartinaṁ sureśvaramāhūya bho śiṣya idaṁ mokṣaliṅgaṁ cidambaraśthalam preṣaya ityuktvā.....*Chapter, 74.

9. *Jagadgururatnamālāstava*, p. 74.

10. (i) *yadiya saṁparkamavāpya kevalam vyaṁ kṛtārthāḥ niravadya-kīrtayaḥ.*

*jagatsu te tāritasīṣyapañktayaḥ, jayantideveśvarapādaṇṇavaḥ, SŚ, I, 8.*  
*śrīdeveśvarapādapañkajaraṇṇasaṁparkapūtāśayaḥ.*  
*sarvajñātmagīrāṇkīto munivaraḥ saṁkṣepa-sārīrakam.*

*ibid.*, IV, 62.

(ii) *śrīdeveśvarāṅghrisphuṭakamarajaḥ pūtasamparkapūtāḥ sarvajñātmā samastāśrutipāthakuśalaḥ.....*PP, p. 15.

(iii) *śrīdeveśvarapādapadmarajasā sadyaḥ pavitrīkṛtāḥ sarvajñātmamaḥāmuniḥ prakaraṇaṁ cakre trikūṇḍigatam,*

*Pramāṇalakṣaṇa*, p. 56.

11. *surapadasthāne devapadaḥprayogaḥ, SŚ, p. 15.*

*idānīm sākṣātsvaguruṁ sureśvarācāryaṁ abhipūjayati, AP, p. 17.*



Brahman-Ātman is intrinsically inward and of the nature of consciousness. And, mind, owing to its association with Brahman-Ātman, is viewed as inward and of the nature of consciousness. It is thus clear that inwardness and consciousness are occasioned in mind because of the mutual superimposition between Brahman-Ātman and mind. In this connection Sarvajñātman states that this view is based upon the sayings of those who know the true tenets of Vedānta.<sup>12</sup> Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his commentary points out that Sarvajñātman refers to his preceptor Suresvara who advocates the above view in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*.<sup>13</sup>

It would have become clear from the foregoing account that Sarvajñātman is the disciple of Suresvara and the grand-disciple of Śrī Śaṅkara. This, however, is questioned by Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Rao on the basis of the geneology said to be given by Sarvajñātman himself in his other work *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* where one Devānanda is referred to as his grand-preceptor and not Śrī Śaṅkara.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, in all his three works, Sarvajñātman offers salutations not to Suresvara but to Devesvara. This fact supported by the name of the preceptor of Devesvara,

---

12. *bodhātmatve nirnimitte prático bodhātmatve tannimitte tu buddheḥ, bodhātmatve buddhidharmāu ca buddheḥ ukte sākṣāt vedasiddhāntavidbhīḥ,*

SS, I, 190.

13. *naiṣkarmyasiddhau ācāryaiḥ tadubhayamapyuktaṁ ityāha—bodhātmatve iti,* SS, p. 150.

*vide—kūṭasthabodhaḥ pratyaktvaṁ animittaṁ sadātmanaḥ  
bodhṛtāhantayoh hetuḥ tābhyāṁ teno'palakṣyate,*

*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, III, 11.

14. *śrī śreṣṭhānandapādaśiṣyāḥ śrī devānandapādāḥ, śrī devānandapādaśiṣyāḥ śrī deveśvarapādāḥ, śrī deveśvarapādaśiṣyāḥ śrī sarvajñātmapādāḥ, tadyā kṛtiḥ pramāṇalakṣaṇaṁ samāptam.*

*Pramāṇalakṣaṇa*, p. 56.



that is, Devānanda has led Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Rao to believe that Devesvara is different from Suresvara and so Sarvajñātman is not the disciple of Suresvara.

It must, however, be noted that the ancestral line referred to above is given more or less in a tabular form. Though the work *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* is in prose form, yet it seems strange how Sarvajñātman who, in that work itself, refers to the name of his preceptor in verse, and who, as we shall presently see, expounds in the *Samkṣepasāri-raka* even the subtle points of Advaita in verses, and that too, in a variety of metres, chose to give his pedigree alone in such a way. It is clear, therefore, that the geneological table given at the end of the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* is a later interpolation. And, we may take Sarvajñātman as the direct disciple of Suresvara and the grand-disciple of Śrī Śaṅkara who, according to the *Guruparaṁparā* lists preserved in the Dvārakā and Purī mutts flourished in about 500 B.C.<sup>15</sup> The ancient tradition of the Śrīṅagiri mutt, however, takes the date of Śrī Śaṅkara to 44 B.C.<sup>16</sup> Sarvajñātman attained *siddhi* in Kali 2737 (365 B.C.) on the caturdasī of the dark half of the Vaisākha month of the year Nala.<sup>17</sup> He was the contemporary of Vimuktātman, the author of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, and this is evident from his reference to the view of the latter in the *Samkṣepasāri-raka*.<sup>18</sup> He was also the contemporary of a king, who shone like the sun of the race of Manu and who was the prosperous king of the Kṣatriya race.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, he was a great devotee of Lord Padmanābha.<sup>20</sup>

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15. *Preceptors of Advaita*, p. 50.

16. *Notable Horoscopes*, by B. V. Raman, (Raman Publications, Sri Rajeswari, Bangalore-3, 1956), pp. 28-30.

17. *Jagadgururātnamālāstava*, p. 47.

18. *SS*, IV, 14.

19. *ibid.*, IV, 62.

20. *ibid.*, IV, 61 and 63.



## HIS WORKS

Sarvajñātman is well known in the history of Advaita as the author of the present work *Samkṣepasārīraka* which is a succinct exposition in verses of the views of Śrī Śaṅkara as stated in his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* or *Sārīraka-bhāṣya*.<sup>21</sup> This work has one thousand two hundred and forty verses in several metres and is divided into four chapters. The first chapter has five hundred and sixty three verses and corresponds to the first *adhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra* termed *Samanvayādhyāya*. It is devoted to the correct interpretation of the different texts of the Upaniṣads pointing to Brahman which is attributeless (*nirguṇa*) and formless (*nirākāra*). The second chapter comprises two hundred and forty eight verses and it corresponds to the second *adhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra* known as *avirodhādhyāya*. It shows that the Upaniṣadic teaching is not stultified by other proofs like perception, etc., or by the views of the other philosophical systems. The third one contains three hundred and sixty six verses and it corresponds to the third *adhyāya* of the *Brāhma-sūtra* known as *sādhanaādhyāya* and it is devoted to an exposition of the means to the realization of Brahman. The fourth one has sixty three verses and it conforms to the fourth chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* termed *phalādhyāya* and it deals with the nature of *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*.

Though the titles of the four chapters of this work correspond to those of the *Brahma-sūtra*, and the subject-matter treated of in each is the same as in the *bhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara on the corresponding chapters of the *Brahma-sūtra* or the *Sārīraka-sūtra*, yet all reference to the nature of the qualified Brahman (*saguṇa* Brahman), the methods

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21. SS, I, 10 and 57.

vide also, *śarīre sthūla-sūkṣma-kāraṇarūpe bhavaḥ pratibimbītaḥ cīddhātuh śārīraḥ, tatpratipāḍako granthopi śārīraka ityucyate, śrī madbhāṣyam ityarthah, TB, p. 19.*



of meditative worship thereof, and the result arising therefrom is avoided. On this ground, the title *Samkṣepaśārīraka*—an abridgement of the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara — is significant.<sup>22</sup>

This work has eight commentaries. The earliest of them seems to be the *Siddhāntadīpa* by Viśvaveda; and, it is available in manuscript [R.1558 (b)] in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha the two commentators on the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* have based their commentaries on the *Siddhāntadīpa*.<sup>23</sup> Another commentary called *Śaṁbandhokti* is by Vedānanda and it is also available in manuscript (R. 2919) in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. In this commentary the author attempts to show the mutual relation of the verses of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* as giving a consistent meaning. Full details about the life and date of these two commentators are not available. Rāmatīrtha, the disciple of Kṛṣṇatīrtha, who is assigned<sup>24</sup> to the middle of the 16th century wrote a commentary called *Anvayārthaprakāśikā*. His disciple Puruṣottama wrote another commentary called *Subodhinī*. These two are published in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Poona. Nṛsiṁhāśrama, the disciple of Jagannāthāśrama who is a contemporary of Kṛṣṇatīrtha, the

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22. *mumukṣvajijñāsyā-saviśeṣabrahmaprāsaṅgikavicāra-parityāgarūpasamkṣepaviśiṣṭam nirviśeṣabrahmavicārātmakam śārīrakaśāstra-meva etad iti samkṣepaśārīrakam iti samākhyā asya yuktaiva*, SS, p. 2.

23. *viśeṣādviśvavedasya pratyagviṣṇośca buddhayaḥ vyākhyānam śraddhayālekhi gurūṇām tau hi no gurū*, SS. p. 2.  
*siddhāntadīpaṁ purato nidhāya vedāntamantargṛhasanniviṣṭam samkṣepaśārīrākaratnapuñjaṁ prakāśamādāya mayā vivikṭam*,  
 AP, p. 853.

24. *The Date of Rāmatīrtha Yati*, by Mr. P. K. Gode, *Adayar Library Bulletin*, Vol. VI; part II, pp. 107-10.



preceptor of Rāmatīrtha referred to above, wrote a commentary called *Tattvabodhinī* and it is published in the Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts Series, Banaras. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who flourished in the middle of the 16th century wrote his commentary *Sārasaṁgraha* and it is published in the Kāśī Sanskrit Series, Banaras. Apart from these six commentaries, Aufrecht mentions one more commentary known as *Vidyāmṛtavariṣṇī* by one Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī.<sup>25</sup> Another commentary by one Pratyagviṣṇu is referred to by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.<sup>26</sup>

Apart from the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, Sarvajñātman wrote another work on Advaita entitled *Pañcaprakriyā* which is published in the Madras University Sanskrit Series. It is divided into five Sections. The first of them deals with the different kinds of meanings which a word may have. The next three sections treat of what are described as the major texts of which *tat tvam asi* (That thou art) is a familiar example and point out how they should be interpreted. The last section is devoted to the elucidation of the nature of bondage and release. This work summarizes the teachings of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*.

Apart from these two works on Advaita, he wrote a short treatise *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* on the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system. This work deals with the various pramāṇas of the Mīmāṃsakas and closes with an estimate of their epistemological doctrines. It is available in manuscript (D - 15716) in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.

We shall in the sequel set forth in detail the teachings of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*.

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25. *Catalogus Catalogorum*, Vol. III, p. 163.

26. See Foot-note 23.



## II

The subject-matter of all religion and philosophy may be stated to comprehend primarily the three elements, namely, God (Īsvara), the individual soul (*jīva*) and the phenomenal<sup>27</sup> world. According to Advaita, all these three are but the appearances from a fourth transcendental entity called Brahman or Ātman which is non-dual and pure consciousness.<sup>27</sup> The truth of non-duality is the import of the Upaniṣadic texts.<sup>28</sup> We shall now deal with the Advaitic conception of the ultimate reality as expounded by Sarvajñātman.

## THE NATURE OF THE ULTIMATE REALITY

The Advaitin assigns an important place to the Upaniṣads and holds<sup>29</sup> that the major texts (mahāvākyās) such as *tat tvam asi*,<sup>30</sup> *aham brahmāsmi*,<sup>31</sup> etc., signify the transcendental non-dual reality. The latter is sometimes represented<sup>32</sup> as the all-pervading principle, and is termed Brahman. And, at other times, it is subjectively represented<sup>33</sup> as the inner consciousness (*pratyakcāitanya*) of *jīva* and is termed Ātman. The term *tat* in the Upaniṣadic sentence *tat tvam asi* gives us a knowledge of Brahman, while the term *tvam* gives us a knowledge of Ātman. This distinction should not be taken as final. What the major text *tat tvam asi* signifies is the identity of Brahman and Ātman.

We shall now consider how the major text *tat tvam asi* conveys the identity of Brahman and Ātman. A sentence

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27. *SS*, III, 293.

28. *B.S.* I, i, 4.

29. *SB*, p. 19.

30. *Chānd.*, VI, viii, 7.

31. *Brh.*, I, iv, 10.

32. *Chānd.*, VI, ii, 1.

33. *Brh.*, IV, iii, 7.



could give rise to the knowledge of its sense only through the knowledge of the senses of the words constituting it. Words convey their senses through three kinds of signification, namely, primary signification (*mukhya-vṛtti*), secondary signification (*lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*), and signification based upon the knowledge of similiarity of the qualities (*gaunī-vṛtti*). These three are defined as follows:

1. Primary signification: A word used to convey a sense conveys that sense through either a genus (*jāti*), or quality (*guṇa*), or activity (*kriyā*), or relation (*sambandha*) which exists in the sense that is conveyed; and this process is known as primary signification.

2. Secondary signification: When the literal meaning of a sentence is incongruous, then one of the words constituting it conveys some other sense that is invariably connected with its primary sense; and this process is known as secondary signification. This is of three kinds: (i) *jahallakṣaṇā* (exclusive secondary signification), (ii) *ajahallakṣaṇā* (non-exclusive secondary signification), and *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* (exclusive—non-exclusive secondary signification). These three may be defined and illustrated successively as follows:

*Jahallakṣaṇā* is that where a word totally abandons its primary sense and signifies the other sense invariably connected with its primary sense. This kind of signification is adopted in the case of 'The hamlet is on the Ganges.' Here since the literal meaning, namely, the hamlet being on the current of the Ganges is discrepant, the word 'Ganges' abandons its primary sense and secondarily signifies its bank which is invariably connected with its primary sense—the current of the Ganges.<sup>34</sup>



*Ajahallakṣaṇā* is that where a word without abandoning any part of its primary sense signifies the other sense connected with its primary sense. This kind is adopted in the case of 'The red (horse) stands outside'. Here the primary sense of the statement, namely, the quality of redness standing is incompatible; and the incompatibility is removed by understanding from the word 'red', without excluding its primary sense, a horse to which redness belongs.<sup>35</sup>

*Jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* is that where a word by excluding a part of its primary sense conveys another part. This is adopted in the case of the sentences such as—'This is that Devadatta'. This sentence involves a partial contradiction in this that 'Devadatta' as related to past time and a different place (referred to by the word 'that') is identified with Devadatta as related to present time and a particular place (referred to by the word 'this'). Hence the words 'this' and 'that' discard a part of their primary sense, namely, the relation of present and past time and place, and convey the other part, namely, the person-in-himself.<sup>36</sup> The secondary signification is thus three-fold.

3. Signification based upon the knowledge of similarity of qualities: When the literal sense of a sentence is incongruous, then one of the words constituting that sentence conveys some other sense which has the same qualities that are present in its primary sense; and, this process is known as signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities. This kind of signification is adopted in the case of—'Devadatta is a lion'. Here since the literal meaning, namely, 'Devadatta being a lion' is discrepant, the word 'lion' signifies the person 'Devadatta', who has the qualities of valour, cruelty, etc.,—the qualities

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35. *ibid.*

36. *SS*, I, 156.



which are present in the primary sense of the word 'lion'. These qualities are secondarily signified by the word 'lion'.

Now, the question arises regarding the resemblance of secondary signification and the signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities, as in both cases alike one word signifies another sense, that is, the sense of another word. Sarvajñātman, following Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, explains the difference between the two by pointing out the characteristic feature which clearly distinguishes the two. He explains that a word has secondary signification if it signifies another sense connected with its primary sense. But as regards the signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities he states that a word has this kind of signification if it conveys another sense having the same qualities present in its primary sense.<sup>37</sup> As has been stated above, the word conveys the qualities present in its primary sense only secondarily.

So far the explanation of the three kinds of signification. It remains to see what kind of signification is adopted in interpreting the words *tat* and *tvam* as meaning Brahman and Ātman respectively. Sarvajñātman points out that the words cannot indicate Brahman-Ātman through primary signification. There is in the first place, the absence of media through which the words could convey their primary senses. A word conveys its primary sense through a genus (*jāti*), or act (*kriyā*), or quality (*guṇa*), or mode of relation (*sambandha*). It follows from this that the primary sense that a word conveys must have any of these four factors. For example, the word 'cow' signifies the object — cow

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37. SŚ, I, 172.

*vide—abhidheyāvinābhūte pratiter lakṣaṇeṣyate*

*lakṣyamāṇaguṇairyogāt vṛtteriṣṭā tu gauṇatā,*

*Tantravārtika* (Ānandāsrama Sanskrit Series, Poona), p. 354.



through the medium 'cowness' (*gotva*) which is present in the object — cow. The word 'cook' signifies a person who cooks through the medium — the act of cooking which is present in the primary sense, that is, a person who cooks. The word 'blue' in the expression — 'blue lotus' signifies the substance — lotus, through the medium — the quality of blueness which is present in the primary sense, that is, lotus. The expression 'a king's servant' signifies a servant of a king through the medium — the relation of being a servant to a king which exists in the primary sense—the servant. It is clear, therefore, that a word could primarily signify a sense only through a genus, or act, or quality, or mode of relation. Brahman-Ātman, which transcends both speech and mind, and which is free from all qualities has no genus, does not act, possesses no qualities and is related to nothing else. Genus, according to the Nyāya school, is eternal and is present in the objects of the same kind. For example, cowness is the genus that is present in all the cows. Thus genus for its existence requires many objects of the same kind. Brahman-Ātman, according to the Upaniṣads, is one without a second<sup>38</sup> and hence it cannot have a genus. The Upaniṣadic texts such as 'Brahman is free from parts and activity',<sup>39</sup> etc., and 'Brahman is the witness, and is of the nature of consciousness; it is absolute and is free from any quality'<sup>40</sup> deny the existence of any quality or activity in Brahman. Similarly the Upaniṣadic text 'Brahman is supra-relational'<sup>41</sup> denies any relation in respect of Brahman. Brahman-Ātman, therefore, does not have genus, or act, or quality, or mode of relation which are the media through which words convey their primary senses. It follows from this that Brahman-Ātman cannot be primarily signified by the

38. *Chān.*, VI, ii, 1.39. *Śvet.*, VI, 19.40. *Ibid.*, VI, 11.41. *Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 15.



words on account of the absence of media through which words could convey their primary senses.<sup>42</sup>

Another reason for holding that the words do not convey Brahman-Ātman is that there is no knowledge of the significative relation between the words and Brahman-Ātman. It is clear that a word (say) 'pot' could primarily signify the sense—pot, only when there is the knowledge of the significative relation between the word and the sense in the form 'This word is significative of this sense'. The significative relation of a word to its sense can be known only when the sense is known through perception or other proofs. But the latter function in respect of that object alone is comprehended by mind. Mind which comprehends only external objects cannot function in respect of Brahman-Ātman which is internal. It follows that, as Brahman-Ātman is not comprehended by mind, it cannot be known through any proof and as such the significative relation of the words to it cannot be known. And in view of this, it is clear that words cannot primarily signify Brahman-Ātman.<sup>43</sup>

From what has been said so far, it would be evident that Brahman-Ātman cannot be primarily conveyed by the words *tat* and *tvam*. Now it is to be examined whether it can be secondarily signified and, if so, what kind of secondary signification could be adopted. Sarvajñātmā holds that the words *tat* and *tvam* convey Brahman-Ātman

42. SŚ, I, 239.

*vide—pravṛttinimittasya durnirūpatvāt avācyaṭvam, taduktam—*

*dr̥ṣṭā guṇakriyājāṭisambandhāḥ śabdahetavaḥ*

*nātmānyanyatamo hyeṣāṁ tenātmā nābhidhiyate*, AS, p. 786.

*vide also : Bh. G. Bh., XIII, 12.*

43. SŚ, I, 240.



through secondary signification, and that too through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification (*jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā*).<sup>44</sup> The argument of Sarvañātman in favour of this view may be briefly stated as follows: a word can secondarily signify that sense alone which is invariably connected with its primary sense. In the sentence 'The hamlet is on the Ganges', the sense 'bank' is secondarily signified by the word 'Ganges' and that sense is invariably connected with the primary sense of the word 'Ganges', that is, the current of the Ganges. Similarly the primary sense of the word 'red' in the sentence 'The red (horse) stands' is 'redness'; and the word 'red' secondarily conveys the sense of horse to which redness belongs. And, in the same way the words 'this' and 'that' in the sentence 'This is that Devadatta' respectively convey through primary signification Devadatta as associated with present time and a particular place, and Devadatta as associated with past time and a particular place. They secondarily convey the person—Devadatta in whom there exists the relation to past and present time and to particular places. It is clear from this that a word secondarily signifies only that sense which is invariably connected with its primary sense. Hence in order to make any further analysis of what is secondarily signified by the words *tat* and *tvam*, it is necessary to find out their primary meanings.

The primary as well as the secondary senses of the words *tat* and *tvam* could be known only from the Upaniṣadic texts. The Upaniṣadic texts which convey the primary and the secondary senses are termed subsidiary sentences (*avāntara-vākyas*).<sup>45</sup> We shall first consider the subsidiary sentences that convey the primary and secondary senses of the term *tat*. The Upaniṣadic text—'That from which these beings arise, That by which the beings that have arisen are

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44. *SS*, I, 151.

45. See *SB*, pp. 26-32.



sustained, That into which they lapse back at the time of dissolution—seek to know That; 'That is Brahman'<sup>46</sup> conveys the primary sense of the word *tat*. This passage states that Brahman is the source of the universe. The primary sense of the word *tat*, therefore, is Brahman which is viewed as the source of the universe.

The Upaniṣadic texts such as 'Brahman is existence, consciousness and endless',<sup>47</sup> and 'Brahman is consciousness and bliss',<sup>48</sup> convey the secondary sense of the word *tat*. The words constituting these two sentences do not give us a complete knowledge of the secondary sense of the word *tat*. The author of the Brahma-sūtras prescribes<sup>49</sup> a method of gathering the unrepeatable words that are found in the Upaniṣadic passages that speak of Brahman. The words thus gathered amount to ten; and, they are: *nitya*, *śuddha*, *buddha*, *mukta*, *satya*, *sūkṣma*, *sat*, *vibhu*, *advitīya* and *ānanda*;<sup>50</sup> and these words constitute a sentence. Sarvajñātman points out that no additional essential feature is accepted in the case of Brahman apart from those signified by the words gathered from the other Upaniṣadic texts.<sup>51</sup> From this it is clear that the ten words referred to above convey the nature of Brahman.

Now, the question arises as to how these words convey the nature of Brahman. We have pointed out earlier that words could signify Brahman-Ātman not primarily but only secondarily. We have also pointed out that in order

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46. *Tait.*, III, i, 1.

47. *ibid.*, II, i.

48. *Bṛh.*, III, ix, 28.

49. *BS.*, III, iii, 11.

50. *SŚ*, I, 173.

51. *SŚ*, III, 323.

*vide*

*lakṣyaśya tadarthasya brahmaṇaḥ pratipādakāvāntaravartino' punar-uktarūpāḥ ete 'nitya' ityādi daśapadārthāḥ brahmatattva-paryavasitā-anusandhīyante*, *AP*, p. 172.



to find out the secondary sense of a word we have to find out its primary meaning. The discussion about the primary meanings of the words *satya*, etc., has a vital bearing on the distinction between the phenomenal entities and Brahman. In Advaita it is accepted that the phenomenal entities are only empirically real. But Brahman is unconditioned by the three divisions of time—past, present, and future, and hence it is absolutely real. Sarvajñātman accordingly holds that there are two levels of reality—one, empirical, and the other, absolute, and he posits the former to the phenomenal entities and the latter to Brahman. And he proceeds further to point out that the phenomenal entities and Brahman, owing to mutual superimposition, form a blend. This blend consists of yet another level of reality, which is distinguishable from the former two and which is also a blend of the empirical and the absolute reality. The interesting point about this result is that the primary sense of the word *satya* is neither the phenomenal entities, nor Brahman, but the blend of the two.<sup>52</sup> Now it is not difficult to see that this explanation is applicable as regards the primary senses of the remaining words such as *jñāna*, etc.<sup>53</sup> It is thus clear from Sarvajñātman's argument that the primary senses of the words *satya*, etc., are the blend of the phenomenal entities and Brahman.

The primary senses of the words having been considered, it remains now to examine their secondary sense. Out of the three kinds of secondary signification already explained, Sarvajñātman adopts the third one, namely, the exclusive — non-exclusive secondary signification. This method which is adopted in the case of the statement — 'This is that Devadatta', excludes a part of the primary sense of a word and conveys another part. Now, in the primary senses of the words *satya*, etc., there are two elements—the phenomenal entities which are insentient

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52. *SS*, I, 178.

53. *ibid.*, I, 179-84.



and Brahman which is sentient. The word *satya*, through exclusive—non-exclusive secondary signification drops the insentient element and conveys only the sentient part which is Brahman. And exactly similar consideration applies to all the other words. It should be noted here that the words *satya*, *jñāna*, etc., which secondarily signify Brahman convey it as of the nature of existence, consciousness, etc., and also eliminate their opposites, namely, non-existence, insentience, etc.<sup>54</sup>

Now, we shall consider and meet the possible objections to the view that the words convey Brahman through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification. It has been explained that the words *satya*, etc., exclude the insentient part of their primary sense and convey the sentient part. It might be objected thus: Why should we leave the insentient part and take the sentient part alone? Why should not the reverse be accepted? It is, therefore, necessary to point out some criterion for maintaining the position affirmed. Accordingly Sarvajñātman holds that a word could signify through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification only that sense which serves as the ground for the use of the word in its primary sense.<sup>55</sup> We have seen that the word *satya* conveys the blend of the phenomenal entities and Brahman—the blend which consists of a particular mode of existence. The ground for the use of the word *satya* in the sense of the blend is the existence present in the blend. But as this existence is derived from Brahman which is of the nature of existence, Sarvajñātman concludes that Brahman which is existence serves as the ground for the use of the word *satya* in its primary sense, namely, the blend.<sup>56</sup>

54. *SS*, III, 319.

55. *SS*, I, 185.

56. *yena kṛtaṁ yatkr̥taṁ tasminnarthe satyādisābale nirāḍhaḥ vācakatvena prasiddhaḥ tatraiva nimittabhūte paramārthasatyādisvabhāve asya satyādīpadasya lakṣaṇā*, *SS*, p. 147.

*vide also: śābale hi satyatā eṣaiva yat paramārthasamsargeṇa pratīyamāne tasmīn satyaśabdasaṅgati-grahaḥ*, *AS*, p. 692.



To state the same in other words, it is because of Brahman, the blend acquires a particular mode of existence and as such it becomes the sense of the word *satya*. Similar consideration applies to the other words also. Hence Sarvajñātman points out that the words *satya*, etc., could signify through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification only Brahman, as the latter serves as the ground for the use of the words in their primary sense, namely, the blend of the phenomenal entities and Brahman.

Another objection which is raised regarding the view that Brahman is secondarily signified may be stated as follows. It is said that a word could secondarily signify a sense which is known through other proofs as related to its primary sense. This is made out from the fact that in the sentence—‘This is that Devadatta’, the word ‘this’ secondarily signifies the person ‘Devadatta’ and this sense is known through perception as related to its primary sense—the person as associated with the present time and a particular place. Similarly, the word ‘that’ secondarily signifies the person ‘Devadatta’ and this sense is known through recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) as related to its primary sense—the person as associated with the past time and a different place. On this ground it is objected that if Brahman is to be secondarily signified by the words *satya*, etc., then it should be known through other proofs as related to the primary sense of the words. But, as Brahman is not cognized by other proofs, it cannot be known as related to the primary sense of the words. It follows then that it cannot be secondarily signified.<sup>57</sup>

Sarvajñātman proceeds to answer<sup>58</sup> this objection by contending that, while it is true that the relation of the primary sense to the sense which is to be secondarily

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57. *SS*, I, 99.

58. *ibid.*, I, 152.



signified should be known, it is not necessary that that relation should be known through proofs. He, however, does not elaborate this point. But, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his commentary explains Sarvajñātman's contention. He points out that Ātman is secondarily signified by the word *tvam* in the sentence *tat tvam asi* or *aham* in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi*. Here the primary sense of the word *tvam* or *aham* is the blend of Ātman and the mind. And its relation to Ātman which is to be secondarily signified is known by the self-luminosity of the latter.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, Brahman is secondarily signified by the term *tat* in the sentence *tat tvam asi* or *Brahman* in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi* and by the words *satya*, etc. The primary sense of the word *tat* or *Brahman* is Īśvara—the blend of Brahman—the non-dual consciousness and *avidyā*. The primary sense of the words *satya*, etc., is the blend of Brahman—the non-dual consciousness—and the phenomenal elements. The relation of the primary sense of these words to Brahman—the non-dual consciousness—which is to be secondarily signified is known through *tarka* in this form: the blend cannot have any manifestation unless it is superimposed on a self-luminous entity to which it is not really related. This self-luminous entity is known from the Upaniṣads to be the non-dual consciousness, that is, Brahman. Thus it is known through *tarka* that the blend which is the primary sense is related to Brahman—the non-dual consciousness.<sup>60</sup> It should be noted here that *tarka* is not an independent proof, but is only a help to a *pramāṇa*. Hence Madhusūdana Sarasvatī con-

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59. *mānāntaraṁ vināpi tadarthasaṁbandhitayā avagamamātreṇa sū (lakṣaṇā) sidhyati, sa ca avagamaḥ tvamahamādīpadalakṣye ahamkārādisākṣiṇi svaprakāśe tadbalaṭ sidhyati*, SS, p. 126.

60. *brahmādīpadalakṣyaṁ ca advayam, brahmādīpadavācyaṁ śabalaṁ vastutaḥ svasaṁsargaśūnye caitanye kalpitam, śabalatvāt, adhyastatvāt vā, śabalāntaravat rajatādivat iti tarkeṇa tatsaṁbandhitayā sidhyati iti na mānāntarāpekṣā*, *ibid.*



cludes that the words *satya*, etc., could secondarily signify Brahman as the relation between the latter and the primary sense of the words is known, though not through a proof. The significative relation of the words *satya*, etc., to the blend is, however, known through perception.<sup>61</sup>

Now, as regards the relation between the primary sense of the words and Brahman, an objection may be raised. And the objection is that as Brahman is supra-relational, it cannot have any relation with the primary sense of the words, and hence it cannot be secondarily signified by the words.

Sarvajñātman admits that there cannot be any real relation of Brahman to the primary sense of the words. But, he points out that this does not preclude the possibility of Brahman being secondarily signified, as there exists, owing to *avidyā*, the superimposed relation of whole and part between Brahman and the primary sense of the words, namely, the blend of the phenomenal entities and Brahman.<sup>62</sup> It is evident from this that Sarvajñātman maintains that, in order that Brahman may be secondarily signified by the words, there should be a relation between Brahman and the primary senses of the words. But he holds that that relation may be a superimposed one and need not necessarily be real. It may be added here that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī adopts this line of argument in his *Advaita-siddhi*.<sup>63</sup>

From what has been said so far, it would have become clear that the words *satya*, etc., secondarily signify Brahman. As regards this conclusion one may put the following question: Is there any difference in the sense secondarily

61. *SS*, I, 189.

62. *ibid.*, I, 204.

63. *na ca śuddhe saṁbandhābhāvānna lakṣaṇāpīti vācyaṁ, atātavika-saṁbandhenaiva lakṣaṇopapattē.....śuddhasyaiva sarvakapaṇāspadatvena śuddhe na kalpitasāṁbandhānupapattiḥ*, *AS*, p. 674.



signified by the words or not? If difference is admitted, then we have to accept that Brahman consists of diverse forms, and this conclusion is contrary to the teaching of Advaita that Brahman is unitary. If the difference is rejected, then the main criticism one would have to make on this is that the words *satya*, etc., are synonymous.

As against the dilemma put forth in the foregoing paragraph, Sarvajñātman holds that there is no difference in the sense conveyed by the words *satya*, etc. In fact, the secondary sense of the word *satya* would hold good, only if it is identical with the secondary sense of the word *jñāna*. If the two are different, then the former being different from consciousness would become insentient like pot, etc., and hence cannot be viewed as absolutely real. Similarly, if the secondary sense of the word *jñāna* is different from the secondary sense of the word *satya*, then it should be held as unreal like the horn of a hare and hence it cannot be consciousness. It is, therefore, clear that it would be reasonable to take Brahman as existence and consciousness only when the secondary sense of the words *satya* and *jñāna* is unitary. Since exactly similar argument applies to the other words like *ānanda*, *nitya*, etc., we have to take the secondary sense conveyed by the remaining words also to be identical. Thus there is no difference in the sense conveyed by the words *satya*, etc.<sup>64</sup>

There remains, however, the difficulty that the absence of difference in the senses conveyed by the words renders the words synonymous. Similar objection is raised as regards the words *tat* and *tvam* in the sentence *tat tvam asi* as the two point to the same object—Brahman-Ātman. And Sarvajñātman answers that objection by contending that, though the words point to the same object, yet they

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64. SS, I, 186-9.



are not synonymous, as their primary senses are different.<sup>65</sup> And this argument should be extended in the case of the words *satya*, etc. It follows then that the words *satya*, etc., convey the same object—Brahman; but they are not synonymous.

This part of the discussion may be summed up by saying that Brahman is secondarily signified by the words *satya*, etc., as eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, existent, subtle, real, all-prevasive, non-dual and of the nature of bliss.<sup>66</sup>

An objection may be raised to the conception of Brahman stated above. The objection is that the many qualities which are ascribed to Brahman as its essential nature are not so. Of course, the qualities of existence, consciousness, and bliss constitute the essential nature of Brahman. But the remaining qualities such as eternity, purity, etc., are not natural to Brahman. Whenever it is said that Brahman is eternal (*nitya*), pure (*suddha*), etc., it does not mean that eternity, purity, etc., are its nature; but the words only convey the absence of their opposites. And no quality involving the aspect of non-existence can be the nature of Brahman, as the latter is existent. On this ground, some hold that eternity, etc., are not natural to Brahman, unlike existence (*satya*), consciousness (*jñāna*), and bliss (*ānanda*).<sup>67</sup>

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65. SŚ, I, 161.

*vide also: śabdāparyāyatvaṁ sāmānādhikarṇyaṁ ca lakṣyaikyē'pi vācyabhedādūpapannataram*, SS, p. 149

66. SŚ, I, 173.

67. SŚ, I, 174.

*vide: brahmaṇo bhāvarūpatvāt bhāvarūpameva sadānandādikāṁ svarūpaṁ bhavitum arhati, na nityatvādikāṁ abhāvarūpam, virodhāt*, SS, p. 141.



Sarvajñātman merely refers<sup>68</sup> to this objection and he suggests<sup>69</sup> a doubt as to its validity; but he does not endeavour to refute the objection. Nṛsiṃhāśrama in his commentary has shown that there are no reasons in favour of the objection and strong reasons against it. He points out that just as the words *satya*, *jñāna*, and *ānanda* secondarily signify Brahman as of the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss, so also the words *nitya*, etc., present in the Upaniṣadic passages<sup>70</sup> secondarily signify Brahman as of the nature of eternity, etc. Moreover, if eternity, purity, etc., are not natural to Brahman, then the inevitable consequence would be that Brahman should be taken as transient, impure; etc.<sup>71</sup> Hence it should be held that eternity, etc., also are the essential nature of Brahman.

It order to complete the account of the nature of Brahman as set forth by Sarvajñātman, it is necessary to consider one more objection which is as follows: why is lordship (*aīśvarya*) not considered to be the essential nature of Brahman like existence, consciousness, bliss, etc.? There are certain Upaniṣadic texts which speak of Brahman as having lordship as its essential nature. The text—‘He becomes a lord’<sup>72</sup> declares that the released soul, that is, one who has realized his identity with Brahman remains, after the final fall of his body, in his true nature which is partless,

68. ŚŚ, I, 174.

69. *atra kecit-kila-sadbhūyāṁ asvārasyaṁ dyotitam*, ŚŚ, p. 141.

70. *nityaṁ vibhuṁ sarvagataṁ susūkṣmaṁ* (Muṇḍ., I, i, 6): *asnā-viraṁ śuddhaṁ apāpavidhaṁ* (Īśāvāsyopaniṣad, 8), *vimuktaśca vimu-cyate*, (Kaṭha, V, i), *ekamevādvītiyaṁ*, (Chānd., VI, ii, 1), *ityādiśrutibhiḥ nityatvādīnāmapī aviśeṣeṇa svarūpatvenāvadhāraṇāt*, TB, p. 192.

71. *nityatvādīnāṁ svarūpabahirbhāve svarūpasya anityatvādi-doṣa-prasaṅgaśca*, *ibid.*

72. Chānd., VII, xxv, 2.

See also ŚŚ, III, 154 and 156.



attributeless, and absolute lordship. Further the text — 'After the dissolution of the subtle and the gross bodies on the realization of Brahman, the released soul attains unconditioned lordship and thereby he is satisfied with his own self'<sup>73</sup> states that the released soul remains in his true nature which is unconditioned lordship. Hence it must be admitted that lordship is the essential nature of Brahman.

This view has also the sanction of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa and Śrī Śaṅkara. The former in the *Brahma-sūtra*, *parābhidyānāttu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhaviparyaya*<sup>74</sup>, affirms that lordship which is veiled by *avidyā* becomes manifest in the individual soul at the time of liberation by meditation on Brahman. It is evident from this that lordship is the essential nature of the released soul, that is, Brahman. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*—*kāraṇatvena cākāśādiṣu yathā-vyapadiṣṭokteḥ*<sup>75</sup> designates<sup>76</sup> the source of the universe, that is, Brahman as lord. On these grounds some hold that lordship also is the essential nature of Brahman.

Sarvajñātman rejects the view put forth in the foregoing paragraph, and he brings out the true import of the Upaniṣadic texts, the *sūtra* of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa, and the statement of Śrī Śaṅkara which are cited in favour of that view. He point out, to begin with, that the Upaniṣadic texts that are referred to above are merely recommendatory passages and they do not have as their import the primary sense conveyed by them. Lordship thus known from the recommendatory passages cannot be the essential

73. *Śvet.*, I, 11; See also *ŚŚ*, III, 155.

74. *BS*, III, ii, 7.

75. *ibid.*, I, iv, 14.

76. *atra tāvat jñānaśabdena pareṇa ca tadviśayeṇa kāmāyitr̥tva—vacanena cetanaṁ brahma nyarūpayat aparaprayojyatvena īśvaraṁ kāraṇaṁ abravīt*, *BSB*, I, iv, 14.



nature of Brahman. If it is urged that lordship, though known from the recommendatory passages, is natural to Brahman, then Sarvajñātman observes that the inevitable outcome would be that singing *sāman*, eating, and the creation of the universe which are known from the recommendatory passages<sup>77</sup> with reference to the released soul, should have to be accepted as natural to Brahman. If it is said that all these cannot be accepted as natural of Brahman on the ground that they are contrary to the Upaniṣadic text<sup>78</sup> which declares the unembodied nature of Brahman, then Sarvajñātman contends.<sup>79</sup> that exactly a similar consideration applies to lordship also. No doubt the text of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*—‘He is the supreme lord’ etc.,<sup>80</sup> conveys lordship with reference to Brahman. But later the text denies it by saying ‘Not this, not this.’<sup>81</sup>

It might be objected: Lordship is two-fold as primary and secondary. And the Upaniṣadic text ‘The self is not this, not this’, denies only the secondary lordship. The primary one, on the other hand, is natural to Brahman and it is not negated by this text.<sup>82</sup>

In reply to this as to the previous objection, Sarvajñātman observes<sup>83</sup> that in that case, it should be held that singing *sāman*, eating and creation of the universe are twofold as primary and secondary, and the Upaniṣadic text — ‘The self is not this, not this’ is concerned with denying only the secondary ones, while the primary ones are the essential nature of Brahman. If it is said that there is no valid reason to consider singing *sāman*, etc., as

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77. See Notes on *SŚ*, III, 160.

81. *ibid.*

78. *Mund.*, II, 8.

82. *SŚ*, III, 163,

79. *SŚ*, III, 161.

83. *ibid.*, III, 164.

80. *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22.



primary and secondary, Sarvajñātman contends<sup>84</sup> that this line of argument can be extended to lordship also. He proceeds to point out<sup>85</sup> that lordship does not admit of any distinction as primary and secondary. It is present in Brahman before the rise of the realization of one's self. But at the time of liberation it ceases to exist. And lordship spoken of with reference to Brahman at the time of liberation is mainly intended to praise the state of liberation.<sup>86</sup>

Another difficulty which Sarvajñātman feels in regard to lordship being of the nature of Brahman may be stated as follows: If lordship is accepted as natural to Brahman on the ground that the Upaniṣadic text mentions it with reference to Brahman, then as the characteristics of being the source of the universe and the witness of all actions are also mentioned by the Upaniṣadic texts<sup>87</sup> with reference to Brahman, they are also to be taken as the essential nature of Brahman.<sup>88</sup> If it is held that the Upaniṣadic texts which convey the characteristics of being the source of the universe and the witness of all actions with reference to Brahman do not have them as their import and hence they are not natural to Brahman, then Sarvajñātman contends<sup>89</sup> that the Upaniṣadic text that conveys lordship also does not have it as its import and hence it should not be admitted as natural to Brahman. He points out that the qualities of being the witness, cause, and the lord are similar in this that they are not the import of the Upaniṣadic texts. Hence these three should not be taken as natural to Brahman. If one is admitted, then all these three should be admitted as natural to Brahman.<sup>90</sup>

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84. *ibid.*, III, 165.

88. *ibid.*, III, 182.

85. *ibid.*, III, 169.

89. *ibid.*, III, 186.

86. *ibid.*, III, 170.

90. *ibid.*, III, 187.

87. *ibid.*, III, 184-5.



Sarvajñātman further emphasizes that the characteristics of being the cause and witness cannot be taken as the essential nature of Brahman on the ground that they are indeterminable by being dependent on something else. The nature of being a cause cannot be thought of except in relation to an effect, while the latter is never intelligible without relation to a cause. Hence these two are interdependent. Similarly the nature of being a witness and the nature of what is witnessed are neither admitted nor intelligible without a reference to the witnessed objects the witness respectively. Hence these two also are interdependent. And whichever is interdependent is indeterminable as either real or unreal. It follows then that as the nature of being a cause and effect, and similarly the nature of being a witness and the witnessed are interdependent, they are indeterminable.<sup>91</sup> In view of this, the nature of being a cause and witness cannot be natural to Brahman which is always real. By extension of this line of argument, Sarvajñātman holds<sup>92</sup> that lordship and the controlled beings are interdependent and as such both are indeterminable. Hence lordship cannot be the essential nature of Brahman.<sup>93</sup>

It might be objected that consciousness and bliss also cannot be considered as natural to Brahman, as the two involve a reference to the objects to be known and the objects to be enjoyed respectively, and as such indeterminable.

Sarvajñātman meets this objection by explaining the nature of *jñāna*. In the system of Advaita, *jñāna* is neither the mental state nor Brahman by itself, but a blend of both—the mental state or the *vr̥tti* inspired by Brahman

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91. *ibid.*, III, 189-190.      92. *ibid.*, III, 188.

93. *ibid.*, III, 193.



—Ātman. In *jñāna* thus understood, the *vṛtti* element is contingent, the other, namely, the spiritual element is eternal. Accordingly Sarvajñātman holds<sup>94</sup> that knowledge or consciousness is two-fold as eternal and transient. The transient knowledge which is mental state depends on external objects, while the eternal one is the essential nature of Brahman and is experienced at the time of deep sleep and liberation. The *Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniṣad* passage 'In the deep sleep state, the self sees (by being the witness), but it does not see (through sense-organs)'<sup>95</sup> clearly distinguishes the knowledge as eternal and transient by stating by presence of the immutable Brahman—Ātman and the absence of mental state in deep sleep.<sup>96</sup> And similarly, bliss is two-fold as eternal and transitory. The passage—'Verily not for the love of the husband is a husband dear, but for the love of the self is a husband dear'<sup>97</sup> etc., brings out the transitory bliss which depends on the conditions like husband, son, and others. The eternal bliss, on the other hand, is of the nature of Brahman and it is stated in the text—'Brahman is consciousness and bliss'.<sup>98</sup>

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that while existence, consciousness, bliss, etc., are the essential nature of Brahman, we cannot maintain the same view as regards lordship.

It now remains to inquire into the import of the *Brahma-sūtra-parābhidyānāttu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhavi-*

94. *ibid.*, III, 166.

95. *Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 23.

96. *SŚ*, III, 167.

*vide* : 'paśyanvai tanna paśyati' iti śrutyā sākṣādeva śatyamapi kṛtasthadrṣṭau buddhivṛttyabhāvākathanāt nityānityajñānavibhāgaḥ tātpar-yeṇo'ktoḥ, *S*, p. 704.

97. *Brh.*, II, iv, 5.

98. *ibid.*, III, ix, 28; See also *SŚ*, III, 168.



*paryayau'* which is stated to affirm lordship in the case of Brahman. The meaning of this *sūtra* as interpreted by Śrī Śaṅkara may be stated as follows: This *sūtra* is intended to refute the contention of the *pūrvapakṣin* that the individual soul is a part of Brahman and so shares its power of knowledge and lordship even as a spark and fire have alike the power of burning and should therefore be able to create the objects of the dream state with his lordship. This, the author of the *sūtras* refutes by pointing out that lordship is covered by *avidyā* and becomes manifest when *avidyā* is destroyed through meditation on Brahman. On this ground, it is held that the author of the *sūtras* admits lordship to be the essential nature of Brahman.

Sarvajñātman points out<sup>99</sup> that it is true that the author of the *sūtras* admits lordship in the case of Brahman, but he does so by adhering for the moment to the standpoint of the *pūrvapakṣin* and it is not his final view. Sarvajñātman adduces two reasons to arrive at such a conclusion. There is in the first place, the Upaniṣadic text—'Not this, not this', which denies lordship in the case of Brahman<sup>100</sup>. In the second place,<sup>101</sup> the *Brahma-sūtra*—*kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ*<sup>102</sup> states that the *Chāndogya* Upaniṣadic passage—'Brahman is the self. It is free from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst. Its desires come true, its thoughts come true,<sup>103</sup> etc., and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upaniṣadic passage—'That great unborn self which is identified with the intellect, which is immanent in the sense-organs, lies in the space within the heart. It is the controller of all,<sup>104</sup> etc., form one sentence and the qualities mentioned in each passage are to be gathered in the other. The *Chāndogya* text treats of the

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99. *SS*, III, 175.

102. *BS*, III, iii, 39.

100. *ibid.*

103. *Chānd.*, VIII, i, 5.

101. *ibid.*, III, 177.

104. *Bṛh.*, VI, iv, 22.



qualified Brahman, while the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, of the attributeless Brahman. This *sūtra* prescribes a combination of qualities for glorifying Brahman.<sup>105</sup> From this it is clear that the quality of being a lord conveyed by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text is similar to the qualities like having desire, etc., conveyed by the *Chāndogya* passage. The qualities of having desire, etc., are stated with a view to glorify Brahman. Hence the quality of lordship also is intended to glorify Brahman.<sup>105</sup> On these grounds, Sarvajñātman contends that the assertion of the author of the *sūtras* that lordship is natural to Brahman is only made from the stand-point of the *pūrvapakṣin* and not a well-grounded theory.

Another argument advanced to prove that lordship is natural to Brahman must be examined in this connection. And that argument is: Śrī Śaṅkara in his *bhaṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*—*kāraṇatvena cākāśādiṣu yathāvyapadiṣ-ṭokteḥ*<sup>106</sup> designates the source of the universe, namely, Brahman as lord.<sup>107</sup> And this would hold good only when lordship is natural to Brahman.

As regards this contention, Sarvajñātman points out that the word *Īśvara* is used by Śrī Śaṅkara to signify Brahman—the source of the universe, through signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities.<sup>108</sup> The latter is adopted in the case of ‘Devadatta is a lion’. Here the word ‘lion’ signifies the individual ‘Devadatta’ who has the qualities of valour, cruelty, etc., that are invariably present in its primary sense—‘a lion’. Similarly the word ‘*Īśvara*’ signifies Brahman which has the quality of independence that is invariably present in its primary sense—‘the supreme lord’. The important point about this

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105. *SS*, III, 178-80.

106. *BS*, I, iv, 14.

107. *aparaprajyātvena īśvaraṁ kāraṇaṁ abravīt*, *BSB*, I, iv, 14.

108. *SS*, III, 171.



result is that the word 'lion' is used with reference to the individual—'Devadatta' to convey the qualities of valour, cruelty, etc., present in him. Similarly, the word 'Īśvara' is used with reference to Brahman to convey the quality of independence present in it.<sup>109</sup> Hence Śrī Saṅkara uses the word 'Īśvara' to signify Brahman with a view to point out that the latter without depending on any cause, is the source of the universe. It might be objected that if the quality of independence is attributed to Brahman, then the latter becomes qualified (*saviśeṣa*). Hence Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out<sup>110</sup> that 'independence' means 'absence of dependence' and this refers to the substratum—Brahman. Hence Brahman does not become qualified.<sup>111</sup>

This part of the discussion may be summed up by saying that the Upaniṣadic text first affirms lordship to Brahman and then denies it by the words 'Not this, not this'. But the Upaniṣadic texts which convey Brahman as of the nature of existence, consciousness, etc., are not contradicted by any other text.<sup>112</sup> Hence lordship is not natural to Brahman, while existence, consciousness, etc., are considered to be its essential nature. Thus it is known that the subsidiary Upaniṣadic sentences that are affirmative in character convey Brahman as of the nature of existence, consciousness, etc.

So far the consideration of the nature of Brahman as conveyed by the subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts that are affirmative in nature. There are certain other subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts which convey Brahman as of the nature of existence, consciousness, etc.

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109. *yathā sinha ityukte śauryam lakṣyate, tathā īśvara ityukte svātantryam lakṣyate*, AP, p. 810.

110. *svātantryam—apāravaśyam*, SS, Part II, p. 253.

111. *atra īśvaraśrutilakṣitasvātantryasya śuddhātmamātratayā viva-kṣitatvāt na tena tasya saguṇatvāpattiḥ*, *ibid.*, p. 255.

112. SS, I, 193.



niṣadic texts which are negative in nature. The Upaniṣadic texts such as—‘Brahman is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long...It is neither air nor etheric space; it is unattached; it is without taste or smell, without eyes or ears, without tongue or mind,’ etc.,<sup>113</sup> and ‘Then there is the description of Brahman as Not thus, not thus’ etc.,<sup>114</sup> negate the phenomenal elements in Brahman. As the phenomenal elements are many, the unpeated words from the other negative Upaniṣadic sentences should be gathered in the negative text found in a particular section of the Upaniṣads.<sup>115</sup> Moreover, the things which are not negated by the words that are gathered together should also be negated; and for that purpose, the words which would convey the negation of the things that are not yet negated should be added to the negative Upaniṣadic sentences. The words found in the latter merely indicate the things to be negated and hence they are not exhaustive.<sup>116</sup> Unless the words which would negate all the phenomenal elements are gathered, there would arise the contingency of the negation of only limited objects in Brahman;<sup>117</sup> and hence the latter cannot be known as free from all duality.<sup>118</sup> So the negative Upaniṣadic texts like—‘it is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long...it is neither air nor etheric space; it is unattached; it is without taste or smell, without eyes or ears,’ etc.,<sup>119</sup> to which unpeated words gathered from the other negative Upaniṣadic texts are added negate all duality in Brahman and thereby indicate that the latter is devoid of any relation, quality, part, etc. It should be noted here that the negative Upaniṣadic texts merely negate the forms in

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113. *Brh.*, III, viii, 8.

114. *ibid.*, II, iii, 6.

115. *SS*, III, 317.

116. *ibid.*, III, 321.

117. *ibid.*, III, 318.

118. *tathā ca naikāntato niṣprapañcam brahma bhavet iti bhūvaḥ*, *TB*, p. 1004.

119. *Brh.*, III, viii, 8.



Brahman. They do not, like the affirmative ones, refer to some form and convey it as the essential nature of Brahman.<sup>120</sup>

Now, one may put the following question: what is the relation of the negative Upaniṣadic texts to the affirmative ones? As regards this, Sarvajñātman refers to the views of Maṇḍana and Padmapāda, and later sets forth his own view.

Maṇḍana holds that the negative Upaniṣadic texts are primary, while the affirmative ones are secondary. It is obvious that the negative Upaniṣadic texts only negate the world of duality. But, as negation is unintelligible without a substratum, the former refers to a substratum. The phenomenal elements cannot be conceived of as the substratum; for, they are altogether denied by the negative Upaniṣadic texts. Hence Brahman alone could serve as the substratum. Thus the negative Upaniṣadic texts, independent of the affirmative ones, refer to Brahman as the substratum of the negation of the universe. The important result about this point is that though the negative Upaniṣadic texts presumptively refer to Brahman, yet there is no need for having recourse to secondary signification in the explanation of Brahman as the import of the Upaniṣadic texts. But the affirmative texts which primarily convey only the blend of the phenomenal entities and Brahman should be taken as conveying Brahman only secondarily. On this ground, Maṇḍana holds that the negative texts are primary and the affirmative ones are secondary.<sup>121</sup>

It should be noted here that Maṇḍana does not state this view quite explicitly; but he should be taken to maintain such a view, as the latter is clearly deducible from his observation that—'the total negation of the world

120. *SS*, III, 320.

121. *SS*, I, 250.



(*prapañcābhāva*) is the absolutely irreducible minimum of truth that could be exclusively attributed to the Upaniṣadic teachings, having due regard to the fact that Brahman in some manner or other, is present in all kinds of cognitions.<sup>122</sup>

Padmapāda on the other hand, maintains that the negative sentences restate the sense which is presumptively known from the affirmative ones. It is obvious that the negative sentence—‘This is not silver’ restates the non-existence of the silver which is presumptively known from the knowledge of the shell arising from the affirmative sentence—‘This is shell.’<sup>123</sup> Similarly, the negative Upaniṣadic sentences restate the absence of duality that is presumptively known from the knowledge of Brahman as the sole reality arising from the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts. Sarvajñātman accepts this view by pointing out that it is commendable, faultless, and desirable.<sup>124</sup>

Sarvajñātman’s view regarding the relation of the negative Upaniṣadic texts to the affirmative ones consists in his criticism of Maṇḍana’s view put forth above. The view of Maṇḍana is not favoured by Sarvajñātman on two grounds. In the first place, the negative Upaniṣadic sentences convey only the absence of the superimposed universe and as such they are not capable of giving rise to the knowledge of Brahman as of the nature of existence, consciousness, bliss, etc.,—the knowledge which leads to liberation. The affirmative texts like ‘Brahman is existence, consciousness, and infinite,’<sup>125</sup> on the other hand, give rise

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122. See Mm. Kuppuswāmi Śāstri’s Introduction to *Brahma-siddhi*, p. xlii.

vide : *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 23 and p. 157.

123. *śuktikeyam ityeva nirākāṅkṣam vākyam, nedaṁ raiatamiti anuvādaḥ, Pañcapādikā*, p. 167.

124. *SŚ*, I, 257.

125. *Tait.*, II, i, 1.



to the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman—the knowledge which directly leads to liberation. Hence the affirmative Upaniṣadic sentences alone are primary to the negative ones.<sup>126</sup> Another ground for rejecting Maṇḍana's view is based on the import of the *Brahma-sūtra—tattu samanvayāt*.<sup>127</sup> This *sūtra* states that Brahman which is of the nature of existence, consciousness, bliss, etc., could be known only through the Upaniṣadic texts, because the latter have it as their import.<sup>128</sup> Brahman having such nature is conveyed by the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts alone and not by the negative ones, as the import of the latter is only the absence of the superimposed universe. Hence from this *sūtra* also, it is evident that Brahman could be known through the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages and hence they are primary and the negative ones are secondary.

Now, it may be asked: What is the function of the negative Upaniṣadic texts? Sarvajnātman, following the author of the *sūtras*, answers that the negative Upaniṣadic texts clarify the sense of the term *tat* in the text *tat tvam asi*. The author of the *sūtras*, in the aphorism—*prakṛtāitāvattvaṁ hi pratiṣedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ*<sup>129</sup> indicates by the word *pratiṣedhati* that the negative Upaniṣadic texts such as—‘Then there is the instruction, ‘Not thus not thus,’<sup>130</sup> etc., clarify the concept of Brahman—the sense of the term *tat*, by denying the material and the immaterial form superimposed on it. Hence the negative sentences are intended to clarify the concept of Brahman.<sup>131</sup>

It may be said that as the subsidiary texts like—‘Brahman is existence, consciousness, and absolute’<sup>132</sup> clarify the concept of Brahman by giving rise to its

126. *SS*, I, 253.

127. *BS*, I, i, 4.

128. *SS*, I, 261.

129. *BS*, III, ii, 22.

130. *Bṛh.*, II, iii, 6.

131. *SS*, I, 262.

132. *Tait.*, II, i, 1.



no need for the negative Upaniṣadic passages. Sarvajñātman points out that the negative Upaniṣadic passages are needed to confirm the knowledge of Brahman arising from the subsidiary Upaniṣadic passages that are affirmative in character. When it is stated that Brahman is existence, consciousness, and absolute, the possibility of its absolute nature is not attained unless there is the knowledge of the annihilation of all duality. And the negative Upaniṣadic texts annihilate all duality and thereby confirm that Brahman is absolute, that is, not conditioned by time, space, and objects.<sup>133</sup> On these grounds, the negative Upaniṣadic texts are assigned a secondary place, while the primary place is given to the affirmative ones. Thus Brahman is known to be of the nature of existence, consciousness, etc., and at the same time to be free from any quality and duality. When such is the case, the Upaniṣadic texts like — ‘Brahman is the creator of the world (*sarvakarmā*), He cherishes all (righteous) desires, contains all (pleasant) odours, and is endowed with all (pleasant) tastes’, etc.,<sup>134</sup> which convey Brahman as possessed of qualities are to be considered as primarily conveying the superimposed qualities.<sup>135</sup> The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* points out<sup>136</sup> that Brahman cannot be attributeless and at the same time endowed with qualities as it is opposed to experience. It may be said that Brahman by itself is free from all attributes, but by its association with a limiting adjunct, it acquires qualities which are real. This contention is not correct; for, the true nature of a thing cannot change because of its association with some limiting adjuncts. Redness in a crystal which is colourless is caused by the redness of a flower placed by its side and it is not real. Similarly the qualities in Brahman which is pure consciousness are caused by *avidyā* and hence they are not

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133. *SS*, I, 263.

134. *Chānd.*, III, xiv, 2.

135. *SS*, III, 288-289.

136. *BS*, III, ii, 11.



real. Of the two aspects of Brahman set forth in the Upaniṣadic texts we have to accept that which is attributeless (*nirviśeṣa*) as its essential nature. The other aspect of Brahman is only superimposed on it by *avidyā* and hence it is not real. This aspect, however, is mentioned for the sake of meditative worship.<sup>137</sup> It is thus clear that there can be no relation of the qualities of real nature to Brahman even through a limiting adjunct. Sarvajñātman, therefore, concludes that the possibility of intrinsic relation of qualities of real nature to Brahman is far removed.<sup>138</sup>

From what has been stated so far, it is clear that the import of the term *tat* in the text *tat tvam asi* is existence, consciousness, bliss, etc., and it is free from implying any quality.

So far, we have considered the Upaniṣadic texts which give us the knowledge of the primary and secondary senses of the word *tat*. Now we shall consider the Upaniṣadic texts which give us the knowledge of the primary and secondary senses of the word *tvam*.

The subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts—‘As a large fish swims alternately to both banks (of a river), so does this self move to both the states of dream and waking’,<sup>139</sup> and ‘As a hawk or falcon roaming in the sky becomes tired, folds its wings, and hastens to its nest, so does this self hasten for this state (of deep sleep), where falling asleep, he cherishes no more desires and has no more dreams’,<sup>140</sup> affirm that the self experiences the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. It moves by turns from the waking state to the dream state, from the dream state to that of deep sleep, from that again back to the dream state and so on. The experient of the three states is *jīva*. The pure

137. BSB, III, ii, 11.

138. SS, III, 282.

139. Bṛh., IV, iii, 18.

140. *ibid.*, IV, iii, 19.



consciousness which is constant in, and also the witness of, the three states is termed *Ātman*. And, *Ātman* associated with *avidyā* and body-mind complex is *jīva* who experiences the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. The primary sense of the word *tvam* is *jīva* who is ignorant, finite and immediate and is endowed with the characteristics of being an agent, enjoyer, etc.

The Upaniṣadic text — 'This self is identified with intellect, is present as the inner ruler of the senses of knowledge and action, and vital airs, and is immanent in the mind as self-luminous consciousness'<sup>141</sup> gives us the knowledge of the secondary sense of the term *tvam*. This text conveys the self to be self-luminous consciousness and it distinguishes it from the intellect, sense-organs, and vital airs by stating that it is *identified* with intellect, that it is *present* as the inner ruler of the sense organs and vital airs, and it is *immanent* in the mind.

The self, which is self-luminous consciousness, being identified with the intellect undergoes transmigration and also experiences the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. It moves by turns from the waking state to the dream state, from the dream state to that of deep sleep, from that again back to the dream state and so on. The spiritual element which is uniformly present in the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep which are variable is real. Whichever is variable is indeed unreal like garland, snake, and stick that appear on the rope.<sup>142</sup> Moreover, the intellect superimposed on the self sustains the three states. And the intellect associated with them is manifested by the light of the self. Hence these four factors, namely, the intellect and the three states are not natural to the self.<sup>143</sup> From this it would be clear that as the intellect is superimposed on the self, the transmigration and the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep which

141. *Brh.*, IV, iii, 7.

142. *SS*, III, 139.

143. *SS*, III, 137.



depend on the intellect are superimposed on the self and they are not real. It follows from this that the characteristics of being an agent, enjoyer, and knower pertaining to the self in the states of waking and dream are also unreal. Hence the self is pure consciousness free from agency, etc. And it is termed *Ātman*. The secondary sense of the word *tvam* is, therefore, *Ātman* which is pure consciousness, and which is constant in and the witness of the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep.

This part of the discussion may be summed up by saying that the primary sense of the word *tat* is Brahman which is viewed as the source of the universe. Brahman becomes the source of the universe only through *avidyā*, and Brahman as associated with *avidyā* is *Īśvara* who, on the basis of the Upaniṣadic texts, is admitted to be omniscient, absolute, and mediate.<sup>144</sup> The primary sense of the word *tvam* is *jīva* who is a blend of Brahman (*Ātman*) and body-mind complex and who is ignorant, finite, and immediate.<sup>145</sup> The secondary sense of the word *tat* is pure consciousness which is existence, consciousness, bliss, etc., and which is free from any quality.<sup>146</sup> The secondary sense of the word *tvam* is pure consciousness which is the witness of the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep.<sup>147</sup>

Now, we shall examine how the two words *tat* and *tvam* refer to Brahman and *Ātman* respectively. These two words give us through exclusive—non-exclusive secondary signification a recollection of the senses of Brahman and *Ātman* which are already known from the subsidiary Upaniṣadic sentences.<sup>148</sup> The relation of the primary

144. *ibid.*, I, 158.

145. *ibid.*, I, 159.

146. *ibid.*, I, 237.

147. *ibid.*

148. .... .. *prathamam avāntaravākyaebhyo'nubhūtayoh śuddhayoh jīva brahmaṇoh tattvamasyādivākye mukhyārthānvaṇupapattiyā lakṣaṇayā smaraṇopapattiḥ*, *SB*, p. 34.



senses of the words is incompatible in view of the contradictory attributes present in them. Hence recourse is had to exclusive—non-exclusive secondary signification. The words *tat* and *tvam* discard a part of their primary senses, namely, *avidyā* and body-mind complex respectively and convey the spiritual element of Brahman and Ātman.

It might be objected that secondary signification need not be resorted to in the case of the words *tat* and *tvam*, as the relation of their primary senses itself is compatible. Sarvajñātman rejects this objection by pointing out that even the entities characterized by unopposed attributes cannot be identical. For example, stick and ear-rings are unopposed attributes present in a person—Devadatta. These two attributes give rise to the knowledge of two qualified entities, namely, Devadatta as associated with the stick, and Devadatta as associated with the earrings. Sarvajñātman proceeds to say that these two entities characterized by unopposed attributes are not identical; for their identity would necessarily involve the identity of the attributes—stick and ear-rings, which is discrepant. When such is the case, Sarvajñātman argues, how could the primary senses of the two words characterized by contradictory attributes such as immediacy and mediacy be identical?<sup>149</sup> On this ground Sarvajñātman concludes that the two terms *tat* and *tvam* refer, through secondary signification, to Brahman and Ātman conveyed by the subsidiary Upaniṣadic sentences.<sup>150</sup>

The process through which the sentence *tat tvam asi* gives rise to the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman is explained by Sarvajñātman thus:<sup>151</sup> first there arises the knowledge that the words *tat* and *tvam*

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149. SŚ, I, 167.

150. *ibid.*, I, 237.

151. *ibid.*, I, 197.



stand in grammatical co-ordinate relation (*sāmānādhikarānya-sambandha*) to each other. This means that the two words which have similar case-endings and which are juxtaposed are intended to convey the identity of their senses. Then there arises the knowledge of the relation of the primary meanings of the two words as attribute and substantive. In expressions such as—'blue lotus' the relating of the primary meanings of the words does not present any difficulty, as they are not opposed to each other. Hence there arises the knowledge in the form 'The lotus is blue'. But in the case of the words *tat* and *tvam* the relating of the primary meanings presents a difficulty. For the primary sense of the word *tat* is Īśvara characterized by mediacy; while the primary sense of the word *tvam* is *jīva* characterized by immediacy. These two cannot be related as attribute and substantive on account of their inherent opposition. And to avoid this difficulty, the words *tat* and *tvam* are taken to mean through exclusive—non-exclusive secondary signification Brahman and Ātman respectively by discarding the contradictory features. This stage is described as the relation of the secondarily signified and the one that signifies. And the two words together convey the identity of Brahman and Ātman. It should be noted that the identity here is not the relation of identity that involves duality but what is known as *svarūpābheda* or identity-in-itself.<sup>152</sup>

There remains one important question, namely, how is the meaning of a sentence known? Two theories are put forward to answer this question, one known as *abhihitānvaya-vāda*, and the other, *anvitābhīdhāna-vāda*. Of these, the former is advocated by Kumārila, and the latter is the refined form of the Prābhākara's *anvitābhīdhāna-vāda*. These two theories may be explained successively as follows.

152. *yatra tādātmyam na sambhavati, tatra akhaṇḍārthatvāt, jīvat-veśatvo'pahitayoḥ tādātmyasambhavāt akhaṇḍārthatvam, nilo ghaṭaḥ ityātau tu tādātmyam sambhavati*, *Laghucandrikā*, p. 675.



The *abhihitānvaya-vāda* holds that the words through their inherent capacity give rise to the knowledge of their senses. The senses later give rise to the knowledge of their relation, namely, the sense of the sentence. Since words cease to function with giving rise to the knowledge of their senses, and since the sense of the sentence, that is, the relation of the senses of the words, must be based on words, this theory holds that words in their capacity as words give rise to the knowledge of their senses. The knowledge of the sense of a word is not *recollection* (*smṛti*); for, in that case we have to consider the word as one which gives rise to recollection (*smāraka*). The relation of the one that gives rise to recollection (*smāraka*) and the one recollected (*smārya*) known as *smārya-smāraka-bhāva* holds good between two objects, (say) elephant and its master. Here the relata are elephant and its master. The knowledge of one of the relata, namely, elephant gives rise to the recollection of the other relatum, its master. This becomes possible because there already exists the knowledge of the relation of the one protected (*pālya*) and the one who protects (*pālaka*) between the elephant and its master. This is the primal relation (*mūla-saṁbandha*) on the basis of which the relation known as *smārya-smāraka-bhāva* exists. In the case of the words and their senses, the *abhihitānvaya-vāda* holds that the function of the words rests in only giving rise to the knowledge of their senses. So, between words and their senses there exists no primal relation on the basis of which the *smārya-smāraka-bhāva* between them could exist. In the absence of any primal relation between words and their senses, there is no relation of the one that gives rise to recollection and the one recollected between them. Hence the knowledge of the senses arising from the words cannot be of the nature of recollection. It cannot be experience (*anubhava*) also; for, the sense conveyed by a word is known already. A word could convey its sense only when the significative relation is known between that word



and its sense. In order that the significative relation between the word and its sense may be known, what is necessary is that this sense must be known through perception or other proofs. So it is clear that while a word gives rise to the knowledge of its sense, the sense is already known and on this ground its knowledge is not experience (*anubhava*). Thus, according to *abhihitānvaya-vāda*, the knowledge of the sense arising from the words is neither *smṛti* nor *anubhava*, but different from the two. It is said that it is *similar* to *smṛti* (*smṛtisama*).<sup>153</sup>

According to the *anvitābhīdāna-vāda*, words themselves have the inherent capacity to give rise to the knowledge of the relation of the senses of words, that is, the sense of a sentence. This serves as the primal relation between words and the relation of their senses. The senses of the words also thus come within the range of this primal relation; and so the words on the one hand and their senses on the other become related of the primal relation. The knowledge of the words—the relatum, gives rise to the recollection of their senses—the other relatum.<sup>154</sup>

In order to account for the nature of the primary meanings of the words *tat* and *tvam*, these two theories are considered. The difference between the two theories

153. *abhihitānvayavāde padaiḥ svasaktivaśāt padārthāḥ abhidhīyante, na tu smāryante smārya-smāraka-saṁbandhātiriktaṁ mūlakalpanāpatteḥ, ekasaṁbandhijñānaṁ hyaṁparasāmbandhismārakam, na tu smārakatvameva saṁbandhaḥ, hastipakādiṣu tathā darśanāt,.....ajñātajñāpakatvābhāvāt na anubhāvakam, saṁbandhāntarābhāvōcca na smārakam, kiṁ tu śaktyā jñātajñāpakamiti smāraka sadṛśaṁ ityarthāḥ, smṛtyanubhavātiriktaṁ ca jñānaṁ pramāṇabalādāyātāṁ aṅgikāryameva, AS, p. 701.*

154. *padānāṁ anvayānubhavaajananasāmarthyameva śaktirityucyate, ekaikapadārtho'pasthitistu smṛtirūpā, na śaktisādhyā, ekasaṁbandhijñānādaparasāmbandhismaraṇasya hastipakādisādhāraṇatvāt, anvayānubhava-jananasāmarthyarūpasya ca mūlasambandhasya vidyamānatvāt, ibid., p. 702.*



involves the difference in the nature of the meaning of the words. Sarvajñātman points out that if *abhihitānvaya-vāda* is adopted in the case of the sentence *tat tvam asi*, then the words *tat* and *tvam* give rise to the cognitions of their primary meanings—the cognitions which are similar to recollection. But if *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* is adopted, then the words give rise to the cognitions of their primary meanings—the cognitions which are of the nature of recollection. Sarvajñātman extends this line of explanation to the secondary meanings. The primary meanings of the words cannot be mutually related, in view of their inherent opposition. So the two words through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification refer to Brahman and Ātman respectively. It follows from this that, if *abhihitānvaya-vāda* is adopted, then the words *tat* and *tvam* through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification give rise to the cognition of Brahman and Ātman—the cognitions which are similar to recollection. If *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* is adopted, then the cognitions arising from the words are of the nature of recollection.<sup>155</sup>

Having stated the difference in the nature of the meanings of the words in the two theories, Sarvajñātman proceeds to deal with the sense of the sentence. It will be remembered that in *abhihitānvaya-vāda* the meanings of the words convey their relation, that is, the sense of the sentence, while in the *anvitābhidhāna-vāda*, the words themselves convey the sense of the sentence. Accordingly, Sarvajñātman states that if *abhihitānvaya-vāda* is followed, then the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, that is, the sense of the sentence, arises from the knowledge of the secondary senses of the words *tat* and *tvam* and not from the words. But in the *anvitābhidhāna-vāda*, the words *tat* and *tvam* themselves convey the relation of their secondary senses. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that Sarvajñātman advocates the *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* as he

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155. ŚŚ, I, 384.



refers to it as 'our view'.<sup>156</sup> This view is preferred because here the words constituting the sentence gives rise to the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman and it is in consonance with the teaching of the Upaniṣadic sentence<sup>157</sup> that Brahman-Ātman could be known only from the Upaniṣadic texts.

From what has been said so far, it would be clear that the Upaniṣadic texts are valid in respect of Brahman-Ātman.

There are certain objections to this conclusion and they are to be examined now. The first of the series of objections of the validity of the Upaniṣadic texts is based on the nature of Brahman. The *pūrvapakṣin* contends that in ordinary experience, it is found that words signify only the existent objects which are cognized by other proofs. So a word depends on some other proof in giving rise to a knowledge of an existent object. He points out that Brahman-Ātman is an existent object and so it is cognized by other proofs. Hence it should be held that the Upaniṣadic texts depend on some other proof in giving rise to the knowledge of Brahman.<sup>158</sup> It follows then that the Upaniṣadic texts are exposed to the fault of losing their self-validity.

Sarvajñātman argues that it is deducible from the *pūrvapakṣin's* argument that the criterion for an object to be cognized by other proofs is its existence. He refutes this point by holding that the criterion for an object to be

156. *smṛtisamapadaajanyabuddhiyugmāt*

*paradrśi mohanivartanaṁ pareṣām*

*paradrśi padajasmṛtidvaye syāt*

*padayugalāt pramiteḥ samudbhavo naḥ, ibid., 1, 385.*

*vide: evaṁ ca na iti vadatā sākṣātkārasya upaniṣajjanyatvena brahmaṇaḥ svamate aupaniṣadatvasiddheḥ idameva jyāya iti darsitam, SS, p. 285.*

157. *Brh.*, III, ix, 26.

158. *SS*, I, 101.



cognized by other proofs is its possession of the qualities of colour, etc. As Brahman-Ātman is without qualities, it cannot be cognized by any proof other than the scripture. Hence the latter without depending on any other proof is valid in respect of it. Sarvajñātman suggests that another criterion for an object to be cognized by other proofs is that it should be conveyed by the words in empirical usage. It follows from this that as Brahman-Ātman is extra-empirical (*alaukika*) it is not cognized by other proofs. On this ground also, Sarvajñātman holds that the scripture, without depending on any other proof, is valid in respect of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>159</sup>

The second objection to the validity of the scripture is that it does not signify anything of value to man and hence it is not valid. It is well-known that attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery constitute the human goal. These two are to be accomplished by performing some activity like *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice or by refraining from prohibited activities like killing a brahmin, etc. And, again activity and abstinence arise from the knowledge that the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is the means to a desired end and as such it is to be achieved; and killing a brahmin is the means to an undesirable result and as such it is to be avoided. The Vedic texts—'*jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*' and '*brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*' give rise to such knowledge which leads to activity regarding *jyotiṣṭoma* and abstinence from killing a brahmin, and they in turn lead to happiness and to absence of misery. Hence the two texts are valid. The *pūrvapakṣin* points out that Brahman being existent, is neither to be attained nor to be avoided. Hence its knowledge is not helpful towards activity or abstinence which would lead to human goal. On this ground, he holds that the Upaniṣadic texts which give rise to the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman are not valid.<sup>160</sup>

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159. *ibid.*, I, 276-8.

160. *ibid.*, I, 112.



Sarvajñātman points out that this objection would hold good only if from the direct experience of Brahman arising from the Upaniṣadic passages, there does not result the highest human goal, namely, liberation. But it is known from the numerous Upaniṣadic texts that the sage experiences the supreme bliss that transcends all happiness. Sarvajñātman proceeds to say that it is not a blemish to our system that the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman does not prompt one to activity or desist from it. On the other hand, it constitutes our glory that the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, by annihilating *avidyā* which is the root-cause of passion and hatred that respectively prompt one to activity and to desist from it, leads to the highest human goal—liberation.<sup>161</sup>

The third objection to the view that the Upaniṣadic texts are valid in respect of Brahman-Ātman may be stated as follows. A proof is valid in this that it manifests the unknown object, that is, the object characterized by *avidyā* by removing *avidyā*. If the Upaniṣadic texts should be valid in respect of Brahman-Ātman, then it should be held that it manifests Brahman-Ātman by removing *avidyā* characterizing it. But as Brahman-Ātman is self-luminous, it is not characterized by *avidyā* and hence there is no question of the Upaniṣadic texts removing *avidyā* and thereby manifesting Brahman-Ātman. On this ground it is held that the Upaniṣadic texts are not valid in respect of Brahman-Ātman.

A connected difficulty is the following. Perception, etc., are valid by giving rise to the self-luminous knowledge in respect of the insentient objects to reveal them. But as Brahman-Ātman is self-revealing, there is no need for another self-luminous knowledge from the Upaniṣads to reveal it. Hence the Upaniṣadic passages are not valid in respect of it.

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161. *ibid.*, I, 301 and 315.



Sarvajñātman answers the objections set forth in the previous two paragraphs. He accepts that the Upaniṣadic passages do not give rise to the self-luminous knowledge to reveal Brahman-Ātman. But he points out that this does not in any way suggest that the Upaniṣadic texts are not valid. He maintains that Brahman-Ātman is the locus (*āśraya*) and content (*viśaya*) of *avidyā*, and the mental state arising from the Upaniṣadic texts inspired by the reflection of Brahman-Ātman annihilates *avidyā* and thereby Brahman-Ātman, which is self-luminous, manifests itself. Sarvajñātman, therefore, concludes<sup>162</sup> that the Upaniṣadic texts acquire validity in respect of Brahman-Ātman by removing *avidyā* present it.

Sarvajñātman next considers the fourth objection which is as follows. The innate nature of a sentence is to give rise to only a mediate knowledge. Hence the Upaniṣadic sentences also, in view of their being sentences, could give rise only to mediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. But as the latter is immediate, the mediate knowledge regarding it, arising from the Upaniṣads could only be erroneous. And on this ground, the Upaniṣadic texts are not valid in respect of Brahman-Ātman.

Sarvajñātman contends that it is not correct to say that the innate nature of a sentence is to give rise to only a mediate knowledge. He points out that whether a sentence gives rise to mediate knowledge or immediate knowledge depends upon the nature of the object concerned. If the object is mediate, then the sentence would give rise to only a mediate knowledge of the object. If the object is immediate, then, knowledge could be immediate. Here Brahman-Ātman is always immediate and hence the Upaniṣadic texts give rise to the immediate knowledge of it.<sup>163</sup>

162. *ibid.*, I, 107, 113, 319, 342.

163. *ibid.*, I, 123, 341.



Now we have to consider the fifth objection which is advanced by the followers of the Prābhākara school. They do not admit that verbal statements whether Vedic or secular can ever point merely to existent things. They limit their scope to the mandate or *niyoga* or *sādhya* or *kārya* and hold that the latter is the final import of the Veda. And assertive or descriptive sentences found in it are fully significant only when construed with an appropriate injunction or prohibition found in the particular context. The important result of this view is that the Upanṣadic texts like *tat tvam asi* which are not injunctive in character should be construed with reference to some action taught in the Veda, and they do not acquire independent logical value. Hence the followers of the Prābhākara school conclude that the Upanṣadic texts like *tat tvam asi* are not valid in respect of the existent entity Brahman-Ātman.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to be clear regarding what the Prābhākaras mean by *niyoga*. *Niyoga* is the sense of the endings of the imperative mood, potential mood, and gerundives present in the secular statements such as 'Fetch the cow', or in the scriptural statements such as *jyotiṣtomena svargakāmo yajeta*. In order that a *niyoga* may become significant, two elements are necessary and they are: (1) the person to whom it is addressed (*niyojya*), and (2) its content (*viśaya*). That is, a *niyoga* should indicate who is to obey it and what particular act one should do to obey it. The application of this principle to the secular injunction, namely, 'Fetch the cow' is clear. It is the servant that is to obey, and he fulfils the *niyoga* when he brings the cow. In the case of Vedic injunction also, the form *yajeta* consists of a root and a potential suffix. The potential suffix denotes the *niyoga* and the root points to the sacrifice as the content of the *niyoga*. It is this *niyoga* that is to be primarily achieved. And the word *svargakāma* refers to the person who is directed (*niyojya*). The *niyoga*, in order that it may be achieved, prompts



the *niyojya* towards its content.<sup>164</sup> When the content is performed, the *niyoga* is achieved and then the fruit ensues necessarily. The *niyoga* is not the means to the fruit; but it is only a necessary antecedent to it. The means to the fruit is the sacrifice which is the content of the *niyoga*. Unless the *niyoga* is first accomplished through the sacrifice, the fruit—*svarga* will not ensue. There is one point to be considered, namely, the exact nature of the *niyoga* in the secular and the scriptural injunction. In the case of the secular injunction mentioned above, the master's direction is carried out by bringing the cow. It is this act, that is, bringing the cow that is the *niyoga* here and the result follows directly from it. But in the case of the sacrifice in the scriptural injunction, the result, namely, *svarga*, is to be attained only in a future life which necessarily involves a long interval between the performance of the sacrifice and its fruit. It follows, then, that there should be something to link them together and it is the accomplishment of the latter that is signified by the suffix. Hence we must give up the idea that it is the mere act that is the *niyoga* as in the case of secular injunction; and we must assume an enduring thing which results from the sacrificial act and serves as the antecedent of the result. It is this additional element and not the mere act that is known to be *niyoga*. While in secular injunction, the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, and the gerundives signify the act which is the sense of the root and which is termed *niyoga*, in the Vedic injunction the *niyoga* is that which results from the act and which serves as the antecedent of the fruit—*svarga*. Both forms of *niyoga* are the same, for both alike prompt one to activity. The endings of the potential mood, etc., primarily refer

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164. *ibid.*, I, 424.

*vide* also : *svātmasiddhyanukūlasya niyojyasya prasiddhaye  
kurvat svargādikamāpi pradhānam kāryameva naḥ,*

*Prakaraṇapañcikā*, Śālikānātha, p. 190.



to *niyoga* which results from the act, that is, the sense of the root and which serves as the antecedent of the fruit (say) *svarga*. And the sense of the root which is termed *niyoga* in secular injunctions is secondarily signified by the endings of potential mood, etc., as there is the knowledge that it is related with the primary sense, that is, *niyoga* in the Vedic injunctions as its content. But it cannot be held that the *niyoga* in Vedic injunctions is secondarily signified and the *niyoga* in the secular injunctions is primarily signified; for the *niyoga* in the Vedic injunctions is not comprehended by any proof other than the scripture and so there is no knowledge of the relation of the primary sense (which is stated to be the sense of the root) with it. And as a word could secondarily signify only that thing which is known as related to the primary sense (of the word), *niyoga* in the Vedic injunctions cannot be secondarily signified. Hence the endings of potential mood, etc., primarily signify the *niyoga* in the Vedic injunctions and secondarily signify the *niyoga*, that is, the act which is the sense of the root in the secular injunctions.<sup>165</sup>

We must now turn to the contention of the Prābhākara that *niyoga* is the final import of the sentences. The secular sentences may be considered first. The Prābhākara points out that a word conveys its sense only as related to *niyoga*. In the well-known example—'Fetch the cow', the word 'cow' conveys its sense only as related to the *niyoga*, namely, the act of bringing. Hence he points out that the import of the sentence is *niyoga* which is the act in the secular sentences. He proceeds to say that in a similar way the words constituting the Vedic injunction also convey their senses as related to *niyoga* which results from the act, that is, the sacrifice, which is an antecedent of the fruit (say) heaven, and which is designated as *apūrva*, *kārya*, *sādhya* or mandate.

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165. *ibid.*, I, 139-140.



Certain objections to this view, however, suggest themselves. In the first place, if it is said that a word invariably conveys its sense as related to *niyoga*, then this view holds good as far as the word 'cow' in the sentence 'Fetch the cow' is concerned. But the word 'Fetch' cannot convey its sense as related to *niyoga*, that is, the act in secular injunctions, because there is no other *niyoga*, that is, the act with which the sense of the word may be connected. It might be said that the word 'fetch' conveys its sense and its relation to another *niyoga*, that is, act. Then the latter *niyoga*, should have been conveyed by a word. And that word in conveying this *niyoga* should convey it as related to another *niyoga*. And so on *ad infinitum*.<sup>166</sup> To this it may be replied that the word 'fetch' conveys its sense as related with the sense of the word 'cow'. But the difficulty about this view is that it is contradictory to the final conclusion of the Prābhākara that all the words convey their senses only as related to *niyoga* and not as related to an existent entity.<sup>167</sup> Thus the Prābhākara is forced to abandon the view that a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga*.

The Prābhākara, however, seeks to overcome this difficulty by pointing out that a word conveys the relatum of the relation existing between the sense of a word conveying existent entity—(say) 'cow', and a word conveying *niyoga* (say) 'fetch'. It is obvious that there exists a relation between the object—'cow', and the *niyoga*, that is, the act of bringing. And the object—'cow' and the *niyoga* are the relata of the relation. Now the Prābhākara points out that the word 'cow' signifies the relatum, (that is, the object 'cow') of the relation existing between the 'cow' and the *niyoga*. Similarly the word 'fetch' signifies the relatum (that is, the *niyoga* which is the act of bringing) of the relation existing between the cow and the *niyoga*. Thus the Prābhākara obviates the difficulty of

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166. *ibid.*, I, 345.

167. *ibid.*, I, 346.



accounting two different criteria for the signification of the word conveying existent entity and the one conveying *niyoga*. Hence he concludes that *niyoga* is the import of all sentences.<sup>168</sup>

Sarvajñātman holds that a word conveys its sense only as related to a different but congruous sense. This view does not involve any defect and as such there is no need to maintain that a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga*. He contends that if any contradiction is noticed when it is accepted that a word conveys its sense as related to a different but congruous sense not qualified by any attribute such as *niyoga* or the relatum of the relation existing between the sense of a word conveying existent entity and the one conveying *niyoga* (*kāryānvayānvayī*) then to obviate such a difficulty it is necessary to hold the attributes mentioned above. But no contradiction arises if it is held that a word conveys its sense as related to another sense and hence there is no need for any attribute.<sup>169</sup>

Sarvajñātman further points out that the Prābhākara holds that a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga* on the only ground that on hearing a sentence (say) 'Fetch the cow', there arises the knowledge of the sense of the word 'cow' as related to the act of bringing which is *niyoga*. Sarvajñātman argues<sup>170</sup> that in that case the Prābhākara should accept that a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga* which, in turn, is related to the knowledge and the intention of the speaker; for on hearing a sentence, there arises invariably the inferential knowledge of the intention and the knowledge of the speaker.

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168. *ibid.*, I, 130.

*vide also* : *kāryasya yo'nvayaḥ sambandhaḥ tadanvayini tadāśraye, kāryasya hi siddhenānvayaḥ siddhe kārye ca vartate, anvayasya dviniṣṭhatvāt*, SS, p. 109.

169. SS, I, 347-9.

170. *ibid.*, I, 350.



Sarvajñātman proceeds to say that this position cannot be accepted by the Prābhākara, because there would arise contradiction with the maxim arrived at in the *loka-vedādhikaraṇa*<sup>171</sup> in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. The maxim is that a word in the scripture does not convey a sense different from the one conveyed in ordinary usage. If it is admitted that in ordinary experience a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga*, which in turn is related to the knowledge and the intention of the speaker, then this position should be maintained in the scripture also for the reason stated above. But it cannot be maintained that a word in the scripture conveys its sense as related to *niyoga* which is related to the knowledge and the intention of the speaker; for the latter are not present in the scripture which is devoid of any author—human or divine.<sup>172</sup> Hence Sarvajñātman holds that the Prābhākara should abandon the view that a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga*.

Another difficulty which Sarvajñātman points out in the view that a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga* is that the Vedic text—*somena yajeta* which conveys a qualified injunction would become unintelligible. This sentence enjoins the sacrifice as associated with *soma* creeper. The association of the sacrifice with *somā* creeper would hold good only when it is accepted that the words *soma* and the root *yaj* are mutually related. But as the Prābhākara admits that all words convey their senses only as associated with *niyoga*, the word *soma* and the root *yaj* cannot be mutually related, as neither of them is significative of *niyoga*. And in the absence of the mutual relation between *soma* and the root *yaj*, there can be no knowledge of the sacrifice as associated with *soma* creeper. It follows then that the sacrifice as associated with *soma* creeper cannot be enjoined. Hence Sarvajñātman

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171. Jaimini-sūtras, 1. 3. 10/30-5.

172. ŚŚ, I, 351.



suggests<sup>173</sup> that if it is held that a word conveys its sense as related to another sense, then the word *soma* conveys its sense as related to *sacrifice* and *vice versa*. Thus there arises the knowledge of the sacrifice as associated with *soma* creeper and hence the latter, namely, the sacrifice as associated with *soma* creeper, can be enjoined. Sarvajñātman further points out that the view suggested by him is in consonance with the *bhāṣya* text of Śābara, which would become unintelligible otherwise. The *bhāṣya* text is: *yadā ekasmādapūrvam tadā itarat tadartham*.<sup>174</sup> This text means that in a Vedic sentence, the endings of potential mood, etc., signify *niyoga*, and all other words are subordinated to the sense of the root (*dhātvartha*) which is the content of *niyoga*. This would hold good only when it is accepted that the words convey their senses as related to another congruous sense. If it is held that the words convey their senses only as related to *niyoga*, then all the words would become subordinate only to *niyoga* and not to *dhātvartha*—the content of *niyoga*. In that case, the *bhāṣya* text referred to above would be contradicted<sup>175</sup>

Sarvajñātman next points out that *niyoga* is a pseudo-concept. The sense of the root itself which is known to be the means to a desired end, when viewed as to be done, becomes the sense of the endings of the potential mood, and the gerundives.<sup>176</sup> Hence Sarvajñātman holds that *niyoga* cannot be the import of the sentences. He affirms this view by pointing out that those who hold that *niyoga* is the import of the sentences cannot maintain the same with reference to prohibitory Vedic statements, as the latter are devoid of *niyoga*. The scope of the prohibitory Vedic sentences such as *brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ* is cessation

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173. *ibid.*, I, 352-3.

174. Śābara *bhāṣya* on *Jaimini-sūtra*, II, i, 1.

175. *SS*, I, 354.

176. *ibid.*, I, 364.



from longing for the fruit of the prohibited deed; and cessation is neither *niyoga* nor its content.<sup>177</sup> Hence Sarvajñātman concludes<sup>178</sup> that the prohibitory Vedic statements are accepted to be valid, though they do not point to *niyoga*. And, in a similar way the Upaniṣadic text like *tat tvam asi*, etc., though devoid of *niyoga*, are valid in respect of Brahman-Ātman by removing *avidyā* present in it.

It now remains to examine Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's objection to the validity of the Upaniṣadic texts in respect of the existent entity—Brahman-Ātman. According to Kumārila a verbal statement may point to an existent entity or something that is fit to be done. But he holds that in the scripture the statement points only to something fit to be done. Hence the followers of the Kumārila school hold that the Vedic texts are not valid in respect of the existent entity—Brahman-Ātman.

Now we have to consider the exact nature of the import of the Vedic texts according to Kumārila. In the secular injunctions such as 'Fetch the cow' (*gāmānaya*), the imperative suffix conveys the command of the speaker—the command which prompts one to activity. But in the scripture which has no author—either human or divine, the function of the endings of imperative mood, potential mood, and the gerundives is to prompt one to activity. And the function is known as *śābdībhāvanā*.<sup>179</sup> It should be noted here that the sense of the endings of imperative mood, etc., is *śābdībhāvanā*. In order that *śābdībhāvanā* may become significant, three elements are necessary, and they are: (i) object, (ii) instrument, and (iii) the subsidiary factor. Of these, the object is the volitional activity of a person regarding the object to be achieved, that is, sacrifice.<sup>180</sup> The instrument is the knowledge of the endings

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177. *ibid.* I, 401.

178. *ibid.* I, 404.

179. *ibid.* I, 387.

180. *ibid.* I, 388.



of imperative mood, etc., and the subsidiary factor is the knowledge of the commendation which gives rise to the desire for the performance of sacrifice. And this *bhāvanā* is conveyed by the endings of imperative mood, potential mood, and the gerundives.

The volitional activity which is the object of *śābdībhāvanā* is termed *ārthībhāvanā*. This also requires three elements referred to above to become significant. Its fruit is (say) *svarga*; its instrument is the principal sacrifice; and its subsidiary factor is the subordinate rites like *prayāja*, etc. And the *ārthībhāvanā* is conveyed by all the ten verbal endings. It is primary and the *śābdībhāvanā* is secondary.<sup>181</sup> The followers of Kumārila conclude that Jaimini and Śabara hold that the existent entity is subordinate to the one to be achieved, that is, *ārthībhāvanā* or volitional activity.<sup>182</sup> On this ground the followers of Kumārila hold that the Upaniṣadic texts are not valid in respect of the existent entity—Brahman-Ātman.

Sarvajñātman refutes this objection, and his arguments may be stated as follows. In the scriptural statements, the endings of potential mood, etc., convey the *śābdībhāvanā* which is their function. They should also be regarded as the productive factor of the *śābdībhāvanā*, as the latter is their function. But in the secular statements the endings of potential mood, etc., convey only the command proceeding from the person who utters the statements. So in the secular statements, the endings of potential mood, etc., are regarded neither as conveying the *śābdībhāvanā*, nor as its productive factor.<sup>183</sup> Thus there arises contradiction to the maxim arrived at in the *loka-vedādhi-karaṇa*.<sup>184</sup> Sarvajñātman, therefore, suggests<sup>185</sup> that both

181. *ibid.*, I, 383-90.

182. *ibid.*, I, 395.

183. *ibid.*, I, 396.

184. *Jaimini-sūtra*, 1.3. 10/30-5.

185. *ŚŚ*, I, 398.



in the secular and in the scriptural statements, the endings of potential mood, etc., convey the uniform sense, namely that a particular act is the means to a desired end, and the knowledge that a particular act is the means to a desired end prompts one to activity. Thus Sarvajñātman holds that the assumption of the concept of *sābdībhāvanā* has no basis. He further points out<sup>186</sup> that in ordinary experience there is no such thing as *ārthībhāvanā* different from the sense of the root. Although in cases like—*pacati*, *pacet*, etc., the *ārthībhāvanā*, that is volitional activity, is known apart from the sense of the root, yet it is not invariably so. For example, in the cases of *yateta*, *kurvīta*, etc., the sense of the root itself is of the form of activity and there is no such thing as *ārthībhāvanā* or volitional activity as different from the sense of the root and as conveyed by all the ten verbal endings.

Sarvajñātman concludes<sup>187</sup> that, on the grounds adduced so far, neither *niyoga* nor *bhāvanā* can be maintained as the import even in the ritualistic portion of the Veda. When such is the case, these two cannot certainly be the import of the Upaniṣads. Hence the import of the Upaniṣads is not *bhāvanā*. It follows from this that the Upaniṣads are valid in respect of the existent entity—Brahman-Ātman.

So far the arguments of Sarvajñātman regarding the validity of the Upaniṣadic texts have been set forth. Now, to complete this question, we have to consider one more objection, namely, that the Upaniṣadic teaching is stultified by the knowledge of duality arising from perception, etc. The Upaniṣadic texts convey Brahman-Ātman as absolute. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that perception and other proofs comprehend the universe characterised by duality. Hence the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman as absolute arising from the Upaniṣads is contradicted by the knowledge of the universe arising from perception,

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186. *ibid.*, I. 399.

187. *ibid.*, I, 400.



etc. This objection is met by Sarvajñātman and he points out certain intrinsic difficulties in holding that perception etc., stultify the Upaniṣadic teaching. And his arguments may be set forth as follows.

In the first place, Sarvajñātman holds<sup>188</sup> that perception, etc., comprehend only the external objects which are empirically real, that is, real until the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. But the Upaniṣadic texts give rise to the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman as absolutely real, that is, not conditioned by the three divisions of time—past, present and future. Thus there is difference in the scope of perception, etc., on the one hand, and the scripture on the other; and hence one cannot stultify the other.

It might be said: In the system of Advaita, all the proofs including the scripture are the transfigurations of *avidyā* abiding in Brahman-Ātman. When such is the case, it is necessary to point out some criterion for maintaining that the Upaniṣadic texts alone comprehend Brahman-Ātman and not the other proofs. Sarvajñātman, therefore, brings out the difference between the two, namely, scripture and perception, etc., by pointing out the characteristic feature which clearly distinguishes the two. The Upaniṣadic texts like the other proofs, are the transfigurations of *avidyā* present in Brahman-Ātman. But the spiritual element predominates in the scripture, while the element of *avidyā* predominates in the other proofs.<sup>189</sup> Hence *avidyā* serves as a defect in the case of perception, etc., and not in the case of scripture.<sup>190</sup> On this ground the scripture alone comprehends Brahman-Ātman, while

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188. *ibid.*, II, 103.

189. *pratyakṣaṁvidavacchinnaṁ ajñānaṁ pramāṇākāreṇa nivartate, tatra ajñānaprādhānyena cakṣurūdivivartatḥ, saṁvidprādhānyena vedavivarta iti bhūvaḥ*, SS, part II, p. 64.

190. SS, II, 102.



perception, etc., comprehend only external objects. Thus there is difference in the scope of perception, etc., on the one hand and the scripture on the other. Hence one cannot stultify the other.

Sarvajñātman further points out that perception, etc., cannot be considered as valid in the strict sense of the term. For, it is held that a proof is that which makes known the unknown object, that is, an object which is veiled by *avidyā*. This definition is not applicable to any proof except the Upaniṣads which have Brahman-Ātman as its object. For, it is always Brahman-Ātman that can be veiled; for that alone is luminous. Everything else is itself insentient and needs no external cause for being obscured. It follows from this that the Upaniṣadic texts alone make known the object—Brahman-Ātman which is characterized by *avidyā*, and on this ground it alone can be considered as a proof. All other objects except Brahman-Ātman are not characterized by *avidyā* and hence perception, etc., which comprehend them cannot be considered as revealing the hitherto unknown object and on this ground they are not to be treated as proofs in the strict sense of the term.<sup>191</sup> Hence Sarvajñātman concludes that perception, etc., cannot stultify the Upaniṣadic teaching.

Sarvajñātman then proceeds to say that as the cognition of difference is erroneous, there is no stultification of the Upaniṣadic teaching by perception, etc., that cognize the universe characterized by duality. To begin with, it is clear that perception gives us a knowledge of a mere object (say) cloth, and not even a trace of difference in it. It might be objected: Perception gives us a knowledge of the object (say) cloth as well as its difference in the form 'The cloth is different from (say) pot'. Sarvajñātman asks whether the difference which is cognized at the time of perception of the object—cloth is identical with the object

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191. *ibid.*, II, 8.



or different from it. In either view there are difficulties. The first alternative, namely, that difference is of the nature of the object comprehended is untenable on the ground that, while the notion of difference is relative, that of the nature of a thing is not so. We can cognize 'cloth' separately by itself, but not its difference from 'pot' without distinctly calling to mind that from which it differs, namely, pot. Owing to this disparity between the cloth and 'difference', they cannot be the same. Moreover, as difference is relative, it should be held as indeterminable also.<sup>192</sup> It might be said that cloth is different from itself. Sarvajñātman argues<sup>193</sup> that in that case the cloth would be torn into shreds and hence there cannot be the existence of cloth itself. He, therefore, suggests that difference itself is a pseudo-concept.

The cognition of difference is not valid on another ground that it involves the defect of mutual dependence. In the statement of difference of cloth from pot, cloth is known as *dharmī*, that is, as one in which difference exists. Pot, on the other hand, is known as *pratiyogī* or that from which cloth is said to differ. The concepts of *dharmī* and *pratiyogī* can be employed with reference to cloth and pot only when the difference between the two objects has already been perceived. But unless there is the prior knowledge that cloth is the *dharmī*, and the pot is the *pratiyogī*, there cannot be the knowledge of difference in the form: cloth is different from pot. Thus it would be clear that the knowledge of difference, and the knowledge of the *dharmī* and the *pratiyogī* are interdependent and as such the cognition of difference is to be held as erroneous.<sup>194</sup> On this ground also the Upaniṣadic teaching is not stultified by the knowledge of difference arising from perception, etc.

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192. *ibid.*, II, 105.

193. *ibid.*, II, 104.

194. *ibid.*, II, 106.



Another ground against the contention that the Upaniṣadic teaching is stultified by perception, etc., is derived from the absence of validity of perception, etc. What an object requires of a proof is that it should either dispel the doubt or contrary notion about it or it should give rise to its knowledge. Then only a proof can be taken as valid. But perception, etc., do neither the former nor the latter. If it is said that perception, etc., remove the doubt regarding the object concerned, then it is asked whether the doubt that is said to be removed is real or unreal or both. If it is real, then it cannot be removed. If it is unreal, then it is like the horn of a hare which is absolute nothing, and hence it need not be removed. And it cannot be real and unreal at once, for such a position violates the law of contradiction. Other systems of philosophy do not accept the concept of *anirvacanīya*, in which case it can be said that the proofs remove the doubt regarding the object—the doubt which is indeterminable either as real or as unreal. Similar argument applies to the view that perception, etc., give rise to the knowledge of the objects concerned. Hence Sarvajñātman points out that as the result of perception, etc., cannot be determined they are not valid. It follows from this that the nature of the objects of perception, etc., is *anirvacanīya*. Therefore, perception, etc., do not contradict, even through their objects, the import of the Upaniṣads.

Adhering for the moment to the stand-point of the *pūrvapakṣin*, Sarvajñātman concedes that perceptual experiences such as 'I am the agent', 'I am happy', etc., comprehend Ātman as characterized by duality such as agency and the like. In the same way, perceptual experiences such as 'The pot is existent' etc., comprehend Brahman which is of the nature of existence as characterized by the objective world. Perceptual experiences thus are clearly in conflict with the Upaniṣads. Sarvajñātman points out that, just as the subsequent knowledge revealing the true nature of a barren land cannot arise without



sublating the erroneous knowledge of mirage which arose earlier, so also the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman as absolute arises from the Upaniṣads only by sublating the knowledge of duality.<sup>195</sup> This principle of the subsequent sublating the earlier is known as *apaccheda-nyāya*.<sup>196</sup> And this holds where the latter cannot arise except as contradicting the earlier cognition as in 'This is silver' and 'This is not silver'. On this ground also, perception, etc. do not stultify the Upaniṣadic teaching.

From what has been said so far, it would be clear that the Upaniṣads convey the partless and the absolute Brahman-Ātman which cannot be contradicted by any other proof.

The sum up: the Upaniṣadic texts alone convey the true nature of Braaman-Ātman which, according to Advaita, is the sole reality and which, owing to *avidyā*, appears as God, the individual souls, and the phenomenal world.

### NESCIENCE (*MĀYĀ—AVIDYĀ*)

The Upaniṣadic text 'That from which these beings arise, by which the created beings are sustained, That into which they lapse back at the time of dissolution—seek to know That; That is Brahman'<sup>197</sup> states that Brahman is the cause of the universe. Now the question arises as to how Brahman which is pure consciousness and is attributeless could be the cause of the universe. It is in order to account for the rise of the universe from Brahman of

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195. *ibid.*, II, 113—5.

196. *Jaimini-sūtra*, 6-5-20, 54.

For details See Notes on *ŚŚ*, II, 116-119.

197. *Tait.*, III, i, 1.



this nature that the Upaniṣadic text 'The sages absorbed in meditation discovered the *creative power* which is present in Brahman and which consists of the three strands of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*',<sup>198</sup> introduces the principle of *māyā*. The expression *creative power* in the above passage stands for *māyā* which, as we shall presently see, is identical with *avidyā-ajñāna*. The Upaniṣadic text 'Know *māyā* to be the primal cause of the universe and *maheśvara* as possessing *māyā*',<sup>199</sup> speaks of *māyā* as the primal cause of the world. The word *maheśvara* in this text means pure consciousness, that is, Brahman-Ātman. We shall deal with this point at a later stage. It follows that Brahman-Ātman associated with *māyā* is viewed as the source of the universe.<sup>200</sup> This point which thus finds full expression in the Upaniṣads has been foreshadowed in the *R̥g-Veda*. A remarkably profound hymn of the *R̥g-Veda* speaks of ultimate reality as one and as associated with *māyā*. The hymn is as follows:

*na mṛtyurāsīt amṛtaṁ na tarhi  
na rātryā anha āsīt praketaḥ  
ānīt avātāṁ svadhayā tadekaṁ  
tasmād ha anyāṁ na paraṁ kiñcana āsa*<sup>201</sup>

This hymn means :

"Before the creation of this world, there existed neither the lord of death nor the nectar of the divine beings; there did not exist the sun and the moon—the marks of day and night. There existed only *That One* (*tadekaṁ*) which is free from activity and which is associated with *māyā*. Nothing existed apart from it."

When it is said that Brahman-Ātman associated with *māyā* is viewed as the source of the universe, we must

198. *Svet.*, I, 3.

199. *ibid.*, IV, 10.

200. *na hi tayā vinā paramēśvarasya sraṣṭṛtvaṁ arhati*, *BSB*, I, iv, 3.

201. *R̥g-Veda*, VIII, vii, 17.



understand that *māyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmyupādāna*) and Brahman-Ātman is the transfigurative material cause (*vivarto'pādāna*) of the universe. The difference between *prīṇāma* and *vivarta* is that in the former the cause and effect belong to the same level of reality, while in the latter they belong to two different levels of reality. *Māyā* and the world consist of empirical reality, that is, they are real till the rise of the direct experience of Brahman. These two, therefore, belong to the same level of reality. On the other hand, Brahman-Ātman and the world differ from each other in this that while the former is absolutely real, that is, not conditioned by the three divisions of time, past, present, and future, the latter is real only provisionally. These two thus consist of two different levels of reality. And it is with this in view it is said that *māyā* is the transformative material cause and Brahman-Ātman is the transfigurative material cause of the universe. This we shall explain in detail in the section entitled *The Phenomenal World*.

*Māyā* thus is the first cause of the phenomenal world and consequently corresponds to the *prakṛti* or the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhya system; but there is one vital difference which distinguishes the one from the other. The *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhya system is conceived of as the source of the universe by being independent of the Puruṣa or the spirit. But *māyā* in Advaita is considered as the primordial cause of the universe by being dependent upon Brahman. Śrī Śaṅkara notices this distinction in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and points out that the Advaitins do not follow the line of argument of the Sāṅkhya in accounting for the rise of the universe.<sup>202</sup>

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202. *yadi vyaṁ svatantrāṁ kāmicit prāgavasthāṁ jagataḥ kāraṇatvena abhyupagacchema prasaṅjayema tadā pradhānakāraṇavādam, paramēśvarādhinā tviyamasābhīḥ prāgavasthā jagato'bhyupagamyate na svatantrā,*

BSB I, iv, 3.



*Māyā* is superimposed on Brahman-Ātman and consequently it has the latter as its locus (*āśraya*) and content (*viṣaya*). On this strength it acquires a two-fold power, namely, *āvaraṇa-śakti* or the power of concealment and *vikṣepa-śakti* or the power of illusory manifestation. By the former it conceals the true nature of Brahman-Ātman, and by the latter it illusorily presents it in the form of Īśvara, *jīva*, and the world.<sup>203</sup>

This *māyā* is identical with *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. In his commentary on the *Kaṭho'paniṣad*, Śrī Śaṅkara refers to the root-cause of the world, that is, *māyā* as *avidyā*. He says: '*avidyā* is the seed, as it were, of the whole world. Before the creation of the world, *avidyā* has within itself in a latent form the entire world, as the tiny banyan seed has in it hidden the capacity to generate a banyan tree. It is like the warp and woof in Brahman'.<sup>204</sup> Further, in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* he says: the root-cause of the world is of the form of *avidyā*; it is designated by the word *avyakta*; it is dependent on *paramēśvara*; it is of the nature of *māyā*; it is the great sleep. And, in it the *jīvas* not aware of their identity with Brahman-Ātman rest.<sup>205</sup> These two passages clearly show that Śrī Śaṅkara treats *māyā* and *avidyā* to be identical.

To reinforce the conclusion, namely, that *māyā* and *avidyā* are identical, Sarvajñātman advances one argument which is as follows: *māyā* and *avidyā* or *ajñāna*, according

203. SS, I, 20.

204. *sarvasya jagataḥ bijabbūtaṁ avyākṛtanāmarūpaṁ satattvaṁ sarvakāryakāraṇaśaktisamāhārarūpaṁ avyaktaṁ avyākṛtākāśādināmavācyam paramātmāni oṭaprotabhāvena samāśritaṁ vaṭakaṇikāyāmiva vaṭa-vṛkṣaśaktiḥ*, *Bhāṣya* on *Kaṭha.*, III, 11.

205. *avidyātmikā hi bijasaktiḥ avyaktaśabdanirdeśyā māyāmayī mahāsuṣuptiḥ, yasyām śerate svarūpapratibodharahitāḥ saṁsāriṇo jīvāḥ*, *BSB*, I, iv, 3.



to the *Bhagavad-gītā*, are defined as having the common characteristics of concealing the true nature of Brahman-Ātman and being removable by its direct experience. The *Gītā* text 'Brahman-Ātman is veiled by *avidyā*; and so *jīvas* undergo transmigration'<sup>206</sup> states that *avidyā* veils the true nature of Brahman-Ātman. Another text 'Being veiled by *māyā*, I am not manifest to all.'<sup>207</sup> shows that the true nature of Lord Kṛṣṇa, that is, Brahman, the pure consciousness, is veiled by *māyā*. *Māyā* and *avidyā* have thus the common characteristic of veiling the true nature of Brahman. In the same way, the *Gītā* texts '*Avidyā* is removed by the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman'<sup>208</sup> and 'Those who realize My true nature (Brahman) transcend *māyā*'<sup>209</sup> show that *avidyā* and *māyā* have the same characteristic of being removable by the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. Sarvajñātman, therefore, concludes that *māyā* and *avidyā* are identical.<sup>210</sup>

We shall now pass on to the discussion regarding the proof for the existence of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* is directly manifested by the witness-self (*sākṣi-caitanya*).<sup>211</sup> In the state of deep sleep, *avidyā* is experienced and its experience then is indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) in character. Witness-self is only pure consciousness that transcends *avidyā* or the pure consciousness reflected in the modes of *avidyā*.<sup>212</sup> An entity which is directly manifested by the

206. *Bh. G.*, V, 15.

207. *ibid*, VII, 25.

208. *ibid.*, V, 16.

209. *ibid.*, VII, 14.

210. *SŚ*, III, 108-9.

Some Advaitins make a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* on the ground that *māyā* is rooted in *Īśvara* and *avidyā* in *jīva*. We shall in the sequel prove that *jīva* cannot be the locus of *avidyā*. Hence the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* cannot stand.

211. *sā ca avidyā sākṣi-vedyā*, *AS*. p. 575.

212. *sākṣiṇi-avidyā'pahitaciti*, *Laghucandrikā*, p. 545.  
*sākṣi ca avidyā-vṛtti-pratibimbīta-caityam*, *AS*, p. 575.



witness-self, like happiness or misery, does not require any proof for its existence. Moreover, *avidyā* cannot become the object of any proof; for, proof is that which makes known a thing that is unknown or characterized by *avidyā*. If we admit any proof for the existence of *avidyā*, then we must admit that *avidyā* is characterized by another *avidyā*. This would definitely lead to the fallacy of *infinite regress*.

Although *avidyā* as such cannot become the object of any proof, yet as regards its specific nature, namely, whether it is positive or not, there may arise doubt. And it is this element that is characterized by *avidyā*. And perception, inference, verbal testimony, and presumption aided by reasoning (*tarka*) go to prove that it is positive in nature by removing the *avidyā* pertaining to that element.<sup>213</sup>

We said that the experience of *avidyā* in the state of deep sleep by the witness-self is indeterminate in character. It cannot be referred to by any word then. But in the state of waking, intellect is superimposed on the witness-self and we have the experience of *avidyā* in a determinate form as 'I am ignorant'. This perceptual experience 'I am ignorant' is technically known as *sākṣi-pratyakṣa*. It is suggestive of the existence of *avidyā*. Aided by reasoning, it proves that *avidyā* is positive in nature. It might be said that this perceptual experience refers to mere absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) and not to *avidyā* or *ajñāna* as a positive entity. This contention is wrong. In the first place, it cannot refer to absence of all knowledge; because there manifests in the experience 'I do not know' the experient in the form 'I'. It might be said that it refers to the absence of the knowledge of a particular thing. This is also not correct; because negation presupposes the knowledge of the thing negated. If it is said that the knowledge of a particular thing is negated, then we must

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213. *ajñānasya svarūpeṇa ajñānāviśayatve'pi tadbhāvatvādikaṁ ajñānaviśayo bhavatyeva, tasya ajñānagrāhakasākṣyagrāhyatvāt,*  
*ibid.*, p. 565.



have the knowledge of the knowledge of a particular thing that is negated. It we have that knowledge, how could we have its negation? Hence the perceptual experience 'I do not know' involves a reference not to absence of knowledge, but to a positive entity.<sup>214</sup>

In the same way, inference also goes to prove the positive nature of *avidyā*. It is thus: when valid knowledge arises with reference to an object (say) pot, it gives rise to usages such as 'The pot exists', 'The pot is manifest', etc., like the light of a lamp which appeared first in the darkness gives rise to such usages about things already existing there. From this we could infer that prior to the rise of the valid knowledge of the object there existed some factor in that object which gave rise to usages such as 'The object does not exist, is not manifest', etc., and which is removed by the valid knowledge. And that factor must be different from the antecedent negation of valid knowledge; for, removal of the antecedent negation of knowledge by knowledge is not appropriate; for, knowledge in order to annihilate its antecedent negation should exist prior to its antecedent negation. But knowledge could arise only subsequent to the annihilation of its antecedent negation. Or, to state the same in other words, knowledge, being of the nature of the annihilation of its antecedent negation, cannot be the cause of the annihilation of its antecedent negation. In the light of this argument it should be held that the factor which is removed by valid knowledge is positive in nature. And that factor is *avidyā*.<sup>215</sup>

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214. *ahaṁ ajñāḥ iti jñānasya.....abhāvavilakṣaṇa-viśayatvaṁ siddham, ibid., p. 555.*

See *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, pp. 74-5.

215. *vivādapadaṁ pramāṇajñānaṁ svaprāgabdhāva-vyatirikta-sva-viśayāvaraṇa-svanivartya-svadeśagata-vastvantarapūrvakam. aprakāśitārtha-prakāśakatvāt, andhakāre prathamotpanna-pradīpaprabhāvat, AS, p. 562.*

See *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, p. 85. *vide also: ŚŚ III, 111.*



The Upaniṣadic passages — “The true nature of Brahman is concealed from the individual souls by *avidyā* (*anṛta*)”<sup>216</sup> and ‘The true nature of Brahman is veiled from the individual souls by an entity similar to mist’,<sup>217</sup> state that the true nature of Brahman is veiled by *avidyā*. Since *abhāva* cannot veil an object, and since *avidyā* veils Brahman, *avidyā* is not mere negation of knowledge but a positive entity.<sup>218</sup>

Apart from these, the positive nature of *avidyā* is indicated by the fact that the *jīva* is not manifest in its true nature of being infinite bliss. If there be no *avidyā* to obstruct, it would surely be manifest in its fullness. The non-manifestation of infinite bliss which is natural to *jīva* presumptively implies that infinite bliss is veiled by a factor which, for the reason stated above, must be positive in nature.<sup>219</sup>

It follows from the above that perception, inference, verbal testimony, and presumption aided by reasoning prove the positive nature of *avidyā*.

*Avidyā* is indeterminable. It is not real; for, if it were so, there would arise contradiction with the Upaniṣadic import that everything apart from Brahman is not real. It is not unreal, like a flower sprung from the sky; for, then it cannot serve as the transformative material cause of the world. It cannot be real and unreal at once; for that would violate the law of contradiction. *Avidyā* does not have parts; for, if it has parts then

216. *Chānd.*, VIII, iii, 2.

217. *Tattirīya Saṁhitā*, IV. vi, ii, 2.

218. *evam śrutayaśca.....anṛtena pratyūḍhāḥ iti śrutiḥ brahmajñāna-pratibandhakatvenānṛtaṁ bruvāṇā tādṛgajñāne pramāṇam*, AS, p. 570.

219. *jīvasya anavacchinābrahmānandāprakāśānyathānupapattiśca tatra mānam*, *ibid.*, p. 576.



it must be admitted that it has a beginning and so the reflection of the pure consciousness in it which is Īśvara must also be admitted to have a beginning; and, this is against the Upaniṣadic teaching. Hence it must be admitted that *avidyā* does not have parts. This conclusion presents another difficulty. If *avidyā* does not have parts, then it cannot be viewed as the transformative material cause of the universe. It is a matter of ordinary experience that only those objects having parts do serve as the cause of the effects. Hence *avidyā* cannot be said to be partless. It cannot be partless and possess parts at once; for, that would violate the law of contradiction. These difficulties do suggest that *avidyā* is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*).<sup>220</sup> The Ṛg-Vedic passage 'The cause of the world is neither an absolute nothing nor a real entity'<sup>221</sup> affirms that the cause of the world is something that is neither real nor unreal. This is exactly what is meant when it is said that the cause of the world is indeterminable either as real or as unreal.

It now remains to enquire whether this *avidyā* is one or many. It is one according to Padmapāda, Sarvajñātman, Prakāśātman, and others in their line of thinking. This admission raises one important question, namely, what is the material cause of the illusory appearances of shell as silver, rope as snake, etc. If it is admitted that *avidyā* is the material cause, then as it will be removed only by the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman — its substratum, there would be an unending appearance of shell as silver. And it is contrary to the experience of the removal of the appearance of silver by the knowledge of the true nature of its substratum, namely, the shell. We must, therefore, admit some cause other than *avidyā* to account for the appearance of shell as silver.

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220. See Kṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha's commentary on *SLS*, p. 79.

221. 'nāsadāsīt no sadāsīt' (*Rg-Veda*, 10. 129. 1) *ityādi śrutayo'pi anirvācyatve pramāṇam*, *AS*, p. 643.



Prakāśātman admits *avasthājñāna* or the seeming derivatives of *avidyā* as the cause of illusory appearances and they are present in the consciousness delimited by shell, rope, etc.<sup>222</sup> And, they are removed by the knowledge of their substratum, namely, shell, rope, etc. This theory is not to be confounded with the theory of Vācaspatimisra that there is plurality of *avidyā*. According to Vācaspatimisra, *avidyā*—the primal cause of the world is manifold. But according to Prakāśātman, on the other hand, *avidyā*—the primal cause of the world is one.<sup>223</sup> But both admit seeming derivatives of *avidyā* known as *avasthājñāna* to account for the illusory appearances of shell as silver, rope as snake, etc.

We shall now consider the locus (*āśraya*) and content (*viśaya*) of *avidyā*. The content of *avidyā* is Brahman-Ātman. The nature of *avidyā* is to conceal something. Concealment is possible only with reference to a self-luminous entity. Everything is itself insentient and needs no external cause for being obscured. Hence Brahman alone can be veiled and thus it is the content (*viśaya*) of *avidyā*.<sup>224</sup>

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222. *mūlājñānasyaiva avasthābhedāḥ, rajatādyupādānāni sūktikādi-jñānāni saḥādhyāsena nivartante, Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, p. 99.

*vide also: mūlājñānasyaiva dharmaviśeṣāḥ tatkāryāvachchinna-caitanyaniṣṭhā vā, Bhāvaprakāśikā*, p. 99.

223. *ekājñānapakṣe'pi mūlājñāna-avasthābhedarūpāṇi prātibhāsiko'-pādanājñānāni avaśyaṁ aṅgikāryāṇi anyathā sūktijñānakāle'pi mūlājñānasatvāt idaṁ rajatamiti pratītyāpatteḥ.....na ca ekājñānapakṣasya nānājñānapakṣādaviśeṣa iti śaṅkanīyam, pratijivam mūlājñānasyaiva bhedaḥ iti vācaspatimīśrapakṣasyaiva nānājñānapakṣatvāt, ;*

*Brahmānandiyabhāvaprakāśa*, p. 12.

224. *cinmātrameva avidyāviśayaḥ.....svaprakāśatvena prasaktaprakāśe tasmin āvaraṇakṛtyasambhāvācca, nānyat, tasyājñānakalpitatvāt, aprasaktaprakāśatvena āvaraṇakṛtyabhāvācca, AS*, p. 586



As regards the locus of *avidyā*, Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahma-siddhi* maintains that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* which veils the true nature of Brahman and thus has Brahman as its content. Maṇḍana thus differentiates between the locus and content of *avidyā*.<sup>225</sup> Vācaspatimisra also holds<sup>226</sup> that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*. Brahmanānda in his commentary on the *Siddhāntabindu* points out that according to Vācaspatimisra the locus of *avidyā* must be one from whom the true nature of Brahman is veiled. The true nature of Brahman is veiled from *jīva* who feels that Brahman is not manifest to him. Hence *jīva* alone is the locus of *avidyā*.<sup>227</sup> It is generally believed that this view is derived from Maṇḍana.

Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra—tadadhīnatvādarthavat* states: '*avidyā* is *parameśvarāśrayā*, that is, it depends on Brahman. And, in it the *jīvas*, having lost their identity with Brahman, rest'.<sup>228</sup> Vācaspatimisra while interpreting the word *parameśvarāśrayā* in the above passage states: Brahman is the *āśrayā* of *avidyā* not in the sense of its locus, but in the sense of its content. And, *jīva* alone is the locus of *avidyā*.<sup>229</sup> Ānandagiri, however, interprets the word *parameśvarāśrayā* to

225. *yattu kasya avidyeti, jīvanām iti brūmah, Brahma-siddhi*, p. 30.

226. *na avidyā brahmāśrayā, kiṃ tu jīve, sā tu anirvacanīyā ityuktam tena nityasuddhameva brahma, Bhāmatī*, p. 80.

227. *brahma nāstītyādi vyavahārah yadāśritaḥ, ajñānamapi tadāśritam.....sa ca jīvāśritaḥ iti ajñānamapi tadāśritam, Nyāyaratnāvalī*, p. 227.

228. See Foot-Note No. 205.

229. *jīvādhikarāṇāpyavidyā nimittatayā viśayatayā vā īśvaramāśrayate iti īśvarāśrayā iti ucyate, na tu ādhāratayā, vidyāsvabhāve brahmaṇi tadanupapattēḥ, Bhāmatī*, p. 297.



mean that *avidyā* has Brahman as its locus.<sup>230</sup> Suresvara considers the differentiation between the locus and content to be unnecessary and holds that Brahman is the locus and content of *avidyā*.<sup>231</sup> Sarvajñātman and Prakāśātman maintain the same view.<sup>232</sup> Thus as regards the locus of *avidyā*, Maṇḍana and Vācaspatimisra hold a view contrary to that of Suresvara, Sarvajñātman, and Prakāśātman.

The view that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* does not wholly agree with the view of Suresvara and others in his line of thinking, although it comes nearer to their theory. Sarvajñātman points out that the way in which *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* is inadequate is chiefly based upon the fact that *avidyā* presupposes the appearance of *jīva* and hence the latter cannot be conceived as its locus. No doubt the distinction of *jīva* and Īsvara is beginningless. Yet such a distinction can be made only when Brahman as such is not realized. One cannot have the notion of *jīva*, if one has realized Brahman. Hence the notion of *jīva* derives its existence from *avidyā*, although *avidyā* does not require the notion of *jīva* for its own existence.<sup>233</sup> The relation

230. *na vā tasyāḥ jīvāśrayatvaṁ jīvaśabda-vācyasya kalpitatvāt, tacchabdalakṣyasya brahmūvyatirekāt, Nyāyanirṇaya*, p. 297.

231. *ātmana eva astu ajñānaṁ; tasya ajñāno' smi iti anubhavadarśanāt; Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. pp. 105-6.

232. i. *SS*, I, 319.

ii. *na tīvadaññānaṁ āśrayaviśayabhedāpekṣam, kim tu ekasmin-neva vastuni āśrayatvaṁ āvaraṇaṁ ceti kṛtyadvayaṁ saṁpādayati:*

*Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, p. 213.

233. *yadyapi jīveśvaravibhāgādīḥ anādīḥ tathāpi sa na vāstavaḥ, māyikastu saḥ; advayaabrahmaṇavabhāsadaśāyāmeva bhavatīti tadaññānā-dīnasattāka eva; ajñānaṁ tu svastattāyāṁ vibhāgadisattvaṁ na apekṣate iti na tatprayojyam*, *SS*, p. 239.

*vide also: yadyapi ajñānavat jīveśvaravibhāgo'pi anādīḥ tathāpi tasya ajñānatānratvāt ajñānavibhāgayoḥ pauroḥparayamāpi anādīti kalpyate*, *S*, p. 274.



between *avidyā* on the one hand, and *jīva* and *Īśvara* on the other, is not the relation of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*), but is technically known as *vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva*. Thus as *jīva* is not logically, if not temporally, antecedent to *avidyā*, it cannot serve as the locus of *avidyā*.

Another difficulty which Sarvajñātman points out in the view that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* is as follows: *jīva* is only a blend of Brahman-Ātman and mind. If it is said that *avidyā* is rooted in *jīva*, it means that it is present in Brahman-Ātman and mind. It is well known that mind is the effect of *avidyā* and as such it is of the nature of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* cannot abide in itself, that is, in mind. It follows from this that *avidyā* cannot abide in Brahman-Ātman associated with mind, that is, *jīva*.<sup>234</sup>

One more argument advanced to prove that *jīva* cannot be the locus of *avidyā* is this: in the state of deep sleep, there is the experience of *avidyā*. The reminiscent experience of a person who on waking up from deep sleep says 'I did not know anything when I was asleep', and 'Being enveloped by *avidyā*, I was incapable of understanding anything' involves a reference to *avidyā*. If not, how could there be the reminiscence in the form 'I did not know anything'? On the authority of this reminiscent experience, it should be held that *avidyā* exists and is experienced in deep sleep. But the notion of *jīva* is absent in that state. There is thus the direct experience of *avidyā* even in the absence of the notion of *jīva*. And this would not be possible if *jīva* were the locus of *avidyā*. On this ground also it should be held that *jīva* cannot be the locus of *avidyā*.<sup>235</sup>

These difficulties have led Suresvara, Sarvajñātman, and others in their line of thinking to formulate the theory that pure consciousness (Brahman-Ātman) is the locus of

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234. *SS*, II, 209; III, 15.

235. *PP*, pp. 54-5.



*avidyā*. In the experience 'I am ignorant', the word 'I' primarily signifies the blend of pure consciousness and mind, that is, *jīva*. It secondarily signifies the pure consciousness. This view is held by the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*.<sup>236</sup> In the state of deep sleep only pure consciousness and *avidyā* exist; all other factors are provisionally merged in *avidyā* then. Direct experience of *avidyā* would not be possible without a locus; and pure consciousness alone serves as a locus then. It follows from this that pure consciousness (Brahman-Ātman) is the locus of *avidyā*.

The view that pure consciousness is the locus of *avidyā* appears to be contrary to the view of Śrī Śaṅkara. The latter in his commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the Upaniṣads, and the *Bhagavad-gītā* holds that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*.<sup>237</sup> Suresvara also holds that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*.<sup>238</sup> It may be added here that Vācaspati-misra might have derived the view that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* from these sources.

It has already been shown that *jīva* cannot be the locus of *avidyā* and that pure consciousness alone is the locus of *avidyā*. *Avidyā*, though present in pure consciousness, is revealed in the form 'I am ignorant' by the intellect which is the limiting adjunct of *jīva*. It is well-known that the nature of a revealing medium is such that what is revealed through it appears as though present in the medium itself. The individual 'cow' reveals the

236. *viśiṣṭavācākasyaiva ahaṁpadasya lakṣaṇayā niṣkṛṣṭāhaṁkā-racaitanye prayogāt*, AS, p. 604.

237. i. *kasya punarayaṁ aprabodha iti cet, yastvaṁ prcchasi tasya te iti vadāmaḥ*, BSB, IV, 1, 3.

ii. *avidyāviśiṣṭaṁ kāryakāraṇa'pādhirātmā jīva ucyate*, Bhāṣya on Brh., III, viii, 12.

iii. *avidyā kasya, yasya dṛśyate tasyaiva*, Bh. G. B., XIII, 2.

238. *Brhadāraṇyako'paniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*, I, vi, 298.



universal — cowness (*gotva*) as present in itself. The mirror which reflects the face appears to contain the face. The point that is of profound importance here is that the revealing media reveal the things to be revealed as present in themselves. In the same way, the intellect which reveals *avidyā* reveals it as present in itself and consequently in the consciousness delimited by it, namely, *jīva*. Hence there is the experience 'I am ignorant'.

The intellect does reveal *avidyā* because in its absence in the state of deep sleep, *avidyā*, though present in the pure consciousness is not determinately perceived in the form 'I am ignorant'. And in its presence in the state of waking, we have a clear manifestation of *avidyā* in the form 'I am ignorant'. Sarvajñātman points out that in view of the absence of determinate perception of *avidyā* in the state of deep sleep, Śrī Śaṅkara states<sup>239</sup> in his *bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniṣad* that even *avidyā* does not exist in the state of deep sleep. But in his *bhāṣya* on the *Chāndogyo'paniṣad* he holds<sup>240</sup> that *avidyā* exists in the state of deep sleep. Hence it should be understood that, when Śrī Śaṅkara says that *avidyā* does not exist in the state of deep sleep, what he means is that it is not determinately perceived in the form 'I am ignorant'. It follows from this that *avidyā* is experienced in the state of deep sleep, and pure consciousness alone could serve as its locus. The intellect reveals *avidyā* as present in itself and consequently in the consciousness delimited by it. The statements of Śrī Śaṅkara and Suresvara regarding *jīva* being the locus of *avidyā* should be interpreted in the aforesaid manner.

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239. ....anyatvapratyupasthāpakahetoḥ *avidyāyā abhāvāt āptakāmaṁ*, *Bhāṣya on Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 21.

240. *anṛtena hi yathoktena hi yasmāt pratyūdhā hṛtāḥ svarūpāt avidyādidōṣaiḥ bahirapakṛṣṭāḥ*, *Bhāṣya on Chānd.*, VII, iii, 2.



As Sarvajñātman concludes, the view of Śrī Śaṅkara is that pure consciousness is the locus of *avidyā*.<sup>241</sup>

Vācaspatimisra does follow the tradition of Advaita as represented by Śrī Śaṅkara and so we can confidently say that Vācaspatimisra speaks of *jīva* as the locus of *avidyā* only by courtesy as Śrī Śaṅkara and Suresvara do. On the contrary, Sarvajñātman is not in favour of extending the above line of explanation to the view of Maṇḍana, namely, *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*. The argument that is advanced to this effect is that Maṇḍana represents a stand-point in Advaita different from that of Śrī Śaṅkara.<sup>242</sup>

It follows from the above discussion that Brahman-Ātman which is pure consciousness is the locus and content of *avidyā*.

It remains to be examined how this *avidyā* is removed. *Avidyā* has Brahman-Ātman as its locus. It could, therefore, be removed only by the knowledge of the true nature of its locus — Brahman-Ātman. This knowledge is direct experience and the means thereof we shall set forth in the sequel. The knowledge of Brahman, which is the contrary of *avidyā*, is not pure consciousness as such, but it is the pure consciousness reflected in the mental mode arising from the Upaniṣadic texts. The mental mode inspired by the reflection of pure consciousness which is contrary of *avidyā* is not the locus of *avidyā*; and, pure consciousness which is the locus of *avidyā* is not the contrary of *avidyā*; on the other hand, it is its witness.<sup>243</sup>

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241. *bhagavatpādiye darśane pratyagātmana eva jñānitvaṁ ajñānitvaṁ ca*, PP, p. 69.

242. SS, II, 174.

243. *ajñānavirodhi jñānaṁ hi na'caitanyaṁūtram, kiṁ tu vṛtti-pratibimbam, tacca na avidyāśrayaḥ, yacca avidyāśrayaḥ tacca na ajñānavirodhi* AS, p. 577.



Now we shall consider the nature of the removal of *avidyā* (*avidyā-nivṛtti*). There are three views regarding this; and they are: (1) it is identical with Brahman-Ātman, (2) it is different from Brahman-Ātman, and yet it is not *anirvacanīya*, but of a fifth kind (*pañcama-prakāra*), and (3) it is identical with the direct experience of Brahman. Sarvajñātman deals with the first two views only. We shall, however, examine these views more closely.

We shall begin with the second view, namely, that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is different from Brahman-Ātman, and yet it is not *anirvacanīya*, but of a fifth kind (*pañcama-prakāra*), as its rejection leads us to the adoption of the first view. According to the second view, *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not real; for, if it were so, then it would be a real entity other than Brahman and this would go against the spirit of Advaita that Brahman alone is real. It cannot be unreal; for, if it were so, then it would be an absolute nothing like a flower sprung from the sky and hence it cannot be attained at all. It cannot be real and unreal at once, for that would violate the law of contradiction. It cannot be indeterminable; for, the existence of an indeterminable object is based upon *avidyā*. If *avidyā-nivṛtti* were said to be indeterminable, then it must be admitted that its existence depends upon *avidyā*. But *avidyā* and its removal (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) cannot co-exist. On this ground it is held that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is of a fifth kind. And this view is generally associated with Vimuktātman.<sup>244</sup>

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī criticises the above view on the following ground. It is said that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not of the nature of Brahman-Ātman, and it is different from it. Hence in order that *avidyā-nivṛtti* may manifest, what is

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244. *sat-asat-sadasat-anirvacanīya-prakārebhyaḥ hi anyaparakāraiva ajñānasya nivṛttiriyukā, Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 85.

See also: *SS*, IV, 13-14.







is the manifestation of *avidyā*. Keeping this in view, it is said by courtesy that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is achieved by the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>246</sup>

It might be objected: Brahman-Ātman is always existent. Hence the expression—*avidyā-nivṛtti* could apply to it even at the time of empirical existence, that is, when *avidyā* exists. Sarvajñātman, refutes this objection by contending that the ground for the use of the expression—*avidyā-nivṛtti* in Brahman-Ātman is the mental state which arises from the major texts of the Upaniṣads with reference to Brahman-Ātman. As this mental state is not present at the time of empirical existence, that is, when *avidyā* exists, the expression—*avidyā-nivṛtti* does not signify Brahman-Ātman then.<sup>247</sup> The word *nivṛtti* no doubt conveys the sense of absence. But when compounded with the other word, namely, *avidyā*, it signifies Brahman-Ātman through the medium—the mental state in the form of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>248</sup>

The view that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is identical with Brahman-Ātman is maintained by Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Haristuti* wherein he says that Brahman (Hari) is of the nature of the annihilation of *avidyā*—the cause of the world.<sup>249</sup>

The third view is that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is identical with the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. The latter is the annihilating factor of *avidyā*. Apart from the rise of the annihilating factor, it is not intelligible to hold anything like the annihilation of a thing. Removal of darkness does not mean anything more than the rise of light that

246. *jñānābhāve ajñānānuvṛttiḥ, jñānadaśayām tu na tadanuvṛttiḥ, ityetaṇvataiva avidyānivṛtteḥ jñānasādhya-topacārāt, taduktam ācāryaiḥ: tat kaivalyaṁ ataḥ sādhyam upacārāt pracakṣate*, TB, p. 1061.

247. SS, IV, 19.

248. *ibid.*, IV, 22.

249. *taṁ saṁsāradvāntavināśam harimīde*



removes darkness. Pratyagsvarūpa in his commentary *Nayanaprasādinī* on the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha<sup>250</sup> and Maṇḍana in his *Brahma-siddhi*<sup>251</sup> favour this view of *avidyā-nivṛtti*. It may be added here that the Naiyāyikas also must subscribe to such a view. We shall deal with this point in detail.

Of the many causes that contribute to the origination of a pot the most important cause is the antecedent non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭa-prāgabhāva*). So according to the Nyāya school, pot is the effect of its non-existence. That school further holds that pot which is created is of the nature of the annihilation of its non-existence. *Ghaṭa* is *ghaṭapragabhāva-kārya*; and it is admitted to be of the nature of *ghaṭapragabhāva-dhvaṁsa*. Similarly *jñāna* is only a mental state. Mind is an effect of *avidyā*. Hence the mental state which is *jñāna* is also the effect of *avidyā*. *Jñāna* is thus *avidyā-kārya*; and it is intelligible to hold that it is of the nature of *avidyā-nivṛtti*. This view is advocated by Dr Rāma Varma Parīkṣit — the most noteworthy and authentic exponent of Nyāya.<sup>252</sup>

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who examines all the three views on *avidyā-nivṛtti* in his *Advaita-siddhi* dismisses the second view, namely, that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is of a fifth kind, by saying that this view is formulated to satisfy the aspirants of average intellect. And, he establishes the other two views.<sup>253</sup>

250. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 259.

251. *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 119.

252. *ghaṭapragabhāvakāryasya ghaṭasya taddhvaṁsarūpatayā naiyāyika-irāṅgīkṛtatvāt ajñānakāryasyāpi jñānasya taddhvaṁsarūpatvaṁ sūpa-pannam iti śrī parīkṣinmahārājāḥ, Brahmānandīyabhāvaprakāśa*, p. 12.

253. *tasmāt ajñānahūniḥ ātmasvarūpaṁ, tadākārā vṛttirveti siddham; ye tu pañcama-prakārādīpakṣāḥ, te tu mandamati vyutpādanārthā iti.....*; *AS*, p. 885.



The foregoing discussion may be summarized as follows:

*Avidyā*, which is identical with *māyā*, is the primal cause of the world; it is beginningless and indeterminable. It consists of the three strands of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. It has two powers known as *āvaraṇa-śakti* and *vikṣepa-śakti*. It is positive in nature and it is not mere absence of knowledge. It has Brahman-Ātman — the pure consciousness as its locus and content; and, it is removable by the direct experience of the true nature of its substratum — Brahman-Ātman.

### SUPERIMPOSITION (*ADHYĀSA*)

*Avidyā* which is superimposed on Brahman makes the latter appear as *Īśvara*, *jīva*, and the world. The conception of superimposition is thus an essential part of the Advaitic theory.

Śrī Śaṅkara prefaces his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* with an exposition of superimposition of the phenomenal elements beginning from mind and their characteristic attributes on Brahman, and Brahman and its nature<sup>254</sup> on the phenomenal elements. Although the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* does not state the concept of superimposition so explicitly, yet he should be taken to presume it. According to the *Brahma-sūtra* — *athā'to brahmajijñāsā, jñāna* or the direct experience of Brahman is the means to the attainment of liberation which is only the removal of bondage pertaining to *jīva*. This bondage consists of the characteristics such as agency, finitude, etc. If, however, the bondage were real, *jñāna* would not annihilate it, as it

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254. *ānando viśayānubhavaḥ nityatvaṁ ceti santi dharmāḥ aprthakte'pi caitanyāt prthagiva avabhāsante, Pañcapādikā*, p. 23.

*aprthakte'pi caitanyāt prthagiva avabhāsante — antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttiyupādau nāneva avabhāsante, Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, p. 60.



could remove only that which is not real. This suggests that bondage is not real, but only appears in *jīva* whose true nature is Brahman. It is the appearance of something in a locus where it does not exist that is known as superimposition. It is on the supposition that bondage is superimposed and as such not real, that the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* should have composed the first aphorism.

Now the question arises: What is superimposition as conceived by the Advaitins? Śrī Śaṅkara in the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* frames the definition of *adhyāsa* as follows:

*smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*

*Adhyāsa* is the knowledge (*avabhāsaḥ*) of a particular thing (say) silver in a locus (say) shell where it does not exist (*paratra*). The content of knowledge, that is, silver has originally been seen elsewhere (*pūrvadr̥ṣṭa*). The cognition of silver here is similar to recollection (*smṛtirūpa*), as the object — silver, unlike an object that is remembered, is presented in the cognition 'This is silver', and it is therefore not exactly what is remembered, but only *similar* to what is remembered. The thing that is remembered does not exist at the time of remembering it. Similarly, at the time of the erroneous cognition of silver, silver does not really exist in the locus in which it appears.

The object, namely, silver cannot be real; for, if it were so, it would not be sublated afterwards. Nor can it be unreal; for, in that case it would never have been presented in the cognition 'This is silver'. It cannot be real and unreal at once; for, it is a self-discrepant notion. Thus as the object of the erroneous cognition is not characterisable either as real, or unreal, or real and unreal at once, it is termed *anirvacanīya*. It is also said to be *prātibhāsika* in the sense that it is coterminous with its presentation in cognition. The locus of superimposition, on the other hand, is real, that is, it has empirical reality



(*vyāvahārika-satyatva*). *Adhyāsa*, therefore, is the cognition of an object which is less real than the substratum in which it appears. It is otherwise termed *bhrama* or erroneous cognition.

The erroneous cognition of shell as silver is occasional (*kādācitka*), and hence its material cause must be referred to. The latter must have the same level of reality as silver. And that cause is *avidyā* present in Brahman-Ātman delimited by the true nature of the object (shell) that is misapprehended.

Apart from the material cause, the efficient cause also is necessary for the erroneous cognition of shell as silver. There are four factors which serve as the efficient cause; and they are: (i) defect in the instrument of valid knowledge, like defective eye-sight, (ii) defect in the object of erroneous cognition, (iii) the previous experience of silver, and (iv) a knowledge of the general nature alone of the substrate without a knowledge of its particular character. Shell appears as silver or silver is superimposed on shell not by one who has not seen silver before, but only by one who has seen silver before. Then, a serpent is not superimposed on shell, nor is silver superimposed on rope. There must be similarity between the ground of superimposition and the object superimposed; and this similarity is characterized as a defect present in the object of erroneous perception. Further, there must be also the defect in the instrument of knowledge such as defective eye-sight, etc. And finally, the substrate must be cognized in its general nature and not in its specific aspect. What is presented before the eyes should be cognized as 'this' and not as possessing the attribute of shell-ness.

There is yet another point of profound importance. In the case of the erroneous cognition of shell as silver, it is not silver alone that is superimposed on the 'this'



element, but the 'this' element also on the silver. Sarvajñātman points out<sup>255</sup> that the objects that are not superimposed are not presented in the erroneous cognition. The shell as such is not presented in the erroneous cognition and hence it is not superimposed. The 'this' element of shell, on the other hand, is involved in the erroneous cognition and hence it is superimposed. Similarly the knowledge of silver is superimposed on the 'this' element, and the knowledge of 'this' on the silver.<sup>256</sup> Thus, in the erroneous cognition of shell as silver, there is the mutual superimposition between the 'this' element and the silver, and the knowledge of the 'this' element and the knowledge of silver.

Now it is contended that on similar lines indicated above, there is the mutual superimposition between Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements. But Sarvajñātman suggests that the three factors, namely, defect in the object of erroneous knowledge which is characterized as similarity, defect in the instrument of valid knowledge, and the previous experience of the object superimposed, are not common to all forms of erroneous perception and hence they should not be taken as the cause of superimposition. It is necessary to set forth Sarvajñātman's arguments in support of this view. Sarvajñātman points out<sup>257</sup> that the Vedic text — *brāhmaṇo yajeta* presupposes the superimposition of brahmin caste on Brahman-Ātman. But these two, namely, the brahmin caste and Brahman-Ātman are not similar either through generic attribute or through any quality or action; for, both are devoid of generic attribute, quality or action. On this ground, it should be held that similarity is not an essential condition of superimposition. In the same way,

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255. *SS*, I, 34.

256. *ibid.*, I, 35.

257. *ibid.*, I, 28.



in the case of knowledge which is self-luminous, there arises the erroneous notion that it is manifested by some external factors. This superimposed notion regarding 'knowledge' cannot be due to any defect in the substratum — 'knowledge' for, the latter, being self-luminous, does not become an object. Nor is the superimposed notion due to any defect in the sense-organs; for 'knowledge' being self-luminous, does not come within the range of sense-organs. When such is the case, there is no question of superimposed notion regarding knowledge being due to defect in sense-organs.<sup>258</sup> It follows from this that defect in the object, namely, similarity and defect in the sense-organs are not the essential conditions of superimposition, owing to lack of correspondence (*vyabhicāra*). The third one also, namely, the previous experience of the object superimposed does not pervade all cases of error. Sarvajñātman does not illustrate this point; but Madhusūdana Sarasvatī remarks that Sarvajñātman has not done so, because this point is too clear to require illustration. And he points out that as the *identity* between shell and silver, though not experienced before, becomes the object of erroneous perception and as such superimposed, the contention that the previous experience of the object superimposed is a necessary condition of superimposition is untenable.<sup>259</sup> From what has been said so far, it would be clear that, apart from the material cause, namely, *avidyā*, the only efficient cause of superimposition is that the substrate of superimposition should be apprehended in its generality but not in its particular nature. These

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258. *ibid.*, I, 30.

*tatra saṁvidi pramāṇaphale ghaṭādijñāne yaḥ pareṣāṁ vedyatvādi bhramah sa tāvāt viśayadoṣāt karaṇadoṣādīvā na saṁbhavati, saṁvidah svaprakāśatvenāviśayatvāt, karaṇāgocaratvācca*, SS, p. 39.

259. *samskaro'pi vyabhicārī, śuktirajatādivaiśiṣṭyasya prāgananu bhūtasypī bhramaviśayatvāt iti spaṣṭatvānnoktam*, *ibid.*, p. 40.



two essential conditions are present in the case of Brahman-Ātman, and as such there can be the mutual superimposition between the phenomenal elements and Brahman-Ātman.

So far the presentation of shell as silver which involves the mutual superimposition between the 'this' element of shell on the one hand, and silver, on the other. On similar lines, the mutual superimposition between Brahman-Ātman and the universe is explained. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to consider the necessity for accepting the mutual superimposition between Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements.

The theory of mutual superimposition between Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements is based on the difficulty in accounting for the manifestation of the universe. There are only three ways possible for the manifestation of the universe. It can be said that the universe is manifested by itself, or by Brahman-Ātman or by other proofs like perception, etc. But all these three courses are excluded. The first alternative cannot hold good on the ground that the universe by itself is insentient and as such it cannot manifest the universe. The second alternative also is untenable; for, Brahman-Ātman, being devoid of any relation (*asaṅga*), is not related to the universe and hence it cannot manifest the universe. The third alternative also is ruled out; for as proofs are not productive factors they cannot manifest the universe.<sup>260</sup>

Now it might be said: There exists the relation of the nature of subject and object (*viśaya-viśayi-bhāva*) between Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements and so the universe can be manifested by Brahman-Ātman. Sarvajñātmā refutes this contention by pointing out that

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260. *ibid.*, III, 232.



the relation of the nature of subject and object between Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements should have been caused by a specific relation like identity (*tādātmya*), or conjunction (*saṁyoga*), or inherence (*samavāya*). But these three are not possible for the following reasons. Brahman-Ātman is internal (*pratyak*), while the universe is external (*parāk*). Thus Brahman-Ātman and the universe differ so markedly that there can be no identity between them.<sup>261</sup> The relation of conjunction can hold good only between substances (*dravya*); and substance is defined as that in which qualities inhere. But no qualities inhere in Brahman-Ātman, as the latter is attributeless (*nirguṇa*). Hence Brahman-Ātman cannot be conceived of as a substance, and as such it can have no relation of conjunction with the universe.<sup>262</sup> The relation of inherence also cannot hold good between Brahman-Ātman and the universe. This kind of relation is recognized as existing between the two things that are inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) such as component parts and composite wholes (*avayava* and *avayavin*), qualities and substances (*guṇa* and *dravya*), movements and moving substances (*kriyā* and *dravya*), universals and the individuals (*jāti* and *vyakti*), and particularities and the eternal substances (*viśeṣa* and *nityadravya*). But Brahman-Ātman and the universe cannot be viewed as inseparable. Though the universe cannot exist independently of Brahman-Ātman, yet, the latter, at the time of liberation and deep sleep remains without the universe. Hence these two are not inseparable and as such there does not exist the relation of inherence between them.<sup>263</sup>

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261. *vāstavaṁ tādātmyaṁ pratyagparāgbhāvena virodhānna sambhavati*, SS, Part II, p. 285.

262. *evaṁ adravyatvāt dr̥ṣaḥ saṁyogo'pi na ghaṭate*, *ibid.*

263. *nāpi tayoḥ samavāyasambhavaḥ, ayutasiddhyabhāvādityarthah*, TB, p. 928.



From what has been said, it would be clear that the relation of the nature of subject and object between Brahman-Ātman and the universe is not possible, in view of the absence of any specific relation between the two.<sup>264</sup>

It might be contended that the relation of the nature of subject and object between Brahman-Ātman and the universe is caused by the fitness (*yogyatā*) existing in Brahman-Ātman itself to have such a relation. Sarvajñātman refutes this contention by pointing out that the fitness existing in Brahman-Ātman will last as long as the latter lasts. And as Brahman-Ātman is eternal, the fitness also existing in it should be viewed as eternal. The inevitable result would be that Brahman-Ātman, owing to its fitness to have the relation with the universe, will always be related with the universe and as such there will be never-ending transmigration in the case of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>265</sup> Hence Sarvajñātman concludes that there can be no relation of the nature of subject and object between Brahman-Ātman and the universe, in which case the universe can be manifested by Brahman-Ātman. It is not manifested by itself, as it is insentient; nor by other proofs, as they are not productive factors. Hence the universe is illusory.<sup>266</sup> Sarvajñātman further explains this point. He holds that Brahman-Ātman being veiled by *avidyā* appears as the universe and as such the latter is superimposed on Brahman-Ātman. Thus it has no independent reality apart from Brahman-Ātman and it is manifested by the light of its substratum, Brahman-Ātman.<sup>267</sup>

From the foregoing discussion, it would be clear that to account for the manifestation of the phenomenal elements, it is necessary to admit the theory of superimposition of the latter on Brahman-Ātman. And *avidyā* alone

264. *SS*, III, 233.

265. *ibid.*, III, 234.

266. *ibid.*, III, 232.

267. *ibid.*, III, 236.



is the primary cause of bringing about the superimposition of the phenomenal elements on Brahman-Ātman. Or, to state the same in other words, all objects are related to Brahman-Ātman through their being superimposed on it by *avidyā*. The important result of this view is that *avidyā* also being a phenomenal element should be related to Brahman-Ātman, and its relation also should have been caused by *avidyā*. If, in order to account for the relation of *avidyā* to Brahman-Ātman another *avidyā* is accepted, then for the relation of the latter to Brahman, a third *avidyā* should be admitted. And so on *ad infinitum*. Hence Sarvajñātman concludes<sup>268</sup> that the superimposition of *avidyā* on Brahman-Ātman is caused by *avidyā* itself. It might be thought that this contention involves the fallacy of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*); but Sarvajñātman holds<sup>269</sup> that the objection regarding the defect of self-dependence should not be raised in the system of Advaita where everything except Brahman-Ātman is not determinable and hence illusory.

Sarvajñātman substantiates the view that *avidyā* is the cause of its superimposition as well as the universe by citing three illustrations; and these three may be explained successively as follows: (i) according to the Prābhākara theory of triune perception (*tripuṭi pratyakṣa*) every knowledge manifests itself at the same time it manifests the object and the knower. It does not require any other condition than itself to reveal its object and its own self. Similarly, *avidyā* does not require any other thing than itself for its superimposition as well as the superimposition of the universe on Brahman-Ātman.<sup>270</sup> (ii) According to the Naiyāyikas, the self is an immaterial substance and it comprehends the objects as well as itself through knowledge

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268. *ibid.*, I, 52.

269. *ibid.*, I, 51.

270. *ibid.*, I, 53.



(*jñāna*) which is its quality. Similarly, it is not unreasonable that *avidyā* itself is the cause of superimposition of the universe and itself on Brahman-Ātman.<sup>271</sup> (iii) The pot (*ghaṭa*) and cloth (*paṭa*) are different from each other. *Paṭabheda*, which subsists in *ghaṭa*, differentiates the *paṭa* and the *ghaṭa* from each other. *Paṭabheda*, on the other hand, is different from *ghaṭa* in which it subsists. But it differentiates itself from *ghaṭā* without requiring any other 'difference' (*bheda*), as, otherwise, there would result *infinite regress*. Similarly, *avidyā* superimposes on Brahman-Ātman the universe which is its modification and itself.<sup>272</sup>

So far the consideration of the superimposition of *avidyā* which is the material cause of the superimposition of its effect, namely, mind and other phenomenal elements on Brahman-Ātman. It has already been pointed out that, apart from the material cause, the efficient cause also is necessary for superimposition. And that efficient cause is: the substratum must be cognized in its general nature and not in its specific one. It is clear from the fact that shell which is the substratum of silver that is superimposed on it is cognized in its general nature as *this* and not as *shell*. The *pūrvapakṣin* points out that Brahman-Ātman is unitary and as such it has neither general nature nor specific one and hence it cannot be the substrate of the superimposition of the phenomenal elements.

Sarvajñātmā points out that it is deducible from the *pūrvapakṣin*'s argument that an object, if it should serve as the substratum of a superimposed object, should have parts. But it is not so. What is required is that the particular object should be revealed and at the same time not revealed. Sarvajñātmā illustrates<sup>273</sup> this point. Two trees which

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271. *ibid.*, I, 54.

272. *ibid.*, I, 55.

273. *ibid.*, I, 44.



are at a distance and which are really different are perceived to be one. To state the same in other words, 'oneness' is superimposed on the two trees. The difference that exists in one of the trees from the other tree is identical with the tree that is perceived. It should be held that the tree is perceived, but 'difference' which is identical with the tree is not perceived; for, otherwise, the superimposition of 'oneness' on the two trees would not hold good. The matter that is of profound importance is that 'difference' which is identical with the tree is not cognized even though the tree is cognized. It follows from this that an object is revealed and at the same time it is not revealed. Similarly Brahman-Ātman, being self-luminous, manifests itself; and at the same time owing to *avidyā*, it is not revealed in its true nature. Hence Brahman-Ātman can be the substrate of the superimposition of the phenomenal elements.

It might be objected that shell which is the substratum of silver that is superimposed on it is cognized in its general aspect 'this', and not in its specific aspect. And, the general aspect which is known and the specific aspect which is unknown are different, as the two are designated by two distinct terms 'this' and 'shell'. So what is unknown is different from what is known. It follows from this that one and the same object cannot be known and at the same time unknown.

Sarvajñātman refutes<sup>274</sup> this objection by contending that the difference that accidentally exists between the general aspect and specific aspect of shell does not account for the unknown nature of the specific aspect. He holds that one and the same object can be known and at the same time unknown. We have explained above that though the tree is perceived, yet difference from the other tree which

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274. *ibid.*, I, 45-6.



exists in, and which is identical with the tree that is perceived is not apprehended.<sup>275</sup> Sarvajñātman sets forth another illustration. The permanence of pot (say) is not the attribute of pot. But the form of pot itself, on the basis of its relation to the past and the present time is spoken of as 'permanence'. Hence 'permanence' is identical with the form of pot. Sarvajñātman points out that 'permanence' is not perceived at the time of the perception of pot. However, it later becomes the object of visual perception accompanied by the awakened latent impressions.<sup>276</sup> It would be clear from this that if a person cannot perceive the permanence of an object which is identical with the object, though the latter is perceived, and if a person cannot perceive the difference that exists in one of the two trees from the other tree, though he perceives the tree with which difference is identical, what objection is there in holding that the same object is known and at the same time unknown. Sarvajñātman proceeds to say that Brahman-Ātman as inner consciousness is always manifest, yet it is not revealed in its true nature as absolute bliss. It should be noted here that there is absolutely no difference between the known aspect and unknown aspect of Brahman-Ātman. The latter is self-luminous and hence it manifests itself. But, owing to *avidyā*, it is not revealed in its absolute nature and blissful form. Sarvajñātman holds that the criterion for an object to become the substratum of a superimposed thing is that it should be revealed and at the same time certain aspects which are identical with it should not be revealed.<sup>277</sup> Brahman-

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275. *ibid.*, I, 44 and 47.

276. *na hi sthairyaṁ nāma kaścit guṇaḥ kriyā dharmāntaram vā, api tu vastusvarūpameva pūrvāparakūlasaṁbandhaṁ nimittīkṛtya sthemā ucyate*, *SS*, Part I, p. 52.

277. *adhiṣṭhāne aṁśavattvaṁ aprayojakaṁ, kim tu bhāsamānasvarūpānatiriktasyaiva anavabhāsamānatvam*, *AP*, p. 66.



Ātman is revealed as inner consciousness and at the same time its absolute form which is identical with it is not revealed. Hence it can serve as the substratum of the superimposition of the universe. Or, to state the same in other words it is misapprehended for something else.

One objection to the conclusion that Brahman-Ātman is misapprehended for something else, however, suggests itself. And that objection is: In worldly experience, erroneous cognition arises in respect of objects which are similar to the objects superimposed, and which are composite and external. As Brahman-Ātman is neither, it cannot be misapprehended for something else, that is, the phenomenal universe.

Adhering for the moment to the standpoint of the *pūrvapakṣin*, Sarvajñātman attributes<sup>278</sup> similarity, composite nature and externality to Brahman-Ātman. He holds that the latter and the phenomenal element, intellect, are similar. Brahman-Ātman is pure and internal. The intellect, too, when contrasted with senses and body, is pure and internal. And owing to *avidyā*, Brahman-Ātman, though unitary, is viewed as having parts. And being reflected in the intellect it seems as if it has attained the state of an object. Sarvajñātman in this connection cites Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* text—*na tāvadayaṁ ekāntenāviśayaḥ, asmatpratyaaya viśayatvāt*.<sup>279</sup> Śrī Śaṅkara uses the word *asmatpratyaaya* in the sense of *antaḥkaraṇa*. Brahman-Ātman reflected in it becomes *vyavahārayogya*, that is, it manifests itself indubitably. This is all what it means when we attribute objectivity (*viśayatva*) to Brahman-Ātman and not that it is the object of knowledge. In order that a thing may become an object (*viśaya*), it is enough if it manifests itself, thereby dispelling the doubt

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278. *ibid.*, I, 40.

279. *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*.

See SS, I, 40.



regarding its existence, there being no absolute necessity for sense-contact. Now Brahman-Ātman, being of the nature of consciousness, is self-luminous and needs no other knowlegde for its revelation. Thus Sarvajñātman, from the stand-point of the *pūrvapakṣin*, admits that Brahman-Ātman is similar to the object — intellect that is superimposed on it; and it is composite and an object. But really these three are not the criteria for superimposition, that is, the misapprehension of one thing as other. Sarvajñātman points out that for the misapprehension of one thing as other, what is required is that the object which is misapprehended should be immediately presented. And the objects are immediately presented either by themselves or by mind or by the sense of sight. In the dream state, Brahman-Ātman is immediately presented by its self-luminosity and in it erroneous cognition of objects arises repeatedly.<sup>280</sup> Similarly the etheric space is cognized by the mind; and in it there arises erroneous cognition ascribing various colours to it such as whiteness, etc. In the same way, shell is cognized by sense of sight and in it there arises the delusion of silver.<sup>281</sup> It would have become clear from this that for the misapprehension of one thing as other, what is required is that the object misapprehended should be immediately presented. Here Brahman-Ātman is immediately presented by its self-luminosity and so it can be mistaken for the objective universe. Or, to state the same in other words, the universe can be superimposed on Brahman-Ātman.

It has been said that in superimposition only the superimposed objects are presented. In the case of the superimposition of the objective elements (say) — pot, etc., the latter are presented as existent in the form, 'The

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280. *ibid.*, I, 41-42.

281. *ibid.*, I, 43.



pot is existent, The cloth is existent', etc. And existence is of the nature of Brahman-Ātman. Since the latter also is presented in the superimposition of the phenomenal elements, it should be held that it is also superimposed on the phenomenal elements. Hence there results the mutual superimposition of Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements.<sup>282</sup> Thus in the superimposition of Brahman-Ātman as the phenomenal world, there is the mutual identification of Brahman-Ātman — the absolutely real entity with the phenomenal world which is only empirically real.

There is one important instance of superimposition which Sarvajñātman specially considers;<sup>283</sup> and that is the mutual identification of mind and its qualities with Brahman-Ātman associated with *avidyā*. This gives rise to the notion of 'I' which contains the elements — Brahman-Ātman which is consciousness and mind. The mutual superimposition of the two gives rise to the *aham-padārtha* or *jīva*. The qualities of mind like agency, etc., are superimposed; and, likewise the relation of Brahman-Ātman to mind and its qualities are superimposed.

There is one objection which may be raised against the conception of the mutual superimposition of the phenomenal elements and Brahman-Ātman. And that objection is: whichever is superimposed is later sublated, like the form of silver superimposed on the 'this' element of shell. When such is the case, if Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements are mutually superimposed, it follows that they should also be sublated and as such there would result only void.

Sarvajñātman obviates this difficulty by distinguishing between *adhiṣṭhāna* and *ādhāra*. According to this view, the element which is presented as related to the superimposed object is termed *ādhāra* and that element the

282. *ibid.*, III, 238.

283. *ibid.*, I, 27.



misapprehension of which leads to the presentation of something else in its place is termed *adhiṣṭhāna*.<sup>284</sup> It is clear that in the case of the erroneous cognition of shell as silver, the 'this' element of shell is presented as related to the superimposed object — 'silver' in the form 'This is silver'. Hence the 'this' element is the *ādhāra*. And the misapprehension of the true nature of shell leads to the presentation of silver and hence shell in its specific aspect is termed *adhiṣṭhāna*. The correct apprehension of *adhiṣṭhāna*, that is, shell in its specific nature totally removes the presentation of the superimposed object (say) silver. Now Sarvajñātman argues that there is the mutual superimposition of the 'this' element of shell and silver. And these two alone are sublated as both are mutually superimposed. But the element — *adhiṣṭhāna*, that is, shell in its specific aspect, is not sublated. Sarvajñātman extends this line of argument in the case of the mutual superimposition of Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements. He points out that Brahman-Ātman in its aspect of bliss, eternity, etc., is veiled by *avidyā* and is the *adhiṣṭhāna*, and it is not superimposed on the phenomenal elements. And the part of Brahman-Ātman which is illusorily manifested by *avidyā* and which is presented as related to the superimposed object, that is, the phenomenal element is *ādhāra*.<sup>285</sup> Hence what is superimposed is only the *ādhārāṁśa* or the part of Brahman-Ātman termed *ādhāra*. Consequently the latter alone is sublated and the *adhiṣṭhānāṁśa* remains. It follows from this that, in the case of the mutual superimposition of Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements, the part of Brahman-Ātman termed *ādhāra* and the phenomenal elements are sublated.

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284. *yanniṣṭhatayā yat sphurati tat tasya ādhāraḥ, yadvīṣayājñānācca yadbhavati tat tasya adhiṣṭhānam*, TB, p. 52.

285. *ahaṅkāraśca avidyākalpitacaitanyāṁśaniṣṭha eva, tasya tan- niṣṭhatayā sphuraṇāt ajñānakāryatvācca pūrṇacetanamadhiṣṭhānam, tasya tadviṣaya-ajñānakāryatvāt*, *ibid.*



Yet, as the *adhiṣṭhānāṁśa* remains, there is no question of the universe becoming void.<sup>286</sup> Thus the objection, namely, that there would result only void in the case of the mutual superimposition of Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements, is refuted by Sarvajñātman on the basis of the distinction between *ādhiṣṭhāna* and *ādhāra*. Now Sarvajñātman proceeds to answer the objection without making any distinction as *ādhāra* and *adhiṣṭhāna*. He points out that as regards the mutual superimposition of Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements, the objection that there would result only void would hold good if both are unreal objects. But Brahman-Ātman is real while the phenomenal elements are not real and these two are mutually superimposed.

The phenomenal elements as such are superimposed on Brahman-Ātman. But in the case of the superimposition of Brahman-Ātman on the phenomenal elements, what is superimposed is, not Brahman-Ātman as such, but only the relation between Brahman-Ātman and the objective elements — the relation which does not really exist between the two. Hence in the Advaitic terminology, the superimposition of the phenomenal elements on Brahman-Ātman is known as *svarūpādhyāsa* and the superimposition of Brahman-Ātman on the phenomenal elements is known as *samsargādhyāsa*. Or, to state the same in other words, in the case of the mutual superimposition of Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements, the *relation* of Brahman-Ātman is superimposed on the phenomenal elements and the phenomenal elements *as such* are superimposed on Brahman-Ātman. Hence, what are sublated by the direct experience of the substratum, namely, Brahman-Ātman, are the *relation* of Brahman-Ātman to the phenomenal elements and the phenomenal elements *as such*. Thus Brahman-Ātman remains and hence there arises no possibility

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286. SS, I, 32



for the objection of voidness.<sup>287</sup> Thus the mutual superimposition of Brahman-Ātman and the phenomenal elements has to be admitted.

To sum up: *Advīyā* abiding in Brahman-Ātman illusorily presents the latter in the form of God, the individual soul and the phenomenal world. The forms of God (*Īśvaratva*) and the individual soul (*jīvatva*) and the phenomenal world *as such* are superimposed on Brahman-Ātman and the *relation* of Brahman-Ātman on them. This superimposition is characterized as bondage to Brahman-Ātman and this bondage is caused by its own *avidyā*. And the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman which annihilates *avidyā* results in the annihilation of bondage.<sup>288</sup>

## THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND GOD

### (*JĪVA AND ĪŚVARA*)

Brahman, owing to *avidyā*, appears as *jīva* and *Īśvara*. The Advaitins seek to explain the nature of *Īśvara* and *jīva* in three different ways; and they are: *pratibimba-vāda*, *ābhāsa-vāda*, and *avaccheda-vāda*. These three may be explained successively as follows.

*Pratibimba-vāda*: This view is advocated by Padmapāda in his *Pañcapādikā* and by his commentator Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa*. According to this view, *avidyā* which is superimposed on Brahman, the pure consciousness, receives its reflection, like a mirror, the reflection of a face. The pure consciousness which serves as prototype (*bimba*) is *Īśvara*, and He is not affected by the defects pertaining to the limiting adjunct — *avidyā*. The pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* and its product — mind in its

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287. *ibid.*, I, 32.

288. *ibid.*, I, 50.



gross or subtle states is *jīva*. The latter is affected by the defects pertaining to the limiting adjuncts. This is, as it should be; for, the nature of a limiting adjunct (say) mirror presents the defects in it like impurity, etc., in the face that is reflected and not in the face that serves as prototype. This view allows for the fact that *Īśvara* according to Advaita is not overpowered by *avidyā*, His limiting adjunct. *Īśvara* is pure consciousness that serves as prototype. And the defects of the limiting adjunct are presented only in the reflected image and not in the prototype. *Īśvara*, thus, is not overpowered by *avidyā*; on the other hand, He controls it. Of the two powers characterizing *avidyā*, namely, *āvaraṇa-śakti* and *vikṣepa-śakti*, *āvaraṇa-śakti* is inactive in His case. The truth of non-duality is not concealed from Him. He never loses sight of His identity with the non-dual Brahman. *Avidyā*, however, is operative on its *vikṣepa* side. Consequently the variety of the world appears to Him, but He at the same time realizes that it is nothing more than an apparent diversification within Himself.

*Jīva*, on the other hand, is pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* and its product — mind in its gross and subtle states. Being a reflected image, it is overpowered by its limiting adjuncts. The true nature of Brahman is veiled from it; it identifies itself with the physical and psychical accompaniments brought about by the *vikṣepa-śakti* of *avidyā* and therefore it experiences misery in the form of transmigration.<sup>289</sup>

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289. *Pañcapādikā*, pp. 108, 111.

*Vivaraṇa*, pp. 287, 294.

*vide*: *ajñāno'pahitaṁ caitanyaṁ īśvaraḥ, antaḥkaraṇatatsaṁskārāvachchinna-jñānapratibimbitaṁ caitanyaṁ jīva iti vivaraṇakārāḥ*, *SB*, p. 225.

*antaḥkaraṇatatsaṁskārāvachchinna-ajñānapratibimbitaṁ antaḥkaraṇaṁ sthūlāvasthaṁ manaḥ, tatsaṁskārāḥ sūkṣmāvasthaṁ manaḥ, tayoranyataraviśiṣṭaṁ yadajñānaṁ tatpratibimbitamiti*, *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, p. 225.



This theory known as *pratibimba-vāda* is explained in a slightly different way by Sarvajñātman. He holds<sup>290</sup> both *Īśvara* and *jīva* to be the pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* and mind respectively. This way of viewing *Īśvara* as reflected consciousness in *avidyā* forces us into the conclusion that *Īśvara*, being a reflected image, is affected by the defects present in the limiting adjunct — *avidyā*, and as such He cannot be viewed as one who always realizes His identity with the non-dual Brahman. Sarvajñātman seems to feel this difficulty and sets forth<sup>291</sup> the view that *Īśvara* is pure consciousness that serves as the prototype. Brahmānanda, however, gets over this difficulty by pointing out<sup>292</sup> that the Upaniṣadic text “He who knows everything in its general and particular aspects”<sup>293</sup> states that *Īśvara* is an omniscient being. This omniscience would not hold good if *Īśvara* does not always realize his identity with the non-dual Brahman. *Īśvara* may be regarded as consciousness that serves as the prototype or as consciousness that is reflected. In either case, He is an omniscient being. According to both these views *jīvas* are many owing to the plurality of minds.

The unique feature of the *pratibimba-vāda* is that the reflected image is identical with the prototype and hence it is real. But the reflection which is only immanence of pure consciousness in the limiting adjunct and the limiting adjunct — these two are not real. It is only the immanence of pure consciousness in the limiting adjunct that allows for the fact of viewing the consciousness as associated with the characteristic of being the source of the universe (*Īśvaratva*) or the characteristics of being an agent and enjoyer (*jīvatva*). These two — *Īśvaratva* and *jīvatva* are

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290. *SS*, III, 277-8.

291. *ibid.*, II, 176-7.

292. *Nyāyaratnāvali*, p. 227.

293. *Muṇḍ.*, I, 9.



caused in pure consciousness when the latter is reflected in the limiting adjunct and hence they are not real. It comes to this: the *reflection* of pure consciousness in the limiting adjunct is not real; but the *reflected* consciousness is real.<sup>294</sup>

*Ābhāsa-vāda*: This view is advocated by Suresvara.<sup>295</sup> It is almost the same as the previous one. It is different only in the conception and interpretation of the nature of reflection. According to the previous view, in a reflection the reflected image is identical with the prototype and hence it is real. But it is only wrong localisation, transposition, etc., of the original in the limiting adjunct that are not real. According to the *ābhāsa-vāda*, the reflected image is not identical with the prototype; it is different from it and it is indeterminable either as real or as unreal.<sup>296</sup> The pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* is *Īsvara*; and the consciousness that is reflected in mind is *jīva*. *Īsvara* and *jīva* being reflected consciousness are different from the prototype consciousness and are indeterminable either as real or as unreal. It might be said that the indeterminable character of the reflected images, namely, *Īsvara* and *jīva* precludes the possibility of viewing the former as having the characteristics of being the cause of the universe, the internal ruler, etc., and the latter as having the characteristics of being the knower, agent, and enjoyer. Suresvara gets over this difficulty by pointing out that the reflected consciousness in *avidyā* and in mind are falsely identified with the consciousness that serves as the prototype, and this accounts for *Īsvara* — the reflected consciousness in *avidyā* being viewed as the creator of the universe, and

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294. *SS*, III, 277-8

295. *SB*, pp. 219. ff.

296. *svarūpato mithyābhūtaṁ pratibimīti vādaḥ ābhāsa-vādaḥ, svarūpataḥ satyaṁ, pratibimbatvarūpeṇa mithyābhūtaṁ bimbameva pratibimbamīti vādasya pratibimbavādatvamīti bhāvah, Nyāyaratnāvalī*. p. 255.



*jīva* — the reflected consciousness in mind being viewed as the knower, agent, and enjoyer.<sup>297</sup>

The consciousness that is reflected in mind identified with the prototype consciousness is *jīva*. Since mind is manifold, the consciousness that is reflected in it is also manifold. And the prototype consciousness falsely identified with consciousness reflected in minds appears to be many. Īsvara, on the other hand, is the prototype consciousness identified with the consciousness reflected in *avidyā*. Since *avidyā* is one, the consciousness that is reflected in it also is one. Consequently the prototype consciousness identified with the consciousness that is reflected also is one. Hence Īsvara is one.

*Avaccheda-vāda*: This view is advocated by Vācaspatimīśra in his *Bhāmātī*. Vācaspatimīśra does not favour the theory of reflection of Brahman. While commenting on the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Vācaspatimīśra observes that there could not be any reflection of Brahman which is free from any form. An object having a form could receive the reflection of that thing which has form. Brahman being free from any form cannot have any reflection in mind, which is also formless. How could there be any reflection of sound, smell, taste, etc.? On this ground he advocates the theory known as *avaccheda-vāda*. According to this view, Brahman delimited by *avidyā* is *jīva* which is its locus (*āśraya*) and Brahman which is not conditioned by it, but which is the content (*viśaya*) of *avidyā* is Īsvara.<sup>298</sup>

Vācaspatimīśra in his *Bhāmātī* compares *jīva* to the etheric space delimited by jar, pot, etc.<sup>299</sup> Since there could

297. *mithyātvapakṣe'pi tasyādhiṣṭhānabhūtacittādātmyādhyāsāt cet-anatvamiti bhāvaḥ*, *ibid*, p. 160.

298. *avidyāvaccinnānavacchinnāveva jīveśāviti pakṣaḥ avaccheda-vādaḥ*, *Nārāyaṇī*, p. 232.

299. See *Bhāmātī* on *BSB*, II, i, 4.; II, iii, 13; and III, ii, 3.



be only delimitation and not reflection of etheric space in jar, pot, etc, and since Vācaspatimisra compares the *jīvas* to the etheric space delimited by jar, pot, etc., we must take that Vācaspatimisra favours only the *avaccheda-vāda*. According to this view, since *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* and since there is plurality of *avidyā*, the *jīvas* are many.

The *avaccheda-vāda* is based upon the criticism that there cannot be any reflection of a formless principle. This criticism does not hold good. Redness of a flower is reflected in a crystal; and, redness does not have any form. Sound which does not have any form has reflection in the form of an echo. Hence it is not correct to say that only objects which have form could have reflection.

It might be objected: only those objects which can be perceived by the sense-organs could have reflection. Redness and sound, although they do not have any form, are reflected, as they are respectively perceived by the sense of sight and the sense of hearing. Brahman-Ātman, on the other hand, does not come within the range of any sense-organ. On this ground it cannot have any reflection.

The rule, namely, that it is only those objects which can be comprehended by the sense-organs could have reflection lacks correspondence. Etheric space which does not come within the range of any sense-organ and which is manifested by the witness-self does have reflection in water. In the same way Brahman-Ātman which is formless and which transcends the range of all sense-organs could have reflection in *avidyā* and in mind.<sup>300</sup>

From what has been said so far it would have become clear that Sarvajñātman advocates the *pratibimba-vāda*

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300. *SB*, pp. 148-158



according to which the individual souls are many. Sarvajñātman, therefore, admits *aneka-jīva vāda*.

Apart from the three views set forth above, there is one more view which holds the *jīva* to be one. This is known as *eka-jīva-vāda*. Sarvajñātman accepts this view also and we shall now deal with it.

According to this view Brahman-Ātman that transcends *avidyā* is Īsvara and Brahman-Ātman reflected in *avidyā* is *jīva*. As *avidyā* is one, *jīva* also is one. The *jīva* alone, owing to *avidyā* which conceals the true nature of Brahman-Ātman from it, is the material and the efficient cause of the universe. All the objective elements and other *jīvas* are the fictitious creations of *avidyā* which conceals the true nature of Brahman-Ātman from the only one *jīva* that exists.<sup>301</sup>

It might be objected that the view of the only one *jīva* contradicts experience. The time that had passed is beginningless and the future is endless. The released and ignorant souls existed before and will exist hereafter. And this experience would not hold good, if it is held that there is only one *jīva*. Sarvajñātman refutes this objection by contending that such an experience holds good when viewed in the light of dream experience.<sup>302</sup> A person who goes asleep perceives within a short time, innumerable years that has passed and innumerable years that are yet to come. Sarvajñātman suggests that this experience of dream state should be applied to the waking state.<sup>303</sup> In the latter also, as in the dream state, there is the experience that the time that had passed is beginningless and sage Śuka and others attained release. The time that is yet to come is endless and some others will attain release. Thus, on the lines of dream experience, the

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301. SS, II, 128.

302. *ibid.*, II, 129.

303. *ibid.*, II, 130.



distinction of release and bondage would exist till the realization of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>304</sup> Hence Sarvajñātman concludes<sup>305</sup> that Brahman-Ātman attains the state of *jīva* and it perceives the group of *jīvas* and the universe from ether to earth which are superimposed by *avidyā*. It follows from this that there is only one *jīva* and other *jīvas* and the objective elements are illusory and are to be treated on a par with the objects of dream experience.

Now an objection may be raised: if it is held that there exists only one *jīva* and all other *jīvas* are illusory and are similar to the ones seen in dream, then it follows that preceptor also is illusory and hence there can be none to instruct the only *jīva* about the nature of Brahman-Ātman. The inevitable result would be that the *jīva* cannot attain the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman and consequently it cannot attain liberation.

Sarvajñātman refutes<sup>306</sup> this contention by pointing out that the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman arises to the aspirant who is the only *jīva*, from the preceptor, the Upaniṣads, and the principles of interpretation though these are illusory. And the aspirant whose *avidyā* is annihilated by the rise of the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman remains in his own self-luminous nature, that is, he attains liberation.

This discussion may be summed up by saying that Brahman-Ātman owing to *avidyā* attains the state of *jīva*. There is only one *jīva*; and objective elements, *Īśvara*, and other *jīvas* are illusory. Though these are illusory, yet they appear as if real until the rise of the true knowledge of Brahman-Ātman<sup>307</sup> And the preceptor also is a fictitious creation and yet he instructs the only *jīva* about its absolute

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304. *ibid.*, II, 131.

305. *ibid.*, II, 132.

306. *ibid.*, II, 163.

307. *ibid.*, II, 222.



nature<sup>308</sup> and consequently that *jīva* attains liberation. Another point of profound importance in this view is that as there exists only one *jīva*, it alone is entitled to liberation. Hence the scriptural texts referring to the liberation of Śuka and others are merely recommendatory and they are intended only to glorify the state of liberation. This view known as *eka-jīva-vāda* is the foremost of all the doctrines expounding the nature of *jīva*. And this view, in the Advaitic terminology, is known as *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda*.<sup>309</sup>

The difference between the *aneka-jīva-vāda* and *eka-jīva-vāda* lies in this that according to the former the objective elements, the *jīvas*, and *Īsvara* have empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-satya*) and according to the latter, they have only apparent reality (*prātibhāsika-satya*). Further, *avidyā* which is admitted to be one does not admit *avasthājñāna* to which reference has already been made in the section entitled *Māyā-Avidyā*. The material cause of the illusory appearances of shell as silver, rope as snake, etc., is *avidyā*. It may be objected: since *avidyā* could be removed only by the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman, there will be the unending appearances of shell as silver, rope as snake, etc. And it is contrary to the experience of the removal of these illusory appearances by the direct experience of their substratum. This objection is answered by pointing out that the direct experience of the substratum of the illusory appearances is only the mental state (*vṛtti*); and *vṛtti*, according to this view, does not remove *avidyā* but only suppresses it. Thus according to this view, the material cause of illusory appearances, namely, *avidyā*, is only suppressed and consequently the illusory appearances remain in subtle form. They are finally removed by the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.

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308. *ibid.*, II, 225.

309. *mukhyo vedāntasiddhāntaḥ ekajīvavādaḥkhyah, imameva dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vādaṁ ācakṣate, SB, p. 234.*



We said that Sarvajñātman admits *aneka-jīva-vāda* also. He holds that Īsvara is Brahman-Ātman reflected in *avidyā* and *jīva* is Brahman-Ātman reflected in *avidyā* and mind. He also holds the view that Brahman-Ātman which serves as the prototype (*bimba*) is Īsvara. We shall set forth the difference between Īsvara and *jīva*, although, in essence, they are identical with Brahman-Ātman.

*Avidyā* abiding in Brahman-Ātman conceals the true nature of the latter and shows up something else in its place. These two functions are respectively ascribed to two powers of *avidyā* known as *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*. But it is essential to note that in the case of Īsvara, *avidyā* operates partially — only on its aspect of *vikṣepa*; for by hypothesis nothing is ever concealed from him. The function of *āvaraṇa-śakti* is to conceal the unity of Brahman-Ātman; but since that unity is never concealed from Īsvara, *avidyā* in its aspect of *āvaraṇa* is stated to be powerless over Him. It is for this reason that Īsvara is accepted to be omniscient. In the case of *jīva*, on the other hand, the unity of Brahman-Ātman is concealed from it and thus, *avidyā* in its aspect of *āvaraṇa* is fully active in its case.<sup>310</sup> And it is for this reason that *jīva* possesses only finite knowledge.

Another difference between Īsvara and *jīva* is based on the absence of mind in the case of Īsvara. Īsvara is devoid of mind, while *jīva* is in possession of it. And without the association of the mind, the experience of *avidyā* in the form 'I am ignorant' is not possible in the case of Īsvara. And the absence of experience of *avidyā* in the case of Īsvara suggests that His essential nature is never concealed from Him. In the case of *jīva*, on the other hand, there is the experience of *avidyā* in the form 'I am ignorant', owing to the possession of mind.<sup>311</sup> And the experience of *avidyā* in the case of *jīva* suggests that its essential nature is concealed from it. And for this reason

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310. SŚ, II, 165.

311. *ibid.*, II, 17, 180.



also, *Īśvara* is held to be omniscient, while *jīva* is not so.<sup>312</sup>

It would have become clear that the true nature of *Īśvara* is never concealed from Him by *avidyā*. But in the case of *jīva*, its true nature is concealed from it by *avidyā*. For this reason, the misery born out of *avidyā* pertains to *jīva*. But the misery is not even seemingly present in *Īśvara*. And on this ground the group of qualities such as omniscience, etc., belongs to *Īśvara* and not to *jīva*.<sup>313</sup>

To sum up: the reflection of Brahman-Ātman in *avidyā* is *Īśvara* and in *avidyā* and mind is *jīva*. The former always realizes His identity with Brahman-Ātman and hence He is ever-released. The latter loses sight of its identity with Brahman-Ātman, owing to the power which *avidyā* in its aspect of *āvaraṇa* wields over it and hence it undergoes transmigration. Then by realizing its identity with Brahman-Atman, it attains liberation.

### THE PHENOMENAL WORLD (*JAGAT*)

In order to account for the rise of the phenomenal world, the Advaitins advocate the theory of transfiguration (*vivarta-vāda*). According to it, the cause produces the effect without itself undergoing any change whatsoever. Viewed in the light of this theory, Brahman-Ātman only appears as the world, and being the substratum of the appearance of the world it is its transfigurative material cause (*vivarto'pādāna*). The universe has no independent existence apart from Brahman-Ātman.<sup>314</sup>

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* establishes<sup>315</sup> the *vivarta-vāda*, and as a preliminary he critically examines

312. *ibid.*, II, 183.

313. *ibid.*, II, 173.

314. *brahmayatirekeṇa kāryajātasyaḥbhāva iti gamyate*, BSB, II, i, 14.

315. BS, II, i, 14.



the theories put forward by the Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Sāṅkhya regarding the origin of the universe. Sarvajñātman briefly sets forth the arguments of the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* against their theories.

The Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools of Buddhism advocate the theory of aggregation (*saṃghātavāda*). According to this theory, the external world is an aggregation of four kinds of atoms — earth, fire, water, and air. The internal world is an aggregation of five groups or skandhas: *rūpa*, *viññāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*. The sense organs along with their objects constitute the *rūpa-skandha*. Knowledge in the form 'I' stands for the *viññāna-skandha*. The states of mind such as happiness, misery, or the absence of the two which arise respectively from experience of objects that are pleasant, or unpleasant, or neither pleasant nor unpleasant represent the *vedanā-skandha*. Determinate knowledge (*savikalpa-pratyaya*) is *saṃjñā-skandha*. Desire, aversion, pride, *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., constitute *saṃskāra-skandha*.<sup>316</sup>

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* considers this theory in the *sūtra* — *samudāya ubhaya-hetuke'pi tadaprāptih*.<sup>317</sup> He points out that neither the atoms, nor the groups (skandhas) can achieve the groupings as assumed by them; for they are insentient. The schools of Buddhism do not admit any permanent and intelligent being who could bring about the groupings. Hence the theory of aggregation does not hold good.<sup>318</sup>

The Vaiśeṣikas put forward the theory of creation. According to this theory, something originates from something else, as cloth from threads. When a piece of cloth is woven, we have in it the threads in conjunction; and

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316. SS, Part, II, pp. 41-2.

317. BS, II, ii, 18.

318. *vide* : SS II, 169.



over and above the conjoined threads, the cloth which has come into being afresh. This new product was not in existence before its production. It has come into being as a new creation from its prior non-existence. This doctrine is called *ārambha-vāda* and is also designated as *asat-kāryavāda*. And in this theory, when an object (say) cloth is said to come into existence, what is meant is that the object not existing before its production comes to have the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) with its inherent cause or with its existence.<sup>319</sup> On this basis the Vaiśeṣika school attributes the creation of the world to the conjunction of the primal atoms. Every object in the world is only the combination of the atoms. When the world is to be created, there is movement caused in the atoms owing to the will of God and two atoms join together to form a binary compound (*dvyaṇuka*) which has invisible size and minuteness. Three such binary compounds produce a triad (*tryaṇuka*) which has visible size and visible length. To the question how visible size and visible length in a triad arise from the invisible size of the binary compounds, the answer given is that it is due to the number of constituent atoms.<sup>320</sup> When material things from binary compounds are produced, their qualities also are produced, their nature being determined by the qualities of the respective causal substances. Thus the white colour of the threads woven into a cloth gives rise to the white colour in the cloth. It should be noted here that the white colour of the cloth is not only different from the cloth but also different from the white colour of the threads. On this ground, the Vaiśeṣika school criticizes the Advaitic doctrine that Brahman-Ātman which is sentient is the cause of the world. It argues that if Brahman-Ātman which is sentient is the cause of the world, then sentience must be present in the world also.

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319. *ibid.*, III, 204.

320. *ibid.*, II, 72.



But this is not the case. Hence Brahman-Ātman which is sentient is not the cause of the world.

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* refutes this objection from the Vaiśeṣika's own standpoint. Sarvajñātman summarizes the arguments of the author of the sūtras and he independently criticizes the conception of the production of an effect not existing before its origination. And his arguments may be stated as follows: the origin of an object not existing before its rise is described as the relation of inherence of the object, (say) cloth to its existence and inherent cause (threads). Sarvajñātman argues<sup>321</sup> that this view is incompatible on the ground that the existence as well as the inherent cause are real, while the object with which they are said to be related is non-existent. All the objects, only by being real, are related to the real entities. And a non-existent entity is not related to real entities. Sarvajñātman, therefore, concludes<sup>322</sup> that the production of an object not existing before its origin is incompatible. And, on this ground the theory of creation or the *asatkārya-vāda* stands discredited.

It now remains to answer the objection of the Vaiśeṣika, namely, that Brahman-Ātman which is sentient cannot be the cause of the world. For if it were so, sentience must be present in the effect also. But this is not the case. Hence Brahman-Ātman cannot be the cause of the world. The answer to this objection is given in the *Brahma-sūtra* — *mahad-dīrghavadvā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām*.<sup>323</sup> Sarvajñātman sets forth the answer given by the author of the sūtras thus: the author of the sūtras declares that just as the tertiary compound produced from the binary compounds that have invisible size and minuteness is not accepted as having invisible size and minuteness, similarly it is reason-

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321. *ibid.*, III, 202-3.

322. *ibid.*, III, 210.

323. *BS*, II, ii, 11.



able that the universe which is insentient could originate from the sentient principle.<sup>324</sup> The criticism of the Vais'eṣika school is thus unsound.

Now the theory of transformation which is advocated by the Sāṅkhya school is to be examined. This school accepts two ultimate entities — *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and further holds that the *prakṛti* which is insentient, spontaneously transforms itself into the universe. This, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* refutes<sup>325</sup> by contending that the insentient *prakṛti* cannot evolve itself into the universe. In ordinary experience it is found that an insentient object (say) clay does not change into pot without the causal operation of a potter. Hence, the *prakṛti* cannot transform itself into the world unless there is an ultimate intelligent principle to bring about the transformation. No object ever changes itself and on this ground the theory that *prakṛti* transforms itself into the universe is unreasonable.<sup>326</sup>

Sarvajñātman points out that the concept of transformation itself does not stand to reason. In the Sāṅkhya system, production is transformation which consists only in the manifestation of what is already in a latent form and is not a new creation. The object is existent in an unmanifest form and causal operation manifests it. Hence this theory is also termed *sat-kārya-vāda*. Sarvajñātman holds that in this view causal operation is futile. He argues that it cannot be said that causal operation brings forth the existent object; for, the object is already existent and as such need not be produced.<sup>327</sup> It might be said that causal operation manifests the object by giving rise to some qualities in the object; for, in the *sat-kārya-vāda* the qualities are also existent and hence they need

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324. *SS*, II, 71.

325. *BS*, II, ii, 1. ff.

326. *SS*, II, 76.

327. *ibid.*, III, 211.



not be produced.<sup>328</sup> It might be thought that the causal operation manifests the object by removing some defect in the object; for, in the *sat-kārya-vāda*, defect also is existent in the object and an existent object cannot be removed.<sup>329</sup> Hence, Sarvajñātman concludes that causal operation is futile in the *sat-kārya-vāda*. Sarvajñātman proceeds to point out<sup>330</sup> that even if it is admitted that causal operation manifests the objects, then there arises another difficulty and that is : in the *sat-kārya-vāda*, the causal operation also is always existent and hence it should be held that it always manifests the objects. Hence there can be no dissolution and no states of deep sleep and swoon. If, on the other hand, the causal operation is held to be non-existent, then there can be no creation. Hence the concept of transformation does not hold good.

The defects in the theories of aggregation, creation, and transformation have led the Advaitins to formulate the theory of transfiguration (*vivarta-vāda*). In this theory, Brahman-Ātman gives rise to appearances which, though entirely depending on it, affect it no more than the silver does the shell in which it appears. The cause produces the effect without itself undergoing any change. Brahman-Ātman without itself undergoing any modification gives rise to the appearance of the universe, and being the substratum of the universe, it is viewed as the source of the universe. The principle that accounts for the illusory presentation of Brahman-Ātman as the universe is *āvidyā*. Hence it is mainly owing to *avidyā*, Brahman-Ātman becomes the source of the universe. Sarvajñātman, therefore, holds<sup>331</sup> that Brahman-Ātman depending on *avidyā* inspired by its reflection is the source of the universe. And, *avidyā* superimposed on Brahman-Ātman is a mere accessory to the latter in bringing the universe into exist-

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329. *ibid.*, III, 213.

330. *ibid.*, II, 215.

331. *ibid.*, I, 323, 332.



ence. It should be noted here that when it is said that Brahman-Ātman is the source of the universe, what is meant is that it is the substratum of *avidyā* and its modification — the universe.<sup>332</sup>

Now there arises the doubt whether *avidyā* is the cause of the universe or not. Sarvajñātman holds that *avidyā* is the cause of the universe; but it is to be understood in the sense of transformative material cause. Hence Brahman-Ātman is the transfigurative material cause (*vivarto'pādāna*) and *avidyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmyupādāna*). And being the transformative material cause, *avidyā* serves as an accessory to Brahman-Ātman in bringing the universe into existence.<sup>334</sup> Sarvajñātman in this connection considers a particular theory regarding the source of the universe which is as follows:- the Upaniṣadic passage 'The etheric space arose from Ātman'<sup>335</sup> states that everything beginning with etheric space originates from Ātman. The word Ātman signifies the blend of pure consciousness and the insentient element of *avidyā*. Therefore the pure consciousness associated with *avidyā* is the material cause of the universe. But the spiritual element alone present in the blend is the efficient cause of the universe.<sup>336</sup>

Sarvajñātman refutes<sup>337</sup> this theory by contending that the word Ātman no doubt primarily conveys the blend of the pure consciousness and *avidyā*. But here it should be

332. *evam śuddhaṁ advayaṁ brahmaiva avidyātadvivartādhiṣṭhānatayā śrutisammataṁ jagannidānam*, SŚ, Part I.; p. 243.

333. SŚ, II, 127, 170, and, 171.

334. *kūṭasthasya brahmaṇaḥ śrutipradarśitakāraṇatvādisaṁrakṣaṇārtham jadaprapañcōpādānatayā anumitam ajñānam tadghaṭakatayā āśritam*, SŚ, Part I, p. 247.

335. *Tait.*, II, i 1.

336. SŚ, I, 326-7.

337. *ibid.*, I, 329-30.

For details see SŚ, I, 333-4.



taken in its secondary sense. The word *Ātman*, through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification (*jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā*) conveys the pure consciousness and it should be regarded as the cause of the universe.

It would be clear from this that Sarvajñātman holds that pure consciousness is the source of the universe. But it should not be concluded that *Īśvara* is not the source of the universe. No doubt Sarvajñātman holds<sup>338</sup> that *Īśvara* as the blend of pure consciousness and *avidyā* is not the source of the universe. But when pure consciousness unconditioned by *avidyā* (*bimbacaitanya*) is viewed as *Īśvara*,<sup>339</sup> then Sarvajñātman has no objection in holding<sup>340</sup> that *Īśvara* is the source of the universe. Hence in Sarvajñātman's view, the pure consciousness alone is the cause of the universe. If Sarvajñātman says that *Īśvara* is the source of the universe, it should be taken that the pure consciousness unconditioned by *avidyā* (*bimbacaitanya*) is viewed as *Īśvara* and is considered to be the cause of the universe. Hence the pure consciousness alone, *through avidyā* and *not as associated with avidyā*, is the cause of the universe.

Now what kind of causality is recognized in respect of Brahman-*Ātman*, the pure consciousness? Is it efficient causality alone or material causality or both? Sarvajñātman merely states<sup>341</sup> that Brahman-*Ātman* is the efficient and the material cause of the created objects; and he does not elaborate this point. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* — *prakṛtiṣca pratijñādr̥ṣṭāntānuparodhāt*<sup>342</sup>

338. SŚ, I, 329-330.

339. *ibid.*, II., 176.

340. *ibid.*, II, 191; III, 265, 268.

*vide* : *tamasvyeva brahma bimbātmanā jagajjanakaḥ paramēśvaraḥ*, SŚ, Part, I, p. 115.

341. SŚ, I, 532.

342. BS, I, iv, 23.



elucidates this point and it is essential to deal with this here.

Śrī Śaṅkara observes that Brahman-Ātman is to be admitted as the material and the efficient cause, as this view does not conflict with the statement putting forth the thesis and the illustrative instances. The statement putting forth the thesis is the following: 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not reflected on becomes reflected on; that which is not known, known.'<sup>343</sup> This passage conveys that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause since the effect is non-different from the material cause. The illustrative example is — "Oh ! my dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (the effect) being a name only which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely."<sup>344</sup> This passage refers to the material cause. Similar statements putting forth the thesis and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedānta texts are to be viewed as proving that Brahman-Ātman is the material cause of the world.

That Brahman-Ātman is at the same time the efficient cause of the world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that there is no other guiding principle. Ordinarily material causes such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous efficient causes such as potter and goldsmith; but inside Brahman-Ātman as material cause, there is no other efficient cause on which the material cause could depend; for, the scripture says<sup>345</sup> that prior to creation Brahman-Ātman was one without a

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343. *Chānd.*, VI, i, 3.

344. *ibid.*, VI, i, 4.

345. *ibid.*, VI, ii, 1.



second. Moreover, if there were admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing and thereby the statements putting forth the thesis as well as the illustrative instances would be contradicted. Brahman-Ātman thus is the efficient cause because there is no other guiding principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate. Being the substratum of *avidyā*, Brahman-Ātman is viewed as the material cause. And being the substratum of desire, will, and action which are the transformations of *avidyā* and which are required for the creation of the world, Brahman-Ātman is viewed as the efficient cause of the world.<sup>346</sup> Both material and efficient causality are brought about by *avidyā*.

The Advaitic theory of causation, namely, the *brahma-vivarta-vāda* which is different from both the *prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda* of the Sāṅkhya school and the *aṇu-ārambha-vāda* of the Vaiśeṣika school has been set forth by the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* as his final conclusion in the aphorism-*tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ*.<sup>347</sup>

Now a question arises as to the view that the Advaitic theory of causation is only *vivarta-vāda*. And that is : the author of the sūtras, no doubt, holds the *vivarta-vāda* in the aphorism — *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ*. But in the previous aphorism — *bhoktrāpatter avibhāgaścet syāllokavat*<sup>348</sup> he holds the theory of the transformation of Brahman-Ātman into the universe (*brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*), on the analogy of the modifications of sea-water into foam, waves, and bubbles. Thus when two conflicting theories have been put forward the question arises: how are we to

346. *ekasyaiva avidyo'pahitatvena upādānatvasya, avidyā — pariṇāma — iccākṛtyādyāśrayatvena nimittatvasyāpi sambhavāt* AS, p. 759.

See SS, III, 251-2.

347. BS, II, i, 14.

348. BS, II, i, 13.



decide that the theory of transfiguration alone is the final conclusion and not the theory of transformation?

Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary brings out the true import of the aphorisms, and Sarvajñātman summarizes his arguments which may be stated as follows : an objection is raised as regards the view that Brahman-Ātman is the source of the universe. The Upaniṣadic text 'All this is Brahman'<sup>349</sup> which states that Brahman is the source of the universe affirms that Brahman and the universe which consists of experients and the objects of experience are identical. The result of this argument is that the distinction between experients and objects of experience which we find in ordinary experience and which is the basis of all activities — sacred or secular would cease to exist, as the two by being identical with Brahman, would be identical. Moreover, Brahman-Ātman cannot be taken to be absolute, as its absolute nature is contradicted by the existence of the universe which we perceive.

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* first answers the objections raised in the foregoing paragraph by admitting the theory of the transformation of Brahman (*brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*) on the analogy of the modifications of sea-water into waves, foams, and bubbles. This he states in the aphorism *bhoktrāpatter avibhāgaḥ cet syālllokavat*. He says that just as foams, waves, and bubbles in the sea, which, by being the modifications of the sea-water are identical with the sea and yet different from each other, so also the experients and the objects of experience constituting the world, by being the transformations of Brahman, are identical with it and yet different from each other. The theory of transformation of Brahman into the universe thus preserves activity — sacred or secular, which, according to men of average intellect requires *real* difference in the form of experients and the objects of

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349. *Chānd.*, III, xiv, 1.



experience.<sup>350</sup> Moreover, as the universe is identical with Brahman, the absolute nature of Brahman also is maintained.

Then in the aphorism *tadananyatvaṁ āraṁbhaṇaśabdā-dibhyaḥ*, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* refutes the objection referred to above by adopting the *vivarta-vāda*. The Upaniṣadic texts themselves suggest the theory of transfiguration. The text "Have you ever asked for that instruction, whereby by knowing one, everything else, though unknown becomes known"<sup>351</sup> declares the knowledge of everything, that is, the effects, by knowing one, that is, the cause. And another text 'clay alone is true, and its modifications are names only; they exist through speech only',<sup>352</sup> states that the entire body of products has no existence apart from its cause. By extending this line of interpretation, we conclude that the entire body of products has no existence apart from Brahman.<sup>353</sup> It is only illusory. The absolute nature of Brahman would be contradicted when there exists the universe apart from Brahman. Since the world has no independent existence apart from Brahman, the absolute nature of Brahman is maintained. The world, although illusory, is real till the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. Hence empirical activity also could be preserved.

Of these two theories, the theory of transfiguration alone is the final view of the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*; for, the absolute nature of Brahman can be maintained in this view alone, as it holds the universe to be illusory. The theory of transformation, on the other hand, holds

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350. *apratyākhyāyaiva kāryaprapaṇcaṁ pariṇāmaprakriyāṁ ca āśrayati saguṇo'pāsaneṣūpayokṣyata iti*, BSB, II, i, 14.

*vide* : SŚ, II, 58.

351. *Chānd.*, VI, i, 3.

352. *ibid*, VI, i, 4.

353. *brahma-vyatirekeṇa-kārya-jātasya abhāva iti gaṇiyate*,  
BSB, II, i, 14.



the universe to be identical with Brahman, yet it admits of difference also. Hence in this view the absolute nature of Brahman could be maintained only in a provisional way. From this it should not be concluded that the acceptance of the theory of transformation serves no purpose and as such it is futile. As has been indicated above, the theory of transformation is admitted to satisfy men of average intellect who hold that the universe must be *real* in order that empirical activities may be carried out; and, the theory of transformation holds the universe to be a real transformation of Brahman. Apart from this, the theory of transformation serves as prelude to the theory of transfiguration which treats Brahman as cosmic. This presupposes the view that Brahman is cosmic; and the theory of transformation alone presents Brahman as cosmic.<sup>354</sup> On this ground, the Upaniṣadic texts, and the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* maintain the theory of transformation. And the theory of transfiguration alone is the final conclusion of the author of the *Brahma sūtra*.<sup>355</sup>

So far it has been said that Brahman itself, without undergoing any change appears as the universe. The latter is known (*dr̥śya*) and to that extent it cannot be unreal; for, the absolutely unreal like 'the hare's horn' is only words. Nor can the universe be regarded as real on its own right; for, it is insentient and hence depends entirely upon Brahman for its being. Thus the universe is not finally classifiable as either real or unreal. The Advaitins, by postulating a reality behind the universe, differentiate their doctrine from the *śūnya-vāda* of the Mādhyamika. The latter holds that the world is non-existent. The Advaitins, on the other hand, hold that the world is neither existent nor non-existent but different from being existent and non-existent.

Now it is objected that although the doctrine of Advaita is not similar to the *śūnya-vāda* of the Mādhyamika,

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354. *SŚ*, II, 58-64.

355. *ibid*, II, 56.



yet it is not alien to the *vijñāna-vāda* school of Buddhism. The latter admits the reality of consciousness alone. What is of the nature of consciousness is indeed indivisible; but by those whose vision is confused it is seen to be, as it were, differentiated into the perceived object, the perceiving subject, the proofs, and then the perception itself. And the latter are false. The Advaitins also maintain that Brahman alone which is pure consciousness is real and it appears as the universe consisting of the knower, objects, proofs, and the empirical knowledge, that is, the mental state. And the universe is not real. It is, therefore, argued that the *vijñāna-vāda* and the doctrine of Advaita are similar.

Sarvajñātman refutes this objection by contending that though the two doctrines seem to be similar, yet there are some characteristics which clearly mark the difference between the two systems. In the first place, the Advaitin holds that the four factors, namely, the knower, the object, the proof, and the empirical knowledge are different among themselves, while the Vijñānavādin denies any difference among them.<sup>356</sup> In the second place, the four factors referred to above are created by the beginningless *avidyā* abiding in the eternal Brahman and they are real until the realisation of Brahman. But the Vijñānavādin neither admits an eternal Brahman nor the beginningless *avidyā*. Never does he posit reality to the universe. The third ground that suggests the difference between the two systems is this: Brahman which is pure consciousness is eternal and is different from empirical knowledge or the mental state which arises from the contact of sense-organs with objects and which is insentient. And Brahman itself is the witness; and, without depending on any sense-organ, it perceives the universe. The Vijñānavādin, on the other hand, holds the insentient mental state itself to be consciousness and as it depends on

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356. *ibid.*, II, 27.



the sense-organs for its origin, it is mutable. Moreover, unlike the Advaitins who hold it to be eternal and unitary, he admits it to be momentary and manifold <sup>357</sup> From this it would be clear that the doctrine of Advaita and the Vijñānavāda differ so markedly that there can be no identity between them.

In order to complete the account of the nature of the phenomenal world, it is necessary to consider one more objection which is as follows : The world of objects is declared to be not real. It follows from this that the scripture also is not real, as it belongs to the world of objects. Then how can it convey the true nature of Brahman?

Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* points out <sup>358</sup> with suitable illustrations that the scripture though not real can convey the true nature of Brahman. And Sarvajñātman briefly sets forth Śrī Śaṅkara's arguments as follows : the *Aitareya-āranyaka* text (III, ii, iv, 7.) declares that the perception of aperture in the centre of the sun's disc is not real; but it indicates that one who perceives so will shortly face one's death. And death is real. Again, death which is real, occurs sometimes as the result of the mere suspicion that a venomous snake

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357. *ibid*, II, 28-9.

*vide: pramatrādivibhāgaḥ nityasiddhāparamātmāśritamāyayaiva vijṛm-  
bhitāḥ, sa ca sthiraḥ iti asmābhiḥ aṅgikriyate, na tathā vijñānavādibhiḥ.....  
viśayavijñāna-vyatirikta-svapraśasṭhasvarūpaḥ sajātīyādbhedasūnyaḥ  
paramātmā svādhyastam sakalam prapañcam sādhyati iti asmābhirucyate, na  
tathā bauddhaiḥ, tanmate buddhivṛttereva jādāyāḥ vijñānatvena aṅgikārāt,  
etadvijñānasya kṣaṇikasya kṣaṇikaprapañcasādhakatvāt vijñānānām anekat-  
vācca, ato'pi na sāmānyam, TB, pp. 546-7*

358. *BSB*, II, i 14.



has bitten<sup>359</sup>. Moreover, the *Brahma-sūtra*<sup>360</sup> which discusses the *Chāndogya* Upaniṣadic passage 'If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special purpose, sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in the sacrifice,'<sup>361</sup> states that dream is an illusion and yet it is indicative of future good or evil that is real. From this it is clear that an event in dream though not real indicates an actual future event. In the same way, the scripture though not real can convey the true nature of Brahman.<sup>362</sup>

To sum up : the phenomenal world is appearance of Brahman-Ātman through *avidyā*. Though illusory, it is real till there arises the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.

### LIBERATION [ *MOKṢA* ]

So far we have said that, according to Advaita, one and the same Brahman comes to appear, owing to *māyā-avidyā* as Īsvara, *jīva*, and world. Īsvara always realizes His identity with Brahman and so He is ever-released. The world is an illusory appearance of Brahman-Ātman and it is sublated by the direct experience of the latter. It is only *jīva* who falsely identifying itself with body-mind complex, undergoes transmigration, and strives after liberation. *Jīva* is Brahman-Ātman itself appearing through the limiting adjunct — mind which is a product of *avidyā*. Or, Brahman-Ātman reflected in or delimited by *avidyā* and mind appears as *jīva* and thus there results the mutual identification of *jīva* with the qualities of mind like finitude, agency, etc. Further there is the mutual identification of *jīva* associated with mind and its qualities with sense-organs, body, etc.

359. *SS*, I. 337; II, 227.

360. *BS*, III, ii, 4.

361. *Chānd.*, V, ii, 9.

362. *SS*, I, 338.



Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* says : 'as long as the *jīva* is associated with the adjunct — mind, so long only is the *jīva* a *jīva*. In reality, however, there is nothing like *jīva*-hood apart from what is fancied to be such by reason of this adjunct.'<sup>363</sup> He proceeds to point out: 'this relation of Brahman with mind has but *avidyā* as its source, and this *avidyā* cannot be removed by anything apart from the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. Hence the relation with such a limiting adjunct as the mind does not cease so long as *jīva* is not realized as identical with Brahman-Ātman.'<sup>364</sup> *Avidyā*, therefore, is the source of all evil and its removal would necessarily bring about the removal of the relation of mind, and its qualities like finitude, agency, etc. *Jīva*, then, ceases to be a *jīva*, as it would manifest as Brahman-Ātman in its true nature of absolute bliss and consciousness. And this is liberation. In other words liberation is only Brahman-Ātman freed from *avidyā*.<sup>365</sup> Liberation being identical with Brahman-Ātman is ever-attained; yet, through a mistaken notion of its not being attained, the aspirant longs for it and attains it as if it were unattained through the removal of *avidyā* by the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>366</sup>

*Avidyā* could be removed by the direct experience of its substratum. And substratum is defined as the content

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363. *yāvadeva ca ayaṁ buddhyupādhisambandhaḥ tāvadevāsya jīva-tvaṁ saṁsāritvaṁ ca, paramārthatastu na jīvo nāma buddhyupādhi-sambandhaparikalpitasvarūpavyatirekeṇa asti*, BSB, II, iii, 30.

364. *api ca mithyājñānapurassaro'yaṁ ātmano buddhyupādhisambandhaḥ, na ca mithyājñānasya samyagjñānādanyatra mivṛttirasti ityataḥ yāvat brahmātmātānavabodhaḥ tāvadayam buddhyupādhisambandho na śāmyati*, *ibid.*

365. *ātmaiva anādyavidyānivṛtityupalakṣitaḥ mokṣaḥ*. VK, p. 6.

366. SS, I, 304-5.



of *avidyā* which is the source of all superimpositions.<sup>367</sup> Brahman-Ātman is the content of *avidyā* and hence it is its substratum. Its direct experience, therefore, necessarily removes *avidyā*.

The mental state which arises from the major texts of the Upaniṣads in the form of Brahman-Ātman and which is thereby inspired by the reflection of Brahman-Ātman in it is termed the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. Brahman-Ātman as such cannot dispel *avidyā*; it is its witness. But when reflected in the mental state arising from the major texts of the Upaniṣads, it removes *avidyā*, just as the rays of the sun normally illuminating the grass burn the very grass when reflected through a lens.<sup>368</sup>

Now we shall deal with the means of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. There are two-fold means, namely, instrumental cause and auxiliary cause. The latter is again two-fold as remote means (*bahiraṅga-sādhana*) and proximate means (*antaraṅga-sādhana*).

Of the two auxiliary causes, the remote means to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman consists of those factors that have been prescribed in the scriptural text as indirectly helpful for the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman by giving rise to the desire for the latter (*vividiṣā*).<sup>369</sup> The Upaniṣadic text '*tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇāḥ vividiṣanti, yajñena dānena tapasā anāśakena*'<sup>370</sup> which means that 'the Brahmins seek to realize Brahman through the study of the Vedas, through sacrifices, through gifts, and through austerity and fasting' prescribes the performance of duties relating to one's stage and class of

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367. *adhiṣṭhānatvaṁ ca bhramajanakājñāna-viśayatvam, ajñāna-viśayatvamātraṁ vā*, VK, p. 53.

368. SLS, p. 492.

369. SS, III, 330.

370. Brh., IV, iv, 22.



life with reference to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. One's duties including the optional ones when performed as an offering to Īsvara remove the unseen demerit present in the mind of the aspirant which prevents the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>371</sup> Sarvajñātman holds that in the scriptural text cited above it is not the direct experience of Brahman but merely the desire for the same that is said to result from the performance of one's duties. The word *vividiṣanti* in the text consists of the root *vid* and the desiderative suffix *san* and it conveys that one's duties have for their object the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman which is the sense of the desiderative suffix. The desiderative suffix is used in the sense of desire on the basis of the *Pāṇini-sūtra* — *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkādicchāyām vā*.<sup>372</sup> One's duties are not employed with reference to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman which is the sense of the root *vid*. Pāṇini in another aphorism states as a general rule that the sense of the suffix is primary to that of the root.<sup>373</sup> Hence, here, direct experience of Brahman-Ātman being the sense of the root *vid* is not primary. One's duties, therefore, are not related to it.

It might be objected: Pāṇini supersedes the above general rule by stating the primary nature of the sense of the root in the aphorism — *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkādicchāyām vā*.<sup>374</sup> This aphorism means that the sense of the root being the object of desire, that is, the sense of the desiderative suffix, is primary. Hence one's duties are

371. SŚ, I, 64; III, 351, 353 and 355.

372. *Pāṇini-sūtra*, III, i, 7.

373. *pradhānapratyayārthavacanāṁ arthasya anyapramāṇatvāt*, *Pāṇini-sūtra*, I, ii, 56.

See SŚ, III, 334-5.

374. *Pāṇini-sūtra*, III, i, 7.



related to the sense of the root, that is, the direct experience of Brahman which is primary and not to the sense of the suffix, that is, the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.

Sarvajñātman refutes this objection by pointing out that the sense of the root is primary only by being the object of the sense of the suffix and hence its primary nature is only presumptively known. One's duties could have relation with the sense of the root, namely, direct experience of Brahman-Ātman only when the primary nature of the latter is verbally expressed. But here as its primary nature is only presumptively known, one's duties cannot have any relation to it. In the *sūtra* — *dhātoḥ karmanāḥ*, etc. there is no word that indicates whether the primary nature of the sense of the root is verbally expressed or presumptively known. Thus this aphorism does not supersede the general rule that the sense of the suffix is primary. Moreover, in this aphorism, Pāṇini says that the desiderative suffix should be used in the sense of desire and hence he means that the sense of desire alone is primary.

It follows from the above that the expression *vividiṣanti* means that the sense of the desiderative suffix, namely, the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman which is the sense of the root is primary. And hence one's duties prescribed in the text—*tametam vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇāḥ vividiṣanti, yajñena dānena tapasā anāśakena*<sup>375</sup> are related to the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>376</sup> It may be added here that Suresvara in his *Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika* and Vācaspati-misra in his *Bhāmātī* maintain this view.<sup>377</sup>

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375. *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22.

376. *SS*, III, 333-40.

377. *Samibandha-Vārtika*, 14.

*Bhāmātī* on *BSB*, I, i, 1.



Prakāśātman, on the other hand, holds that the emphasis should always be placed on the object of desire and not on the desire itself. He holds that the rule set forth by Pāṇini to the effect that the sense of the suffix is primary to that of the root is a general one. But in such worldly usage as 'He desires to go on a horse,' the means, namely, horse is understood to relate only to the object of desire, that is going and not to desire itself. In the same way, performance of one's duties relates only to knowledge, that is, the object of desire, and not to desire itself.<sup>378</sup>

It might be said that this view of Prakāśātman is in direct conflict with the view that the abandonment of one's duties is the means of attaining the direct experience of Brahman. But it is not so; for, according to Prakāśātman also one must perform one's duties till there arises in one's mind the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman; and they are to be given up after that state is attained.

The difference between Prakāśātman's view and the view of Suresvara, Sarvajñātman, and Vācaspatimīśra regarding the role of one's duties on the practical side of Advaita is this: according to Prakāśātman, performance of one's duties gives rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman through the desire for it; and hence in this theory the merit generated by the performance of one's duties persists till the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman arises, whereas according to Suresvara, Sarvajñātman, and Vācaspatimīśra the merit generated through the performance of one's duties disappears with the emergence of the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. According to both the views, however, one's duties should not be pursued after the rise of the desire for the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>379</sup>

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378. *Pañcapādikā—Vivaraṇa*, pp. 37, 543, 546, 554.

379. *SLS*, p. 408.



We shall now enquire into the process through which the desire for the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman arises by the performance of one's duties. The latter when performed as an offering to God remove the unseen demerit present in the mind of the aspirant preventing the rise of the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. Then there comes the intellectual conviction that Brahman-Ātman alone is real, and the world is not real. This intellectual conviction is termed *nityā'nitya-vastu-viveka*. This leads to absolute detachment towards enjoyment of objects here and hereafter. This is termed *ihāmutrārtha-bhoga-virāga*. This in turn, gives rise to what is known as *śamādi-sādhana-saṃpat*. These are *śama*, *dama*, *uparati*, *titikṣā*, *śamādhāna*, and *śraddhā*. Of these, the first two, namely, *śama* and *dama* respectively represent the control of the mind and of the senses. *Uparati* is renunciation in spirit. *Titikṣā* is fortitude — a form of courage shown in enduring opposites like heat and cold or pain and pleasure. *Samādhāna* is power of concentration and *śraddhā* is faith in the teaching of the Upaniṣads. These qualities when pursued give rise to the intense desire for release from *saṃsāra* which is termed *mumukṣutva*. The aspirant knows from a study of the Upaniṣads that the means to release is the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. His intense desire for release thus leads to the intense desire for its means, namely, the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. (*vividiṣā*).<sup>380</sup>

So far the discussion regarding the remote means. The proximate means, on the other hand, consists of those factors which are prescribed in the scriptural texts as directly helpful to the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>381</sup>

The Upaniṣadic text<sup>382</sup> speaks of asceticism as the most important factor contributing to the rise of the direct

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380. SS, Part I, p. 67.

381. SS, III, 330.

382. Brh., IV, iv, 22.



experience of Brahman-Ātman. The *Bhagavad-gītā* states:<sup>383</sup> 'duties are useful to one who wants to get the desire to have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman; and, in the case of one who has attained the said desire, renunciation of all activities is the means for attaining the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.' Thus renunciation of all activities which is known as *sarva-karma-sannyāsa* or *vividiṣā-sannyāsa* is one of the means that are proximate to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.

The other group of proximate means are *śama*, *dama*, *uparati*, *titikṣa samādhāna*, and *śraddhā*. The Upaniṣadic text<sup>384</sup> prescribes these as the means to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. These have been explained before. The author of the *Brahma-sūtra*<sup>385</sup> states that one must possess the proximate means as they are enjoined as the means to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman and till the rise of the latter they have necessarily to be pursued.

The Upaniṣadic text '*ātmā vā are dṛaṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*'<sup>386</sup> sets forth one more group of proximate means, namely, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* as the means for attaining the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. This text, according to some preceptors teach abstinence from external activities. Since this is not possible in the absence of activity in the form of Vedāntic study (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), and meditation (*nididhyāsana*), the latter are presumptively implied in the text cited above and are not prescribed. Some other preceptors hold that by the numerous Upaniṣadic texts which enjoin renunciation, it is conveyed as a general rule that the aspirant must abstain from all activities. However, the Upaniṣadic text cited above supersedes the general rule and enjoins activity of the nature of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*.<sup>387</sup>

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383. *Bh*, G., VI, 3.

384. *Brh.*, IV, iv, 22.

385. *BS*, III, iv, 27.

386. *Brh.*, IV, v. 6.

387. *SS*, I, 74-84.



Of these, *śravaṇa* is mental activity in the form of inquiry into the import of the Upaniṣadic texts. *Manana* is mental activity in the form of arguing within oneself after knowing definitely what the Upaniṣads teach with a view to convince oneself that that teaching alone is true.<sup>388</sup> *Nididhyāsana* is the mental operation which consists in turning away one's mind from external objects and thereby maintaining the continuity of knowledge in the form 'I am Brahman' that has arisen from *śravaṇa* and *manana*.<sup>389</sup> *Śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* are thus mental activities and they must be pursued till one gets the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. As regards the nature of *nididhyāsana*, Sarvajñātman records the view of Suresvara which is as follows: 'the knowledge in the form 'I am Brahman' which arises after *śravaṇa* and *manana* and which is devoid of immediacy is *nididhyāsana*. It immediately leads to the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>390</sup> According to this view, *nididhyāsana* cannot be pursued like *śravaṇa* and *manana*, as it is only knowledge which gives rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman immediately.<sup>391</sup>

So far the discussion regarding the proximate means. We shall now enquire into their function; and for this purpose we must deal with the instrumental cause of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. Sarvajñātman holds

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388. *ibid.*, III, 344.

389. *ibid.*, III, 345.

*vide* ..... *tattvamādivakyajanyavṛttimadantaḥkaraṇasya brahmātmāikyaviśayatā, ... vijātiyapratyayaṁ akṛtvā ahaṁ brahmāsmīti brahmātmaviśaya-pratyayapṛavāhaḥ nididhyāsanamityarthaḥ*, *TB*, p. 1020.

390. *SS*, III, 346.

*vide* : *aparāyattabodho'tra nididhyāsanam ucyate*,

*Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*, II, iv, 217.

391. *asmin pakṣe śravaṇamananayoreva anuṣṭheyatvam, nididhyāsanam tu dirghakālam - anuṣṭhita - śravaṇa - manana - phalarūpa-nirṇayā - buddhiḥ yadā bhavati tadaiva sākṣātkāro bhavati iti nānuṣṭheyam, pūrvāsmiṁ pakṣe tu nididhyāsanamapi pṛthagānuṣṭheyamiti bhedaḥ*, *TB*, p. 1021.



that the major texts of the Upaniṣads are the instrumental cause of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. His view is based upon the theory that a sentence gives rise to the mediate knowledge of an object if the object is mediate, and it gives rise to the immediate knowledge of an object if the object is immediate. Here since Brahman-Ātman is always immediate, the Upaniṣadic texts give rise to the immediate knowledge or the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. According to this view, there arises first the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman in the form 'I am Brahman' from the major texts of the Upaniṣads. But it is not effective in dispelling *avidyā*, because the mind of the aspirant who has such a knowledge is confounded by latent impressions arisen from enjoyment of worldly objects (*viṣaya-bhogavāsanā*), doubt regarding the validity of the Upaniṣadic passages (*pramāṇāsambhāvanā*), contrary notion as regards the import of the Upaniṣadic texts (*prameyāsambhāvanā*) and an unconscious reassertion of old habits of thought (*viparītabhāvanā*) incompatible with the truth since learnt. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his preface to the third *adhyāya* of the present work points out that one group of proximate means consisting of *śama*, *dama*, etc. removes *viṣaya-bhogavāsanā*.<sup>392</sup> *Śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* respectively remove *pramāṇāsambhāvanā*, *prameyāsambhāvanā*, and *viparītabhāvanā*.<sup>393</sup> It may be added here that *nididhyāsana*, which according to Suresvara's view set forth above cannot be pursued, which is mediate knowledge in the form 'I am Brahman' and which immediately gives rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman, must be taken to remove *viparīta-bhāvanā* by its mere rise. Sannyāsa or renunciation from all activities which is another proximate means helps the aspirant to pursue *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* and thereby it is helpful to the

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392. SS, Part II, p. 146

393. *ibid.*; See SS, III, 340, 342.



rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>394</sup> These proximate means in their entirety should be pursued by the aspirant until all the impediments referred to above are removed. And the major texts of the Upaniṣads, when contemplated at this stage give rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman which is effective in annihilating *avidyā*. Thus, according to Sarvajñātman, the instrumental cause of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman is only the Upaniṣadic texts. The latter are intrinsically valid in giving rise to knowledge and so, if it were held that the proximate means help them in giving rise to knowledge, then they are exposed to the fault of losing their self-validity. The proximate means only remove the impediments that hinder the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman which has arisen already from the major texts of the Upaniṣads through dispelling *avidyā*.<sup>395</sup> The view that the major texts of the Upaniṣads alone are the instrumental cause of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman is known from the *Chāndogya* text which states that the son has attained the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman<sup>396</sup> following the instruction of his father in the form 'That thou art'.<sup>397</sup>

Vācaspatimīśra, on the other hand, states that the innate nature of a sentence is to give rise only to mediate knowledge. The Upaniṣadic texts also, in view of their being sentences, could give rise only to mediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. The proximate means when pursued remove the impediments present in the mind of the aspirant. And the mind which becomes freed from impediments gives rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. According to this view, the Upaniṣadic text 'Brahman does not come within the range of

394. *sannyāsaḥ śravaṇādyaavasaraḍānena jñānārthaḥ, Gāḍhārthadīpikā*, p. 242.

395. *SS*, I, 14-19.

396. *taddhāsyā vijajñāu, Chānd.*, VI, xvi, 3.

397. *tattvamasi, ibid.*, VI, ix, 4.

For details See *SS*, III, 299-303.



mind<sup>398</sup> means that the mind which is not free from impediments cannot give rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. And the Upaniṣadic text 'It should be realized through mind alone'<sup>399</sup> states that the mind which is free from impediments gives rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.

It may be said that the *Chāndogya* texts which state that the son attained the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman<sup>400</sup> following the instruction by his father of the major text 'That thou art'<sup>401</sup> shows that the major texts of the Upaniṣads alone are the cause of the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. In the same way, the Upaniṣadic text 'I ask about the Puruṣa who could be known from the Upaniṣads'<sup>402</sup> speaks of Puruṣa, that is Brahman-Ātman, as one to be known only from the Upaniṣads. But according to Vācaspatimisra's view all these texts would mean this much, namely, that the true nature of Brahman-Ātman could be known only from the Upaniṣads. That knowledge could only be mediate, as sentences could give rise only to mediate knowledge; and, it becomes immediate through mind.<sup>403</sup> Thus according to Vācaspatimisra, mind alone is the instrumental cause for the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. It may be added here that the view which holds the major texts of the Upaniṣads to be the instrumental cause of Brahman-Ātman is the prevalent one in Advaita.

Sarvajñātman points out that *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* along with *sama*, *dama*, etc. when pursued by ascetics remove the impediments present in their minds, and the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman, effective in dispelling *avidyā*, arises in this life itself, provided there is

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398. *Tait.*, II, 4.

399. *Kaṭh.*, IV, 11.

400. *Chānd.*, VI, xvi, 3.

401. *ibid.*, VI, ix, 4.

402. *Bṛh.*, III, xii, 6.

403. See *ARR*, p. 45.



no obstruction to its rise by a variety of *prārabdhakarma*. If there is such obstruction, knowledge does arise to them in the next life<sup>404</sup> irrespective of the stage of life which they lead then.<sup>405</sup> Sarvajñātman then points out that those who have not taken up asceticism can practise *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* daily at the time they are free from the performance of obligatory rites. They, however, do not attain the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman in this life; but they attain it in the next life, and that too, only after adopting the ascetic stage of life. Thus Sarvajñātman speaks of asceticism as the necessary condition for attaining the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman.<sup>406</sup>

The direct experience of Brahman-Ātman is directly opposed to *avidyā* and hence it dispels *avidyā* by its mere rise. *Jīva* is then freed from the bonds of *saṁsāra*. The Upaniṣadic text is explicit in this that the direct experience of Brahman Ātman enables one to attain the freedom from the bonds of *saṁsāra* here and now.<sup>407</sup>

Now there arises the question whether the aspirant who has attained the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman is dissociated from his physical and psychical accompaniments at once, or he continues to live in the body till his past deeds which have started yielding their fruits and which have given rise to the present body are exhausted. If the latter position is held, then such a one is known as a *jīvanmukta* or the one who is liberated and yet alive. And this state is known as *jīvanmukti*.

Before we discuss this question, we may state in passing that the prerogative of *jīvanmukta* is to keep alive the Advaitic tradition for the benefit of posterity. The Upaniṣadic text 'one who has a teacher directly experiences

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404. SS, III, 349-50.

405. *ibid.*, III, 361.

406. *ibid.*, III, 359.

407. *Kaṭh*, II, iii, 14.



Brahman-Ātman'<sup>408</sup> and the *Bhagavad-gītā* text 'The preceptors who have the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman impart the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman'<sup>409</sup> are clear in stating that a preceptor is necessary in order to preserve and propagate the Advaitic tradition. The *Bhagavad-gītā* text cited above is more specific in stating that that preceptor must be a realized soul. The truth of Brahman cannot be conveyed by one who has not realized that truth or by one who has realized that truth but is disembodied. It follows from this that he alone who has the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman and is embodied at the same time could impart the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman to others — the bound souls. Such a one is a *jīvanmukta*.

From what has been said above it would be clear that a *jīvanmukta* has the specific function of imparting the knowledge of Brahman to the bound souls. This would hold good only when the theory of the existence of many individual souls (*aneka-jīva-vāda*) is admitted. But according to the theory of only one individual soul (*eka-jīva-vāda*), the knowledge of Brahman arises to the only *jīva* from the preceptor, the Upaniṣads, and from the worship of Īśvara although these are only apparently real (*prātibhāsika-satya*). The preceptor is a fictitious creation and he is fancied to be a realized soul.<sup>410</sup> As there exists only one *jīva*, it alone is entitled to liberation. Hence the scriptural passages dealing with the liberation of Śuka and others are intended to glorify the state of liberation. The point that is of profound importance in this view is that the only *jīva* after attaining the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman is immediately dissociated from his physical and psychical accompaniments and remains as Brahman-Ātman. He does not remain as a *jīvanmukta*, for apart from him there is no other soul to whom he could impart the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman.

408. *Chānd.*, IV, xiv, 2.

409. *Bh. G.*, IV, 34.

410. *na ca upadeṣṭurabhāvah., kalpitasya tasya sadbhāvāt*, *ARR*, p. 45.



Sarvajñātman admits the *eka-jīva-vāda* also; and from that stand-point he says that the concept of *jīvānmukti* does not hold good and the one who has attained the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman is freed from physical and psychical accompaniments and remains as Brahman. This is known as *sadyomukti* or *vīdehamukti*.<sup>411</sup>

According to the *aneka-jīva-vāda* which is also admitted by Sarvajñātman the concept of *jīvanmukti* does hold good. The Upaniṣadic text 'One who has got the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman has to wait to be Brahman-Ātman till the final fall of one's body; and after the fall of the body one remains as Brahman-Ātman'<sup>412</sup> expressly states the concept of *jīvanmukti*. We shall now deal with this in some detail.

In the case of one who has attained the direct experience of Brahman, the merits (*punya*) and demerits (*pāpa*) accumulated in the innumerable previous births and also in this life before the rise of the direct experience of Brahman are annihilated. The Upaniṣadic text 'Just as the upper part of a reed thrown into fire is completely burnt, so also all his sins are burnt away'<sup>413</sup> and the Upaniṣadic text 'He transcends both merits and demerits'<sup>414</sup> states that merits and demerits accumulated in the past life and also prior to the rise of knowledge of Brahman are annihilated by the knowledge of Brahman. Further there is no possibility of the rise of any merit or demerit in future to the knower of Brahman; for, merit and demerit would arise by performing prescribed and interdicted actions respectively with attachment in the form 'I am the agent of this action'. But the one who has

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411. *SS*, II, 225, 227, 288; IV, 37-8.

*vide also* : *tathā ca ekājñānavāḍīpakṣe ayamārthaḥ saṃpannaḥ yat sadyomuktiriti*, *ARR*, p. 45.

412. *Chānd.*, VI, xiv, 2.

413. *ibid.*, V, xxiv, 3.

414. *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 2.



the direct experience of Brahman has no idea of any agency whatsoever with regard to any action that may occur in future. Hence there is no possibility of the rise of any merit or demerit in future in his case. It is with this in view that the *Chāndogyo'paniṣad* passage 'As water does not stick to a lotus leaf, even so sin does not cling to one who has realized Brahman'<sup>415</sup> states that a future sin that might be expected to arise by performance of activities does not arise in the case of one who has realized Brahman. The word 'sin' in the Upaniṣadic text must be taken to convey the sense of merit also; for the result of merit like that of sin, is inferior to the fruit of the direct experience of Brahman.<sup>416</sup>

It follows from the above that the knowledge of Brahman destroys past merits and demerits, and since it removes the sense of agency no future merit or demerit clings to the one who has realized Brahman.<sup>417</sup>

There is one important point to be noted in this connection. When it is said that the past merits and demerits of a person are destroyed, we have to make a distinction between two kinds of past merits and demerits, namely, *sañcita* — the merits and demerits which have not fructified, and *prārabdha* — the merits and demerits which have begun to yield their results and have produced the body through which a person has attained knowledge. The *Brahma-sūtra*<sup>418</sup> states that the merits and demerits which have not fructified are annihilated by the direct experience of Brahman. But the merits and demerits which have started giving their results and which have produced the body through which a person has attained the direct experience of Brahman are not annihilated by

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415. IV, xiv, 3.

416. *yatrāpi kevala eva pāpma śabdo drśyate, tatrāpi tenaiva punyamapi ākalitamiti draṣṭavyam, jñānaphalāpekṣayā nikṛṣṭaphalatvāt,*  
BSB, IV, i, 14.

417. BS, IV, i, 13-14.

418. *ibid*, IV, i, 15.



the latter. Knowledge could arise to an individual soul only when it is embodied. And body is produced by merits and demerits which have evidently started yielding their results. When it is thus clear that the rise of knowledge is based upon the body produced by merits and demerits that have started yielding their results, it is but natural that knowledge cannot annihilate the latter. Such an individual who is free from the accumulated merits and demerits that have not fructified and who is living out only his fructified merits and demerits is called a *jīvanmukta* — one who is liberated while embodied. His body continues to exist by the merits and demerits that are fructified.

Now it is necessary to deal with the factor that sustains the fructified deeds. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* sets forth two views. The first view is that it is *saṁskāra* or a residuum of *avidyā* after the latter has been removed by the direct experience of Brahman that sustains the fructified deeds. This he explains by means of a simile. Just as the fragrance of flowers persists in the vessel even after the flowers have been taken away, so also a residuum of *avidyā* (*saṁskāra*) persists even after it has been removed. This *saṁskāra* is present in the pure consciousness, that is, the released soul.<sup>419</sup> The other view is: of the two powers of *avidyā*, namely, *āvaraṇa-śakti* and *vikṣepa-śakti*, it is only the *āvaraṇa-śakti* that is removed by the direct experience of Brahman. The *vikṣepa-śakti*, however, persists even after the rise of the direct experience of Brahman and this residual portion of *avidyā* is termed *avidyāleśa*. This sustains the fructified deeds that account for the continuance of the body in the case of a *jīvanmukta*. This explanation Madhusūdana Sarasvatī gives in his commentary on the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*.<sup>420</sup> This *vikṣepa-śakti* has three aspects. Of these, one gives rise to the notion that the universe is absolutely real. The second

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419. AS, p. 890.

420. SS, IV, 40.



one gives rise to the notion that the universe, though not absolutely real, is empirically real. That is, the objects of the universe, can be adapted to practical needs of life. These two powers are removed respectively by *nididhyā-sana* in the form 'I am Brahman' and by the direct experience of Brahman which results from the major texts of the Upaniṣads at the end of *nididhyā-sana*. The third one gives rise to the apparent presentation of the universe; and it is not annihilated by the direct experience of Brahman. It is *avidyā* associated with this power and divested of the other two powers that is termed *avidyāleśa*.<sup>421</sup> It is this *avidyāleśa* that sustains the fructified deeds which, in turn, accounts for the embodied existence of the one who has got the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman. The latter removes the *avidyāleśa* when the fructified deeds are exhausted by experiencing their results.

The view as regards the three aspects of *avidyā* and their removal is based upon the following Upaniṣadic text:

*kṣaram pradhānam amṛtākṣaram haraḥ  
kṣarātmānau īśate deva ekaḥ  
tasya abhidhyānāt yojanāt tattvabhāvāt  
bhūyaścānte viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ.*<sup>422</sup>

This text means : *avidyā* is mutable. The one self-luminous Brahman (when reflected in *avidyā*) is Īśvara; the latter is immutable and immortal and it controls *avidyā* and the individual souls. The meditation upon Brahman (*abhidhyāna*) as 'I am Brahman' removes that aspect of *avidyā* which gives rise to the erroneous notion that duality is absolutely real. By the direct experience of Brahman (*yojanāt*) that aspect of *avidyā* which gives rise to the notion that the objects of the world are empirically real is removed. Again, in the end, that is, when the fructified deeds are exhausted (*ante*) there results from the

421. *AS*, p. 891.

422. *Śvet.*, I, 10.



direct experience of Brahman the removal of *avidyā* in its entirety, that is, without any remnant (*viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ*). Madhusūdana Sarasvatī adds that the expression *ante viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ* which means that *avidyā* in its entirety is removed when the fructified deeds are exhausted suggests that before the exhaustion of the fructified deeds there has been the removal of *avidyā* only in certain of its aspects.<sup>423</sup>

The *jīvanmukta*'s life has two phases : it is either *samādhi* when he turns inwards and loses himself in Brahman; or the condition known as *vyutthāna* or reversion to empirical life when he wakes back to variety. The world does appear to him then; but it does not delude him, since he has once for all realized its falsity. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* says : 'one who has realized his identity with Brahman does not have the worldly experience *just as before*, whereas one who considers the world to be real and deluded by it has not realized his identity with Brahman.'<sup>424</sup> Such a one known as *jīvanmukta*, in order to be Brahman waits for nothing else but the extinction of the merits and demerits that have already begun to fructify and have produced the body through which he has attained the knowledge of Brahman. The *Brahma-sūtra*<sup>425</sup> states that the merits and demerits which have begun to bear fruit are exhausted only by experiencing their fruits. And then *avidyāleśa* or *avidyā-saṃskāra* — the sustaining factor of the fructified

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423. *tasya... brahmaṇaḥ ābhimukhyena ahaṃ brahmāsmīti evānṛpāt dhyānāt.....dvaitasatyatvabhramahetubhūtaḥ māyāleśaḥ nivartate; tataḥ dhyānaparīpakasākṣātkārāt yojanāt, dvaita vyāvahārikasattvabhramahetubhūtamāyāleśo nivartate, bhūyaśca tattvabhāvāt anūṛtapārṇabrahmātmatvarūpasvabhāvāt ante prārabdhakarmaṇām bhogena kṣaye dvaita prātibhāsikasattvabhramahetubhūtamāyāleśasyaśaśiṣṭasya nivṛttiḥ.....atra ante viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ iti uktatvāt prāgapi sāvāśeṣamāyānivṛttiḥ pratiyate.....*

SS, Part II, p. 385.

424. BSB, I, i, 4.

425. BS, IV, i, 14 and 19.



merits and demerits is annihilated by the continuing knowledge of Brahman. The body of the *jīvanmukta* then falls off and he becomes Brahman itself. This is *videhamukti*. And Brahman which is pure consciousness and absolute bliss is free from *avidyā* and bodily organisms then. This is liberation.

To sum up: *Avidyā* veils the true nature of Brahman-Ātman. The direct experience of Brahman-Ātman which arises from the major texts of the Upaniṣads and which becomes free from the four-fold impediments present in the mind of the aspirant by the observance of the proximate means brings about the removal of *avidyā*. Thereby Brahman-Ātman manifests in its true nature of absolute bliss and consciousness which is liberation.

## CONCLUSION

Sarvajñātman has distinct views on the important Advaitic concepts, and they have considerable importance in the historical development of Advaita. His merits appear most clearly when he is contrasted with other Advaitic writers like Padmapāda, Maṇḍana-Suresvara, and Vācaspatimiśra.

Sarvajñātman's most important contribution is his view regarding the locus and content of *avidyā*. He holds<sup>426</sup> that the pure consciousness is the locus and content of *avidyā* as against Vācaspatimiśra who maintains that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*, while Brahman is its content. The latter view is refuted by Sarvajñātman on the ground that the notion of individual soul derives its existence from *avidyā* and as such it is posterior to *avidyā*. The latter cannot abide in a substratum which is decidedly subsequent to it. Sarvajñātman further contends<sup>427</sup> that the pure

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426. *ŚŚ*, I, 319.

427. *ibid.*, II, 211-212.



consciousness is the locus and content of *avidyā* neither in its absolute form, nor in its blissful form, but in the form of inner self (*pratyakcāitanya*). This he proves on the basis of the experience 'I do not know myself'. It is Sarvajñātman who explains the apparently contradictory statements of Śrī Śaṅkara regarding the presence of *avidyā* in Brahman in deep sleep. To any serious student of Advaita, the contradiction in the statements of Śrī Śaṅkara, namely, *avidyā* does not exist in the state of deep sleep and *avidyā* exists in Brahman in that state<sup>428</sup> remained unsolved. And, Sarvajñātman explains<sup>429</sup> this view of Śrī Śaṅkara by stating that *avidyā* is not determinately perceived in the form 'I do not know myself' in the state of deep sleep and it is with this view that Śrī Śaṅkara has said that *avidyā* does not exist in that state. Really it exists in that state in Brahman-Ātman, as it is evident from the reminiscent experience in the form 'I did not know anything when I was asleep.'<sup>430</sup> Similarly Sarvajñātman explains Śrī Śaṅkara's statement<sup>431</sup> that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*, by contending<sup>432</sup> that *avidyā* though present only in the pure consciousness is revealed in the form 'I am ignorant' by the intellect which is the limiting adjunct of the individual soul. It is well-known that the nature of a revealing medium is such that what is revealed through it appears as though present in the medium itself. The mirror which reflects the face appears to contain the face. In the same way, the intellect which is the revealing medium of *avidyā* reveals it as present in itself and consequently in the consciousness delimited by it, that is, the individual soul. *Avidyā*, however, is present in the pure consciousness.

Sarvajñātman's contribution to the theory of the nature of Brahman also is noteworthy. Relying on the method of gathering the unrepeated words found in the

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428. *ibid.*, III, 125-126.

429. *ibid.*, III, 123.

430. *ibid.*, III, 120-122.

431. *ibid.*, II, 175.

432. *ibid.*



affirmative Upaniṣadic texts to arrive at the exact nature of Brahman, the method prescribed by the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* in the aphorism *ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya*,<sup>433</sup> Sarvajñātman affirms that on the whole only ten words convey the essential nature of Brahman in an affirmative manner. And those words are: *nitya*, *śuddha*, *buddha*, *mukta*, *satya*, *sūkṣma*, *sat*, *vibhu*, *advitīya*, and *ānanda*.<sup>434</sup> This same method is adopted in the case of the negative texts also. But, Sarvajñātman suggests that as the elements that are to be negated in Brahman are numerous, the words found even in all the negative Upaniṣadic passages are not exhaustive and hence many words should be gathered.

Herein arises the question of the relation between the affirmative and negative Upaniṣadic passages. Sarvajñātman considers two views — one advocated by Maṇḍana, the other by Padmapāda. The former holds<sup>435</sup> that the negative Upaniṣadic passages are primary, while the affirmative ones are secondary. Padmapāda, on the other hand, holds<sup>436</sup> that the absence of duality in Brahman presumptively known from the knowledge of the absolute nature of Brahman arising from the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages, is restated by the negative Upaniṣadic passages. Thus the latter are secondary, while the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages are primary. While Sarvajñātman accepts this view as highly commendable, faultless, and desirable, he refutes<sup>437</sup> the former view on the ground that the negative Upaniṣadic passages cannot directly convey Brahman as of the nature of bliss, etc. Sarvajñātman, however, advances<sup>438</sup> his own view that the negative Upaniṣadic passages, by denying all duality, confirm the knowledge of the absolute nature of Brahman arisen from the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages. This view seems to be an improvement on that of Padmapāda.

433. *BS*, III, iii, 11.

434. *SS*, I, 173.

435. *ibid.*, I, 250-1.

436. *ibid.*, I, 257.

437. *ibid.*, I, 253-4.

438. *ibid.*, I, 263.



The question whether lordship is natural to Brahman or not is answered<sup>439</sup> in the negative by Sarvajñātman, on the ground that lordship involves a reference to the controlled beings; and whichever is dependent on something else is illusory, and hence lordship, being illusory, cannot be natural to Brahman. This conclusion seems contrary to the view of the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, who in the aphorism *parābhidyānāttu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau*<sup>440</sup> holds that lordship is natural to Brahman. Sarvajñātman, with a refreshing independence of judgment, points out<sup>441</sup> that the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* has said so from the opponent's stand-point and it is not his final view. And to substantiate this point, he refers<sup>442</sup> to the other aphorism *kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ*<sup>443</sup> which treats lordship on a par with attributes like possession of desire, etc., which cannot be said to be natural to the attributeless Brahman. Hence, Sarvajñātman holds<sup>444</sup> that Brahman is eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, real, subtle, existent, all-pervasive, absolute, and bliss. And herein lies Sarvajñātman's contribution to the theory of the nature of Brahman.

As regards the elucidation of the nature of Īśvara and *jīva*, Sarvajñātman adopts the well-known theory, the *pratibimba-vāda*, and in this he seems to have been influenced by the view of Padmapāda.

Coming to the practical side of Advaita, Sarvajñātman speaks<sup>445</sup> of asceticism as a necessary condition for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. He holds<sup>446</sup> that the remote means, namely, the performance of rituals including the

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439. *ibid.*, III, 151-170.

444. *SS*, I, 173.

440. *BS*, III, ii, 15.

445. *ibid.*, III, 358-361.

441. *SS*, III, 175.

446. *ibid.*, I, 64; III, 330-340.

442. *ibid.*, III, 177.

443. *BS*, III, iii, 39.



optional ones (*kāmya-karma*) leads to the desire to know Brahman; and after this result is achieved the remote means should not be pursued. Again, Sarvajñātman holds<sup>447</sup> that the Upaniṣadic texts alone give rise to the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman; and *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* remove the impediments which are present in the intellect of the aspirant who has such a knowledge and which hinder the knowledge from becoming effective in dispelling *avidyā*.

Sarvajñātman's relation to the schools of thought other than Advaita deserves to be mentioned. He is mainly concerned with criticising the doctrine of *niyoga* held by the Prābhākara school, and the doctrine of *bhāvanā* maintained by the Kumārila school. His criticism<sup>448</sup> of the doctrine of *niyoga* is original, and he is so well-versed in the Pūrvaṃīmāṃsā school that he cites the *bhāṣya* texts of Śabara and points out<sup>449</sup> that the doctrine of *niyoga* is contrary to the latter. And his criticism<sup>450</sup> of the doctrine of *bhāvanā* also is amazingly logical.

Summing up, Sarvajñātman as a philosopher has a considerable historical importance. His main contribution to Advaita rests in his clear exposition, in verses, of Śrī Śaṅkara's views stated in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*. His work is entitled *Śaṅkṣepaśārīraka*; and the title is very significant, as throughout the work, Śrī Śaṅkara's phrases and arguments recur. He is most concerned with finding a way of reconciling the apparent contrary statements of Śrī Śaṅkara. His treatise is systematic, critical, and without any trace of dogmatic assertion. He does accept the foundations laid by his predecessors, yet he makes improvement on them. He is best in detail and in criticism. His style is easy and unpedantic. He has an admirable

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447. *ibid.*, III, 299.

448. *ibid.*, I, 343-69.

449. *ibid.*, I, 354, 472.

450. *ibid.*, I, 385-99.



literary sense, and, in fact, only several centuries after Sarvajñātman the world could produce Vidyāraṇya, who like Sarvajñātman, wrote in verses on the Advaitic concepts in an admirable way. Sarvajñātman is a great philosopher who influenced profoundly the Advaita thought in the subsequent ages. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* characterizes him as one who knows the traditional interpretation of the Advaita Vedānta. His views are respectfully cited by Appayya Dīkṣita, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, and Brahmānanda Sarasvatī. It is heartening to see that he has been followed by a galaxy of Preceptors of Advaita in the great *Kāmakoti-pīṭha* of Ādi Śaṅkara which continues to shed its lustre on humanity even to the present day.

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## Part II: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES



PART II: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES



॥ संक्षेपशारीरकम् ॥

॥ प्रथमोऽध्यायः ॥

INVOCATION

[ 1 ]

अनृतजडविरोधि रूपमन्तत्रयमलबन्धनदुःखताविरुद्धम् ।  
अतिनिकटमविक्रियं मुरारेः परमपदं प्रणयादभिष्टवीमि ॥

I devoutly praise the supreme status of Viṣṇu — the enemy of the demon named Murā — whose nature is opposed to what is unreal and insentient, which is free from the three limitations (of time, space, and objects), and is like-wise free from impurity, bondage, and misery, and which is immediate, and immutable.

The ultimate reality is sometimes represented in the Upaniṣadic texts as Brahman — the all-pervading principle, and, at other times, as Ātman — the inner consciousness of the individual soul. In this verse, an invocation is addressed to Brahman which appears as God (*Īśvara*), the individual soul (*jīva*), and the phenomenal world, through the veil of *avidyā* which is superimposed on it, and which consists of three strands of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. Brahman reflected in *avidyā* is God. The latter, although one, is designated by such terms as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Siva representing His creating, maintaining, and destroying aspects respectively, according to the preponderance of *rajas*, *sattva*, or *tamas*. Brahman reflected in mind — the product of *avidyā* — is the individual soul, while Brahman which serves as the original (*bīmba*) is pure; and it is the supreme form of both God and the individual soul. (See Introduction, p. 103). The latter when divested of their respective qualities superimposed on them by *avidyā* and its product are identical with the supreme reality which is Brahman.



[ 2 ]

स्वाज्ञानकल्पितजगत्परमेश्वरत्व-  
 जीवत्वभेदकलुषीकृतभूमभावा ।  
 स्वाभाविकस्वमहिमस्थितिस्तमोहा  
 प्रत्यक्चित्तिर्विजयते भुवनैकयोनिः ॥

Pre-eminent shines the inner consciousness which is the sole cause of the universe; whose infiniteness is marred by the diversity of the universe, supreme lordship, and the nature of the embodied soul that are superimposed on it by its *avidyā*; which stands aloft on its permanent and natural eminence; and which is unaffected by *avidyā*.

This verse is an invocation addressed to Ātman. The latter is undifferentiated consciousness; and, it is the locus and object of *avidyā* (SS, I, 319). *Avidyā* veils the Ātman and illusorily presents it in the forms of God, the individual soul, and the phenomenal world. (SS, I, 20). Ātman is identical with Brahman; and, depending on *avidyā* abiding in it, it is the source of the universe. (SS, I, 323).

[ 3 ]

प्रत्यक्प्रमाणकमसत्यपराक्प्रभेदं  
 प्रक्षीणकारणविकारविभागमेकम् ।  
 चैतन्यमात्रपरमार्थनिजस्वभावं  
 प्रत्यञ्चमच्युतमहं प्रणतोऽस्मि नित्यम् ॥

I ever bow humbly to the immutable Brahman which is identical with Ātman — the inner consciousness; which is self-evident; in which the difference from the external world is sublated; and in which the cause, (that is, *avidyā*), and its modifications are annihilated; which is one and whose true nature is pure consciousness.



[ 4 ]

औपत्तिकी शक्तिरशेषवस्तुप्रकाशने कार्यवशेन यस्याः ।

विज्ञायते विश्वविवर्तहेतोर्नमामि तां वाचमचिन्त्यशक्तिम् ॥

I salute the Speech (of the form of Veda) which possesses inconceivable power; which arises<sup>1</sup> from the transfigurative material cause of the universe (that is, Brahman), and whose innate power of imparting the knowledge of the supreme Brahman<sup>2</sup> is known from the effect (namely, the rise of the direct experience of Brahman-Ātman).

1. *vide Bṛh.*, II, iv, 10.

2. *aśeṣavastuprakāśane — śeṣaḥ parārthaḥ aparārthasarvapradhāna-bhūṭacidātma - vastuprakāśane [S]*

[ 5 ]

प्रारम्भाः फलिनः प्रसन्नहृदयो यश्चेत्तिरश्चामपि

नो चेद्विश्वसृजोऽप्यलं विफलतामायान्त्युपायोद्यमाः ।

विश्वैश्वर्यमतो निरङ्कुशमभूद्यस्यैव विश्वप्रभोः

सोऽयं विश्वहिते रतो विजयते विघ्नेश्वरो विश्वकृत् ॥

Pre-eminent shines Lord Gaṇeśa. When He is kindly disposed the endeavours of even the lower animals give forth infallible results and when not gracious the efforts of even the Lord of creation to attain the desired objects become thoroughly futile. His sovereignty over the universe is unimpeded; He is the Lord as well as the

1. आरम्भाः—B.



creator of this universe<sup>1</sup> and He is keen on the prosperity of this universe.

1. *viśvakṛt — viśvasya kartā tatkartṛṇām prajāpatīnām vighnāpaharaṇāt...viśvakartā ityarthah. [AP].*

[ 6 ]

वाग्विस्तरा यस्य बृहत्तरङ्गा वेलातटं वस्तुनि तत्त्वबोधः ।  
रत्नानि तर्कप्रसरप्रकाराः पुनात्वसौ व्यासपयोनिधिर्नः ॥

May the sage Vyāsa who is like the ocean purify us. He, whose extensive speeches are the high waves; the true knowledge of Reality is the shore; and whose modes of the application of reasoning are the gems.

[ 7 ]

वक्तारमासाद्य यमेवं नित्या सरस्वती स्वार्थसमन्वि<sup>1</sup>तासीत् ।  
निरस्तदुस्तर्ककलङ्कपङ्का नमामि तं शङ्करमर्चिताङ्घ्रिम् ॥

I salute Śrī Śaṅkara whose feet were worshipped by all; and on obtaining that exponent the eternal speech—the Veda—became possessed of its true import, as from it the fallacious reasoning, metaphorically, the dirt and loose clay, has been removed.

[ 8 ]

यदीयसंपर्कमवाप्य केवलं वयं कृतार्था निरवद्यकीर्तयः ।  
जगत्सु ते तारितशिष्यपङ्क्तयो जयन्ति देवेश्वरपादरेणवः ॥

1. व्ता स्यात्—M<sub>1</sub>



Pre-eminent shine the particles of dust which stuck to the feet of Śrī Suresvara and which helped the series of disciples to cross the ocean of transmigration; and on merely getting their contact we, the pupils, have achieved our purpose and spotless fame in this world.

[ 9 ]

गुरुचरणसरोजसंनिधानादपि वयमस्य गुणैकलेशभाजः ।  
अपि महति जलार्णवे निमग्नाः सलिलमुपाददते मितं हि मीनाः ॥

Though we are in the proximity of the lotus-like feet of the preceptor we share only a bit of his virtues, like the fish which, though immersed in the ocean, take in only a small measure of water.

[ 10 ]

शक्तो गुरोश्चरणयोर्निकटे निवासान्नारायणस्मरणतश्च निरन्तरायः ।  
शारीरकार्थविषयावगतिप्रधानं संक्षेपतः प्रकरणं करवाणि हृष्यन् ॥

On account of my residing in the vicinity of my preceptor's feet, I have become competent (to write this treatise). The obstacles (that are likely to occur in attempts like this) have been removed by my preceptor's contemplation on Lord Nārāyaṇa. Gladdened (by this) as I am, I shall compose briefly this treatise that has for its main purpose the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman which is the fruit as well as the subject-matter of the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

[ 11 ]

पदवाक्यमाननिपुणा निपुणं विमृशन्त्वित्दं प्रकरणं मनसा ।  
गुणदोषनिर्णयनिमित्ततया प्रथिता हि पण्डितजना जगति ॥



Let the learned in grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and logic intelligently review this treatise with attention. For, in this world learned men are well-known as being the means of deciding the excellence and defect (of any work).

[ 12 ]

विद्वांसो यदि मम दोषमुद्दिरेयुर्यद्वा ते गुणगणमेव कीर्तयेयुः ।  
तुल्यं तद्वहु मनुते मनो मदीयं कष्टं 'तद्वत् मनुते यदाह मन्दः ॥

If learned men point out the defects or praise the excellences in my work, my mind highly considers them both as equal. Alas! it considers as pitiable what a dull person points out.

Learned men by pointing out defects in a work help the author to rectify those defects; and their words of praise about the work are a source of encouragement. It is in this sense our author says that he highly values the criticisms as well as the words of praise of the learned men as being equal.

[ 13 ]

महामहिम्नामपि यश्चिकीर्षति स्वभावसंशुद्धतरं तिरो यशः ।  
स नूनमाच्छादयितुं प्रवर्तते विवस्वतो हस्ततलेन मण्डलम् ॥

He, who wishes to put aside the reputation—very pure in nature, of the persons having exalted intellectual power, certainly attempts to conceal the orb of the sun with the palm of the hand.



## RESULT OF INQUIRY

[ 14 ]

पुरुषापराधमलिना धिषणा निरवद्यचक्षुरुदयापि यथा ।

न फलाय 'भर्तुर्विषया भवति श्रुतिसंभवापि तु तथात्मनि धीः॥

Just as the cognition though arising from a faultless eye and relating to *Bharchu*<sup>1</sup> but being obscured by the fault of a person, does not lead to determination in regard to *Bharchu* so also the cognition of Brahman arising from the infallible Veda, being coloured by the predilections of man does not become fruitful (by dispelling *avidyā*).

1. *Bharchu*, a favourite minister of a king was led to a forest by those who were jealous of him, and he was reported dead to the king. Later, the king happened to see him in the forest, and he mistook him for a devil. Here the point of illustration is : the knowledge relating to *Bharchu* arises through a faultless eye. But it does not lead to the determination in the form 'This is *Bharchu*', because of the contrary notion that *Bharchu* was dead. Similarly, the knowledge of Brahman arising from the infallible Upaniṣadic sentences is not effective in dispelling *avidyā*, because the intellect of the person who has such a knowledge is confounded by the latent impression arisen from enjoyment of worldly objects, doubt regarding the validity of the Upaniṣadic passages, contrary notion as regards the import of the Upaniṣadic teaching, and an unconscious reassertion of old habits of thoughts incompatible with the truth since learnt.

The story of *Bharchu* is based upon the *Chāndogya* Upaniṣadic text VI, xiv, 1.

[ 15 ]

पुरुषापराधविगमे तु पुनः प्रतिबन्धकव्युदसनात् सफला ।

मणिमन्त्रयोरपगमे तु यथा सति पावकाद्भवति धूमलता ॥

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1. भर्तुर्विषया—P<sub>1</sub>



Just as there arises the column of smoke from fire, only after the removal of the counteracting jewel and the charm, so also the cognition of Brahman becomes fruitful after the removal of the defects (of the aspirant).

[ 16 ]

पुरुषापराधविनिवृत्तिफलः सकलो विचार इति वेदविदः ।  
अनपेक्षतामनुपरोध्य गिरः फलवद्भवेत् प्रकरणं तदतः ॥

Without denying the self-validity of the Vedic texts, experts in the Veda maintain that the entire science of inquiry, (namely, the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*) has for its purpose the removal of personal predilection. Hence this treatise would become fruitful.

It is concluded in the *Jaimini-sūtra—autpattikastu śabdasya arthena saṁbandhaḥ.....arthe'nupalabdhe tatpramāṇam bādarāyaṇa-syānapekṣitatvāt* (I, i. 5) that the Vedic texts are intrinsically valid in giving rise to the knowledge of their sense. If it is said that inquiry is helpful to the Vedic texts in giving rise to the cognition of their sense, then the Vedic texts are exposed to the fault of losing their intrinsic validity and thus there would arise conflict with the import of the aphorism cited above. Hence it is stated that inquiry only removes the defects present in the intellect of the aspirant.

[ 17 ]

पुरुषापराधशतसंकुलता विनिवर्तते प्रकरणेन गिरः ।  
स्वयमेव वेदशिरसो वचनादथ बुद्धिरुद्भवति मुक्तिफला ॥

The import of the Vedic texts is confused by hundreds of personal faults, and this confusion disappears as a result of this treatise. Then the cognition, having liberation as its fruit, arises from the Upaniṣadic texts without any extraneous aid.



[ 18 ]

स्वाध्यायवन्न करणं घटते विचारो  
 नाप्यङ्गमस्य परमात्मधियः प्रसूतौ ।  
 सापेक्षतापतति वेदगिरस्तथात्वे  
 ब्रह्मात्मनः प्रमितिजन्मनि तन्न युक्तम् ॥

In giving rise to the cognition of Brahman-Ātman, inquiry serves neither as the efficient cause like one's own Veda, nor as an ancillary to the Vedic text. For, in that case, absence of self-validity is liable to occur to Vedic text in giving rise to the knowledge of Brahman which is identical with Ātman. And, that is not proper.

[ 19 ]

व्युत्पन्नस्य हि बुद्धिजन्म सहसा वाक्यश्रुतौ दृश्यते  
 वाक्यार्थे न ततोऽस्ति बुद्धिजनने मीमांसनव्यापृतिः ।  
 तेनार्थात् करणादिभावभजने मीमांसनस्याश्रिते  
 वेदार्थप्रमितौ तु वेदवचसः सापेक्षतायास्यति ॥

Inquiry does not function in giving rise to the cognition of the sense of a sentence; for, it is seen that cognition arises to one well-trained in language, immediately on hearing a sentence. So if, by presumption inquiry is regarded as the efficient cause or accessory to it, then in giving rise to the valid cognition of its sense, the Vedic text is exposed to the fault of losing its self-validity.

AVIDYĀ

[ 20 ]

आच्छाद्य विक्षिपति संस्फुरदात्मरूपं  
 जीवेश्वरत्वजगदाकृतिभिर्मृषैव ।  
 अज्ञानमावरणविभ्रमशक्तियोगा-  
 दात्मत्वमात्रविषयाश्रयताबलेन ॥



*Avidyā*, owing to the strength of having the pure consciousness as its locus and content, comes to have a veiling and a transfiguring faculty. It veils the ever-luminous Brahman-Ātman, and (then) projects it illusorily in the form of embodied souls, God, and the phenomenal world.

[ 21 ]

प्रत्यक्त्वमात्रविषयाश्रयताबलेन प्रत्यक्स्वरूपमपिधाय पराग्विवर्तैः ।  
प्रत्यञ्चमद्वयमशेषविशेष<sup>१</sup>हीनं विक्षिप्य तिष्ठति तदग्रहणं मृषैव ॥

*Avidyā* partially conceals the nature of Ātman, owing to the strength of having it as its locus and content. It illusorily presents Ātman which is absolute and free from all differences, as the external world, etc. And *avidyā* is indeterminable (either as real or as unreal).

*Avidyā* conceals only the blissful form of Brahman-Ātman and not the consciousness aspect of it. It is only the latter that manifests *avidyā*. Hence it is said that *avidyā* partially conceals the nature of Ātman.

## THE NATURE OF THE SELF

[ 22 ]

प्रत्यक्षलिङ्गवचनानि हि दर्शयन्ति  
निर्दुःखनित्यसुखविग्रहतां प्रतीचः ।  
निर्दुःखनित्यसुखविग्रहभूम्नि नास्मिन्  
संभाव्यते दृशि पुरोदितमल्परूपम् ॥

Perception, inference, and verbal testimony ascertain that Ātman is free from misery, is eternal, and is of the nature of bliss. In this great one which is pure consciousness, free from misery, and which is eternal and of the

1. शून्यं १, २, १, ३



nature of bliss, the existence of the limited forms (namely, the form of God, the embodied soul, and the phenomenal world) previously mentioned<sup>1</sup> is unimaginable.

1. See ŚŚ, I, 2.

[ 23 ]

प्राज्ञे सुखं समनुभूय समुत्थितः सन्  
सर्वप्रकारविषयप्रतिपत्तिशून्ये ।

सुप्तोऽहमत्र सुखमित्यनुसंधानः

सर्वोऽपि जन्तुरवगच्छति तस्य सौख्यम् ॥

Having fully experienced the bliss in the state of deep sleep which is devoid of all types of cognition of objects, and having come to the waking condition, every one recollects 'I slept happily here'. Thus every being experiences the blissful form of Ātman.

Sarvajñātman sets forth the experience of every being which proves the blissful form of Ātman.

[ 24 ]

सर्वं यदर्थमिह वस्तु यदस्ति किञ्चित्  
पारार्थ्यमुज्झति च यन्निजसत्तयैव ।

तद्वर्णयन्ति हि सुखं सुखलक्षणज्ञा-

स्तत्प्रत्यगात्मनि समं सुखतास्य तस्मात् ॥

Experts describe happiness as one, with reference to which all objects in the world are ancillary and which by its very existence gives up the state of being an ancillary to anything else. That description is equally applicable to Ātman. Hence Ātman is of the nature of bliss.

Sarvajñātman in this and the following verse proves through inference that Ātman is of the nature of bliss.



The inferential argument put forth in this verse is as follows :

*ātmā sukhābhinnah sukhalakṣaṇavattvāt, vaiśayikasukhavat, SS.*

[ 25 ]

प्रेमानुपाधिरसुखात्मनि नोपलब्धः

स प्रत्यगात्मनि कृमेरपि नित्यसिद्धः ।

प्रेयःश्रुतेरपि ततः सुखतानुमानं

नैयायिकोऽपि न दृगात्मनि निह्वीत ॥

Absolute bliss is not found in the objects that are different from Ātman. It is ever experienced in the self of even an insect. This is established by the *preyaḥ śruti*.<sup>1</sup> So even the follower of the Nyāya system will not deny the inference of Ātman as being of the nature of happiness.

1. *Vide* 'This self is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, and is innermost' *Bṛh. I, iv, 8.*

The inferential argument put forth in this verse is as follows :

*ātmā sukham, anaupādhikagocaravāt, yannaivam tannaivam, yathā duḥkhādi, SS.*

[ 26 ]

आनन्दविग्रहमपास्तसमस्तदुःखं वस्तुस्वभावपरिकल्पितसर्वभेदम् ।

आत्मानमध्ययनविध्यनुसारिणस्तं प्रत्यक्षतः श्रुतिशिरःसु समामनन्ति ॥

Those who follow the injunction of the study of one's own branch of the Veda directly ascertain Brahman from the Upaniṣads' as of the form of bliss, and as one free from all miseries, and all differences by virtue of its very nature.

Sarvajñātman in this verse refers to the *śruti* texts that convey that Ātman which is identical with Brahman is of the nature of bliss.

1. *Vide Brh., III, ix, 18, and Chānd., VII, xxiii, 1.*



## SUPERIMPOSITION

[ 27 ]

अध्यस्तमल्पवपुरस्य न वास्तवं त-  
 त्प्रत्यक्पराद्वयमिदं हि परस्परस्मिन् ।  
 अध्यस्ततां प्रति समर्थमबोधमात्र-  
 मन्योन्यरूपमिथुनीकरणे निमित्तम् ॥

The limited form (that is, ego or *aham̐padārtha*) is a superimposed entity and it is not real (as such). It consists of two elements<sup>1</sup>—conscious (element) and the objective (element); and these two are capable of undergoing mutual superimposition. And *avidyā* alone is the cause of their mutual superimposition.

1. Ego is a complex of Brahman-Ātman and mind.

For details See Introduction. p. 98.

[ 28 ]

सादृश्यधीप्रभृति न त्रितयं निमित्त-  
 मध्यासभूमिषु जगत्यनुगच्छतीदम् ।  
 ब्राह्मण्यजातिपरिकल्पनमात्मनीष्टं  
 जात्या न साम्यमुपलब्धमिहास्ति किञ्चित् ॥

The group of the three elements, namely, the cognition of similarity (defect in the instrument of knowledge, and the latent impression) is not the cause of superimposition, as it does not pervade all cases of superimposition occurring in this world. The superimposition of Brahmin-caste in Brahman-Atman is desired by the scripture<sup>1</sup>, but in it the similarity of being a particular caste is not cognized.

1. *Vide the śruti text : brāhmaṇo yajeta.*

For details See Introduction, p. 87.



[ 29 ]

भूयस्त्व<sup>1</sup>वन्ननु गुणावयवक्रियाणां  
 सामान्यपूगवपुरुक्तमिहाभियुक्तैः ।  
 सादृश्यवस्तु न चिदात्मनि किञ्चिदत्र  
 जात्यादिभिः सह निरीक्षितमस्ति तादृक् ॥

It has been said by experts that the category—similarity is of the nature of the aggregate of the generalities that pertain to the abundance of the qualities, limbs, and activities.<sup>1</sup> Such character of similarity is not perceived in the self along with (brahmin) caste, etc.

1. When it is said that 'gayal' is similar to 'cow', what we mean is that in gayal there is the presence of the generic attributes of qualities like whiteness, of limbs like the characteristic of having a dew lap, of activities like eating and chewing that are present in cow. The presence of the aggregate of these generic attributes constitutes similarity.

[ 30 ]

विषयकरणदोषान्न भ्रमः संविदि स्या-  
 दपि तु भवति मोहात् केवलादेवमेव ।  
 भगवति परमात्मन्यद्वितीये विचित्रा  
 द्वयमतिरियमस्तु भ्रान्तिरज्ञानहेतुः ॥

The erroneous cognition arises regarding the empirical knowledge, not owing to the defects present in the object and the sense-organ, but only owing to *avidyā* unassisted by any extraneous means. Similarly, the indescribable cognition of duality in the adorable absolute self is erroneous and is caused by *avidyā*.

For details See Introduction, p. 88. This verse is restated in the second *adhyāya* of this work. See II, 172.



[ 31 ]

संसिद्धा सविलासमोहविषये वस्तुन्यधिष्ठानगी-  
 नाधारेऽध्यसनस्य वस्तुनि ततोऽस्थाने महान् संभ्रमः ।  
 केषांचिन्महतामनूनतमसां 'निर्वन्धमात्राश्रया-  
 दन्योन्याध्यसने निरास्पदमिदं शून्यं जगत् स्यादिति ॥

The designation of 'substrate' (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is well-established not in the substance that serves as the locus (*ādhāra*) of the superimposed object, but in the substance that is the object of *avidyā* with its product. Hence the great anxiety owing to prejudice of some perverted men of utter ignorance is improper, the anxiety, namely, acceptance of mutual superimposition is open to the defect that this world being devoid of a substratum would become a void.

For details See Introduction. pp. 99-100.

This verse is restated in the third *adhyāya* of this work. See III, 239.

[ 32 ]

अधिष्ठानमाधारमात्रं यदि स्यात् प्रसज्येत सत्यं तदा चोद्यमेतत् ।  
 न चैतत्सकार्यस्य मोहस्य वस्तुन्यधिष्ठानगीर्गोचरे लोकसिद्धा ॥

If the mere locus were the substrate, then certainly this objection would hold good. But this is not so. The name 'substrate' is applied in the world to the substance that is the object of *avidyā* with its products.

For details See Introduction, p. 99.

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1. पाण्डित्यगर्वाश्रया—B<sub>2</sub>



[ 33 ]

किं चानृतद्वयमिहाध्यसितव्यमिष्टं  
 स्याच्चेत्तादा भवति चोद्यमिदं त्वदीयम् ।  
 सत्यानृतात्मकमिदं मिथुनं मिथश्चे-  
 दध्यस्यते किमिति शून्यकथाप्रसङ्गः ॥

Moreover, if it were intended here that a pair of unreal objects is to be (mutually) superimposed, then your objection would stand. When the pair consisting of the real and the unreal forms is mutually superimposed, wherefore arises (the possibility of) the objection of voidness?

For details See Introduction, pp. 99-100.

[ 34 ]

इदमर्थवस्त्वपि भवेद्रजते परिकल्पितं रजतवस्त्वदमि ।  
 रजतभ्रमेऽभ्य च परिस्फुरणान्न यदि स्फुरेन्न खलु शुक्तिरिव ॥

The silver is superimposed on the object in front of the perceiver, namely, the element—'this'. The element—'this' also, as it is manifested in the erroneous cognition of silver, is superimposed on the silver.<sup>1</sup> If it were not so, it would not be manifested (in the erroneous cognition) like the (specific nature of the shell.)<sup>2</sup>

1. The mutual superimposition of the 'this' element and silver is inferentially proved.

2. Reasoning which is an aid to a *pramāṇa* is set forth.

[ 35 ]

रजतप्रतीतिरिदमि प्रथते ननु यद्वदेवमिदमित्यपि धीः ।  
 रजते तथा सति कथं न भवेदितरेतराध्यसननिर्णयधीः ॥



Just as the cognition of silver presents itself in the element—'this', so also the cognition of the element—'this', certainly arises in the object 'silver'. When such is the case, how is it not ascertained that there is mutual superimposition ?<sup>1</sup>

1. The mutual superimposition of the 'this' element and silver is an object of ordinary experience.

[ 36 ]

अध्यस्तमेव हि परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु  
नान्यत्कथंचन परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु ।  
रज्जुत्वशुक्तिशकलत्वमरुक्षितित्व-  
चन्द्रैकताप्रभृतिकानुपलम्भनेन ॥

In erroneous cognitions (of serpent, silver, mirage, and two moons), there is not the apprehension of the rope, the piece of shell, the desert, and the unity of moon, etc. Only the superimposed object appears therein. In no case does an object different from the one superimposed appear in erroneous cognitions.

[ 37 ]

इतरेतराध्यसनमेव ततश्चित्तिचेत्ययोरपि भवेदुचितम् ।  
रजतभ्रमादिषु तथावगमान्न हि कल्पना गुरुतरा घटते ॥

As it is observed thus in erroneous cognition of silver, etc., it is but proper to admit the mutual superimposition of self and not-self. Certainly any other assumption, being superfluous, will not be reasonable.

[ 38 ]

अनुभूतियुक्त्यनुमितित्रितयादितरेतराध्यसनसिद्धिरतः ।  
चित्तिचेत्यवस्तुयुगलस्य न चेत् त्रितयस्य बाधनमिहापतति ॥



Hence the mutual superimposition of self and not-self is ascertained by the triple evidence of experience, reasoning, and inference. Otherwise the three grounds mentioned<sup>1</sup> will be open to contradiction.

1. See SS, I, 34-5.

*vide 'rajatapratītiridami prathate' [SS, I, 35,] ityasmin padye upapāditā anubhūtiḥ, tataḥ pūrvapadye 'idamarthavastvapi bhavet' ityasmin ukte yuktyanumiti, AP.*

[ 39 ]

सदृशसांशपराग्विषयेषु चेद्भवति दोषवशाज्जगति भ्रमः ।  
भवतु तत्सकलं वदितुं वयं तदुपचारवशाद् दृशि शक्नुमः ॥

If it be said that in worldly experience, erroneous cognition arises in objects that are similar, composite, and external, then let it be. We are able to attribute all these to the self by virtue of worldly usage.

For details See Introduction, pp. 96-7.

*upacāraḥ—vyavahāraḥ, SS.*

[ 40 ]

अपि च भाष्यकृदेव तदब्रवीद्विषयताद्युपचारसमाश्रयात् ।  
स्ववचसैव न तावदिति ब्रुवन् सकलमात्मनि विभ्रमसिद्धये ॥

Moreover, by openly proclaiming in the texts '*na tāvad*'<sup>1</sup>, the author of the *bhāṣya* has declared, resorting to worldly usage, objectness, etc., in the case of the self in order to establish erroneous cognition regarding it.

1. The following *bhāṣya* text is referred to here.

*na tāvadayaṁ ekāntenāviśayaḥ, asmatpratyaya viśayatvāt, Adhyāsa-bhāṣya.*

For details See Introduction, pp. 96-7.



[ 41 ]

अपरोक्षरूपविषयभ्रमधीरपरोक्षमास्पदमपेक्ष्य भवेत् ।

मनसः स्वतो नयनतो यदि वा स्वपनभ्रमादिषु तथा प्रथितेः ॥

The erroneous cognition of objects in the form of immediacy comes about depending on the locus cognized as immediately by the mind, by itself, or by the sense of sight ;<sup>1</sup> for, it is so presented in dream, delusion, etc.

1. See the following two verses.

For details See Introduction, p. 97.

[ 42 ]

स्वतोऽपरोक्षा चित्तिरत्र विभ्रमस्तथापि रूपाकृतिरेव जायते ।

मनोनिमित्तं स्वपने मुहुर्मुहुर्विनापि चक्षुर्विषयं स्वमास्पदम् ॥

Here, in the dream state, erroneous cognition of objects arises repeatedly in the substrate—the self which manifests itself immediately and which is beyond the scope of the sense of sight and the intellect.

For details See Introduction, p. 97.

[ 43 ]

मनोवगम्येऽप्यपरोक्षताबलात्ताम्बरे रूपमुपोल्लिखन् भ्रमः ।

सितादिभेदैर्बहुधा समीक्ष्यते यथाक्षिगम्ये रजतादिविभ्रमः ॥

In the ether cognized by the mind, there arises by force of immediacy the illusion ascribing various colours to it such as whiteness, etc. Similarly, there is the illusion of silver, etc., in the substrate cognized by the visual sense.



[ 44 ]

ज्ञातेऽपि तावति ततोऽनतिरिक्तरूपेऽ-  
 प्यज्ञानतः स्फुरणमस्फुरणं च दृष्टम् ।  
 दूरस्थयोर्ननु वनस्पतिवस्तुनोस्त-  
 द्वेदो न दृष्टिविषयोऽवगते च ते नः ॥

Regarding the same object which is perceived, there is manifestation and also no manifestation owing to some defect. It is well-known that when two trees which are (apart and) at a distance are perceived, their difference (which is of the nature of the tree) is not noticed.

For details See Introduction, p. 94.

*ajñānataḥ—doṣavaśāt, AP.*

[ 45 ]

यत्रापि दैवगतितोऽस्यतिरिक्तभावो  
 रूपात्प्रतीतिविषयादितरत्र रूपे ।  
 तत्राप्यबोधघटनां प्रति नाङ्गभाव-  
 स्तस्यातिरिक्तवपुषो<sup>1</sup>ऽपुनरुक्तरूपात् ॥

Though there exists difference accidentally between the (general) feature (of the shell, that is, the 'element—this') which is cognized and the (specific) feature (of the shell, that is, triangular form, etc.) which is not cognized, yet the difference does not account for the unknown nature of the specific feature of shell which is different from the (general) feature that is denoted by the word ('this') which is not synonymous (with the word 'shell' conveying the specific feature of the shell).

For details See Introduction, p. 94.

1. षोऽनतिरिक्तरूपात्—I<sup>2</sup>, I<sup>3</sup>



[ 46 ]

शुक्ती<sup>1</sup> दमंशात्पृथगप्रतीता त्रिकोणता स्या<sup>2</sup> ननु वस्तुवृत्त्या ।  
तथापि तत्स्थं न पृथक्त्वमिष्टं तदप्रबुद्धत्वनिमित्तभूतम् ॥

Indeed the triangular form (that is, the specific feature) of shell which is not perceived is naturally different from the element—'this' (that is, the general nature) of the shell. Nevertheless, the difference that exists in its specific feature does not account for its unknown aspect.

For details See Introduction, p. 94.

[ 47 ]

यतः प्रपश्यन्नपि भेदिनः स्वं वनस्पते रूपमभिन्नमस्मात् ।  
न भेदमस्य प्रतिपद्यतेऽक्षणा वनस्पतेः पार्श्वगतात्परस्मात् ॥

The reason is this: though the tree which has difference from the one nearby is well-examined, yet that difference which is of the form of that tree does not come within the range of perception.

[ 48 ]

सप्रत्यभिज्ञनयनोत्थधियो घटादेः  
स्वाभाविकात्स्ववपुषोऽनतिरिक्तरूपः ।  
<sup>3</sup>स्थेमाप्रबोधविषयो विषयत्वमेती-  
त्यङ्गीकृतं ननु मितेऽपि घटादिकेऽर्थे ॥

The permanence of the pot, etc., which is naturally identical with the form of the pot, etc., is not perceived at the time of the perception of the latter. But it is admitted

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1. दमंशात्पृ—T<sub>2</sub>      2. न तु—B<sub>2</sub>      3. स्थेमाप्रतीतिवि—T<sub>2</sub>



that it later becomes the object of the visual perception accompanied by the awakened latent impression.

For details See Introduction, p. 95.

[ 49 ]

एवं स्फुरत्यपि दृगात्मनि तत्स्वरूपे-  
णास्फूर्तिभाजि परिकल्पिततोपपन्ना ।  
स्वाज्ञानतो जगदिदं परमेश्वरोऽसौ  
जीवोऽहमित्यपि विभागवतोऽल्पकस्य ॥

Similarly the self manifests itself in its aspect of consciousness, but not in its absolute nature. Hence it is reasonable that, owing to *avidyā*, there is the superimposition on it of the limited forms such as 'This is the universe', 'He is God', and 'I am the individual soul'.

[ 50 ]

अल्पं रूपं बन्धनं प्रत्यगात्मा बद्धोऽनेन स्वच्छचैतन्यमूर्तिः ।  
स्वात्माज्ञानं कारणं बन्धनेऽस्य स्वात्मज्ञानात्तन्निवृत्तिश्च युक्ता ॥

The inner self which is of the nature of consciousness is fettered by the limited forms<sup>1</sup> which serve as bondage. The cause of its bondage is *avidyā* present in it. The annihilation of *avidyā* through the realization of the true nature of the self is liberation.

1. See SS, I, 2 and 22.

[ 51 ]

अज्ञानमप्यविदुषोऽस्य न तु स्वतोऽस्ति  
चैतन्यनिर्विकृतिताद्वयताविरोधात् ।  
अज्ञातताप्यनवबोधनिबन्धनैव  
नात्माश्रयत्वमपि चोदयितव्यमत्र ॥



As there would be contradiction to the conscious, immutable, and non-dual nature of the self, the presence of ignorance in the person characterized by it, is not (accepted to be) real, but is caused by nescience alone. Here the objection regarding the defect of self-dependence should not be raised.<sup>1</sup>

1. The fallacy of self-dependence is not injurious to the school of Advaita where everything except the self is not determinable.

[ 52 ]

द्वारं तमोऽन्वयमपेक्ष्य दृशा हि दृश्यं  
संगच्छते सकलमत्र न नो<sup>1</sup> विवादः ।  
मोहोऽपि दृश्यवपुरत्र च संवदध्वे  
तस्मात्तादन्वयनिमित्तमपीह मोहः ॥

There is no dispute regarding the view that all objects are related to the self through *avidyā*.<sup>1</sup> All agree that *avidyā* also is an object. Hence the cause of its association (with the self, also is *avidyā*.

1. *ātmanyavabhāsamānaḥ mohasambandhaḥ mohāyattaḥ, dṛśyatvāt, mohakāryaprapañcavat, Saṁb.*, p. 63 (b).

[ 53 ]

संविद्गुरं वहति तद्विषयो<sup>2</sup> पयुक्तां स्वात्मन्यपि स्वरसतः स्वरूपसिद्धेः ।  
कार्यप्रपञ्चपरिकल्पनमात्ममोहान्मोहप्रकल्पनमपीति तथोपपन्नम् ॥

Just as empirical knowledge has the required capacity to reveal itself as well as its object, so it is intelligible that

1. वो—M<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, T<sub>4</sub>, T<sub>5</sub>, T<sub>6</sub>,

2. परक्तां—B<sub>2</sub>



*avidyā* existing in the self superimposes itself as well as the resultant world (on the self).

For details See Introduction, p. 92.

[ 54 ]

आत्मा प्रसाधयति वेद्यपदार्थजातं स्वात्मानमप्यवगतिक्षमशक्तियोगात् ।  
अज्ञानमेवमिदमात्मपरप्रकृतौ शक्तं भवेदिति न किञ्चन दौस्थ्यमस्ति ॥

Just as the soul comprehends the group of objects and itself through the power (*jñāna*) which makes it the cognizer, so also it is not unresonable that *avidyā* is capable of superimposing the universe and itself (on Brahman).

For details See Introduction, p. 92.

[ 55 ]

भेदं च भेद्यं च भिनत्ति भेदो यथैव भेदान्तरमन्तरेण ।  
मोहं च कार्यं च बिभर्ति मोहस्तथैव मोहान्तरमन्तरेण ॥

Just as difference without requiring any other difference explains its own difference (from the objects) as well as the difference between the two things that are to be mutually distinguished, so also *avidyā* superimposes itself as well as its effects without another *avidyā*.

For details See Introduction, p. 93.

[ 56 ]

ब्रह्मज्ञानं सूचयन् सूत्रकारो बन्धोत्पत्तेर्हेतुविध्वंसनाय ।  
एतत्सर्वं सूचयामास तस्मादेतत्सर्वं भाषते भाष्यकारः ॥

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* has indicated all these when he sets forth the realization of Brahman as the anni-



hilating factor of the root-cause of the origin of bondage. The author of the *bhāṣya*, therefore, elucidates them all.

The theory of superimposition is implicit in the aphorism—*athā* to *brahmajijñāsā*, BS, I, i, 1.

For details See Introduction, p. 94.

[ 57 ]

तस्मादध्यस्तमेतत्सकलमपि 'दृशौ भूमरूपातिरिक्तं  
रूपं स्वाज्ञानमात्रादिति भवति परब्रह्मधीवाध्यमेतत् ।  
ईशित्रादिप्रभेदप्रतिहतिफलकज्ञानदौस्थ्यपनुत्त्यै  
श्रीमच्छारीरकार्थप्रकटनपटुताशालि शास्त्रं विदध्मः ॥

Hence all the objects that are different from the self are superimposed on it by nescience. They are all, therefore, sublated by the knowledge of the self. In order to remove the incredibility of the view that the knowledge of the self has the purpose of destroying the differences in the form of the supreme lord, the individual soul, and the phenomenal world, we compose this treatise which attempts to make clear the true purport of the hoary *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

[BRAHMAN—THE OBJECT OF INQUIRY]

[ 58 ]

मीमांसितव्यमनयैव सदद्वितीयं मीमांस्यमेव च सदात्मतयानयैतत् ।  
ज्ञातं प्रयोजनमनेन पथेदमस्यास्तन्नान्तरीयकतया च तमोनिवृत्तिः ॥

The non-dual Reality should be inquired into; it should be inquired into as the same as the self by this, namely,

1. दृशः— P<sub>2</sub>  
A 23a



the study of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*. The realization of Brahman in this manner is the aim of the inquiry. And the removal of *avidyā* invariably ensues from it.

[ 59 ]

न च गतार्थमिदं प्रतिभाति नो न हि विधेः पदमात्मसमीक्षणम् ।  
न खलु यागददातिजुहोतिवत् पुरुषतन्त्रमिहात्मनि दर्शनम् ॥

Since the knowledge of the self does not fall within the scope of Vedic injunction, it appears to us that the subject-matter of this system is not covered by the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*. Indeed the knowledge of the self does not depend on human activity, unlike sacrificing, making gifts, and offering in fire.

It is said that Jaimini has fully inquired into *dharma* in his Vedic exegesis. The knowledge of Brahman, as it comes within the purview of injunction such as—*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*, etc., acquires the character of *dharma*. (*vide* : *codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmah*, *Jaimini-sūtra*. I. i. 2). Hence Brahman which is adjectival (*viśeṣaṇa*) to knowledge also comes within the scope of *dharma*. Therefore the inquiry into Brahman also must be taken as having received full treatment in the work of Jaimini, and a fresh inquiry into it in the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* is not justifiable. This contention, however, cannot stand. The objects of injunction like sacrificing (*yāga*), making gifts (*dāna*), offering in fire (*homa*), etc., are solely achieved by human activity, while the knowledge of Brahman arises from the thing itself and not through human activity. So it does not fall within the scope of injunction and hence it is not a *dharma*. It follows from this that Brahman does not fall within the range of *dharma*. So Jaimini did not address himself to the inquiry into Brahman and a fresh inquiry is called for.

*yagadadātijuhotivat*—See *Jaimini-sūtra*. II, ii, 1.



[ 60 ]

अपि च रूपितगोचरता विधेर्न परमात्मधियोऽस्ति<sup>1</sup> च रूपणम् ।  
अविदिते परमात्मनि च तद्धियो न खलु रूपितता घटनान्विता ॥

Moreover, the content of any injunction should be known (previously). But here there is no comprehension of the knowledge of the supreme self (namely, the content.) When the supreme self is not known, it is indeed unreasonable to speak of the comprehension of its knowledge.

An aspirant cannot be directed to carry out the injunction if its content is not known. Hence prior to the application of the injunction there should be the knowledge of its content. In the case of the injunction about the knowledge of Brahman, the comprehension of its content, namely, the knowledge of Brahman cannot fit in as Brahman which is adjectival (*viśeṣaṇa*) to it is not known in its specific nature.

[ 61 ]

विदितता परमात्मन इष्यते यदि वृथा विधिरस्य धियो भवेत् ।  
निखिलभेदनिदाननिवृत्तितो भवति तद्विषयादि च दुर्लभम् ॥

If it is admitted that Brahman is known, then the injunction about its knowledge is futile; for, then as there ensues the annihilation of the material cause of all differences, the object, etc., of the injunction ceases to exist.

For details see SS, I, 452-62.

[ 62 ]

इति न धर्मविशेषसमर्पणं श्रुतिशिरोवचनैः क्रियते ततः ।  
भवति धर्मविचारगतार्थतानवसरः परमात्मविचारणे ॥

1. स्ति निरूपणम् T<sup>2</sup>



Thus the Upaniṣadic passages do not present the knowledge of Brahman as a mode of action. Hence, the inquiry into Brahman is not included in the examination of *dharma*.

[ 63 ]

अर्हाद्यर्थे च कृत्यस्मरणमभिमतं पाणिनेः प्रार्थनादौ  
लिङ्लोडादेश्व 'वृत्तिः प्रचुरमभिमता पाणिनेर्जैमिनेश्च ।  
तस्माद्वेदान्तवाक्ये पठितमपि लिङाद्यन्यथा योजनीयं  
विध्यर्थासंभवेन स्फुटमुदितनयादेतदन्यागतार्थम् ॥

Pāṇini accepts the use of the gerundive suffixes in the sense of fitness, etc.<sup>1</sup> Both Pāṇini and Jaimini admit that the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, etc., convey many senses such as 'request' etc.<sup>2</sup> Since the sense of injunction is impossible (here), for this (that is, the use of potential mood, etc., in the Upaniṣads) another sense results in the manner clearly explained. Hence the subject-matter of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* is not covered by the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

1. *Vide* the Pāṇini-sūtras:

- (i) *vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādkīṣṭasaṃpraśnaprārthanēṣu liṅ*,  
III, iii, 161.
- (ii) *arhe kṛtyatṛcaśca*, III, iii, 169.
- (iii) *loṭ ca*, III, iii, 162.

2. *Vide* (i) '*viṣṇurupāṃśu yaśṭavyaḥ*,'

In connection with the *upāṃśu* sacrifice we read:

'*upāṃśuyājāntarā yajati, viṣṇurupāṃśu yaśṭavyo*' *jāmitvāya*'

The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (II, ii, 49) which considers this passage states that the sentence *upāṃśuyājāntarā yajati* is injunctive in character, and the text '*viṣṇurupāṃśu yaśṭavyo*' *jāmitvāya* which contains the

1. वृत्तिस्मरणमभिमतम्—12, 13



potential mood has no injunctive force and should be regarded as a mere recommendatory passage.

(ii) *jartilayavāgvā juhuyāt*

In connection with the *Agnihotra* we read:—

*Jartilayavāgvā juhuyāt, gavīdhukayavāgvā juhuyāt, na grāmyān paśūn hinasti, atho khalvāhuḥ—anāhutirvai jartilāśca gavīdhukāśca, payasū agnihotram juhuyāt.*

The *Pūrva mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (X, viii, 7) which considers this passage conveys that the sentences such as *jartilayavāgvā juhuyāt*, which contain the potential mood glorify the injunctions like *payasū agnihotram juhuyāt* and do not at all convey the sense of injunction.

## QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ASPIRANT

[ 64 ]

एकाहाहीनसत्रद्वयविधिविहितानेककर्मानुभाव-

ध्वस्तस्वान्तोपरोधाः कथमपि पुरुषाश्चिदिदृक्षां लभन्ते ।

यज्ञेनेत्यादिवाक्यं शतपथविहितं कर्मवृन्दं गृहीत्वा

स्वोत्पत्त्याम्नानसिद्धं पुरुषविविदिषामात्रसाध्ये युनक्ति ॥

Persons whose mental obstacles are removed by the performance of rituals that are enjoined by the injunctions of two-fold *satra, ahīna*, and *ekāha* sacrifices attain the desire to know the self. The Vedic text, *yajñena*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> comprehends the group of rituals that are enjoined in the *śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, and are established by the originative injunction; and it correlates them with the fruit that is of the form of mere desire to know the self.

1. See *Bṛh*, IV, iv, 22.

The performance of rituals without any longing for personal gains leads to the complete purification of mind, and thereby generates in the mind of the aspirant the desire to know the self. (*vide SS*, III, 333-40)



*ekāha* — a *soma* sacrifice lasting only one day.

*ahīna* — a *soma* sacrifice lasting several days.

*satra* — a *soma* sacrifice lasting for a year.

There is another type of *satra* which lasts for a day.

For *Utpatti-vidhi* See *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāyaprakāśa*, [Chinnaswami Śāstri's Edition] p. 25.

[ 65 ]

उपससाद् चतुष्टयसाधनो निशितबुद्धिरशुद्धिपरिक्षयात् ।  
विविदिषुर्विहितैर्विविधाध्वरैर्विदितवेद्यतमं विधिवद्गुरुम् ॥

The aspirant having his intellect whetted by the destruction of impurity by the performance of various prescribed sacrifices, possessing the four-fold means,<sup>1</sup> and desiring to know the self, duly approaches the preceptor who has realized the highest to be known.<sup>2</sup>

1. See *BSB*, I, i, 1.

2. *vide Muṇḍ.*, I, ii, 12.

[ 66 ]

इह जगति सर्व एव जन्तुर्निरतिशयं सुखमुत्तमं ममास्तु ।  
<sup>1</sup>उपरमतु तथोपघातरूपं विषयजदुःखमिति स्पृहां करोति ॥

Every living being in this world desires thus: let there be the unexcellable supreme bliss for me, and likewise let the misery which arises from worldly enjoyment and which forms an obstacle (to the experience of bliss) come to an end.

[ 67 ]

निरतिशयसुखं च दुःखजातव्युपरमणं च वदन्ति मोक्षतत्त्वम् ।  
उभयमपि जनोऽभिवाञ्छतीति स्फुटतरमस्य सदास्ति मोक्षवाञ्छा ॥

1. व्युपरमतु P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>,



The wise men declare that the essence of liberation is unexcellable bliss and utter removal of misery. As men always desire both, it is quite clear that the aspirant always longs for liberation.

[ 68 ]

उभयमपि परात्मनः स्वरूपं विमलचिदेकरसं स्वयंप्रकाशम् ।  
इति भवति विना प्रमाणमस्मिन्नुदितनयादभिवाञ्छनोपपत्तिः ॥

And, these two (unexcellable bliss and removal of misery) are of the nature of the supreme self which is pure consciousness and as such self-luminous.<sup>1</sup> Hence in the manner set forth above,<sup>2</sup> it becomes intelligible, without any further proof, that there is desire for liberation.

1. Absolute bliss is the supreme self. For we have such *śruti* texts as *ānandaṁ brahmeti vyajānāt*, *Taitt*, III, 6. Similarly, the removal of misery also is of the form of the supreme self. Misery, like every other thing in this world, is superimposed on the self, and has no independent reality of its own. The destruction of a superimposed thing is but its being reduced to its substrate. Hence the destruction of misery also is of the nature of its substrate, namely, the supreme self.

2. See *ŚŚ*, I, 66.

[ 69 ]

कर्मकाण्डकृतबुद्धिशुद्धितस्तर्किते च खलु मोक्ष<sup>1</sup>वस्तुनि ।  
अर्थात्तास्य घटते प्रयोजकज्ञाननुन्नमनसो महात्मनः ॥

It is reasonable that the high-souled person who has a mind purified by the performance of various sacrifices, and who is directed (towards the Vedāntic study, etc.) by the

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1. वर्त्मनि P<sub>2</sub>.



superficial knowledge of the supreme self, longs for liberation which he regards (as the seat of bliss).

*prayojakajñānanunnamanasaḥ — vedāntavākyajanyaṁ āpātajñānaṁ prayojakajñānaṁ, tena nunnāṁ śravaṇādipravṛtṭyunmukhaṁ manah, yasya tasya, TB.*

[ 70 ]

धर्मनिर्णयनिमित्तमिष्यते वेदवित्परिषदेव मानवे ।

तद्वदत्र गुरुणास्य संगतिस्तेन चास्य घटतेऽर्थिता गुरौ ॥

The assembly of Vedic scholars alone is approved in the code of Manu<sup>1</sup> for the purpose of determining the nature of *dharma*. Here, in the case of the aspirant, his association with a preceptor is similarly admitted. Hence it is proper that he should approach a preceptor.

1. See *Manusmṛti*, 12-112.

[ 71 ]

यः कर्मकाण्डविषयेऽभिहितोऽधिकारी

सोऽयं प्रवृत्तिषु निवृत्तिषु तुल्यरूपः ।

अत्राभिधित्सितविशेषणपूगयुक्तोऽ-

साधारणस्त्वभिमतः पुरुषो निवृत्तौ ॥

One who is mentioned as the qualified person in the sphere of *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* has to devote himself equally to activity in respect of (prescribed deeds) as well as renunciation (from prohibited deeds). But here in the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* the aspirant who possesses the mass of attributes that are desired to be mentioned (in the third *adhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra*) is unique, as he has to devote himself solely to renunciation (from all activities).



[ 72 ]

शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तिषु निवृत्तिषु तुल्यरूपं साधारणस्य पुरुषस्य पुराभ्यधायि ।  
अत्रोच्यते सकलकर्मनिवृत्तिभाजः सर्वं निवृत्तिविषयं श्रवणादिशास्त्रम् ॥

Precepts of equal validity have been set forth in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* with reference to the aspirant who has to devote himself equally to activity (towards prescribed deeds) and renunciation (from prohibited acts). Here in the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, the Vedic text—*śrotavyaḥ*<sup>1</sup> which is concerned with renunciation has been propounded with reference to the aspirant who has taken to renunciation from all (worldly) activities.

1. *Bṛh.*, II, iv, 5.

[ 73 ]

शास्त्रद्वैविध्यदृष्टेर्द्विविधमधिकृतेर्भेदमप्याश्रयन्ते  
तद्द्वैविध्योपलब्धेः पुरुषमधिकृतं शास्त्रयोर्भिन्नमाहुः ।

शास्त्रार्थद्वित्वहेतोः पुरुषमधिकृतं तद्गतं चाधिकारं  
नो चेद्भिन्नं प्रतीयुर्द्विविध<sup>1</sup>मिह वृथा शास्त्रमापद्यते हि ॥

In view of the *śāstras* being two-fold, two different qualifications are prescribed (for their study). And, because of that, it is held that the persons qualified to study the *śāstras* are also different. As the aims of the two *śāstras* differ, it should be maintained that the competence and the persons qualified are separate. Otherwise, it is futile to hold the two-fold character of the *śāstras*.

1. मिति—T<sub>2</sub>.



[ 74 ]

यमनियमविधानैर्वाङ्मनःकायचेष्टा-

व्युपरमणमशेषैः कथ्यते न प्रवृत्तिः ।

यदि भवति कदाचित्काचिदस्य प्रवृत्तिः

श्रुतिविहितनिवृत्तोः कर्मणां कथनं स्यात् ॥

The texts that prescribe observance (*niyama*)<sup>1</sup> and forbearance (*yama*)<sup>2</sup> speak of the control over speech, mind, and the body, and not of activity. If there be any activity on the part of the aspirant at sometime or other, then the cessation of activities enjoined by the Upaniṣadic passages<sup>3</sup> would be contradicted.

1. *vide* *Yōga-sūtra*, II, 30.

2. *ibid.*, II, 32.

3. *vide* *Bṛh.*, III, v, 1.

[ 75 ]

औदासीन्यविशेषमेव हि परब्रह्मात्मधीजन्मने

शास्तीदं श्रवणादिशास्त्रममुना त्वाक्षिप्यते व्यापृतिः।

तां तां व्यापृतिमन्तरेण घटते सा सा न शास्त्रार्थधी-

रित्यर्थाल्लशुनादिभक्षणगतौदासीन्यबोधादिव ॥

From the prohibition relating to eating garlic, there arises, by presumptive implication, the activity consisting in the resolve to abstain from eating garlic. Similarly the text—*śrotavyaḥ*<sup>1</sup> prescribes a particular inactivity for the rise of the knowledge of the supreme self. As indifference (to external activities which is the import of the text



*śrotavyaḥ*) is not possible in the absence of activity in the form of Vedāntic study, the latter is got by presumption from inactivity.

1. *vide Bṛh*, II, iv, 5.

[ 76 ]

औदासीन्ये बोधिते शास्त्रबृन्दैरर्थादस्मात्प्रच्युतस्यास्त्यनर्थः ।  
इत्यालोच्य प्रच्युतेः प्रापकस्य प्राबल्येऽर्थे प्रातिलोभ्यं विधत्ते ॥

Considering by presumption that evil ensues one who swerves from indifference which is made known by numerous scriptures, the aspirant resolves to act contrary to the strong desire which is inimical to difference.

[ 77 ]

औदासीन्यं बोधयच्छास्त्रमेतन्नित्यं पथ्यं बोधयत्यस्य पुंसः ।  
पथ्यादस्मात्प्रच्युतस्यास्त्यपथ्यं 'बुद्ध्वापथ्यप्रातिलोभ्ये यतेत ॥

The Vedic text (*śrotavyaḥ*) teaches the aspirant that indifference (to worldly activities) leads to liberation through knowledge. The aspirant, considering that evil ensues one who swerves from this precept, should strive to counteract this evil.

[ 78 ]

वृत्ता प्रवर्तकनिवर्तकशास्त्रसिद्धयै  
षष्ठे प्रवृत्तिविनिवृत्त्यधि<sup>१</sup>कारिचिन्ता ।  
अत्रैकमेव तु निवृत्त्यधिकारमार्ग-  
माश्रित्य सूत्रकृदथात इति प्रवृत्तः ॥

1. बुद्ध्वापथ्यं—P<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>1</sub> ; बुद्ध्वा पथ्यं—P<sub>2</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>. 2. कारचि—P<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>.



In order that activity and abstinence conveyed by the injunctive and the prohibitory texts may be pursued, the discussion about the qualified person who has to pursue activity and renunciation equally, has taken place in the sixth chapter of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*. But here in the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, the author of the *sūtra* has commenced the first aphorism with the words—*athātaḥ*. (Then, therefore)<sup>1</sup> specifying the aspirant who is devoted (solely) to renunciation.

1. *BS*, I, i, 1.

[ 79 ]

औदासीन्यप्रच्युतेः प्रापकौ च रागद्वेषौ नापरो हेतुरस्ति ।  
रागद्वेषप्रातिलोभ्ये प्रवृत्तिरौदासीन्यप्रापणाच्छास्त्रतोऽर्थात् ॥

Apart from appetite and aversion there is no other cause which brings about any lapse from indifference. The text that teaches indifference presumptively implies the activity to resist the appetite and aversion.

[ 80 ]

अशुचेः प्रतिषेधशास्त्रतो न भवत्येव हि वेदचिन्तनम् ।  
श्रवणादिनिवृत्तिशास्त्रतः स्वयमर्थादथ शौचमापतेत् ॥

As prohibitory texts<sup>1</sup> instruct that one who is impure should not recite the Veda, purity (mental and physical) is naturally known by presumption from the text *śrotavyaḥ* which teaches abstinence.

1. *na aśuciḥ brahma kīrtayet*.



[ 81. ]

अचतुर्गुणशौचवारणात् स्वयमेवास्य चतुर्गुं भवेत् ।

अचतुर्ष्वशनस्य वारणात् स्वयमेवास्य चतुर्षु भोजनम् ॥

The purification is limited naturally to four times in the case of the aspirant, as there is the prohibition that it should not exceed four times.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, he collects food from members of four castes, as there is the (text<sup>2</sup> which prescribes the restriction that he should not take food from a person not belonging to the four castes.

(1) *Manusmṛti*, V, 137.

(2) *cāturvarṇyam caret bhaikṣyam*, S.

[ 82 ]

इति योजय सर्वमीदृशं कथितन्यायवशेन सादरम् ।

विधिहीननिवृत्तिशास्त्रतः कथितेऽस्मिन्नधिकारवर्त्मनि ॥

As the Vedic texts only teach and not enjoin renunciation as the qualification of the aspirant described above, carefully construe such texts in the aforesaid manner.

[ 83 ]

इति केचन वर्णयन्ति तद्विपरीतं प्रवदन्ति केचन ।

प्रविभज्य तदप्युदीर्यते निपुणाचार्यपरंपरागतम् ॥

Some teachers maintain thus, while others hold a contrary view. This being handed down in an uninterrupted line of competent teachers is now explained in detail.



So far it has been said that the Vedic texts like *śrotavyaḥ*, etc., teach only abstinence from external activities and activity in the form of Vedāntic study is presumptively known, and not prescribed. Now it is said that some activities are prescribed for the ascetic by the Vedic texts.

*vide: kecana ācāryāḥ nivṛttiṣaṁ śravaṇādīśāstram iti varṇayanti kecana tu ācāryāḥ pravṛttiṣaṁ iti pravadanti, AP.*

[ 84 ]

उत्सर्गतः सकलकर्मनिवृत्तिनिष्ठा  
संन्यासशास्त्रशतकोटिभिरर्पितास्य ।  
अस्ति प्रतिप्रसवशास्त्रमुखात्प्रतीता  
चेष्टात्मबुद्धिपरिपाकफलापि काचित् ॥

By the numerous Vedic texts which enjoin renunciation it is conveyed as a general rule that the aspirant has to concentrate on indifference to all activities. However, from the text which teaches an exception to this, it is known that there is the activity having as its fruit the perfection of the knowledge of the supreme self.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (III, v, 1) enjoins renunciation of all activities. But another text of the same Upaniṣad (IV, iv, 6) supercedes the general rule and enjoins activity of the nature of Vedāntic study, reasoning, and meditation which leads to the perfection of the knowledge of the supreme self.

[ 85 ]

यमस्वरूपा सकला निवृत्तिस्तथा प्रवृत्तिर्नियमस्वरूपा ।  
निवर्तकादत्र यमप्रसिद्धिः प्रवर्तकात्स्यान्नियमप्रसिद्धिः ॥



All cases of forbearance are of the nature of renunciation, while all observances are of the nature of activity. The prohibitory and injunctive texts convey forbearance and observance (respectively).<sup>1</sup>

1. *nivartakasūstravedaniyā yamāḥ, pravartakasūstravedaniyaniamāḥ, TB.*

[ 86 ]

निवृत्तिरस्ति द्विविधा बहिः स्थिता शरीरसर्वेन्द्रियसंयमात्मिका ।  
तथापराभ्यन्तरवस्तुसंश्रया सदात्मकूटस्थचिदेकविग्रहा ॥

Renunciation is two-fold: one is related to the external objects and is of the nature of control over body and all senses. The other is concerned with the inner self and is of the nature of absolute consciousness which is immutable and real.

*prāptakriyākārya - karaṇa - uparamarūpā bāhyaniṣṛtīḥ, nityaniṣṛt-takriyātmarūpā ābhyantaranīṣṛtīḥ, AP.*

[ 87 ]

तयोस्तु बाह्या विधिशास्त्रलभ्या प्रयत्ननिर्वर्त्यतया प्रतीतेः ।  
विधानशास्त्रं विरह्य लभ्या चित्तिस्वरूपा त्वितरा निवृत्तिः ॥

Of these two, as the external renunciation is known to be of the nature of what is to be achieved by human effort, it is got from the injunctive texts. The internal renunciation, however, is of the nature of consciousness and is known without the aid of any injunctive text.



[ 88 ]

मायामयी बाह्यनिवृत्तिरिष्टा चित्तिस्वरूपा परमार्थसत्या ।  
तयोनिवृत्त्योश्च निवृत्तिशास्त्रं विधायकं बाह्यनिवृत्त्यपेक्षम् ॥

It is considered that external renunciation is illusory, and the other which is of the nature of consciousness is absolutely real. Of these two, the prohibitory texts contain injunction regarding only the external renunciation.

[ 89 ]

प्रवृत्तिशास्त्रेण समेऽपि संमते  
निवृत्तिशास्त्रस्य विधेयबोधने ।  
निवृत्त्यनुष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वतो  
निवर्तकं शास्त्रमिदं प्रचक्षते ॥

The prohibitory text is considered similar to the injunctive text regarding the teaching of something prescribed. But learned men say that a text is prohibitory since it enjoins the observance of renunciation.

[ 90 ]

शास्त्रद्वयेन परिदर्शितसाधनेन  
साध्यस्पृहापरवशः पुरुषो मुमुक्षुः ।  
शुश्रूषते गुरुमथेत्युदितः स चात्र  
वेदान्तवाक्यविषयश्रवणाधिकारी ॥

The aspirant who longs for liberation and who, owing to the observance of the means prescribed by the two-fold scriptures (*karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñānakāṇḍa*), is overwhelmed by



the desire for what is to be achieved (namely, the knowledge of the self), serves the preceptor. He alone is specified by the word *atha* (in the *sūtra*—*athāto brahmajijñāsā*) as the qualified person to inquire into the subject-matter of the Upaniṣads.

*sāstradvaya*.—SS interprets this word to mean *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñānakāṇḍa*, while other commentaries take it to mean *yama* and *niyama* previously mentioned.

[ 91 ]

स परिपृच्छति कोऽहमसौ च कः

सहजमस्य च तस्य च किं पृथक् ।

उत तयोरभिदेश्वरजीवयो-

रिति च संशयसंकुलमानसः ॥

The aspirant whose mind is confounded by doubts asks thus: what is my nature? What is the nature of the supreme self? Are the inner self and the supreme self intrinsically different or identical?

[INSTRUCTION BY THE PRECEPTOR]

[ 92 ]

तीर्थेन तं विविदिषन्तमनन्यभक्तं

संसारसागरभयातुरचित्तवृत्तिम् ।

एकं मुमुक्षुमधिकारिणमात्मतत्त्व-

ज्ञाने समीक्ष्य गुरुराह दयाविधेयः ॥

Having examined the aspirant who desires to know the self through the perceptor, who is devoted to no other



thought (except to know the self), whose mind is afflicted with the fear of the ocean-like transmigration, who is unique and longs for liberation, and who is fit to receive the knowledge of the true nature of the self—the compassionate preceptor says thus:—

*tirtha*—SS takes this word to mean 'preceptor.' Other commentaries, however, take it to mean *śāstra*.

[ 93 ]

वक्ष्यामि वत्स तव वाञ्छितमत्यवस्थ-  
मत्यन्तमेव च हितं शृणु तन्मनस्कः ।  
त्वं प्रत्यगव्यवहितं तव सुप्रसिद्धं  
ब्रह्माद्वितीयमुदितं च तदस्यजस्रम् ॥

Oh dear! I shall explain to you the object which you desire to know, which transcends the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, and which is highly beneficial. Listen with attention. You are the inner self which is immediate and is well within your experience. And the supreme self is said to be absolute. And you are always the supreme self.

*atyavastham*—*avasthātrayātītam, tūrīyam iti yāvat, SS.*

[ 94 ]

यद्यत्र पश्यसि विरोधमुदीरय त्वं  
सद्यस्ततः परिहराणि तमप्रयत्नात् ।  
वाक्यं निरस्तसकलप्रतिबन्धकं सत्  
त्वां बोधयिष्यति करार्पितबिल्वतुल्यम् ॥



Tell me if you find anything inconsistent here (that is, in my statement). Let me answer them immediately without exertion. When all the contrary notions are removed, the Upaniṣadic sentence (*tat tvam asi*) will impart to you the true knowledge of the self as clearly perceptible as the *bilva* fruit placed on the palm.

### [DOUBTS OF THE ASPIRANT]

[ 95 ]

अत्राह सद्द्वयमहं मम रूपमीक्षे तच्चाद्वयं विगणयामि परोक्षमेव ।  
पारोक्ष्यसद्द्वयविभागयुजोर्विरोधाद्वाक्यार्थबोधमतिदुर्लभमेव मन्ये ॥

Now the aspirant says thus:—I perceive my nature as characterized by duality, and I regard the absolute self to be mediate. In view of the pair of conflicting attributes such as immediacy and mediacy and duality and absolute nature (present in the individual soul and the supreme self respectively), I think that the import of the Upaniṣadic passage (namely, the oneness of the self) is impossible.

The supreme self is mediately known through reasoning or revelation, and is known to be absolute, while the inner self is immediate and is associated with body, senses, etc. The identity between the two, therefore, is discrepant.

*vigaṇayāmi—viruddham gaṇayāmi, pratyakṣaviruddham manye, AP.*

### [THE SELF CANNOT BE KNOWN THROUGH THE UPANISADS]

[ 96 ]

यद्वस्तु सद्द्वयतयावगतं स्वशब्दा-  
त्तस्याद्वयत्वमवगन्तुमशक्यमेव ।



यद्वस्तु च व्यवहितं प्रतिपादितं तत्  
प्रत्यक्तया न तु जनः प्रतिपत्तुमीशः ॥

That object known by the word signifying it as characterized by duality cannot be considered as absolute in nature. Similarly one cannot comprehend the object mediately known as of the nature of inner self.

[ 97 ]

आकाङ्क्षितं भवति पूरणशक्तियुक्तं  
यत्संनिधौ 'पठितमस्य हि संगतिः स्यात् ।  
नाकाङ्क्षयैव न तु संनिधिनैव वा स्यात्  
संबन्धिता हि विरह्य पदार्थशक्तिम् ॥

If a word should have syntactical relation, it should possess expectancy, congruity, and proximity. But there cannot be any relation by mere expectancy or proximity without congruity.

*Padārthasaktim—padārthasāmarthyam, योग्यतां इत्यर्थः, AP.*

[ 98 ]

योग्यत्वमत्र न च तत्त्वमसीति वाक्ये  
संबन्धितां प्रति पदार्थयुगस्य भाति ।  
पारोक्ष्यसद्वयविभागविरोधहेतो-  
र्गौरश्च इत्यभिहिते तु यथैव वाक्ये ॥

There is no congruity in respect of the mutual relation of the meanings of the words such as cow, horse, etc.,

1. पठित—B<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>



expressed as a sentence. Similarly there is no congruity in respect of the mutual relation of the meaning of the terms (*tat* and *tvam*) in the sentence (*tat tvam asi*) in view of the contradictory attributes such as mediacy, duality, etc., present in them.

[ 99 ]

सोऽयंगिरोरिव न लक्षणयापि वृत्ति-  
 मानान्तराधिगतिहीनतयात्मानि स्यात् ।  
 मानान्तराधिगतगोचर एव दृष्टः  
 शब्दप्रयोग इह लाक्षणिकस्तु लोके ॥

In ordinary experience words with secondary significative power are employed to signify only that object which is cognized by another means of valid knowledge. (The words *tat* and *tvam* in *tat tvam asi*) unlike the words 'this' and 'that' (in the sentence 'This is that Devadatta') do not even secondarily signify the self as the latter is not an object of any other means of valid knowledge.

For details see Introduction, p. 15.

The objection raised in this verse is answered in *SS*, I, 152.

[ 100 ]

तस्मादखण्डविषया न वचः प्रवृत्तिः  
 संसर्गबोधनमपास्तमयोग्यभावात् ।  
 एवं न वाक्यगतशब्दसमन्वयोऽपि  
 दूरे प्रमान्तरविरोधनिराससिद्धिः

Hence the import of the words is not partless entity, nor identity (involving duality) as there is no congruity.



Thus in the absence of syntactical relation of the words in the sentence, no sense is made out. Hence there is no occasion to refute the contradiction arising from other proofs (in respect of the sense of the sentence).

The import of the sentence *tat tvam asi* is not identity involving duality (*saṁsarga*) in view of the conflicting attributes present in the meanings of the terms, *tat* and *tvam*. Nor is it partless entity, since the words do not secondarily signify it.

[ 101 ]

किं च प्रमान्तरमपेक्ष्य गिरः प्रवृत्तिः  
सिद्धेषु वस्तुषु जगत्युपलब्धपूर्वा ।  
ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुनि तथा वचसः प्रवृत्तिः  
र्युक्तात्मनस्तु फलवत्परिनिष्ठितत्वात् ॥

Moreover, in ordinary experience it is found that the words signify the existent objects which are cognized by another means of valid knowledge. As the supreme self identical with the inner self is an object like 'fruit', it is reasonable that the words should signify it in the manner (mentioned above, namely, when it is cognized by some other proof).

(1) This is explained in the following verse. The objection raised in this verse is answered in *SS*, I, 276-8.

[ 102 ]

नद्यास्तीरे फलमिति गिरः सिद्धवस्तुप्रवृत्ते-  
र्दृष्टा स्वार्थप्रमितिजनने स्वान्यमानव्यपेक्षा ।  
तद्वद्ब्रह्मण्यपि तु वचसो वैदिकस्याभ्युपेया  
तस्मादस्मिन्न खलु घटते मानभावः श्रुतीनाम् ॥



Just as the sentence—‘There are fruits on the bank of the river’ which denotes an existent object (namely, fruit) is found to depend on some proof other than itself (namely, perception) in giving rise to the cognition of its sense, so also it should be admitted that the Upaniṣadic passage in producing the cognition of the supreme self depends on another proof. (As the supreme self is not cognized by other proofs), there is no validity of the Upaniṣadic passages in respect of it.

[ 103 ]

नाखण्डवस्तुविषया वचसः प्रवृत्ति-  
 लोकेऽपि दृष्टिपथमापतिता कदाचित् ।  
 नानापदार्थघटनाविषयत्वहेतो-  
 र्दूरेत्यता श्रुतिशिरोवचनेषु तस्याः ॥

It is known that the significance of even the secular statements is not partless entity, as they apprehend the relation of the meanings of several words. (When such is the case) it is incompatible that the significance of the Upaniṣadic passages (like *tat tvam asi*) is partless entity.

*dūretyatā—dūre bhavaḥ tasya bhāvaḥ, vide: dūrādetyaḥ, Vārtika on the Pāṇini - Sūtra, 4-2-104].*

*ghaṭanā — saṁsargaḥ, SS.*

[ 104 ]

आदाय मुख्यगुणलाक्षणिकप्रवृत्ति-  
 र्थं समर्पयति शब्द इति 'प्रसिद्धम् ।  
 आस्वेष नान्यतमयापि वदत्यखण्डं  
 शब्दान्तरात्ताविषयादधिकार्थवृत्तोः ॥

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1. प्रसिद्धिः—T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>



As word, as is well-known, signifies its sense by means of either the primary signification, or the secondary one or the one based on similarity. Since a word in a sentence should convey a sense different from the one denoted by the other word (in it), the words *tat* and *tvam* do not convey the partless entity by any one of the three significative forces.

A word in a sentence should convey a sense different from the one signified by the other word in the sentence. If it conveys the same sense signified by the other word, then both would become synonymous.

*śabdāntarātta.....vṛttech—padāntaropasthāpitārthāt padāntarasya adhikārthavṛttech, anyathā paryāyatvāpattech, AP.*

The objection raised in this and the following verse is refuted in SS', I, 161.

[ 105 ]

आधिक्यमुत्सृजति शब्दगणो निजेऽर्थे  
शब्दान्तरात्तविषयादिति मन्यमानाः ।  
वाक्यत्वमेव पदजातगतं विहन्यु-  
र्न ह्यस्ति हस्तकरशब्दगतं तदेषाम् ॥

Those who think that any word (in a sentence) does not denote a sense different from the one signified by the other word, rule out the very nature of sentence pertaining to a group of words. Indeed the string of words such as *hasta*, *kara*, does not constitute a sentence.

[ 106 ]

किं च स्वयंप्रभमलुप्तचिदेकरूपं  
सर्वप्रमाणविषयाद्बहिरभ्युपेत्य ।



आत्मानमात्मनि च शास्त्रमुदाहरन्तः  
सिद्धान्तमभ्युगतं परिपीडयन्ति ॥

Moreover, having once accepted that the self is beyond the scope of all the means of valid knowledge, as it is eternal pure consciousness and as such self-luminous, they definitely contradict this accepted logical conclusion by holding that the scripture is the means to understand the nature of the supreme self.

On the strength of the Upaniṣadic passages such as *yato vāco nivartante* (Taitt., II, iv, 1), *etadaprameyam dhruvam* (Brh., IV, iv, 20) the Advaitins maintain that the supreme self is beyond the scope of all the means of valid knowledge; but on the basis of the *Brahma-sūtra-sūtrayonitoṭ* (I, i, 3) they hold that the supreme self is to be known through the Upaniṣadic passages.

The objection raised in this and the following verse is answered in SŚ, I, 245.

[ 107 ]

सर्वत्र वस्तुषु जडेष्वजडप्रकाशं  
कुर्वत्प्रमाणमिति संप्रतिपन्नमेतत् ।  
ब्रह्मात्मवस्त्वजडबोधवपुः कुतोऽस्मिन्  
वेदान्तवाक्यजनिताजडसंविदन्या ॥

A proof is accepted to be that which gives rise to the self-luminous knowledge in respect of the insentient objects. As the supreme self is of the nature of self-luminous knowledge, wherefore can there be another self-luminous knowledge from the Upaniṣadic passage in respect of it.



[ 108 ]

किं च क्रियापदमपेक्ष्य पदानि वाक्य-  
 भावेन सम्यगिह संगतिमाप्नुवन्ति ।  
 नात्र क्रियापदमपेक्षितमामनन्ति  
 वाक्यं कुतो भवति वेदशिरस्तदानीम् ॥

Moreover, words syntactically related to the finite verb, constitute a sentence. But here the Vedāntins hold that the verb (namely, *asi*, etc., present in the Upaniṣadic passages such as *tat tvam asi* etc.,) does not signify its primary sense. How then can the Upaniṣadic passage constitute a sentence.

Now it is objected that the Upaniṣadic passage does not constitute a sentence. And for this reason also it cannot be considered as the source of the knowledge of the self.

According to the Advaitins, the word *asi* in the passage *tat tvam asi* does not have the force of a verb, as it denotes mere existence which is the essential nature of the self.

The objection raised in this verse is answered in *SS*, I, 280-2.

[ 109 ]

नापूर्वमर्थमुपलम्भयितुं पदानां  
 सामर्थ्यमस्ति परिहृत्य तु वाक्यभावम् ।  
 स्वार्थस्मृतिं हि जनयन्ति पदानि लोके  
 विज्ञातसंगतितया न तु कार्यमन्यत् ॥

The words without being constituted as a sentence have no capacity to signify a sense not known by any other



means. The words have no other function except to give rise to the recollection of their own meanings with which their significative relation has already been known.

The verse refutes the contention that the words without being constituted as a sentence can signify a sense which is not known through any other proof.

[ 110 ]

हित्वा न वाक्यपदते प्रतिपत्तिहेतु-  
 वेदो भवेदिति कथंचन वक्तुमीशः ।  
 कश्चित्कदाचिदपि तत्र कुतः श्रुतीनां  
 प्रमाप्यमात्मनि भवेदिति वर्णयन्ति ॥

One can never say that the Upaniṣadic passage, leaving aside its character as word and sentence somehow becomes the source of knowledge (of the self). So how can it be said that the Upaniṣadic passages are valid in respect of the self?

[ 111 ]

किं च प्रमान्तरमिहाभ्युपयन् प्रतीचि  
 वेदान्तवाक्यमनुवादकमभ्युपेयात् ।  
 मानान्तरं यदि च नेच्छति शब्दशक्ते-  
 स्तत्र ग्रहः कथमिति प्रतिपादनीयम् ॥

Moreover, if it is held that the self falls within the scope of another proof, then one should accept that the Upaniṣadic passage (which signifies the self) is a mere restatement (of what is known through another proof). If, on the other hand, it is accepted that the self is not cognized



by another proof, then it should be explained how the significative power of the words (such as *satya*, *jñāna*, etc.) pertaining to the self is comprehended.

The word *pramā* here means *pramāṇa*.

The objection raised in this verse is refuted in *SS*, I, 289 ff.

[ 112 ]

किं च प्रवृत्तिविनिवृत्तिविहीनवस्तु-  
तत्त्वप्रतीतिजननान्न च किञ्चिदस्ति ।  
पुंसः प्रयोजनमतोऽपि न तत्र मानं  
वेदान्तवाक्यमिति युक्तिमदुच्यमानम् ॥

Any scriptural text which gives rise to the knowledge of an (existent) object which is not helpful towards activity or abstinence does not signify anything of value to man. So for this reason also the view that the Upaniṣadic passages are not valid in respect of the self is quite sensible.

For details see Introduction, pp. 71-2.

The objection raised in this verse is restated in *SS*, I, 300, and answered in *SS*, I, 301.

[ 113 ]

अज्ञातमर्थमवबोधयतः प्रमायां  
हेतुत्वमभ्युपगतं ननु वेदविद्धिः ।  
अज्ञात'ता च परमात्मनि दुर्निरूपा  
विज्ञानमात्रवपुषीति न मानकृत्यम् ॥

1. तापि—T<sub>2</sub>.



A proof is accepted indeed by the Vedic scholars to be valid in this that it manifests an unknown object. But as the supreme self is of the form of pure consciousness, it is difficult to prove that it is unknown; and hence the proof (namely, the Upaniṣadic passages) is not valid.

*na mānakṛtyam—na prāmāṇyam, TB.*

The translation follows *TB*. The objection raised in this verse is answered in *SS*, I, 335.

[ 114 ]

बोधस्वभावकमबुद्धमनुष्णमुष्णं  
शीतस्वभावकमशीतमितीदृशानि ।  
कः श्रद्धधीत पुरुषो वचनानि तस्माद्  
ब्रह्माप्रबुद्धमिति वाक्यमयुक्तमाहुः ॥

Who will have faith in the import of the statements such as—‘A self-luminous object does not reveal itself’, ‘An object which is hot is cold’, and ‘An object which is cold is hot’? So the Vedāntins say that the statement—‘The supreme self is unknown’ is (similarly) incompatible.

[ 115 ]

उपाध्यभावे न भवेदुपाधिमतु तटस्थमज्ञानमुपाधिरिष्यते ।  
प्रमाणबुद्धेर्न तदात्मवस्तुनि स्वयंप्रकाशे न ततोऽत्र मानधीः ॥

In the absence of the limiting condition, it is not possible to have the object as presented by that limiting condition. In the cognition of the self through proof, *avidyā* is admitted to be this adventitious limiting condi-



tion. But *avidyā* is impossible in the self-luminous self. Therefore the self does not come within the scope of any proof.

If it is said that the self characterized by *avidyā* is the object of the Upaniṣads, then it is asked whether *avidyā* is the qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the self, or limiting condition (*upādhi*). It cannot be the former, as otherwise *avidyā* also, like the self, would become the object of the Upaniṣads and as such it would become real. The inevitable result would be that *avidyā* cannot be sublated by the knowledge of the self arising from the Upaniṣads. Hence it should be held that *avidyā* serves as the limiting condition in the case of the self. And this contention is refuted in this verse.

[ 116 ]

अद्वैतमात्मपदमाहुरनन्यमानं

द्वैतं प्रमाणमिह च प्रतिपादयन्ति ।

वाक्ये निजे पदविरोधमनीक्षमाणाः

पाण्डित्यमप्रतिहतं प्रतिलभ्य धीराः ॥

Having penetrating erudition the scholars do not notice the inconsistency of the words in their sentence that the proof (Upaniṣads) characterized by duality is the source of the knowledge of the self which is absolute and self-luminous.

15

[ 117 ]

मातृप्रमाणमिति मेयविभागभिन्नं

ब्रह्मैव चेद्ववति तत्र च वर्णयामः ।

कूटस्थतापहतिरेकरसत्वहानिः

शाक्यैश्च सन्धिरिति दूषणमन्यदत्र ॥



If it is held that the knower, knowledge, its means, and its object are the transformation of the self (which is consciousness) then we point out the defects, namely, the loss of the immutability and absoluteness of the self, and adoption of the view of the Buddhists.<sup>1</sup>

1. The *Vijñānavāda* school of Buddhism also holds the view that consciousness alone is real. What is of the nature of consciousness is indeed indivisible; but by those whose vision is confused, it is seen to be, as it were differentiated into the perceived object, the perceiving subject, and then perception itself. Sarvajñātman, in the sequel, refutes the contention that the view of Advaita is similar to that of the *Vijñānavāda* school of Buddhism.

See SŚ, II, 25-32.

[ 118 ]

अज्ञानकल्पितमनिर्वचनीयमिष्टं

मात्रादिमानफलपर्यवसानमेतत् ।

इत्युच्यते यदि तदा परमात्मनोऽपि

मेयत्वतो भवति कल्पितताप्रसङ्गः ॥

If it is said that the differences beginning with knower and ending with the result of proof (namely, knowledge)<sup>1</sup> are falsely created by *avidyā* and hence indeterminable, then there arises the contingency of the self also being superimposed in view of its knowability (through the Upaniṣadic passages).

1. Knower, means of knowledge, object of knowledge, and knowledge.

If it is said that the knower, knowledge, its means and its object in view of their knowability, are falsely created by *avidyā* and hence indeterminable, then the self also should be held as superimposed



and as such indeterminable, as it is also knowable by being the object of knowledge for the Upaniṣads.

[ 119 ]

ब्रह्म प्रमेयमथ नेष्टमिह प्रमाणं  
वेदान्तवाक्यमिति पक्षपराहर्तिर्वः ।  
न ह्यप्रमेयमवबोधयदस्ति मानं  
नादाह्यदाहक इति प्रथितः कृशानुः ॥

Just as fire is not noted for consuming an unburnable object, so also there is no proof that manifests an unknowable object. Hence the contention that the supreme self is not admitted to be knowable, but has the Upaniṣadic passages as the source of its knowledge amounts to the stultification of your view.

[ 120 ]

किं । सद्धमिदमत्र जगत्त्रयेऽपि  
स्वाज्ञानकल्पितमनिर्वचनीयमेकम् ।  
नःशेषतीर्थकृदुदीरिततन्त्रमार्गे  
सिद्धे यतः सदसती सकलेऽपि तन्त्रे ॥

Moreover, two classes of objects 'real' and 'unreal' alone are admitted in all the sacred books which are the means of understanding the philosophical doctrines advocated by experts in the *sāstras*. Further, even a single object which is falsely created by one's own *avidyā* and as such indeterminable is unheard of in the three worlds.

The objection raised in this verse is refuted in *SS* I, 336.



[ 121 ]

अज्ञानमप्यसदभावतया प्रसिद्धे-  
 द्वैतप्रसूतिकृदतो न तदभ्युपेयम् ।  
 नासत्कदाचिदपि सज्जनने समर्थं  
 वन्ध्यासुता न खलु पुत्रशतं प्रसूते ॥

As nescience is well-known to be the absence of knowledge, it is a void and so it should not be accepted as the source of the universe characterized by duality. A void is never capable of giving rise to a positive entity. Never does the daughter of a barren woman give birth to a hundred children.

The objection raised in this verse is answered in *SS*, I, 320.

### MAJOR TEXTS DO NOT GIVE RISE TO IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

[ 122 ]

वाक्यप्रसूतमतिरिन्द्रियजन्यधीव-  
 न्नार्थापरोक्ष्यजननी भवितुं समर्था ।  
 तेनास्तु वाक्यजनितात्मपरोक्षबुद्धि-  
 भ्रान्तिः सदाजडतयानुभवेऽपरोक्षे ॥

The cognition arising from a sentence, unlike the one from the senses, does not present its object as immediate. Hence the mediate cognition arising from the sentence is erroneous in respect of the self which is always self-luminous and is of the nature of immediate experience.

The objection raised in this and the following two verses is refuted in *SS*, I, 341.



[ 123 ]

नित्यापरोक्षमपि वस्तु परोक्षरूपं  
 वेदान्तवाक्यमवबोधयति स्वभावात् ।  
 प्रामाण्यमत्र कथमस्य वदोपपन्नं  
 न ह्यन्यदन्यदिति बोधयतः प्रमात्वम् ॥

The Upaniṣadic sentence, by its innate nature, makes known the eternal and self-luminous object (namely, the self) as mediate. Tell me how it is reasonable that the Upaniṣadic texts are valid in respect of the self. Indeed there is no validity for a proof, if it makes known an object as of a different nature.

[ 124 ]

वस्त्वस्तु नित्यमपरोक्षमिदं तु वाक्यं  
 तद्वस्तु वक्तुमपरोक्षमशक्तमेव ।  
 न ह्यस्ति शब्दजनितात्र जगत्त्रयेऽपि  
 बुद्धिः करोति खलु या विषयापरोक्ष्यम् ॥

Though the object is always immediate yet the Upaniṣadic passage is incapable of presenting it as immediate. Indeed in the three worlds the cognition arising from a sentence does not present its object as immediate.

KNOWLEDGE ARISING FROM UPANIṢADS  
 DOES NOT REMOVE AVIDYĀ

[ 125 ]

अत्राह यद्यपि किमप्युपनेयमत्र  
 चैतन्यवस्तुनि न संभवति प्रमाणैः ।



अस्त्येव तत्र भवभीतिनिदानभूत-  
मज्ञानमात्रमपनेयमनन्यमाने ॥

Now (if) it is said (by the Siddhāntin): though there is nothing to be revealed by proof in the case of the self-evident self, yet there is the nescience which is the dread of transmigration and which has to be annihilated (by the proof).

Now the *Siddhāntin* holds that the Upaniṣadic passages are valid in this that they remove nescience present in the self.

[ 126 ]

नैतत्प्रमाणमपनेतु 'सतो न ताव-  
न्नैतन्नियोज्यसमतोऽप्युपघातसिद्धयै ।  
नाप्यन्यदस्ति सदसद्यदनेन हेयं  
तस्मात्प्रमाणमपनेतु न कस्यचिद्द्वः ॥

It is not correct. A proof does not annihilate anything real. It need not be employed to annihilate the non-existent object. And there is no object which is both real and unreal, and which could be annulled by this. Hence in your (Advaitic) school, proof does not annihilate anything.

If nescience is real, it cannot be annihilated. Similar is the case if it is unreal, like the horn of a hare. It cannot be both real and unreal at once. So nescience is not annihilated by any proof, in which case the latter would become valid.

The objection raised in this and the following verse is answered in *SS*, I, 342.

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1. सती—1 6



[ 127 ]

मानं न कारकमिति प्रथितं पृथिव्यां  
 स्याच्चेत्क्रियावदिदमुज्झति मानभावम् ।  
 जन्यं न मानफलमित्यपि युष्मदीयाः  
 संविद्वते न खलु जातुचिदक्षरेऽस्मिन् ॥

In ordinary experience, it is well-known that a proof is not a productive factor. It is were so, then it ceases to be a proof, like an act. The followers of your school also do not accept that the result of a proof (namely, knowledge) is produced (even in the case of the insentient objects). Never do they accept it in the case of the self.

As a proof is not a productive factor, it cannot annihilate nescience. It cannot be urged that, as a proof gives rise to the knowledge of an object, it is a productive factor; for even the Advaitins do not admit that a proof gives rise to the knowledge of an object. They hold that the pure consciousness delimited by an insentient object (say) pot, when reflected in the mental state arising from a proof in the form of 'This is pot', is knowledge and it manifests the pot. Hence knowledge is not produced by a proof and so the latter cannot be considered as a productive factor.

ANIRVACANĪYATĀ—A PSEUDO-CONCEPT

[ 128 ]

नाद्यापि वेद्म्यहमनिर्वचनीयभाषां  
 सर्वप्रवादहृदयान्य<sup>1</sup>पि गाहमानः ।  
 तात्पर्यतो न च तथाविधमस्ति किञ्चि-  
 ह्योके प्रसिद्धमपि यद्विषयेयमिष्टा ॥

1. न्यवगा—12, 13



Even now, I do not understand the concept of *anirvacanīya*, though I thoughtfully enter into the core of all the philosophical doctrines. Such an object as is termed *anirvacanīya* is also unheard of in worldly experience.

The objection raised in this verse is answered in *SS*, I, 339-40.

[ 129 ]

तस्मात्प्रमाणफलमत्र निरूप्यमाणं  
ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुनि न संभवतीह किञ्चित् ।  
कृत्यं विना न च निरूपयितुं प्रमाणं  
वेदान्तवाक्यमिह शक्यमनर्थकत्वात् ॥

Hence, on careful examination (it is found) that in the case of the self no result (namely, either the removal of nescience, or the manifestation of the self itself) is possible. In view of the absence of any result, the Upaniṣadic passage becomes futile and hence it cannot be shown to be a proof.

## IMPORT OF THE VEDIC TEXTS IS NIYOGA

[ 130 ]

कार्यान्वयान्वयिनि वस्तुनि शब्दशक्तिं  
श्रोतुः प्रवर्तकधियं परिकल्प्य बालः ।  
चेष्टावशात्पुनरपि प्रविभज्य भागं  
भागस्य वाचकमिति स्वयमेव वेत्ति ॥

The beginner observes activity on the part of the hearer and infers the knowledge that prompts the latter to activity. He then understands the significative power (of the group of words uttered by the elder person) in the



sense which is one of the relata of the relation existing between the existent object and *niyoga*. (Later by a process of insertion and elimination), he distinguishes the words and naturally understands that each word is significative of its sense (as associated with *niyoga*).

Now the *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that the import of the Vedic texts is *niyoga*, and hence the Upaniṣads are not vaild in respect of the existent entity, the self.

For details see Introduction, pp. 53-4.

[ 131 ]

यक्तः कार्यान्वितार्थं वदितुमलमयं शब्द इत्येष पक्षो  
 नोक्तो योग्येतरार्थान्वितमिति तु पुनः पूर्वमप्येष पक्षः ।  
 किं तु स्यादस्य शक्तिर्निजसहजवशादन्वितार्थाभिधाने  
 योग्यत्वादेस्तु पश्चात्स्वयमुप'निपतत्यस्य कार्यैदमर्थ्यम् ॥

The view that the word is capable of denoting the sense as related to *niyoga* is given up. The other view that the word denotes the sense as related to another compatible sense has not been advanced even before. But in view of its innate nature, a word conveys a related sense. Later, owing to compatibility, etc., the whole sentence naturally points to *niyoga*.

If it is said by the *Siddhāntin* that a word conveys only a related sense, the *Pūrvapakṣin* admits this contention. He, however, holds that the word would naturally point to *niyoga* later, owing to compatibility, congruity, and expectancy.

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1. निपतेत्—P<sub>2</sub>



[ 132 ]

प्रवृत्त्यभावस्य विरोधि कार्यं कालत्रयानन्वितमाहुरेके ।  
स्वगोचरस्येप्सितसाधनत्वं विज्ञापयत्प्रेरकमाहुरन्ये ॥

Some followers of the Prābhākara<sup>1</sup> school maintain that *niyoga* is that which is inimical to inaction and is not conditioned by the three divisions of time—past, present, and future. Some others affirm that it prompts one to activity by making known that its content is the means to a desired result.

1. *eke*—*gurumatekadeśinah*, [ SS ]

For details see SS, I, 386, ff.

[ 133 ]

<sup>1</sup>या नान्यमुद्दिश्य कृतिः प्रवृत्ता तयैव यद्व्याप्यतया प्रतीतम् ।  
<sup>2</sup>तदेव कार्यं<sup>3</sup> कथयन्ति केचित् विचक्षणाः कार्यनिरूपणायाम् ॥

Experts in defining the nature of *niyoga* affirm thus—*Niyoga* is that which does not have any other as the aim of activity and is known to be achieved by it (activity).

For details see Introduction, pp. 50-1.

[ 134 ]

भूत्वा रागः कारणं पुंस्प्रवृत्तेर्नैवं कार्यं कार्यरूपं विहाय ।  
रूपेणा<sup>4</sup>न्येनाप्यतेऽस्या निमित्तं भिन्दन्त्येनं रागकार्ये बहुज्ञाः ॥

1. यानन्यमु—M<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, T<sub>6</sub>.

2. तथैव—T<sub>6</sub>.

3. व्यं प्रथयन्ति—T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>.

4. न्येनेप्यते—M<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.



Scholars contrast both 'passion' and *niyoga* thus:—  
'Passion' prompts one to activity by existing beforehand.  
*Niyoga*, on the other hand, remains to be achieved and in  
this aspect and not in any other aspect, it prompts one to  
action.

[ 135 ]

आवापोद्वापहेतोः पदमिदममुकस्याभिधाने समर्थं  
स्वोत्पत्त्यैवेति शक्तिप्रतिनियममिमं पार्श्ववर्ती तटस्थः ।  
जानात्यालोच्य भूयो नयनिपुणमतिर्भागशः कार्ययुक्ते  
वस्तुन्येतस्य हेतोरुपनिषदखिला कार्यशेषे प्रमाणम् ॥

By a process of insertion and elimination, the learner  
who passively stands near and who is an adept in the  
application of the logical method (of agreement and  
difference) considers that a word is naturally capable of  
denoting a particular sense as related to *niyoga*. Again,  
from other usages, he ascertains the significative relation  
of each word to the sense related to *niyoga*. Hence all the  
Upaniṣadic passages are valid in respect of the object  
which is subsidiary to *niyoga*.

For details see Introduction, p. 50.

[ 136 ]

आज्ञादिभेदेष्वनुवर्तमाने प्रवृत्त्यभावस्य विरोधिमात्रे ।  
लिङादिशब्दस्य स वेत्ति शक्तिं प्रवर्तकाख्यविषयत्वयोग्ये ॥

The beginner understands the signification of the  
potential suffiz (*liñ*), etc., in the 'state of being mandatory',  
which is present in 'command', etc., that are wholly  
inimical to inaction and are capable of being denoted by  
the word—'mandatory' (*pravartaka*).



[ 137 ]

अन्ये वदन्ति निरुपाधिनियोगरूपं  
 वेदे भवत्यपुरुषप्रभवे स्वतन्त्रम् ।  
 लोके पुनः पुरुषधीरचितेषु कार्यं  
 सोपाधिकं तदिति कारणतो वचस्सु ॥

Others hold : *Niyoga* is unconditioned and as such independent in the sphere of scripture which is of impersonal origin. But it is conditioned in the sphere of secular statements, as the latter are of personal origin.

[ 138 ]

आज्ञायाच्चाद्युपाधिप्रणिपतितवपुः साधनेहानु<sup>1</sup> बद्धं  
 विज्ञातोपायभावं विषयमनुसरत्पौरुषे<sup>2</sup> योषु वाक्षु ।  
 वेदे कर्तृस्थरागाद्युपाधिविरहितं कर्तृशून्ये ततोऽस्मिन्  
 सर्वत्रैकस्वभावस्थितवपुषि भवेल्लब्धशक्तिर्लिङादिः ॥

In the sphere of secular statements, *niyoga* is determined by its relation to the means (*dhātvartha*) which is of the form of activity, which is associated with the limiting conditions like 'command', etc., and which is already known to be the means of a desired end. In the sphere of Vedic sentences, which have no author, *niyoga* is free from limiting conditions such as 'the desire of the speaker'. Hence the signification of the potential suffix (*lin*), etc., is the state of being a *niyoga*, and it is common to both Vedic and secular statements.

1. बन्धं—M<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>

2. येये तु वाक्ये—T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>,



[ 139 ]

अन्ये भिन्नस्वभावं विविधमभिदधत्यानुरूप्येण कार्यं  
 लोके धात्वर्थरूपं श्रुतिवचसि पुनस्तन्नियोगाख्यमेव ।  
 संमुग्धे तत्र शक्तिं शिशुरयमवगम्यादितो न्यायचक्षुः  
 पश्चाद्वेदैकवेद्यं वदति लिङिति च प्रेक्षते निश्चयेन ॥

Others maintain a two-fold *niyoga* characterized by different nature according to fitness or suitability. In the sphere of the secular statements, it is the sense of the root, while in the sphere of the Vedic statements it is called *niyoga*. The beginner at first understands the signification of the potential suffix to be *niyoga* in its generic aspect. Later, acquiring philosophical training, he definitely ascertains that the potential suffix refers only to *niyoga* that is present in the Vedic statements.

For details see Introduction, pp. 51-52.

[ 140 ]

धात्वर्थाख्यानशक्तो यदि भवति गुणाद्वर्तितुं वैदिकेऽयं  
 संबन्धाज्ञानहेतोरनलमथ पुनर्वैदिके शक्तिमान् स्यात् ।  
 तत्संबन्धात्क्रियामप्यभिवदितुमलं लक्षणावृत्तितोऽयं  
 लिङ्शब्दस्तेन कार्ये श्रुतिवचनगते शक्त इत्यध्यवस्येत् ॥

If the potential suffix is capable of primarily signifying 'the sense of the root', then it is not competent to secondarily signify the *niyoga* present in the Vedic texts, as there is no relation of the primary sense (namely, the sense of the root) with *niyoga*. If, on the other hand, the potential suffix primarily signifies the *niyoga*, then it is capable of secondarily signifying the 'sense of the root', as *niyoga* has relation with the secondary sense, namely, the sense of the root. Hence one should ascertains that



the primary signification of the potential suffix is *niyoga* present in the Vedic texts.

[ 141 ]

एवं शब्दान्तराणां<sup>1</sup> नयनिपुणमतिः शक्तिवित्सन् क्रमेण  
पक्षेपोद्धारदर्शी भवति कतिपयैर्वासरैस्तत्र तत्र ।  
तस्मात्कार्यान्वितार्थे सकलमपि पदं शक्तिमद्बुध्यमानः  
भूताद्यर्थप्रतीतिं प्रति विमुखमनाः शास्त्रतः स्यान्मनुष्यः ॥

By a process of insertion and elimination the beginner who is an adept in the application of the logical method (or agreement and difference) understands in a few days the signification of other words. As he considers that all the words have primary signification in the meanings as related to *niyoga* he is positively against the view that the Vedic texts give rise to the sense of any existent entity (that is, the self).

[ 142 ]

वाक्याद्भूतार्थनिष्ठाद्भवति न तु नृणां शब्दशक्तिप्रतीतिः  
लिङ्गं श्रोतृस्थबुद्धेर्नहि किमपि भवेदत्र बालोपलभ्यम् ।  
न ह्येतत्पुत्रजन्माद्यवगतिनियतं नित्यवन्निश्चितं नो  
यद्वक्तादिप्रसादक्षितितल्लुठनादीक्ष्यते श्रोतृदेहे ॥

There does not arise to anyone the comprehension of the primary signification of the words from the sentence that conveys an existent entity, in view of the absence of any 'reason' (namely, activity) from which the presence of the knowledge in the hearer could be inferred. The brightness in the face and weltering on the ground noticed

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1. णामतिनिपुणमतिः T<sub>2</sub>. णामपि निपुणमतिः T<sub>3</sub>,  
णामपि नयनिपुणः शक्तिः—P<sub>1</sub>



in the body of the bearer are not always ascertained as invariably probative of the news of the birth of a son (or some calamity).

[ 143 ]

तस्मादाध्वं निराशाः श्रुतिशिरसि न तस्यास्ति निष्पन्नरूपे  
प्रामाण्यं कार्यशून्ये कथमपि च परब्रह्मणि स्वप्रधाने ।  
भूतं भव्यप्रधानं भवति न हि पुनः स्वप्रधानं कदाचित्  
शास्त्रस्थाः शब्दशक्तिस्थितिनिपुणधियो विस्तरादेवमाहुः ॥

Therefore, be without any hope of the Vedic texts (conveying an existent entity). The experts in the Śāstras who have a well-trained mind in determining the signification of words speak at length thus—the existent entity is never independent by itself, but is subservient to *niyoga*, that is, the 'one to be achieved'.<sup>1</sup> So the Vedic texts are not valid in respect of the supreme self which is independent, self-existent, and not related to *niyoga*.

1. *vide*: *bhūtān bhavyāya upadiśyate*, Śābara-bhāṣya on Jaimini-Sūtra, III, iv, 40.

[ 144 ]

तस्मादसंगतमिदं प्रतिभाति यन्मे  
वाक्यप्रमाणकमुदीरितमद्वयत्वम् ।  
इत्येवमेष मम बुद्धिपथं विरोधः  
प्राप्तः प्रभो परिहरैनमनुग्रहाय ॥

The said view, namely, that the Vedānta is valid proof in respect of the oneness of the self, appears to me incongruous. Thus there has arisen this contradiction in my mind. Oh! Lord, please remove this for my edification.



## OBJECTIONS ANSWERED :

IMPARTITE SENSE — THE IMPORT OF  
THE MAJOR TEXTS

[ 145 ]

सत्यं 'यदाह गुरुमान् यदि वाक्यगम्यं  
संसर्गरूपमिह वेदशिरस्त्वभीष्टम् ।  
अस्त्येव तत्र पदयोरुभयोर्विरोधः  
पारोक्ष्यसद्वयविरोधकृतस्तदानीम् ॥

(Now the preceptor begins to answer the objections raised so far).

What you, a well-trained student, say is indeed true. If it is accepted that the import of the Upaniṣadic passage (*tat tvam asi*) is identity involving duality (*samsarga*), then there is indeed a conflict between the two words (*tat* and *tvam*) in view of the contradictory attributes present in their primary senses, namely, mediateness and duality.

The objection raised in the verses SS, I, 95-6 is answered in this and the following verses.

*gurumān—śikṣitamatiḥ* [ SS ]

[ 146 ]

यत्कर्मकाण्डनिपुणैरुदितं पुरस्ता-  
द्वाक्यार्थलक्षणमदः पुनरत्र नेष्टम् ।  
भेदादिवर्जितमखण्डमुशन्ति यस्मा-  
च्छ्रीबादरायणमतानुगता महान्तः

The nature of the import of a sentence as stated by the authorities on the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* is not accepted here. Hence the great representatives of the philosophical

1. यथाह—T.



discipline of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa favour the partless entity bereft of any relation, as the import of the Upaniṣadic passages.

[ 147 ]

भेदादिरूपमवबोधयितुं समर्थं  
यद्वाक्यमस्ति तदखण्डविलक्षणार्थम् ॥  
तल्लौकिकं भवतु वैदिकमेव वास्तु  
नास्माकमत्र विषये विमतिः कदाचित् ॥

We are not at variance with the existence of the sentence—sacred or secular, which is capable of conveying the sense of identity involving duality, and which is different from the one whose import is the partless entity.

[ 148 ]

यद्वाक्यजातमथ वेदशिरोनिविष्टं  
यद्वापि लौकिकमखण्डमपास्य नान्यत् ।  
शक्नोति वस्तु वदितुं तदशेषमेव  
ब्रूयादखण्डमिति तु प्रतिपादयामः ॥

The group of (certain) sentences—Upaniṣadic<sup>1</sup> or secular<sup>2</sup>—is not capable of imparting any sense other than the partless entity. We shall elucidate how all such sentences convey the sense of the partless entity.

1. (a) *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*, *Taitt.*, II, i, 1.  
(b) *tat tvaṁ asi*, *Chānd.*, VI, vii, 7.
2. (a) *prakṛṣṭaparakāśaḥ candrah.*  
(b) *so'yaṁ devadattah.*

[ 149 ]

सोऽयं पुमानिति हि मुख्यपदार्थयुक्त-  
वाक्यार्थबुद्धिजननस्य न वाक्यमेतत् ।



ईशीत वाच्यशबलस्थपदद्वयेन  
संसृष्टबुद्धिजनने पदयोर्विरोधात् ॥

The sentence 'This is that Devadatta' is not capable of conveying the usual sense of a sentence, namely, an idea consisting of the relation of the primary sense of the words. If the two words should give rise to the knowledge of identity of their primary senses, then there cannot be the relation between the two words as required in a sentence (as they convey contradictory senses).

[ 150 ]

एतद्धि सोऽयमिति वाक्यमखण्डनिष्ठं  
वक्तव्यमत्र गतिरस्ति न काचिदन्या ।  
तद्देशकालमनुकृष्य स इत्यनेन  
नायं पदार्थमुपढौक्यते हि नैतत् ॥

Here there is no other alternative than to accept that the import of the sentence—'This is that Devadatta', is partless entity. This sentence neither conveys the identity of the secondary sense of the term—'this' (namely, the person-in-himself) with the (primary) sense—'Devadatta as related to past time', the sense referred to by the word 'that'; nor does it convey the identity of the secondary sense of the term 'that' (namely, the person-in-himself) with the (primary) sense of the term—'this' (namely, Devadatta as related to present time).

[ 151 ]

एवं सतीदमपि तत्त्वमसीति वाक्य-  
माश्रित्य लाक्षणिकवृत्तिमखण्डनिष्ठम् ।  
सोऽयं पुमानिति यथा वचनं तथास्तु  
नो चेत्समं तदलाबुनिमज्जनोक्त्या ॥



When such is the case, the sentence *tat tvam asi* like the sentence 'This is that Devadatta' secondarily signifies the sense of the partless entity; for, otherwise, this sentence (is not significant and hence it) will be analogous to the statement—'a dry gourd immerses in water'.

### THE SELF IS SECONDARILY SIGNIFIED

[ 152 ]

मानान्तराधिगतगोचरगामिनी स्या-  
च्छब्दस्य लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरिति प्रत्यपः ।  
सिद्धत्वमात्रमिह लाक्षणिकप्रवृत्ते-  
निर्वाहकारण'मनङ्गमतोऽन्यदस्याः ॥

The assertion that a word could secondarily signify only that sense which is known by other proofs (as related to the primary sense of the word) is unsound. For, the criterion for taking a word in its secondary sense is that the latter should be known (as related to the primary sense of the word) and not anything else.

The objection raised in *SS* I, 99 is answered here. For details see Introduction, p. 19.

*siddhatvam—jñātātvaṃ* [*SS*]

[ 153 ]

मानान्तराधिगतता हि न लक्षणायां  
किञ्चित्करी भवति पिङ्गलतावदग्नेः ।  
धूमस्य जन्मनि हि पिङ्गलता न हेतु-  
र्यद्यप्यवस्थितवती हुतभुक्शरीरे ॥

The criterion for taking a word in its secondary sense does not lie in the secondary sense being known by other proofs (as related to the primary sense of the word), just

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1. णमितोऽन्यदनङ्गमस्यः—*P*<sub>2</sub>, *T*<sub>8</sub>.



like the tawny colour of fire is not the criterion for the rise of smoke. Though the tawny colour subsists in fire, yet it is not instrumental in giving rise to smoke.

[ 154 ]

शब्दस्य लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरपि त्रिधैषा  
काचिज्जहाति न जहाति च वाच्यमन्या ।  
भागं जहाति न जहाति च भागमन्या  
सोऽयं त्रिधा भवति लाक्षणिकप्रकारः ॥

The secondary signification of a word is of three kinds. One totally discards the primary sense; the next does not discard any part of the primary sense; and, the third partly gives up the primary sense and partly retains it. Thus the mode of secondary signification is three-fold.

[ 155 ]

गङ्गापदं हि निजमर्थमपास्य तीरे  
यद्वर्तते भवति सा जहती प्रसिद्धा ।  
शोणः स्थितो बहिरितीह तु लक्षणाया-  
मादाय शोणिमगुणं तुरगे प्रवृत्तिः ॥

The word 'Ganges' discarding its primary sense (that is, current) conveys the bank, and this (namely, the secondary signification of the 'bank' by the word 'Ganges') is known as exclusive secondary signification. The non-exclusive secondary signification is adopted in the case of 'The red (horse) stands outside' where the word 'red' retains its primary sense, namely, the red quality, and signifies the horse to which redness belongs.

For details see Introduction, p. 10.



[ 156 ]

सोऽयं पुमानिति वचस्युभयप्रकारा  
 देशादिभागपरिवर्जनतः प्रसिद्धा ।  
 पुंसश्च केवलमुपात्तातया पदाभ्या-  
 मेवं त्रिधा भवति लाक्षणिकी प्रवृत्तिः ॥

The exclusive—non-exclusive secondary signification is well-known in the case of the sentence 'This is that Devadatta', wherein the words discarding a part of their primary sense, namely, the place, etc., convey the other part, namely, the person-in-himself.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the mode of secondary signification is threefold.

For details see Introduction, p. 11.

[ 157 ]

वेदेऽपि लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरियं त्रिधैषा  
 यज्ञायुधीति वचने तु जहत्प्रवृत्तिः ।  
 वैश्वानरादिवचनेष्वजहत्प्रवृत्ति-  
 स्तत्त्वं गिरोरुभयरूपतया प्रतीतिः ॥

In the Vedic texts also, the secondary signification is of three kinds:—the exclusive secondary signification is adopted in the case of the sentence—*yajñāyudhī*, etc., the non-exclusive one in the case of the sentence—*vaiśvānara*, etc., and the exclusive-non-exclusive one in the case of the sentence—*tat tvam asi*.

The exclusive secondary signification is adopted in the case of the sentence—*sa eṣa yajñāyudhī yajamānaḥ svargaṁ lokam yāti*. Here since the literal meaning, namely, the body of the sacrificer reaching the



heaven with the sacrificial vessels is discrepant, as the body along with the sacrificial vessels are burnt in this world itself, the word *yajñāyudhi* totally abandons its primary sense and secondarily signifies the soul of the sacrificer, which is connected with the primary sense.

The non-exclusive secondary signification is adopted in the case of *vaiśvānaram upāste*. The literal sense of this statement, namely, meditation on the fire belonging to the stomach is discrepant, as the fire belonging to the stomach, being inert, is not fit to be meditated upon. And this discrepancy is removed by understanding from the word *vaiśvānara*, without excluding its primary sense, the self delimited by the fire belonging to the stomach. For the exclusive—non-exclusive secondary signification in the case of the sentence *tat tvam asi*, see Introduction, pp. 40-1.

[ 158 ]

ब्रह्माज्ञाने ह्यद्वितीयत्वमेकं ब्रह्मण्यन्यच्चाद्वितीयत्वमस्ति ।

तत्संपर्कात्तत्र चाद्वैततान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं ब्रह्मशब्दस्तु तत्र ॥

One aspect of absolute nature is present in the nescience existing in the supreme self, another aspect is in the supreme self; and the third is in the blend—the result of the mutual superimposition of the self and nescience. Of these, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word 'Brahman'.

It is said that the terms *tat* and *tvam* convey the unitary self by partly giving up the primary sense and by partly retaining it. Now the primary sense of the word 'Brahman' for which the term *tat* stands is explained.

The absolute nature is fancied in the case of nescience which is superimposed on the self; and it is real in the case of the self. The absolute nature present in the blend of nescience and the self consists of the real and the superimposed absolute nature. And the term



'Brahman' conveys the self associated with nescience. It secondarily signifies the self by discarding a part of its primary sense, namely, nescience.

[ 159 ]

प्रत्यग्भावस्तावदेकोऽस्ति बुद्धौ प्रत्यग्भावः कश्चिदन्यः प्रतीचि ।

प्रत्यग्भावस्तत्कृतस्तत्र चान्यो व्युत्पन्नोयं तत्र चात्मेति शब्दः ॥

One aspect of inwardness is present in the intellect; another aspect is in the inner self; and the third aspect is in the blend — the result of mutual superimposition of intellect and the inner self. Of these, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word Ātman.

The primary sense of the word Ātman which stands for the term *tvam* is explained. The term Ātman primarily conveys the inner self associated with the intellect which consists of the blend of the real and the superimposed inwardness. It secondarily signifies the inner self by discarding a part of its primary sense, namely, the intellect.

[ 160 ]

तच्छब्दवाच्यगतमद्वयभागमेकं

प्रत्यक्त्वमात्रमविरोधमपेक्षमाणः ।

त्वंशब्दवाच्यशबलस्थमुपाददानो

वाक्यदखण्ड<sup>1</sup>मथ तत्त्वमसीति विद्यात् ॥

The aspirant who seeks absence of incongruity in the sense of the sentence (*tat tvam asi*) should take (through secondary signification) the spiritual element which is

1. ण्डामिह—T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>



absolute and is present in the primary sense of the term *tat*, and the spiritual element which is inward and is present in the blend—the primary sense of the term *tvam*, and should understand the partless self from the text *tat tvam asi*.

[ 161 ]

आदेयांशो नाणुमात्रोऽपि भेदो यद्यप्येवं भिन्नमादाय शब्दौ ।  
वर्तेते त्वय्यद्व'यात्मप्रकाशो बाह्यं हेतुं जामिता नास्ति तस्मात् ॥

Though there is not even a trace of difference in the sense conveyed as their import (by the words), yet the two words are not synonymous, because they secondarily signify the absolute pure consciousness in you through different media (that is, the primary senses) that are outside the 'sense of the sentence' (that is, the oneness of the self.)

The objection raised in *SS*, I, 104-5, is answered here.

[ 162 ]

अद्वैतेऽर्थे प्रत्यगर्थोऽस्ति तद्वत् प्रत्यक्तत्त्वे चाद्वयस्यापि भावः ।  
यद्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णे तत्त्वे तत्त्वमर्थोपपत्तोः ॥

The inner self is present in the absolute self; similarly the absolute self is present in the inner self. Even then (if it is argued that, in order to justify the grammatical co-ordination of the two words, it is necessary to accept difference), still there is not even a trace of difference (between the senses signified), as the secondary senses of these two words would hold good only when they are identical.

The spiritual element signified by the term *tat* is not conditioned by time, space, and object and hence it is absolute. The spiritual



element signified by the term *tvam* is inward and it underlies everything. This would hold good only when the two senses are identical. If they are different, then the sense of the *tat* cannot be absolute, and the sense of the term *tvam* cannot be inward.

cf. SS, III, 305.

[ 163 ]

न च विनिगमनायां कारणं किञ्चिदस्ति

स्पुटमुभयपदस्था लक्षणा शंस्यतेऽतः ।

न हि विनिगमनायां हेत्वभावे कदाचित्

क्वचिदियमुपलब्धा सोऽयमित्यादिवाक्ये ॥

As there is no clear basis for taking one of the two words in its figurative sense, it is proper that the two words should be taken (together) in their secondary significative function. Never indeed in sentences like 'This is that Devadatta' such a position (namely, taking one of the two words in its figurative sense) is observed, in the absence of any ground to take it so.<sup>1</sup>

This verse answers the objection that the import of the sentence *tat tvam asi* may be identity between the primary sense of one word and the secondary sense of the other.

1. See SS, I, 150.

[ 164 ]

प्रथमचरमभावो निर्णये कारणं चे-

दयमपि नियमो न ह्यन्यथाप्यस्य दृष्टेः ।

प्रथमपठितमासीत्तत्पदं सामवेदे

चरमपठितमेतद्दृष्टमध्वर्युवेदे ॥



If the state of being read first and read second should be the criterion for taking a word in its primary and secondary senses, then it does not hold good; for the position of words is found in a reverse order. The word *tat* is read in the beginning in the *Sāma-Veda*, but (its corresponding word *brahma*) is read at the end in the *Rajurveda*.

1. *tat tvam asi*, *Chānd*, VI, viii, 7.
2. *aham brahmāsmi*, *Brh.*, I, iv, 10.

[ 165 ]

सोऽयं पुमानयमसाविति पौरुषेये

वाक्ये तथा व्यतिहतेऽत्र विशेषहेतुः ।

पूर्वापरत्वमिति शक्यमिदं न वक्तुं

मुख्यत्वलाक्षणिकते प्रति शब्दवृत्त्योः ॥

It cannot be said that the state of being read first and read later is the criterion for taking the words in their primary and secondary senses, because in the secular sentences 'This is that Devadatta', and similarly in the sentence 'That is this Devadatta', the order of the words 'this' and 'that' is reversed.

[ 166 ]

न च भवति विरोधस्योत्थितस्यापनीतिः

पदयुगलनिविष्टां लक्षणामन्तरेण ।

न हि भवति गदाचित्सद्वयस्याद्वयत्वं

न हि भवति परोक्षः प्रत्यगर्थोऽपि तद्वत् ॥

Unless secondary signification is adopted in the case of the two words, there cannot be the removal of contradiction that has arisen. The object characterized by duality



never becomes (identical with) the object that is absolute. Similarly the object which is mediate cannot be identical with the object that is immediate.

[ 167 ]

अविरुद्धविशेषणद्वयप्रभवत्वेऽपि विशिष्टयोर्द्वयोः ।

घटते न यदैकता तदा नितरां तद्विपरीतरूपयोः ॥

When two qualified entities resulting from the two unopposed attributes cannot be possibly identical, it is highly improbable that the qualified entities characterized by contradictory attributes could be identical.

For details see Introduction, p. 41.

[ 168 ]

अथ केनचिदात्मनैकता वचनेन प्रतिपाद्यते तयोः ।

तदसुन्दरमस्तमेति हि स्फुटमेवं त्रिविधापि लक्षणा ॥

It is unsound to hold that the text (*tat tvam asi*) conveys the identity of the primary senses of terms (*tat* and *tvam*) in some aspect, because the three modes of secondary signification would be definitely lost then.

[ 169 ]

साभासाज्ञानवाची यदि भवति पुनर्ब्रह्मशब्दस्तथाहं-

शब्दोऽहंकरवाची भवति तु जहती लक्षणा तत्र पक्षे ।

नौरैषा रौति लोहं दहति विषधरो रज्जुरग्रे तवासा-

वित्यत्रेवात्मवस्तुन्यपि भवतु जहल्लक्षणा को विरोधः ॥

Just as in the sentence 'The boat makes noise', 'The iron burns', 'In front of you there is the rope bearing poison', the words convey the multitude of men, fire and



the serpent respectively, so also (in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi*), what objection can there be if the words *Brahman* and *aham*, which primarily signify respectively *avidyā* and the intellect inspired by the reflection of the self, should convey the supreme self through exclusive secondary signification?

In this verse, Sarvajñātman sets forth the view-point of Sureśvara. According to Sureśvara, the primary meanings of the words *tat* or *Brahman* and *tvam* or *aham*, namely, *Īśvara* and *jīva* are indeterminable entities. (See Introduction, pp. 104-5). They are respectively *avidyā* and intellect inspired by the reflection of the self. Or, they are the reflected images of the self in *avidyā* and intellect respectively. In either case, they are indeterminable either as real or as unreal. (See *SB*, pp. 219 ff). Since the primary meanings of the words *tat* and *tvam* are indeterminable entities, the two words leave out their primary sense completely and secondarily signify the pure consciousness which serves as the basis for the two. And this kind of secondary signification is exclusive secondary signification (*jahallakṣaṇā*).

[ 170 ]

प्रत्यक्त्वादिगुणान्वयेन यदि वा गौण्यस्तु वृत्तिस्तयो-

ब्रह्माहंपदयोः परेतरदृशोर्मुख्ये विरोधो यतः ।

मुख्यार्थानुपपत्तिहेतुकतया गौण्यस्तु वृत्तिर्यतो

लोके माणवको विभावसुरसौ सिंहः पुमानित्यपि ॥

Or else, just as in ordinary experience secondary signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities is adopted in the cases of "The student is fire", "This person is a lion", in view of the incompatibility (of any relation) between the primary senses of the words (student and fire), similarly, on account of the incompatibility (of any relation) between the primary senses,



namely, God and the individual soul, of the words *Brahman* and *aham*, these words secondarily signify the supreme self and the inner self through the common feature of inwardness, etc.

The word 'fire' in the sentence 'The student is fire' primarily signifies 'fire' which has the quality of brilliance. It secondarily signifies a student who has the quality of brilliance; and this signification is based upon the common feature of brilliance present both in fire and in student.

In the same way, the word *aham* in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi* or *tvam* in the sentence *tat tvam asi* primarily conveys *jīva* who is inward. It secondarily signifies the inner self which is taken to be possessing the quality of inwardness; and this signification is based upon the common feature of inwardness present both in *jīva* and the inner self.

The word *brahma* in *aham brahmāsmi* or *tat* in *tat tvam asi* primarily conveys Īśvara who is all-pervasive. It secondarily signifies the supreme self which is taken to be possessing the quality of all-pervasiveness; and this signification is based upon the common feature of all-pervasiveness present both in *jīva* and in the supreme self. It must be added here that the inner self which is identical with the supreme self is free from any quality. Inwardness constitutes the essential nature of the inner self and all-pervasiveness, of the supreme self. Yet inwardness and all-pervasiveness are, by courtesy, spoken of as the attributes of the inner self and the supreme self and it is on the basis of these attributes, the two words *aham* or *tvam* and *brahma* or *tat* convey through signification based upon the knowledge of similarity of qualities (*gaunībhāvī*) the inner self and the supreme self respectively. And the text *aham brahmāsmi* or *tat tvam asi* conveys the identity of or more strictly the non-distinction between the inner self and the supreme self.

This view is advocated by Sureśvara.

*vide*

*pratyaktvādatisūkṣmatvāt ātmadr̥ṣṭī yanuśīlanāt  
ato vṛttirvihāyānyā ahamvṛttyaiva lakṣyate,*

*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, II, 55.



The view set forth here, according to Madhusūdanasarasvatī, is *Praudhivāda* :—

*vide*

*siddhānte'pi (prabhvādi) [pratyaktvādi] guṇayogena gaṇyāḥ svikārah  
saṁkṣepaśūrirakakārāṇām praudhivādamātramiti saṁpradāyaḥ, VK, p. 49.*

[ 171 ]

परशब्दवृत्तिरपरत्र भवेदिति यद्यपीदमुभयोः सदृशम् ।

अनयोस्तथापि तु विभागकरं स्फुटमस्ति लक्षणमवान्तरकम् ॥

Though in both (secondary signification and signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities) alike, one word signifies the sense of another, yet there is a characteristic feature which clearly distinguishes the two.

[ 172 ]

गुणतो गुणवृत्तिरिष्यते ह्यपरा लाक्षणिकी तु संगतेः ।

इति भेदकमस्ति लक्षणागुणवृत्त्योरिति वेदवादिनः ॥

The Mīmāṃsakas' bring out the difference between the secondary signification and signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities thus: a word has secondary signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities, if it conveys another object possessing the same qualities present in its primary sense. On the other hand, a word has secondary signification, if it signifies another object connected with its primary sense.

1. *vide*

*abhidheyāvinābhūte pratīter lakṣaṇeṣyate*

*lakṣyamāṇaguṇairयोगात् वर्ततेऽपि तु गाणता*

*Tantra-Vārtika (Ānandaśrama Sanskrit*

*Series), p. 354.*



[ 173 ]

नित्यः शुद्धो बुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः सत्यः सूक्ष्मः सन् विभुश्चाद्वितीयः ।  
आनन्दाब्धिर्यः परः सोऽहमस्मि प्रत्यग्धातुर्नात्र संशीतिरस्ति ॥

Being the inner self, I am identical with the supreme self which is eternal, pure, intelligent, and is of ever-released nature; which is existent, subtle, real, all-pervasive, nondual, and which is supreme bliss. There is no doubt about this experience.

[ 174 ]

सच्चित्सुखाद्वयवपुः कथयन्ति केचित् ।  
सच्चित्सुखात्मकमिति प्रथयन्ति केचित् ।  
ब्रह्मेतराणि किल नास्य वपूंषि तेषां  
बुद्धौ स्फुरन्त्यपररूपनिवृत्तिभावात् ॥

Some hold that the supreme self is absolute and is of the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss. Some others, however, maintain that it is of the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss only. It does not seem to them that the other qualities (such as eternality, etc.) constitute the nature of the supreme self, as they are of the nature of absence of the qualities (such as 'transience').

For details see Introduction, pp. 23-4.

[ 175 ]

ब्रह्मेति शेषिपदमत्र हि लक्ष्यमेकं शेषाणि लक्षणसमर्पणमस्य कुर्युः ।  
लक्ष्यार्पणेन सह लक्षणवाचि<sup>1</sup> सर्व संगच्छतेऽरुणपदं क्रयवाचिनेव ॥

1. चि पूर्व—T.



The word 'Brahman' (in the sentence *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*) signifies what is to be defined and as such it is primary, while the other words serve as its definition. Just as the word *aruṇa* is related to the word that signifies the sense of 'purchasing', so also the words that signify the characteristic attributes are related to the word that conveys what is to be defined.

See the following verse.

[ 176 ]

पृष्ठात्परस्परयुजाप्रतिपत्तिरेषा-

मेवंविधत्वमुपपादयितुं समर्था ।

लक्ष्यस्य तस्य महतः क्रयवस्तुवत्स्यात्

सर्वस्य कारकपदस्य परस्परेण ॥

Just as there is the mutual relation of the words which convey case-notions and which are (at first) related to the sense of 'purchasing', so also there is the mutual relation of the words (*satya*, etc.) later and the ascertainment of the relation is capable of expounding the unitary character of the supreme self which is all-pervasive and which is defined (in the sentence: *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*).

In the sentence : *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṁ kṛiṇāti* (Buy *soma* by means of red coloured, tawny-eyed, and one year-old calf), the two words *piṅgākṣī* and *ekahāyanī* which denote the substance, 'calf' are related to the sense of 'purchasing'. The word *aruṇa* as it denotes the immaterial quality is related to the sense of 'purchasing' through its being a determining characteristic (*avacchedaka*) of the substance, 'calf'. Then these words which determine the nature of the substance are related to each other in order to convey one substance, 'calf'.

*vide Śābara-Bhāṣya on Jaimini-Sūtra, III, i, 12.*



Similarly the words *satya*, *jñāna*, and *ananta* are related to one another and point to the supreme self as truth, consciousness, and absolute.

[ 177 ]

तत्त्वंपदार्थविषयो नय एष योज्यः  
 सत्यादिवस्तुषु न तत्र विशेषकल्पः ।  
 सत्यादिशब्दविषयाः शबलास्तदर्थ-  
 भागेषु लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरपीह तुल्या ॥

The method prescribed in respect of the primary senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* should be applied in the cases of the words *satya*, etc., as there is no special method here. The primary senses of the words *satya*, etc., being composite in nature, a part of their senses is secondarily signified and in this respect the words *satya*, etc., and the words *tat* and *tvam* are alike.

### THE PRIMARY SENSES OF THE TERMS SATYA, ETC.

[ 178 ]

आकाशादौ सत्यता तावदेका प्रत्यङ्मात्रे सत्यता काचिदन्या ।  
 तत्संपर्कात्सत्यता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं सत्यशब्दस्तु तत्र ॥

One form of reality is present in the ether, etc; another form is present in the self; and the third is in a blend of these two. Of these three, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word *satya*.

The phenomenal entities are empirically real; the self is absolutely real. And the blend of the ether, etc., and the self has a third mode of reality which is a combination of absolute and empirical reality.



The word *satya* primarily conveys the blend of the ether, etc., and the self which has absolute and empirical reality.

[ 179 ]

बुद्धेर्वृत्तौ ज्ञानता तावदेका प्रत्यग्बोधे ज्ञानता काचिदन्या ।  
तत्संपर्काज्ज्ञानता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं ज्ञानशब्दस्तु तत्र ॥

One form of the state of being knowledge is present in the psychosis; another form is in the inner self; and the third one is in what is a blend of these two. Of these three, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word *jñāna*.

As the mental modification or psychosis reveals the consciousness delimited by the objects cognized, it is figuratively spoken of as knowledge.

*vide : jñānatā—caitanyābhivyāñjakatvarūpā, SS*

And the inner self is of the nature of self-luminous knowledge which is absolutely real.

*vide : jñānatā—svaprakāśa jñānarūpā, SS*

[ 180 ]

बुद्धेर्वृत्तौ तावदानन्दतैका प्रत्यङ्मात्रे काचिदानन्दतान्या ।  
तत्संपर्कात्तत्र चानन्दतान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं तत्र चानन्दशब्दः ॥

One form of bliss is present in the psychosis; another form is in the inner self; and the third one is in what is a blend of these two. Of these three, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word *ānanda*.

As the mental state reveals the bliss which is the essential nature of the self, it is figuratively spoken of as 'bliss'. The inner self is of the nature of bliss which is absolutely real.



[ 181 ]

आकाशादौ नित्यता तावदेका प्रत्यङ्मात्रे नित्यता काचिदन्या ।  
तत्संपर्कान्नित्यता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं नित्यशब्दस्तु तत्र ॥

One form of eternity is present in the ether etc.;<sup>1</sup> another is in the inner self;<sup>2</sup> and the third one is in what is a blend of these two. Of these three, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word *nitya*.

1. *kalpasthāyitārūpā nityatā*
2. *trikālāparicchedyasvarūpā nityatā, SS*

[ 182 ]

आकाशादौ शुद्धता तावदेका प्रत्यङ्मात्रे शुद्धता काचिदन्या ।  
तत्संपर्कच्छुद्धता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं शुद्धशब्दस्तु तत्र ॥

One form of purity is present in the ether;<sup>1</sup> another form is in the inner self;<sup>2</sup> and the third one is in what is a blend of these two. Of these three, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word *śuddha*.

1. *malādileparahitatvalakṣaṇā śuddhatā*
2. *asaṅgatvādīpra yuktā tātत्वiki (śuddhatā), SS*

[ 183 ]

गोवत्सादौ मुक्तता तावदेका प्रत्याङ्मात्रे मुक्तता काचिदन्या ।  
तत्संपर्कान्मुक्तता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं मुक्तशब्दस्तु तत्र ॥

One form of release is present in cow, calf, etc.;<sup>1</sup> another form is in the pure self;<sup>2</sup> and, the third one is in what is a blend of these two. Of these three, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word *mukta*.



1. *bandhanarahitatārūpā*
2. *samsārānarthasya nityanivṛttirūpā*, SS.

[ 184 ]

आकाशादावस्तिता तावदेका प्रत्यक्तत्त्वे चास्तिता काचिदन्या ।  
तत्संपर्कादस्तिता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं तत्र चास्तीति शब्दः ॥

One form of existence is present in ether,<sup>1</sup> etc; another form is in the inner self;<sup>2</sup> and the third is in what is a blend of these two. Of these three, it is the last that is the primary sense of the word *sat*.

1. *vyāvahārika sattālakṣaṇā astitā*
2. *pāramārthikasattārūpā*, S.

[ 185 ]

यो यः शब्दो यत्कृतेऽर्थे निरूढस्तत्रैवार्थे लक्षणावृत्तिरस्य ।  
वक्तव्या स्यात्पण्डितैरेवमेतत् प्रत्यक् पूर्णं ब्रह्म वेदान्तवेद्यम् ॥

Scholars should maintain that the word *satya* secondarily signifies the self which serves as the ground for its use in its primary sense (that is, a blend of the self and the phenomenal entities from ether onwards). When such is the case, the absolute self identical with the inner self is the import of the Upaniṣadic texts.

*yat* in *yatkṛte* means the *pratyakṛtinimitta* or the ground on which a word is used in its primary sense. In the present case, it is because of the presence of the self that the word *satya* is used in its primary sense of the blend of the self and the phenomenal entities.



# IDENTITY OF THE SECONDARY SENSES OF THE TERMS SATYA, ETC.

[ 186 ]

सत्येऽप्यस्ति ज्ञानता ज्ञानतायां सत्यत्वं च स्पष्टमस्त्येव तद्वत् ।  
सत्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णे तत्त्वे ज्ञानसत्योपपत्तेः ॥

The secondary sense of the word *jñāna* is the same as the secondary sense of the word *satya*. Similarly the secondary sense of the word *satya* is the same as the secondary sense of the word *jñāna*. Even then (if it is argued that there should be some difference between the two, it is said that) there is no scope for difference; for only then it would be reasonable to take the self as consciousness and absolute reality.

For details see Introduction, p. 22.

[ 187 ]

आनन्दत्वे ज्ञानता ज्ञानतायामानन्दत्वं विद्यते निर्विशङ्कम् ।  
सत्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णे तत्त्वे ज्ञानसौख्योपपत्तेः ॥

The secondary sense of the term *ānanda* is the same as the secondary sense of the term *jñāna*. Similarly the secondary sense of the term *jñāna* is the same as the secondary sense of the term *ānanda*. Even then (if it is argued that there should be some difference between the two, it is said that) there is no scope for difference; for only then it would be reasonable to take the self as consciousness and bliss.

For details see Introduction, p. 22.



[ 188 ]

आनन्दत्वे सत्यता सत्यतायामानन्दत्वं निर्विवादं प्रसिद्धम् ।  
सत्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णं तत्त्वे सत्यसौख्योपपत्तेः ॥

The secondary sense of the term *ānanda* is the same as the secondary sense of the term *satya*. Similarly, the secondary sense of the term *satya* is the same as the secondary sense of the term *ānanda*. Even then (if it is argued that there should be some difference between the two, it is said that) there is no scope for difference; for only then it would be reasonable to take the self as absolute reality and bliss.

For details see Introduction, p. 22.

[ 189 ]

शेषेऽप्यह्यं न्यायसाम्यादशेषमन्योन्यस्मिन्नस्तिता पूर्णता च ।  
अन्योन्यस्याजामिता शब्दशक्तेरैवं सुस्थं सर्वमुक्तोपपत्तेः ॥

The existence of one thing (namely, the secondary sense) in another (secondary sense) and as such the unitary character of the self, and moreover the absence of the redundancy of the significative power of the words<sup>1</sup> — all these should be understood in the case of the senses of the remaining words,<sup>2</sup> on the lines indicated above.

1. Though the words *satya* and *jñāna* convey the same sense, that is, the self, yet they are not synonymous, as their primary senses are different.

2. *śeṣe'pi—satyajñānānandātirikṭeṣu nityādīpadārtheṣu, SS.*



[ 190 ]

बोधात्मत्वे निर्निमित्ते प्रतीचो बोधात्मत्वे तन्निमित्ते तु बुद्धेः ।

बोधात्मत्वे बुद्धिधर्मौ च बुद्धेरुक्ते साक्षाद्वेदसिद्धान्तविद्धिः ॥

Those who know the true tenets of the Vedānta declare thus:—sentience and inward nature are natural to the inner self. Sentience and inward nature present in the intellect are caused by it (namely, the self). The sentience and inward nature of the intellect are its attributes (and not its essential nature).

It has been said in SŚ, I, 159, 179 that one form of sentience and inwardness is present in the intellect, while another form is in the self. Sarvajñātman, in this verse, substantiates this point by citing the view of Sureśvara.

*vide :*

*kñāsthabodhaḥ pratyaktvaṁ animittam sadātmanah*

*boddhṛtāhantayorhetuḥ tūbhyām teno'palakṣyate, Naiṣkarmya-siddhi,*

III, II.

[ 191 ]

जहतीह च लक्षणा मता गुणवृत्तिश्च तथाभ्युपेयते ।

न विशेषविनिर्णयक्षमं किमपीहास्ति विशेषकारणम् ॥

It is accepted that the words (*satya, etc.*) signify the self through exclusive secondary signification or through secondary signification based on the knowledge of similarity of qualities, because there is no specific reason to hold that they signify the self only through a particular mode of secondary signification (that is, exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification).

See SŚ, I, 169-70.



## LORDSHIP—NOT THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE SELF

[ 192 ]

ऐश्वर्यमप्यनुभवदिवदात्मरूपं

तस्मादबोधगतमस्य च तानि कस्मात् ।

नेष्टानि पूर्ववदिति ब्रुवतो मुखस्य

सद्यः पिधानमनुसृत्य वचांसि कुर्मः ॥

We shall advance arguments to silence the opponent who may ask why like *satya*, etc., that are previously explained,<sup>1</sup> lordship also should not be accepted as having three aspects, namely, the one pertaining to the self, another to *avidyā*, and the third one to the blend of these two.

1. See *SS*, I, 178-84.

*vide* :

*ātmarūpaṁ ekam; abodhagatam—māyāgatam anyat iti śeṣaḥ;*

*asya—tadubhaya śabalasya ca āparam, SS*

[ 193 ]

ऐश्वर्यवर्णनमतिस्फुटमेव कृत्वा

नेतीत्यवादि बहुशः श्रुतिभिः प्रयत्नात् ।

सत्यादिवस्तुनि पुनर्न तथास्ति पूर्व-

मुक्त्वा निषेधनमितीह विशेषयुक्तिः ॥

The Upaniṣadic passages after attributing lordship to the self in a clear manner, later repeatedly denies it by the words such as 'not this.' But the uniqueness consists in



this, that the Upaniṣadic passage does not deny existence, etc., after mentioning them as of the nature of the self.

The Upaniṣad passage—*sarvasyavaśī sarvasyeśūnaḥ* (*Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22) attributes lordship to the self and later denies this by the words *sa eṣa neti netyātmā*, (*Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22)

[ 194 ]

शब्दस्य लाक्षणिकमुख्यविभागभिन्ना  
वृत्तिर्हि लौकिकवचस्युपलब्धपूर्वा ।  
यस्मादतो न घटते यदि मुख्यवृत्ति-  
राश्रीयतामिह गिरश्चरमापि वृत्तिः ॥

It has been determined previously that in secular statements words have two kinds of signification, namely, primary signification and secondary signification. If the primary signification does not fit in (in the case of the words *tat* and *tvam*), then let the secondary signification be adopted in respect of them.

[ 195 ]

तस्मादखण्डमवबोधयितुं समर्थो  
वेदान्तभूमिगतशब्दसमन्वयोऽतः ।  
संसर्गलक्षणमपास्य विरोधहेतो-  
र्वाक्यार्थमद्वयमखण्डमिहाश्रयस्व ॥

The group of words constituting the Upaniṣadic sentence (*tat tvam asi*) is capable of conveying the partless entity. Here the signification of the sentence is not of the nature of identity involving difference (*sāmsarga*), in view of the contradiction (between the primary meanings of the words *tat* and *tvam*). So take the import of the sentence to be the partless self.



SEQUENCE THROUGH WHICH THE KNOWLEDGE  
OF THE SELF ARISES

[ 196 ]

सामानाधिकरण्यमत्र भवति प्राथम्यभागन्वयः  
 पश्चादेष विशेषणेतरतया पश्चाद्विरोधोद्धवः ।  
 उत्पन्ने च विरोध एकरसके वस्तुन्यखण्डात्मके  
 वृत्तिर्लक्षणया भवत्ययमिह ज्ञेयः क्रमः सूरभिः ॥

First there arises the knowledge that the two words (*tat* and *tvam*) have similar case-endings. Then the meanings of the two words are related as substantive and attribute. As this presents incompatibility, the words secondarily signify the partless self. And scholars know that this is the sequence through which the knowledge of the absolute entity arises.

For details see Introduction, p. 42.

[ 197 ]

सामानाधिकरण्यमत्र पदयोर्ज्ञेयस्तदीयार्थयोः  
 संबन्धस्तु विशेषणेतरतया ताभ्यां सहास्यात्मनः ।  
 संबन्धोऽप्यथ लक्ष्यलक्षणतया विज्ञेय एवं बुधै-  
 रेतान्यर्थपदानि बुद्धिपदवीमारोहणीयानि तु ॥

It is to be known that the two words (*tat* and *tvam*) have similar case-endings. Then the meanings of the two words are related to each other as attribute and substantive. Then there is the relation of the implied and implying between the two terms *tat* and *tvam* and the self. It should be borne in mind that these three stages are the



means of understanding the import of the sentence, that is, the impartite sense.

cf. *sāmānādhikarāṇyaṁ tadanu viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyatā ceti*

*atha lakṣyalakṣakatvaṁ bhavati padārthātmanāṁ ca sambandhaḥ*

Śrī Śaṅkara's *Svātmanirūpaṇam*, 29.

*sāmānādhikarāṇyaṁ ca viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyatā*

*lakṣyalakṣaṇasambandhaḥ padārthaḥ pratyagātmanām,*

*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, III, 3.

*arthapadāni—arthapratipattisādhanaṇi*, SS.

For details see Introduction, p. 42.

[ 198 ]

निःसन्धिबन्धनमिदं चिदचित्स्वरूपं

संकीर्णमन्तरपरिस्फुरणेन शून्यम् ।

आचित्तशुद्धिफलतः स्फुरितोपपत्तेः

शब्दार्थसंगतिमिहैव तु गृह्यतेऽज्ञाः ॥

The self and the objective elements are not identical. (Yet) they have become a blend, owing to their mutual superimposition; and the blend is devoid of the manifestation of difference. Men of average intellect, before the rise of reasoning from the purity of the mind, hold that the words (like *satya*, etc.) are significative of this blend.

*niḥsandhibandhanam—tādātmyarahitam*, SS.

*āntaraparispurāṇena śūnyam—bhedapratipattyā śūnyam*, TB.

[ 199 ]

शब्दार्थसंगतिविदामथ सत्त्वशुद्धे-

रुत्पन्नतर्कदृढलोहशलाकया तु ।

दृश्यं दृशं च निपुणं द्वयमन्तरेण

निक्षिप्तया दृगदृशोः क्रियते विभागः ॥



Owing to the purity of the mind, there arises 'reasoning' which is like a strong iron rod to those who know the relation of the words (*satya*, etc.) to their senses (the blend of the self and the objective elements). By carefully applying the reasoning to (the blend of) the self and the objective element, the self is distinguished from the objective element.

[ 200 ]

शुद्धच्युत्यतर्कजनितं चिदचिद्विभागं  
प्राप्य स्थिताः पुनरिमां गिरमुद्गिरन्ति ।  
सत्यादिशब्दगण एष तु तत्र तत्र  
व्युत्पत्तिमान् शबलवस्तुनि नो दृशीति ॥

Men, who have distinguished the self from the objective element by the reasoning that arises from the purity of the mind, declare that (before the rise of such distinct knowledge) the group of words like *satya*, etc., are significative of the 'blend' and not of the self.

[ 201 ]

एकत्र शक्तिग्रहणोपपत्तावनेककलृप्तिः क्रियते किमर्थम् ।  
इत्येतदेवं सति नास्ति चोद्यं पुरास्य पंसः परमाविवेकात् ॥

As the aspirant understands the signification of the words (such as *satya*, etc.) to be the blend in a state of utter non-discrimination (between the self and the objective element), there is no scope for the question, why the significance of the words is held to be the blend, while it is reasonable to hold that it (namely, the significance of the words) is either the self or the objective element.



[ 202 ]

अत्राह वाच्यशबलान्वितवस्तुनीयं  
 तद्वर्त्मना भवति लाक्षणिकी प्रवृत्तिः ।  
 किं वा तदन्वितविलक्षणवस्तुनि स्या-  
 च्छब्दस्य नोभयमपि प्रतिभाति युक्तम् ॥

It is asked (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) whether the word secondarily signifies the object as related to its primary sense (namely, the blend), or as unrelated. These two alternatives seem to be unsound.

[ 203 ]

संबन्धिरूपं यदि वस्तु लक्ष्यं अखण्डवाक्यार्थमितिः कुतस्त्या ।  
 अनन्वितं वस्तु पदार्थलभ्यं न लक्ष्यते कुत्रचिदत्र लोके ॥

How could there be the knowledge of partless entity, if the word secondarily signifies the object as related with its primary sense? But, nowhere in ordinary experience is it found that the word secondarily signifies the object which is not related to its primary sense.

[ 204 ]

पूर्वक्षणे भवति वाच्यपदार्थभाग-  
 भागित्वसंगतिरिहात्मनि निर्विभागे ।  
 मोहोपदर्शितवपुर्घटते ततोऽमि-  
 च्छब्दस्य लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरदोषदुष्टा ॥

(The *siddhāntin* replies):

Prior to the (rise of the) knowledge of the import of the sentence, owing to *avidyā*, there exists the relation of



whole and part between the partless self and the primary sense of the words (namely, the blend of the self and the objective elements). Thus it is not faulty to say that the word secondarily signifies the partless self.

For details see Introduction, p. 21.

[ 205 ]

संबन्धिता भवति लाक्षणिकप्रवृत्तेः  
 सर्वत्र कारणमितीदमभीष्टमेव ।  
 संबन्धिताकरणमेव तु लाक्षणिक्या  
 बुद्धेरनिष्टमिह तद्व्यभिचारदृष्टेः ॥

It is indeed desirable that the knowledge of the relation (of the primary sense of the word with its secondary sense) is the criterion for the secondary signification of all words. But it is not accepted that the knowledge arising through secondary signification has for its content the secondary sense as associated with the primary sense because of lack of correspondence.<sup>1</sup>

1. See the following verse.

[ 206 ]

यत्रैष काक इदमेव तु देवदत्ता-  
 वेश्मेति लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरिहाभ्युपेता ।  
 काकास्पदत्वमवधीर्य तथापि वेश्म-  
 मात्राकृतिर्भवति लाक्षणिकी तु बुद्धिः ॥

The secondary signification is adopted in the case of the statement 'That is the house of Devadatta, where the crow is sitting.' But the knowledge arising through secon-



dary signification has for its content only the house, by leaving aside its relation with the crow.

The knowledge arising from the sentence 'That is the house of Devadatta where the crow is sitting,' through secondary signification has for its content the secondary sense, that is, the house as indicated by the relation of the primary sense, namely, the existence of crow, and not as associated with the primary sense.

[ 207 ]

सोऽयमित्यपि पदार्थरूपकं लक्षणं यदुपलक्षणं हि तत् ।  
अंशिता यदि पदार्थलक्ष्ययोर्गृह्यते ननु पुनर्विरोधिता ॥

The primary meanings of the words 'this' and 'that' (in the statement 'This is that Devadatta') indicate the person-in-himself, and hence they are '*qualification per accidens*' (*upalakṣaṇa*). If the terms secondarily signify the person-in-himself as related with their primary senses, then indeed the contradiction stands.

Just as the relation of identity between the primary senses of the words ('this' and 'that') is incompatible, so also the relation of the secondary sense (the person-in-himself) and the primary senses of the terms is incompatible. So a word cannot secondarily signify the object as related with its primary sense.

[ 208 ]

एवं तावल्लक्षणावृत्तिहेतोरानीतैषाखण्डवाक्यार्थबुद्धिः ।  
मुक्त्वापीमां लक्षणावृत्तिमेषा वक्तुं शक्येत्युच्यतेऽनन्तरेण ॥

It has been proved that the words convey the sense of partless entity through secondary signification. In the following verses, we show that the words, without resorting to secondary signification, could convey the partless entity.



[ 209 ]

भिन्नाभिन्नरवौ घटादिवचसा साकं समुच्चारिता-  
 वन्यूनानधिके घटादिविषये तावत्प्रवृत्तौ तव ।  
 नो चेद्विश्वसृजोऽपि दुष्परिहरा भेदादिमालाऽऽगता  
 भेदादेरपि तत्र वाच्यमपरं भेदादिकं स्यादिति ॥

The words *bhinna* and *abhinna* uttered along with the words such as pot, etc., signify neither more nor less than the pot, etc. If not, even the creator cannot avoid the infinite regress of difference (and non-difference) as we have to maintain another difference (and non-difference) to account for the prior difference (and non-difference).

In the statement — 'The pot is different (from the cloth)' — the difference should be held as identical with the pot. If it is held to be different from the pot, then this difference also is different from the pot. And, so on, *ad infinitum*.

Similarly in the statement — 'The pot is not different (from the pot)' — the non-difference cannot be different from the pot. For, otherwise, this difference is different from the pot, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Hence it should be admitted that 'non-difference' is identical with the pot.

So the words 'different' and 'non-different', in the statements 'The pot is different' and 'The pot is not different', point to a single entity — 'pot', through primary signification.

cf. *ata eva bhedaḥbhedayorapyabhedāt tacchabdao api  
 abhinnārthau, bhinno'bhinnaśca ghaṭa ityatra, Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 25

[ 210 ]

परस्पराभावमुपाददानो निमित्तमर्थेषु हि भिन्नशब्दः ।  
 प्रवर्ततेऽन्ये तु घटादिशब्दा निजं निजं वाच्यमुपाददानाः ॥



The word *bhinna* signifies (the pot) through the mutual negation (of cloth) which serves as the basis for the use of the word *bhinna* in the object, (pot). The words 'pot', etc., on the other hand, signify the objects pot, etc., through their primary senses (namely, the generic attributes 'potness' etc.) which serve as the basis for the use of those words in the objects.

Though the two words 'different' and 'pot' convey the same sense, that is, the pot, yet they are not synonymous, as they convey the sense through different means (*pravṛttinimitta*).

[ 211 ]

परस्पराभावविहीनभावादभिन्नशब्दस्य घटे प्रवृत्तिः ।  
घटस्वरूपैकनिबन्धना तु घटादिशब्दस्य घटे प्रवृत्तिः ॥

The word *abhinna* signifies the pot through the 'absence of mutual negation' which serves as the ground for its use in the sense—*pot*. But the word 'pot' signifies the object—'pot', through the generic attribute 'potness', which serves as the basis for its use in the sense 'pot'.

*ghaṭasvarūpaikanibandhanā—ghaṭasvarūpam*

*ghaṭapratīpadikārthaḥ, ghaṭatvam vā tannibandhanā ityārthaḥ, AP.*

[ 212 ]

अबोधनाशश्चित्तिरित्यमुष्मिन् पदद्वये त्वेकरसात्मनिष्ठे ।  
अगौणमेकं पदमन्यदत्र द्वितीयवृत्तीतरसंगमाय ॥

The two words in the sentence 'The destruction-of-nescience is knowledge' convey the sense of partless entity. Here one word is used in its primary sense, while the other word, in order to have syntactical relation, is used in its secondary sense.



It is said in this verse that the sentence 'The destruction-of-nescience is knowledge' can convey the sense of unitary object even if secondary signification is adopted in the case of only one word.

See the following verse.

[ 213 ]

अज्ञाननाशपदमत्र हि मुख्यमिष्टं  
विद्यानिबन्धननिवृत्ति<sup>१</sup>समर्पकत्वात् ।  
तेनान्वयाय चित्तिवाचि पदं स्ववाच्ये  
सौवं समुद्भाति मतेः परिणामरूपम् ॥

Here the word 'destruction-of-nescience' is taken in its primary sense, since it signifies the removal of nescience by the realization of the self. The other word 'knowledge', in order to have syntactical relation (with the word 'destruction-of-nescience') discards a part of its primary sense, namely, the psychosis.

As *avidyā* is superimposed on the self, its removal represents the substratum — the self. So the word 'destruction-of-nescience' primarily conveys the self. But the word 'knowledge' primarily signifies the blend of the psychosis and consciousness. It discards a part of its primary sense, that is, the psychosis, and secondarily signifies 'consciousness', the self. The two words, therefore, convey the partless entity.

[ 214 ]

विधिपदानि हि भागसमर्पणादपरभागनिराकरणादपि ।  
अविषयात्ममर्तिं जनयन्ति नो न तु मृषार्थनिवृत्तिगिरस्तथा ॥

The words which signify the existent objects, by discarding a part of their primary sense and presenting

1. समर्पणत्वात् P<sub>2</sub>.



another part, give rise to the knowledge of the self which is not an object. But the words which signify the annihilation of the superimposed objects are not so (that is they primarily signify the self).

See notes on the verse, SS, I, 213.

[ 215 ]

भेदो भिन्नश्चातिरेकोऽतिरिक्तोऽ-

भेदोऽभिन्नः संविदः स्वप्रकाशः ।

इत्येतस्मिन् विद्यते नार्थभेदो

वेदान्तानामप्यखण्डस्तथार्थः ॥

Just as there is no difference in the sense conveyed by the words in the sentences such as, 'Difference is different' 'the attribute "atireka" is distinct', 'The non-difference is not different', 'The knowledge is self-luminous', even so the Upaniṣadic passages also convey the partless entity.

(i) *bhedo bhinnah* :

Pot is different from cloth. That is to say that difference from cloth exists in pot. If it is said that the difference (from cloth existing in the pot) is different from pot, then it amounts to saying that difference is different. Here the word 'different' conveys the sense of the word 'difference' and not any other sense. Otherwise, the sense of the sentence would be — 'The difference is the locus of difference'. Here the second difference should be taken as different from the first one, and so the second difference becomes the locus of a third 'difference' which should be held as different from the second difference. And so on, *ad infinitum*. Hence it should be held that the word 'different' conveys the sense of the word 'difference'. Thus the two words in the sentence 'difference is different' point to a single entity — 'difference'.

(ii) Similarly the two words in the sentence — *atireko'tiriktah* point to a single entity, namely the attribute — *atireka*.



*atirekaḥ—jīva brahmaṇoḥ bhedaḥ bheda saṃpāda kaḥ kaściddharmaḥ, SS.*

(iii) *saṃvidāḥ svaprakāśāḥ*

The followers of the Prābhākara school who hold that 'knowledge is self-luminous' should accept that this sentence conveys the unitary object, namely, 'knowledge'. In the system of the Prābhākara, the word 'self-luminous' could signify only 'knowledge', as everything apart from 'knowledge' is insentient. Hence the two words 'knowledge and 'self-luminous' signify the same entity 'knowledge'.

[ 216 ]

एवं तावदखण्डवस्तुविषयः शब्दान्वयो दर्शितो  
लोके दृष्टनयेन पाणिनिवचोऽप्यस्यैव संसूचकम् ।  
येनायं स्मरति प्रकृत्यभिहिते वृक्षादिके केवले  
तन्मात्रे प्रथमेति सूत्रवचसैवाद्यां विभक्तिं मुनिः ॥

So far in the light of the ordinary experience, it has been shown that the words (in the sentences cited previously) convey the unitary object. The words of Pāṇini also are indicative of this, namely, the words could convey the unitary object. For he teaches the nominative case in the sense of tree, etc., that are conveyed by the stems, by the words—*tanmātre prathamā*.

The stem 'tree' (*vrkṣa*) and the nominative case termination are not synonymous. Yet it has been shown by Pāṇini that they both point to a single entity—'tree.' *vide* Pāṇini-sutra — *prātipadikārthalingaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā, II, iii. 46.*

Hence Pāṇini also accepts that the import of a sentence could be a unitary object.

See also *SS I, 274.*

A—33



[ 217 ]

सामानाधिकरण्यमन्वयगिरा हेतुं वदत्यादरात्  
 तस्यैवाथ विशेषणं समिति च व्यावृत्ताये गृह्यते ।  
 गौणान्मुख्यमयं भिनत्ति भगवान् व्यावर्तकेनामुना  
 नीलेनोत्पलवस्तुवत् स्फुटतरद्वैविध्यसद्भावतः ॥

Śrī Bādarāyaṇa sets forth the *probans* (*hetu*) in the word—*anvaya* which means syntactic equation of the terms (of the Upaniṣadic passages). As syntactic equation is two-fold as primary and secondary, he prefixes the word *anvaya* with the preposition *sam* with consideration and takes it as a differentia; and by this he differentiates the primary syntactic equation from the secondary one, like the term 'blue' (in the sentence 'blue lotus') differentiates the 'lotus' (from the white ones).

In the aphorism *tat tu samanvayāt* (*BS*, I, i, 4) the proposition is that the self is to be known from the *Vedānta-śāstra*; and the *probans* is stated in the words 'because they are congruent' (*samanvayāt*), which means that the terms of the Upaniṣadic passages like *tat tvam asi* are in syntactic equation, that is, they convey the single object, the self. By the preposition *sam*, the secondary syntactic equation is eliminated.

For primary and secondary syntactic equation see *SS*, I, 220.

[ 218 ]

तद्धि द्विधैकाधिकरण्यमुक्तं गौणं च मुख्यं च विविच्य सद्भिः ।  
 संसर्गरूपार्थनिवेशि गौणं मुख्यं त्वखण्डार्थनिविष्टमाहुः ॥

After careful examination, experts say that the syntactic equation is two-fold as primary and secondary. The primary one is that where the terms convey the



sense of partless entity; while the secondary one is that where the words convey the sense of relation.

[ 219 ]

आदाय नानाविधकारणानि गिरामथैकत्र तु या प्रवृत्तिः ।  
तामाहुरैकाधिकरण्यनाम्ना विपश्चितो वेदशिरस्सु विप्राः ॥

The teachers well-versed in the Upaniṣads hold that the syntactic equation is that where the terms having different grounds for their application (in their senses) convey only one concept.

[ 220 ]

नीलं सुगन्धि महदुत्पलमम्बुशायी-  
त्येवंप्रकारमिह गौणमुशान्ति सन्तः ।  
सोऽयं पुमानुदशरावगतो विवस्वा-  
नाकाशगो रविरसाविति मुख्यमाहुः ॥

The words are said to be in secondary syntactic equation in the statement like 'The lotus lying in water is blue, fragrant, and big.' Similarly in the statements such as 'This is that man', 'The sun reflected in the vessel containing water is the one existing in the sky' the words are said to be in primary syntactic equation.

[ 221 ]

एकत्र वृत्तिरिति लक्षणमत्र मुख्यं  
संसर्गवस्तुनि पुनर्न हि तद्घटेत ।  
नानारसे हि विषये वचसां प्रवृत्ति-  
नीलं सुगन्धि महदुत्पलमित्यमीषाम् ॥



The definition of primary syntactic equation, namely, the words (constituting a sentence) convey an unitary object, does not fit in where the words convey the objects involving relation. It is well-known that the words in the sentence like 'A blue, fragrant, and big lotus, signify the object with different characteristics.'

(1) *guṇaguṇyātmakatvena viśayasya nānūrasatvaṁ, AP.*

[ 222 ]

नानाविधैर्बहुभिरेव निमित्तभेदै-

भिन्नेषु वस्तुषु गिरामथ या प्रवृत्तिः ।

सर्वत्र वैयधिकरण्यमिति प्रसिद्धा

सा शब्दवृत्तिकुशलव्यवहारभूमौ ॥

Those adepts in determining the significative power of words hold that grammatical disagreement is well-known as that were the terms having different grounds for their use in their senses convey (totally) different objects.

*bhinneṣu vastuṣu—bhinneṣu atyantabhinneṣu, SS.*

[ 223 ]

अभिन्नेहेतुर्विषये समाने विभिन्नवाचामथ या प्रवृत्तिः ।

पर्यायनाम्ना<sup>1</sup> प्रवदन्ति धीराः प्रवृत्तिमे<sup>2</sup>नां वचसां बहूनाम् ॥

When various terms having the same ground for their use in their senses are employed to signify the same object they are called 'synonyms' by wise men.

[ 224 ]

कुड्यं गृहस्य सरसोऽम्बुजमस्य वस्त्र-

मित्यत्र वैयधिकर<sup>3</sup>ण्यमपि प्रसिद्धम् ।

एवं मुखं वदनमाननमित्यमीषां

पर्यायतापि विदितैव पुरोक्तहेतोः ॥

1. स्नाऽभिव — B<sub>1</sub>    2. मेतां — B<sub>1</sub>    3. ण्यमिति — B<sub>1</sub>



In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the terms in the statements such as 'The wall of the house', 'The lotus of the pond', 'This man's cloth', are said to be in grammatical disagreement. Similarly the terms such as 'mukha', 'vadana', and 'ānana' are well known to be synonyms.

[ 225 ]

पर्यायता न खलु तत्त्वमसीति वाक्ये  
 नापीह संभवति भेदकभेद्यभावः ।  
 तत्त्वंपदार्थगतमेकरसैकभागं  
 तत्त्वंपदे समुपलक्षयतो विरोधात् ॥

In the sentence *tat tvam asi*, the two words are neither synonymous, nor are their meanings related as attribute and substantive. The two words secondarily signify the part, namely, the absolute consciousness present in their primary senses, as the relation between their primary senses is incompatible.

[ 226 ]

प्रकृष्टप्रकाशध्वनी व्यक्तिमेकां यथा लक्षणावर्त्मनोपक्षिपेताम् ।  
 शशाङ्कादिशब्दार्थसंकीर्तने सच्चिदानन्दशब्दाः परं ब्रह्म तद्वत् ॥

When the concept of the moon is intended to be conveyed, the two words *prakṛṣṭa* and *prakāśa* secondarily signify the object 'moon'. Similarly, the words *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda* secondarily signify the supreme self.

One who wishes to know which particular object is known by the word — *candra*, puts the question, which luminous body in this firmament is known by the name — *candra*. The answer to this question is 'that which shines the brightest is the moon' (*prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ*). Here the words *prakṛṣṭa* and *prakāśa* point to the



same object. Similarly, to the question about the nature of the self, the answer is *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*—*Taitt.*, II, i, 1.

Here the words *satyam*, etc., secondarily refer to the self.

For details see the following verses.

[ 227 ]

न नीलोत्पलाद्या गिरो व्यक्तिनिष्ठाः  
स्ववाच्यार्थसंसर्गमात्राभिधानात् ।  
विरोधे हि वाच्यव्युत्तिर्नाविरोधे  
गिरां लक्षणाऽत्रापि चेदस्तु साम्यम् ॥

The terms in the statements like 'blue lotus', etc., do not point to a particular object, as they convey the relation of their primary senses. Since recourse is had to secondary signification only when the relation of the primary senses is incongruent and not otherwise, (the terms 'blue' and 'lotus' do not secondarily signify the particular object). (If it is said that secondary signification is adopted even if the relation of the primary senses is not incongruent), then let the statement 'blue lotus' be similar to the statement (*prakṛṣṭaprakāśaścandraḥ*).

[ 228 ]

न नीलत्वजात्याश्रयव्यक्तिः स्या-  
द्विभिन्नोत्पलत्वाश्रयव्यक्तिरेषा ।  
तथैवोत्पलत्वाश्रयव्यक्तिः स्या-  
न्न नीलत्वजात्याश्रयव्यक्तिरन्या ॥

The object which is the substratum of 'lotusness' is not different from the object that is the locus of the generic attribute 'blueness'. Similarly, the object which is the



substratum of the generic attribute 'blueness' is not different from the object that is the locus of 'lotusness'.

The word 'blue' primarily conveys the generic attribute — 'blueness', and secondarily signifies the blue colour which is the substratum of 'blueness'. Similarly the word 'lotus' primarily conveys the generic attribute 'lotusness', and secondarily signifies the lotus which is the substratum of 'lotusness'. The secondary senses of the words, namely, the blue colour and the lotus are identical, as substance and quality are identical.

*vide—guṇāguṇīnorabhedāt ityartaḥ, SS.*

Sarvajñātman admits from the standpoint of the *Pūrvapakṣin* that the sentence 'blue lotus' conveys the unitary object. See the following verses.

[ 229 ]

न नीलोत्पलादिप्रदेशेषु किञ्चिद्विरां लक्षणाकारणं तेन तत्र ।

न नीलोत्पलत्वादिकव्यक्तिनिष्ठा गिरस्ता भवेयुः प्रमाणादृते नः ॥

There is no basis for resorting to secondary signification<sup>1</sup> in the case of the words in the statements like 'blue lotus', etc. So, owing to the absence of any evidence, the two words do not, in our view, point to a particular object.

(1) Recourse is had to secondary signification, when the relation of the primary senses is inapt, or when the intended sense is incompatible with the primary sense of the sentence. Here in the statement 'blue lotus', there is no incompatibility to the intended sense, namely, the relation of the meanings of the words as attribute and substantive, nor is the relation of the primary senses inapt. So there is no basis for resorting to secondary signification.

*vide: na tāvadanvayānupapattiḥ tatrāsti nimittam  
tadanvayasya sattvāt, nāpi tātparyānupapattiḥ,  
guṇāguṇītvasaṃsargasyaiva tatra abhipretatvāt, SS.*



[ 230 ]

इदमुपेत्य किमप्युदितं मया न तु तयोरभिदा परमार्थतः ।

गुणगुणित्वकृतोऽतिशयस्तयोर्भवति लक्षणयापि गृहीतयोः ॥

Granting the opponent's view, it was said by me that the two words convey an identical object.<sup>1</sup> But, really even when the two words (blue and lotus) are taken in their secondary senses, they (namely, the senses) are not identical, as one (blue colour) is a quality and the other (lotus) is a substance.

(1) See SS, I, 228.

[ 231 ]

प्रकृष्टप्रकाशत्वजाती हि लोके प्रकृष्टप्रकाशाभिधानाभिधेये ।

तयोरन्वये कीर्त्यमाने तु ताभ्यां शशाङ्काभिधानाभिधेयं न लभ्यम् ॥

In ordinary usage, the primary meanings of the words *prakṛṣṭa* and *prakāśa* are the generic attributes 'abundance' and 'brightness'. If the relation of the two generic attributes is intended, then the two words cannot convey the sense of the word 'moon' (which is desired to be known).

[ 232 ]

शशाङ्काभिधानाभिधेये हि पृष्टे तदेवोत्तरेणापि निर्णयमत्र ।

प्रकृष्टप्रकाशत्वजात्यन्वयोऽयं तदाक्षिप्ततद्व्यञ्जकव्यक्तिनिष्ठः ॥

When the sense of the word 'moon' is asked for, that alone should be given in the answer. The relation of the generic attributes—abundance and brilliance—presumptively make known the relation of the individuals which reveal them (and not the moon).



The relation of the two generic attributes would be unreasonable, if there is no relation of the individuals (*vyakti*) which reveal them. So the relation of the generic attributes points to the relation of the individuals and not the moon.

*vide : prakṛṣṭaparakāśapadaavācyajātyoḥ yo'yaṁ parasparānvayaḥ, sa sākṣādasaṁbhavannanupapattyā tadvyāñjaka-guṇavyaktiyorānvaye paryavasyati, na candravyaktau ityarthah, AP.*

[ 233 ]

शशाङ्कभिधानाभिधेयो न चेष्टः

शशाङ्कस्य तेजोविशेषत्वहेतोः ।

ततश्चोपपन्ना जहल्लक्षणातः

पुरोक्ता पदाभ्यामखण्डार्थसिद्धिः ॥

As the moon is of the nature of effulgent luminary, (the relation of the generic attributes) is not accepted to be pointing to it (namely, the moon), which is the sense of the word, 'moon'. So exclusive secondary signification is appropriate and hence the words convey the unitary sense already referred to.

The two words *prakṛṣṭa* and *prakāśa*, discard their primary senses, namely, the generic attributes, and secondarily signify the bright luminary (moon) which is the locus of the generic attributes.

*vide : prakṛṣṭaparakāśatvadharmarūpavācyārtha parityāgena tadādharma-  
ratejoviśeṣātmaakavyaktimātraniṣṭhā padavṛttirupapannā  
ityarthah, AP.*

[ 234 ]

प्रकर्षः प्रकाशातिरिक्तो न चात्र प्रकाशः प्रकर्षातिरिक्तो न चात्र ।

बहिश्चन्द्रमस्ति स्वरूपातिरेकस्तयोश्चन्द्रमस्येकतैवातिमात्रम् ॥



The 'abundance' present in the moon is not different from the 'lustre', and similarly the 'lustre' present in the moon is not different from 'abundance'. Though 'abundance' and 'lustre' present in the object other than the moon are different, yet in the moon they are not only mutually identical but identical with moon also.

The two qualities of 'abundance' and 'lustre' are found to exist separately, one in the abundance of darkness, the other in the lustre of ordinary lights. But when present in the moon they are identical.

[ 235 ]

न चन्द्रप्रकाशप्रकर्षं प्रकाशात्तदीयात्पृथक्कश्चिदुत्पश्यतीह ।  
तथास्य प्रकर्षप्रकाशं प्रकर्षात्ततो नानयोरस्ति भेदे प्रमाणम् ॥

Nobody perceives the 'abundance' of the lustre of the moon as different from the lustre of the moon. Similarly the abundant lustre is not perceived to be different from the 'abundance'. So there is no evidence for proving the difference between the two (lustre and abundance).

[ 236 ]

तथा सच्चिदानन्दशब्दास्तदर्थं तथा तत्त्वमावात्मनो ब्रह्मभावम् ।  
विरोधान्मिथो लक्षणावर्त्मनेमौ किमर्थं न संभूय वक्तुं समर्थौ ॥

(Just as the words *prakṛṣṭa* and *prakāśa* secondarily signify the moon) so also the words, *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda* secondarily signify the self — the secondary sense of the term *tat*. Similarly, in view of the contradiction to the relation between their primary senses, why cannot the two terms *tat* and *tvam* secondarily signify in unison the identity of the inner self with the supreme self.

[ 237 ]

प्रत्यक्तत्त्वं लक्षयेत्त्वं पदार्थस्तच्छब्दार्थो लक्षयेदद्वितीयम् ।  
एवं पूर्णं प्रत्यगात्मानमेतौ शब्दौ ब्रूतो लक्षणावर्त्मनैव ॥



The primary sense of the term *tvam* secondarily signifies the inner self and the primary sense of the term *tat*, the absolute self. Thus the two words *tat* and *tvam* convey through secondary signification alone that the inner self is identical with the supreme self.

As a word could secondarily signify only that sense which is related to its primary sense, it is stated here that the primary sense of a word itself secondarily signifies the object.

*Vide : padasya lakṣyabodhakatve śakyasambandhasya dvāratvāt artho lakṣayet ityuktam, TB.*

*See also SS, I, 206-7.*

[ 238 ]

पारोक्ष्यं च ब्रह्मणि प्रत्यगर्थे दुःखित्वं च 'ध्वान्तसंभूतमाहुः ।  
सम्यग्ज्ञानध्वस्तमोहस्य पुंसः प्रध्वंसेते हेत्वभावेऽफलत्वात् ॥

It is said that, owing to *avidyā*, the supreme self is characterized by mediacy and the inner self by misery. In the case of the aspirant whose *avidyā* has been annihilated by the direct knowledge (of the self), the mediacy and the misery are removed; for, the removal of cause (*avidyā*) brings about the removal of its effects.

WORDS CANNOT PRIMARILY SIGNIFY THE  
SELF

[ 239 ]

षष्ठीजातिगुणक्रियादिरहिते सर्वस्य विज्ञातरि  
प्रत्यक्षे परिवर्जिताखिलजगद्द्वैतप्रपञ्चे दृशौ ।  
संत्यक्तव्यवधानके परमके विष्णोः पदे शाश्वते  
त्वय्यज्ञान<sup>१</sup>विनिर्मिता न हि गिरो मुख्यप्रवृत्तिक्षमाः ॥

1. भ्रान्त—T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>.

2. विजृम्भिताः M<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.



The words which arise from *avidyā* are not competent to signify primarily your true nature—the inner self which is identical with the supreme status of Lord Viṣṇu, which is immutable, which is not intervened by anything, which is bereft of the universe characterized by duality, which is immediate and the witness of all, and as such devoid of any relation, generic attribute, quality, action, etc.

*śaṣṭhī—śaṣṭhīśabdena tadarthaḥ sambandho lakṣyate, SS.*

For details See Introduction, pp. 12-14.

[ 240 ]

आस्तामत्र वचः प्रवृत्तिविरहः प्रत्यक्त्वहेतोर्दृशि  
व्यापाराय मनोऽपि न प्रभवति भ्राम्यत्पराग्भूमिषु ।  
एवं चेदखिलप्रमाणपदवीः षोढा विभिन्ना भवा-  
नुल्लङ्घ्य व्यवतिष्ठते त्वयि गिरः स्यान्मुख्यवृत्तिः कथम् ॥

Let it be that the words do not primarily signify the self. Even the intellect which comprehends the external objects cannot give rise to the knowledge of the self, as it is inward. When such is the case, as you do not fall within the scope of all the six proofs, how can the words primarily signify you (the self)?

For details See Introduction, pp. 12-14.

[ 241 ]

आत्मानं न तु कर्मतामुपनयञ्छब्दो वदेल्लक्षणा-  
मार्गेणापि यतः पराग्विषयवन्नास्येष्यते कर्मता ।  
प्रत्यक्ता हि विरुध्यते यदि भवेदस्यात्मनः कर्मता  
यद्यत्कर्म न तस्य तस्य भवति प्रत्यक्स्वभावो यतः ॥

The words while secondarily signifying the self do not introduce objectivity in respect of it, as it (namely, the



self) is not objective like external objects. If the self were an object then its inwardness would be contradicted; for whichever is an object is not by nature inward.

[ 242 ]

वागादेः खलु बाह्यवस्तुविषयो नात्मा यतो नात्मनि  
 व्यापारं करणस्य कस्यचिदपि प्रेक्षामहे न्यायतः ।  
 यत्किञ्चित्करणं जगत्त्रयगतं तत्प्रत्यगात्मेक्षितं  
 बाह्ये वस्तुनि वर्ततेऽनुभवनं तत्र प्रमाणं मतम् ॥

The external objects alone fall within the scope of speech, etc., and not the self. For when logically viewed we do not see any instrument of knowledge functioning in respect of the self. The instruments of knowledge present in the three worlds, by being superimposed on the self, comprehend the external objects. And as regards this, the experience (of great men) is the evidence.

[ 243 ]

प्रत्यग्रूपमतो न शब्दविषयो बुद्धेरवेद्यं यतो  
 बुद्धिर्यत्र हि वर्तते स विषयः शब्दस्य नात्मन्यसौ ।  
 तेनात्मानमसौ न गोचरयितुं शब्दः क्षमो मुख्यया  
 'वृत्त्यैवेतरयापि तेन न तथा तस्यात्मनः कर्मता ॥

Words signify an object which comes within the scope of the intellect. As the self does not come within the range of the intellect, it is not signified by the words also. So the words cannot signify the self either primarily or secondarily. (And since the self is comprehended by the

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1. वृत्त्या वेत—T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>.



psychosis) it is secondarily signified; but thereby it does not acquire the character of an object.

There may appear to be contradiction between the two statements namely, 'The words cannot signify the self secondarily' and 'The words signify the self secondarily'. But it is explained thus: the mental state arising from the sentences such as *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*, inspired by the reflection of the self in it, refers to the self, and removes only *avidyā* obscuring it. The reflection of the self in the mental state, on the other hand, known as *phala* being but a reflex, is neither required nor competent to reveal the self. That is to say, the self is *ṛttivyāpya*, that is, it is comprehended by the psychosis arising from the sentences such as *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*, and not *phalavyāpya*, that is, it is not manifested by the reflection of the self in the psychosis. Hence when it is said that the self is secondarily signified, what is meant is that the self is comprehended by the psychosis arising from the sentences such as *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*. When it is said that the self cannot be secondarily signified, what is meant is that it is not manifested by the reflection of the self in the psychosis. Thus there is no contradiction between the two statements.

*vide : lakṣaṇayā tadgocaraniṣedhaśca ātmanaḥ phalavyāpyatvāśayena, SS.*

## VALIDITY OF THE UPANIṢADS IN RESPECT OF THE SELF

[ 244 ]

नन्वज्ञेयमिदं भवेद्यदि मम प्रत्यक्स्वरूपं ततः

प्रामाण्यं कथमस्य वेदशिरसस्तत्र प्रतिज्ञायते ।

यन्मेयं न भवेत्कदाचिदपि तद्वेदान्तवेद्यं भवे-

दित्येतद्वचनं पराहतपदं वक्तुं न युक्तं बुधैः ॥

(The disciple enquires):



If my true nature—the inner self—is not an object of knowledge, then how do you affirm the validity of the Upaniṣadic passages in respect of it? The statement—‘The one which never becomes the object of knowledge, is known from the Upaniṣadic passage’—involves a contradiction. And it is not proper on the part of wise men to utter such statements.

The objection raised in SS, I, 116 is restated here.

[ 245 ]

नैतद्वस्तुनि कल्पितस्य जगतो वाक्यप्रसूतप्रमा-  
 बुद्धिर्मूलधगिष्यते तव निजस्वाकारमात्रग्रहात् ।  
 कर्मत्वं न करोति वाक्यजनिता बुद्धिःस्वरूपे तव  
 स्वाकारग्रहणेन केवलमियं संसारमूलं दहेत् ॥

(The preceptor replies):

This is not correct. The psychosis which arises from the Upaniṣadic passages, and which is inspired by the reflection of the self in it, annihilates the root-cause of this universe superimposed on the self. The psychosis arising from the Upaniṣadic passages does not introduce the character of an object to your essential nature, but it receives the reflection of the self and (thereby) removes the root-cause of transmigration.

The Upaniṣadic passages are valid in respect of the self in this that the mental state in the form of the self arising from them annihilates *avidyā* abiding in the self. Thereby the self which is self-luminous manifests itself.

*Vide : aviśayatve brahmaṇaḥ śāstrayonitvānupapattirīti cet, na avidyā-  
 kalpitabhedanivṛttiparatvāt śāstrasya, BSB, I, i, 4.*



[ 246 ]

संविद्व्युत्पादकं यद्वचनमभिमतं कर्ममीमांसकानां  
 तत्कर्मत्वं न तावत्क्षिपति घटपटाद्यर्थसंवित्स्वरूपे ।  
 किं त्वज्ञानापनुत्त्या फलवदभिमतं तत्र शिष्यस्य तद्वत्  
 सर्वं वेदान्तवाक्यं फलवदिदमपि प्रत्यगात्मस्वरूपे ॥

The Mīmāṃsakas accept the statement that elucidates the essential nature of 'knowledge'. But it does not introduce the character of an object to the knowledge of pot, cloth, etc. Its fruitfulness lies in this that it removes the ignorance of the disciple regarding the nature of 'knowledge'. Similarly the Upanisadic texts are fruitful in respect of the self.

'Knowledge', according to the Prābhākaras, is self-luminous. It is not an object of another knowledge. So the knowledge arising from the statement that 'knowledge' is 'self-luminous' could not have 'knowledge' as its object. But the statement is valid in this that it removes the ignorance regarding the nature of knowledge. Similarly the Upanisadic texts are valid by annihilating *avidyā* present in the self.

[ 247 ]

अकार्यस्वरूपस्य कार्यत्वमिष्टं यथा कारकैर्मूर्तमुत्सारयद्भिः ।  
 तथैवाप्रमेयस्य मेय<sup>1</sup>त्वमिष्टं प्रमाणैस्तम<sup>2</sup>स्तज्जमुत्सारयद्भिः ॥

Just as an existent object (like ether) is said to be accomplished, when the material objects are removed by the productive factors, so also the self which is not an object of any proof is said to fall within the scope of proof, as the latter removes *avidyā* and its effects.

1. त्वमस्य प्रमा—T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, T<sub>4</sub>, T<sub>6</sub>.

2. स्तद्वदुत्सा—P<sub>2</sub>.



A well is the ether delimited by a particular cavity. The ether is existent and as such it cannot be accomplished. But in ordinary experience we find that a well is said to be accomplished by the removal of material objects such as mud, stone, etc.

*svayaṁprakāśamāpi pramāṇaprakāśyameva, tasya ca aprakāśanam  
ajñānameveti tannivartanameva tatprakāśakatvaṁ pramāṇasya, yathā  
mūrtadravyāpanayanameva kūṭhākāśādikaraṇam, tasya akāryatvāt, akṛtakal-  
patvācca pūrvam. tathā svayaṁprakāśasyāpi, aprakāśyatvāt,  
aprakāśakalpatvācca pūrvam, Iṣṭa-siddhi, p 72.*

[ 248 ]

वाक्योत्थापितबुद्धिवृत्तिरमला यज्ञादिभिर्निश्चला

वेदान्तश्रवणादिभिः स्फटिकवत् स्वच्छा सती तावकम् ।

रूपं दर्पणवद्विभर्ति परमं विष्णोः पदं संनिधे-

रेतस्मा<sup>1</sup>दिह कारणादथ भवेत्संसारबीजक्षयः ॥

The psychosis which arises from the Upaniṣadic sentences, which has become pure by the performance of sacrifices, and which is firm and transparent like crystal by the Vedāntic study (reasoning and meditation), by its proximity to the inner self, receives, like a mirror, the reflection of your true nature which is identical with the supreme status of Viṣṇu. This becomes the cause of the annihilation of the source of transmigration.

[ 249 ]

एवं वेदशिरः प्रमाणमुदितं प्रत्यक्स्वरूपे तव

कर्मत्वं विरह्य तत्र न हि नो बाधः प्रतिज्ञागिरः ।

कर्मत्वं न करोति बोधयति च स्पष्टं वचो वैदिकं

रूपं तावकमेवमस्य भवति प्रामाण्यमत्रात्मनि ॥

1. दथ—T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>.



Thus there is no contradiction to the thesis (that the Vedānta is the source of the knowledge of the self), as it has been shown that the Upaniṣadic passages, without introducing the character of an object to it, are valid in respect of it.<sup>1</sup> The Upaniṣadic passages clearly make known your true nature<sup>2</sup> without introducing the character of an object to it; and thus they are valid in respect of it.

1. See notes on, SŚ, I, 245.

2. The knowledge arising from the Upaniṣad annihilates *avidyā* present in the self; and thereby the self which is self-luminous manifests itself. It is with this view it is stated that the Upaniṣadic passages clearly make known the self.

[ 250 ]

पृष्ठेन पूर्ववपुषा क्रियते प्रतीति-

नेतीति वाक्यजनिता जगतो निषेद्धी ।

प्राधान्यमस्तु विधिना सममेव तस्मात्

तस्याथ वा भवतु तद्वचनं प्रधानम् ॥

The knowledge of the negation of the universe arising from the negative Upaniṣadic sentences such as 'Not this', etc., subsequently has for its content the absolute self. So let the negative Upaniṣadic sentences be primary along with the affirmative ones, or let them be primary (and the affirmative ones secondary).

1. *Bṛh.*, II, iii, 6.

The view put forth in this and the following verses, is advocated by Maṇḍanamiśra. See S.

For details see Introduction, p. 34.



[ 251 ]

अद्वैतीकरणं निषेधवचनादुत्पन्नबुद्धेरपि

तुल्यं तत्त्वमसीति वाक्यजनितप्रत्यक्प्रतीत्या सह ।

आर्थं शाब्दमथापि वा भवतु तत्किं तेन यद्वा विधि-

नार्कर्तुं शबलार्थगोचरतया निर्भेदमर्थं क्षमः ॥

The knowledge of the self arising from the negative Upaniṣadic texts is similar to the one arising from the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts such as *tat tvam asi*. It does not matter whether the self is conveyed directly by the words, or presumptively known.<sup>1</sup> Or else, as the (words in the) affirmative Upadiṣadic texts signify the blend of the self and the objective element, they cannot convey the sense of partless entity.

1. The self is conveyed directly by the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts, and presumptively by the negative ones.

For details see Introduction, p. 34.

[ 252 ]

संबन्धजातविरहान्न च लक्षणास्मिन्

संभाव्यते परिहृताखिलदृश्यराशौ ।

ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुनि ततः प्रतिषेधवाक्य-

शेषत्वमेतु विधिरित्यपि केचिदन्ये ॥

The self cannot be secondarily signified, as it is devoid of all objects and as such incapable of having any relation<sup>1</sup> with anything. So they hold: let the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages be subsidiary to the negative ones.

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1. मेति—T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>.



1. *saṁyoga-samavāya-tādātmya-kāryakāraṇatādīśaṁbandhū-sambhavāt*  
SS.

[ 253 ]

वाक्यं मुक्तिफलां धियं जनयति स्पष्टं विधिव्यापृतं  
साक्षादेव तव स्वरूपकथनाच्चैवं निषेधात्मकम् ।  
अध्यारोपितरूपभेदविलयव्यापारनिष्ठं तव  
स्वाकारग्रहणक्षमां न हि धियं कर्तुं समर्थं यतः ॥

The affirmative Upaniṣadic sentences convey your true nature, and thereby give rise to the immediate knowledge of the self that directly leads to liberation. The negative ones, on the other hand, are not so. They convey the absence of duality, namely, the superimposed universe, and hence they are not capable of giving rise to the psychosis that could present your true nature (that is, the self).

The view put forth in SS, I, 250 is refuted in this and the following three verses.

[ 254 ]

अस्थूलादिवचःसमुत्थितमतिर्नाकारमादास्यते  
साक्षादद्वयवस्तुनस्तव विभोरज्ञानविच्छेदिनः ।  
अज्ञातस्य हि वस्तुनो न हि धिया स्वाकारसंवेदनं  
मुक्त्वा तद्विषयस्य विभ्रमकृतो ध्वान्तस्य विध्वंसनम् ॥

The psychosis arising from the text, *asthūla* etc., does not present your true nature, the absolute self, which is all-pervasive and which annihilates *avidyā*. And, without the comprehension of the true nature of the unknown object (namely, the oneness of the self) there cannot arise, from the knowledge of the texts such as *asthūla*, etc., the



annihilation of *avidyā* which abides in the self and which is the root cause of transmigration.

1. *Bṛh.*, III, viii, 8.

[ 255 ]

रज्ज्वज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य फणिनो रज्जुप्रकाशक्षमं  
विज्ञानं विरह्य न प्रशमनं दृष्टं निषेधे कृते ।  
तद्वत्प्रत्यगविद्यया विरचितं संसारदुःखं न त-  
त्संवित्तिं विरह्य शाम्यति धिया नेतीति शब्दोत्थया ॥

The serpent (which appears in a rope, and) which is the product of *avidyā* that veils (the true nature of) the rope vanishes not by the negative statements, but by the specific knowledge that is capable of revealing the rope. Similarly, the misery in the form of transmigration which is the product of *avidyā* of the inner self is annihilated, not by the knowledge arising from the (negative) Upaniṣadic texts such as *neti neti*,<sup>1</sup> but by the true knowledge of the inner self (that is, by the knowledge of the identity of the inner self and the supreme self).

1. *Bṛh.*, II, iii, 6.

[ 256 ]

अस्थूलादिवचो निषेधकतया भेदस्य संशोधना-  
द्वाक्यार्थान्वयसिद्धये नु<sup>1</sup> घटते वाच्यार्थलक्ष्यार्थयोः ।  
एवं तत्त्वमसीति वाक्यगतयोस्तत्त्वंपदोक्तार्थयोः  
संशुद्धयैव तु नेति नेति वचनं मोक्षाय साक्षान्न तु ॥

The texts such as *asthūla*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> convey the sense of partless entity, by denying the duality and by clarifying the

1. तु — B<sub>1</sub>



primary and the secondary senses of the terms (*tat* and *tvam*).<sup>2</sup> Thus the statement *neti neti* is intended only for the clarification of the import of the terms *tat* and *tvam*. And the knowledge arising from it does not directly lead to liberation.

1. *Brh.*, III, viii, 8.

2. *vācyārthena vākyatūtparyam, api tu lakṣyamātre iti niścaya eva tayoh samśodhanam, SS.*

[ 257 ]

अन्ये पुनर्विधिवचोजनितात्मबुद्धि-

सामर्थ्यसिद्धमनुवक्ति निषेधवाक्यम् ।

द्वैतोपमर्दमिति शासति शिष्यवर्गं

तच्च प्रशस्तमनवद्यमभीष्टमेव ॥

Some others, however, instruct their disciples thus: the negative Upaniṣadic texts restate the annihilation of duality that is presumptively known from the knowledge of the self arising from the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts. This view is commendable, faultless, and desirable.

The view set forth in this verse, according to *S*, is advocated by Padmapāda.

*vide : sūktikeyamityeva nirākāṅkṣaṁ vākyam, nedaṁ rajatamityanuvādaḥ, Pañcāpādikā, p. 167.*

See the following verse.

[ 258 ]

दृष्टश्च रज्जुविधिनावगतार्थवस्तु-

सामर्थ्यसिद्धभुजगप्रशमानुवादः ।

रज्जुस्तवाग्रत इयं न भुजङ्गमोऽय-

मित्यत्र तद्वदिह योजयितव्यमेतत् ॥



In ordinary experience, it is observed that the statement, 'What is in front of you is not serpent, (but rope), restates the non-existence of the serpent which is presumptively known from the knowledge of the rope arising from the affirmative sentence 'In front of you, there is rope'. In the present case also, it should be understood in the same way.<sup>1</sup>

For details see Introduction, p. 35.

[ 259 ]

अस्यैव तत्त्वविनिवेदनशक्तिभाजः  
संसारमूलविनिवृत्तिफलप्रसूतौ ।  
सामर्थ्यमस्ति पटुभिः परिवृंहितत्वा-  
द्वेदान्तभूमिगतपञ्चविधार्थवादैः ॥

As the five-fold purposive commendatory passages of the Upaniṣads substantiate the sentence *tat tvam asi*, the latter signifies the self, and it alone is capable of giving rise to the knowledge that annihilates the root-cause of transmigration.

[ 260 ]

सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयसंयमनप्रवेश-  
व्यापारजातकथनच्छलतः प्रवृत्तेः ।  
सानुग्रहादवगतिः खलु तत्त्वमादे-  
र्वाक्यात्परस्य घटते न ततोऽपरस्मात् ॥

The knowledge of the self does not arise from any other source than from the sentences like *tat tvam asi*, which are substantiated by the commendatory statements which function under the guise of conveying the creation,<sup>1</sup>



sustenance,<sup>3</sup> and dissolution<sup>3</sup> (of the universe), the self's control (over the universe)<sup>4</sup> and its immanence)<sup>5</sup>

1. *Taitt*, III, 1.
2. *ibid*
3. *ibid*
4. *Brh.*, III, vii, 3.
5. *Taitt.*, II, 6.

[ 261 ]

सूत्रं तत्तु समन्वयादिति विधिव्यापारनिष्ठं वचो  
 मोक्षायेति निवेदनाय कृतवान् वेदान्तवेदी मुनिः ।  
 न्यायेनाकलयन्नशेषवचनव्यापारमूरीकृत-  
 स्वातन्त्र्यः सकलेऽपि वेदशिरसि स्वैरं चरन्नीश्वरः ॥

The sage Bādarāyaṇa, who has assumed sovereign authority, who has true insight into the significance of the entire Upaniṣadic texts, who has determined the import of all the Upaniṣadic passages through reasoning and as such knows the true import of them, composed the *sūtra*—*tattu samanvayāt*,<sup>1</sup> in order to propound (the truth) that (the knowledge arising from) the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages leads to liberation.

1. *BS*, I, i, 4.

For details see Introduction, p. 36.

[ 262 ]

वाक्यार्थान्वयितत्पदार्थकथने नेतीति वाक्यं पुनः  
 साक्षात्सूचयति स्म सूत्रकृदतस्तत्तात्परं निश्चितम् ।  
 एवं हस्ततलार्पितामलकवत्तात्पर्यसंवेदने  
 सत्यन्याद्गुदीरयन्ति यदि तत्क्षन्तुं कथं शक्नुमः ॥

The author of the *sūtras* has indicated<sup>1</sup> that the Upaniṣadic sentence *neti neti*, is for the clarification of the sense



term *tat* that directly partakes in the sentence *tat tvam asi*. So it is ascertained that the negative Upaniṣadic sentence is intent on it (namely, the clarification of the term *tat*). The intention of the author of the sūtras is thus brought forth as clearly as a myrobalan fruit placed on one's palm. (Even then) if others hold a contrary view, then how are we to tolerate that?

1. *vide BS, III, ii, 22.*

See also Introduction, p. 36.

[ 263 ]

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमित्यभिहिते संभावनाऽऽनीयते  
नास्थूलादिवचः समुद्रवधिया द्वैतोपमर्दं विना ।  
तेनावान्तरवाक्यलक्ष्यविषयां बुद्धिं दृढीकुर्वता  
सर्वद्वैतनिषेधकेन वचसा वाक्यार्थधोर्जन्यते ॥

When it is said that the (supreme self) is truth, consciousness, and absolute, the possibility of such a being is not attained, unless there arises the knowledge from the statement *asthūla*, etc., annihilating all duality. The sentence which negates all duality confirms the knowledge of the secondary sense of the subsidiary sentences and thereby leads to the import of the sentence (*tat tvam asi*) namely, the partless entity.

For details see Introduction, p 37.

[ 264 ]

अस्थूलादिवचोनिरस्तनिखिलद्वैतप्रपञ्चं परं  
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिवर्जितमिदं प्रत्यक्स्वरूपं तथा ।  
एकीकृत्य परस्परेण पदयोरर्थद्वयं तत्त्वतः  
प्रत्यक् चाद्वयमद्वयं च तदिति प्रेक्षस्व निःसंशयम् ॥



The supreme self is free from the entire universe which is characterized by duality and which is annihilated by the knowledge arising from the sentence *asthūla*, etc. The inner self is free from the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. By mutually combining the senses of the two terms *tat* and *tvam*, you ascertain without doubt that the inner self is really the absolute self and the absolute self is really the inner self.

[ 265 ]

अद्वैतं परिशोधितं भगवतो विष्णोः परं यत्पदं  
तच्छब्देन समर्पितं परिहतानादेयमात्मप्रभम् ।  
यच्चोपाधिविवर्जितं तव निजं साक्षात्स्वरूपं तयो-  
रेकत्वं परिवर्जितव्यवधिकं प्रत्यक्षमीक्षस्व भोः ॥

The secondary sense of the term *tat* is the supreme self, namely, the supreme status of Lord Viṣṇu. It is clarified (by the statement *asthūla*, etc.) and it is free from the qualities that should be discarded and is self-luminous. Your true nature is free from the limiting conditions (namely, mind, etc) and as such it is immediate. As the difference between the two, namely, the inner self and the supreme self, is annulled, you immediately perceive the oneness of the supreme self and the inner self.

[ 266 ]

अनृतजडविभक्तदुःखतुच्छासहनवपुः परमं पदं मुरारेः ।  
परिहतसकलप्रपञ्चमात्मा तव तदवेहि तमो निरस्य वाक्यात् ॥

By removing *avidyā* through (the knowledge arising from) the sentence (*tat tvam asi*), you understand your true nature to be the supreme status of Viṣṇu, which is opposed



to what is unreal, insentient, and which is opposed to duality, misery, voidness, and (hence) distinct from the entire universe.

[ 267 ]

श्रद्धत्स्व सोम्येति हि शास्ति शास्त्रं श्रद्धाधनत्वश्रुतिरस्ति चान्या ।  
श्रद्धा तु यस्येत्यपरं च वाक्यमधीयते संशयकुत्सनाय ॥

In order to remove any doubt, the Upaniṣadic passage instructs — Oh! dear, have faith;<sup>1</sup> and there is another text which states that faith is wealth;<sup>2</sup> and some others recite the text 'one who has faith'.<sup>3</sup>

1. *Chānd.*, VI, xii, 2.

2. *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 23.

3. *Chānd.*, III, xiv, 4.

[ 268 ]

अज्ञो विनश्यति पुमानतिमूढभावा-  
दश्रद्धयोपहतबुद्धिरतोऽपि कष्टः ।  
कष्टाच्च कष्टतर एव तु संशयात्मा  
दुःखी सदेति भगवानपि वासुदेवः ॥

Lord Kṛṣṇa says that the ignorant, owing to the non-discrimination (of the sense of the term *tat*) fails to achieve the goal; the one who lacks faith is miserable; and the one of doubting intellect is still more miserable and is always wretched.<sup>1</sup>

1. *Bh. G.*, IV, 40.

[ 269 ]

रूपं तावकमुज्झितद्वयमभूदद्वैतमेवाञ्जसा  
तच्चाद्वैतमपास्य मोहजनितं पारोक्ष्यमात्मा ह्यभूत् ।  
एवं वेदशिरः पदान्वयवशादेकत्वमेकान्ततः  
सिद्धं प्रत्यगनन्तयोरिति तव श्रेयः समाप्तिं गतम् ॥



Your nature, the inner self, released from duality is truly of the nature of the supreme self. The absolute self, free from mediacy which is the result of *avidyā*, is of the nature of the inner self. Thus the oneness of the supreme and the inner self is invariably established through the syntactical relation of the words of the Upaniṣads. And thus the supreme goal of life is completely attained.

[ 270 ]

संबन्धः समवाय इत्यपि पदे वैशेषिकोच्चारिते

नाखण्डव्यतिरिक्तवस्तु वदितुं शक्तोऽनवस्थाभयात् ।

पञ्चानां समवायितेति वचनव्याघातभीतेरपि

संबन्धान्तरमस्य नाभिमनुते वैशेषिकः कातरः ॥

The timid Vaiśeṣika is not capable of stating the import of his sentence 'Inherence is related' to be none other than the partless entity, as he is afraid of infinite regress. Moreover, in view of the fear of contradiction to his own view that the relation of inherence exists between five pairs of things alone, he does not accept any other relation to the relation of inherence.

Sarvajñātman in this and in the following five verses points out that the schools other than Advaita also admit that the import of a sentence could be a partless entity.

According to Vaiśeṣika, a generic attribute (*jāti*) is related to an individual object (*vyakti*) through the intimate relation known as *samavāya*. This *samavāya* being a relation should be related to the two objects that are related, namely, the generic attribute and the individual object. Hence there is the usage that the relation known as *samavāya* is related to the generic attribute and the individual object. Now what kind of relation is admitted between *samavāya* and the generic attribute or the individual object? It cannot be *samavāya*, for this *samavāya* would require another *samavāya* to get itself related to



the former *samavāya* or to the relata, namely, the generic attribute and the individual object. And so on, *ad infinitum*. Moreover, the Vaiśeṣika has accepted the relation of *samavāya* only between five pairs of things, namely, (i) *avayava* and *avayavin*, (ii) *guṇa* and *dravya*, (iii) *kriyā* and *dravya*, (iv) *jāti* and *vyakti*, and, (v) *viśeṣa* and *nitya-dravya*, but not between *samavāya* and *jāti* or *vyakti*. So he holds that *samavāya* is connected with *jāti* or *vyakti* through the direct relation of *svārūpa-sambandha*, that is, the *samavāya* itself is looked upon as the relation. Hence the two words in the sentence *sambandhasamavāyaḥ* should convey only the unitary object, namely, the relation known as *samavāyaḥ*. The word *sambandha* means *svārūpa-sambandha* and this is *samavāya* itself; and, the word *samavāya* also conveys the sense of the relation known as *samavāya*. Hence the two words convey nothing else than the unitary entity, namely, *samavāya*.

[ 271 ]

शब्दो गकार इति लौकिकमस्ति वाक्यं  
 विस्पष्टमस्ति च पदद्वयमत्र वाक्ये ।  
 प्राभाकरे च समये न गकारमात्रा-  
 दन्यत्पदद्वयनिगद्यमभीष्टमस्मिन् ॥

There are clearly two words in the ordinary sentence 'Ga is a letter'. The import of this sentence, according to the system of the Prābhākaras is accepted to be none other than the letter *ga*.

[ 272 ]

शब्दत्वजातिवचनो न हि शब्दशब्दः  
 श्रोत्रोपलम्भनतया तु निबन्धनेन ।  
 वर्णान् ब्रवीति न हि जातिरिहाभ्युपेता  
 साक्षाद्गकारमयमाह गकारशब्दः ॥

As the Prābhākaras do not admit a generic attribute in sound, the word *śabda* does not denote the generic attribute *śabdatva*, but signifies the letters (*varṇa*), through the



means 'perceptibility by the sense of hearing'. The word *ga* directly conveys the letter *ga*.

The Prābhākaras contend that a generic attribute can be recognized only in perceptible substance and not in qualities like sound. Hence the word *śabda* signifies not the generic attribute, but the letters through the perceptibility by the ear which serves as the ground for the use of the word *śabda* in the sense of letters. The word *ga* signifies the letter *ga*. The import of the sentence, therefore, is the letter *ga*.

[ 273 ]

तस्मादखण्डविषये वचने विवादं

प्रभाकराः परिहरन्तु न चेदशक्यम् ।

निर्वोदुमेतदिह वाक्यमितोऽन्यथा चेद-

स्यार्थकल्पनमभीप्सितमिष्टहानिः ॥

So let the {followers of the system of Prabhākara abandon the dispute regarding (the view that the import of a sentence is) an unitary object. If not, it is impossible to give an intelligent interpretation of the sentence (that 'Ga is a letter'). If the import of (this) sentence is accepted (by Prabhākara) to be different from the unitary object (namely, the letter *ga*), then there would arise contradiction to his accepted tenet (namely, that the qualities do not have any generic attribute).

The import of the sentence *śabdo gākāraḥ* would be different from the unitary sense, only when the word *śabda* conveys a generic attribute. But this is contrary to the view of Prabhākara that the qualities do not have any generic attribute.

*vide* Notes on the previous verse.

[ 274 ]

प्रातिपादिकान्यनतिरिक्तविषयाणि

प्राह भगवान् प्रथमशब्दितविभक्त्या ।

पाणिनिरतः सकलतर्कसमयज्ञो

वष्टि वचसोरनतिरिक्तविषयत्वम् ॥



The venerable Pāṇini holds that the nominative case-suffix added to the nominal stem does not convey any sense other than the sense of the stem.<sup>1</sup> Hence, Pāṇini, a master of all schools of thought, accepts the import of the words (which are not even synonymous) to be the unitary object.

1. *vide* the *Pāṇini-sūtra*:—

*prātipadikārthalingaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā*, II, iii, 46.

See Notes on *SS*, I, 216.

[ 275 ]

इयं घटव्यक्तिरितीदृशेषु च प्रसिद्धमेवैकरसार्थगोचरम् ।  
पदद्वयं लोकवचस्सु तेन च प्रशस्यते नात्र विवादसंग्रहः ॥

It is well known that the import of the two words of the sentences such as 'This is pot', etc., is the unitary object — pot. Hence it is not reasonable to evoke controversy on this point.

[ 276 ]

न च प्रमाणान्तरयोग्यतायां प्रयोजकं स्यात्परिनिष्ठितत्वम् ।  
यतः प्रमाणान्तरयोग्यतायां प्रयोजकं रूपरसादिमत्त्वम् ॥

As the criterion for an object to become capable of being known by the proofs other than the Upaniṣads is possession of colour, taste, etc., existence is not the criterion for an object to become capable of falling within the scope of other proofs.

The objection raised in *SS*, I, 101 is refuted here.

[ 277 ]

ततस्तु रूपादिविहीनरूपे प्रमाणान्तरगोचरचित्स्वरूपे ।  
वचः प्रमाणान्तरनिस्पृहं सत् प्रमाणमात्रात्मनि निर्विवादम् ॥



Hence the Upniṣadic passages, without depending on any other proof, are indisputably valid in respect of the self which is devoid of colour, etc., and which is pure consciousness that does not become the object of any other proof.

[ 278 ]

लोकप्रसिद्धपदगोचरतानिमित्त-

मन्यप्रमाणविषयत्वमिह प्रसिद्धम् ।

लोकप्रसिद्धपदगोचरता न चास्मिन्

ब्रह्मात्मनीति च तदत्र निवारणीयम् ॥

It is well known that the object which is signified by a word current in ordinary usage falls within the scope of the other proofs. But as the self is not denoted by the word found in ordinary usage, it should be denied that it is the object of the other proofs.

[ 279 ]

लोकप्रयुक्तपदगोचरतास्ति कार्ये

तेनास्तु कार्यपरवाक्यमशेषतस्ते ।

मानान्तरेषु परतन्त्रतया प्रमाणं

स्वार्थे न दूषणमिदं श्रुतिमस्तकेषु ॥

*Niyoga* is denoted by the potential ending, etc., found in ordinary usage. Hence all the sentences intent on conveying the *niyoga* are not valid in respect of it, because they depend on another proof.<sup>1</sup> And this objection does not apply to the Upniṣadic passages.

1. In the system of Prabhākara, the Vedic sentences convey *niyoga* which is denoted by the potential ending in ordinary usage. Hence they are said to be dependent on another proof (namely, the



word in ordinary usage). As the Vedic texts convey something that is already known, they do not answer the definition of validity, namely, *anadhigata-abūdhitārtha-bodhakatvam*.

[ 280 ]

न च क्रियाकारितसंहतीनि पदानि लोके नियमेन वक्तुम् ।  
समीहते पक्वमतिः पदानां क्रियां विनाप्यन्वयदर्शनेन ॥

As the words are found to have syntactical relation even without a finite verb, a man of ripe intellect does not desire to state that the syntactical relation of the words is invariably brought about by the finite verb.

This verse refutes the objection raised in ŚŚ, I, 108.

[ 281 ]

महीभुजोऽयं पुरुषो मनस्वी वनस्पतेस्तत्फलमित्यपीह ।  
क्रियां विनाप्यन्वयवन्ति लोके पदानि दृष्टानि बहूनि वक्तुः ॥

In ordinary experience it is found that the words (in the sentences) of the speaker such as 'This high-minded servant of the king', and 'that fruit of the tree' are syntactically related even without a finite verb.

[ 282 ]

क्रियापदं वेदशिरस्स्वपीष्यते विवक्षितार्थानुगुणं तु तन्मतम् ।  
विवक्षितार्थप्रतिपत्तिघाति तु क्रियापदं स्वीकृतमप्यनर्थकम् ॥

The finite verb is accepted even in the Upaniṣadic passages; and it is considered essential only when it is agreeable to the intended sense. But the finite verb, though read in the Upaniṣadic passage, is futile if it should spoil the intended sense.



[ 283 ]

अस्त्यस्म्यसीति च पदं प्रचुरं क्रियाया  
वेदान्तवाक्यगतमादरतः पठन्ति ।  
तन्मात्रतः सकलवेदशिरः पदानां  
संघातसिद्धिरिति वेदशिरोनिषण्णाः ॥

The authorities on the Upaniṣads read with consideration the abundant finite verbs of the Upaniṣadic passages such as 'IS',<sup>1</sup> 'AM',<sup>2</sup> 'ART'.<sup>3</sup> They hold that by the presence of these verbs alone the words of the Upaniṣadic passages are syntactically related.

- vide the texts : 1. *asti brahmeti cedveda, Taitt*, II, vi, 1.  
2. *aham brahmāsmi, Brh.*, I, iv, 10.  
3. *tattvaṁ asi, Chānd*, VI, viii, 7.

[ 284 ]

यत्तु प्रमाणमनुभूतिरिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमनूय पुनर्वदन्ति ।  
सत्ताप्रमाणघटनां प्रति योग्यतातो नास्त्यर्थनिष्ठवचनेष्वनपेक्षतेति ॥

The followers of (the Prābhākara school) state the general definition of valid knowledge as 'All experience is valid'; and then declare that existence is 'fitness of an object to fall within the scope of valid knowledge'. Hence the Upaniṣadic passages that (are said to) convey the sense of 'existence' are not self-valid.

The contention of the Prābhākara is: the Upaniṣads are said to convey the self which is of the nature of existence. And, as existence is the fitness of a thing to become the object of valid knowledge, that is, another proof, the Upaniṣadic passages convey the thing which is capable of becoming the object of another proof; and in this respect they are dependent on another proof and hence they are not self-valid.



[ 285 ]

तद्दुर्घटं न खलु संविदियं स्वयोग्या  
 न ह्यात्मनि स्थितिमुपैष्यति योग्यतास्याः ।  
 वस्त्वन्तरोपनिहितस्वपदत्वहेतो-  
 र्न ह्यात्मरूपदहने दहनस्य शक्तिः ॥

This does not hold good. 'Consciousness' is not capable of becoming its object. It is not reasonable to hold that the 'fitness' to become the object of consciousness exists in consciousness itself; for, that thing alone which is different from consciousness can become its (namely, consciousness's) object. Indeed fire does not have the power to burn itself.

The contention of the Prābhākara does not hold good. If 'existence' is defined as fitness of a thing to become the object of consciousness, then it is asked whether 'consciousness' possesses existence or not. If it possesses existence, then it should be held that 'consciousness' is capable of becoming the object of 'consciousness.' And this is unreasonable as the same thing (namely, consciousness) cannot be both the knowing subject and the object.

[ 286 ]

संवित्रप्रमाणघटनां प्रति योग्यतां चे-  
 न्नेयं बिभर्ति न सती भवितुं समर्था ।  
 तद्योग्यतैव यदि मातृघटादिसत्ता  
 तस्याप्यसत्त्वमिति शून्यमुपाजिहीथाः ॥

If 'consciousness' does not possess the fitness to become the object of 'consciousness', then it cannot be existent. (Moreover) the existence of the cognizer, pot, etc., is the fitness of their becoming the objects of consciousness. (As consciousness itself is non-existent), you (the Prābhākara) should accept the non-existence of cognizer, pot, etc.



[ 287 ]

वस्तुस्वभाव इति सत्त्वमतो गृहाण  
 तच्च द्विधेति वितथावितथत्वभेदात् ।  
 सत्त्वं द्विरूपमितरेतरसंकरेण  
 सच्छब्दवाच्यमिति च व्यवहारकाले ॥

Hence you must accept that 'existence' is the essential nature of a thing. And it is two-fold as real and unreal. You understand that at the time of empirical usage, the 'blend' resulting from the mutual superimposition of the two kinds of existence is the primary sense of the word *sat*.

This verse bring out the conception of 'existence' according to Advaita, and shows that it is free from the defect pointed out in the conception of the Prābhākaras.

[ 288 ]

उत्सृज्य तत्र वितथांशमथेतरस्मिन्  
 संवित्स्वरूपपरमार्थसति स्वरूपे ।  
 बुद्धिं कुरु प्रणिदधत्प्रणयेन भूम्नि  
 ब्रह्माहमस्मि परमार्थसदित्यजस्रम् ॥

Discarding the unreal element and fixing the mind with faith on the self which is self-luminous, infinite, and absolutely real, you ascertain that you are always the supreme self.

[ 289 ]

ब्रह्म स्वयंप्रभमतः शबलेषु तस्य  
 मानन्तरानधिगतेष्वपि शब्दशक्तिः ।  
 रूपेषु वृद्धजनसंव्यवहारहेतोः  
 शक्या ग्रहीतुमुदितेन पथानभिज्ञैः ॥



That the self is self-luminous and as such the blend (of the self and the objective element) is not known through any proof (other than the witness-self). Ordinary men understand the relation of the words (*satya*, etc.,) to the sense (namely, the blend of the self and the objective element) in the manner mentioned before,<sup>2</sup> in accordance with the usage of the elders.

1. The objection raised in *SS*, I, 111 is answered in this verse.

The primary sense of the word *sat* is only the blend of the self, the pure consciousness and the phenomenal element (say) pot. The relation of the word *sat* to this sense is known through perception in accordance with the usage of the elders.

The primary sense of the word *aham* is the individual soul which is a blend of the self and the intellect. The relation of the word *aham* to this sense is known by the witness-self (*sākṣi-caitanya*).

2. See *SS*, I, 198-200.

[ 290 ]

लोकप्रसिद्धार्थपदान्तराणां समीपसङ्कीर्तनतोऽपि शक्तिः ।

ब्रह्मादिशब्दस्य सुखावसेया यथा हि यूपादिगिरस्तथैव ॥

Just as the meanings of the words like *yūpa* etc., are easily determined, so also the meanings of the words like 'Brahma', etc., can be easily determined, as they are mentioned in proximity to the other words whose meanings are well known in ordinary experience.

The method to know the primary sense of the word *brahman* is set forth with an illustrative example. In the sentence *Khūdiro yūpaḥ, bailvo yūpaḥ, yūpaṁ takṣati, yūpaṁ aṣṭāśrīkaroti*, the sense of the word *yūpa* is known, with the aid of the other words whose meanings are already known, to be a piece of wood which is cut so as to have eight sides. Similarly, the meaning of the word *brahman* which is found in the sentence—*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante.....tadbrahma*



[*Taitt.*, III, i, 1.] is known to be the absolute entity, with the aid of the other words whose meanings are known already.

[ 291 ]

विनापि शक्तिग्रहणं पदानां परात्मनोर्वाचकभावभाजाम् ।  
भवेत्परब्रह्मणि वेदवाक्यात् प्रतीतिरन्यप्रतिषेधनेन ॥

Even if the primary senses of the words (such as *brahma* and *aham*) which signify God, and the individual soul are not known, there could arise the knowledge of the supreme self from the Upanisadic text (*neti, neti*)<sup>1</sup> by the negation of the objective elements.<sup>2</sup>

1. *athūta ādeśo neti neti Brh.*, II, iii, 6.

2. *anyapratishedhanena—anūtmāpohanena*, *AP*.

The view put forth in this verse, according to *SS* is not the final view of the author. See Notes on the following verse.

*vide: svāsammatamāpi pakṣamāha, SS.*

[ 292 ]

नञः प्रपञ्चप्रतिपादकस्य च प्रतीत्य शक्तिं व्यवहारतः स्थितः ।  
पदस्य शक्नोति परं समीक्षितुं श्रुतेः प्रपञ्चप्रतिषेधमार्गतः ॥

One can have the knowledge of the self from the Upanisadic passages through the negation of the universe, if one knows, from ordinary usage, the meaning of the negative particle *nañ* and the words that convey the universe (namely, *nāna* and *kiñcana*).

The main objection to the view put forth in this verse is this:—the universe is to be negated in the self which should be referred to by the word *iha* in the sentence, *neha nānāsti kiñcana* (*Brh.*, VI, iv, 19). The meaning of the word *iha*, which is said to be significative of the self, is not known and so the word *iha* cannot refer to the self, and as such the universe cannot be negated in it. Moreover, the know-



ledge of the essential nature of the self could arise only from the affirmative Upaniṣadic statements like *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantam brahma* and not from the negative statements such as *neha nānāsti kiñcana*.

[ 293 ]

ब्रह्मास्मीति वचोनिविष्टपदयोर्मानं भवेदन्वयः

साक्षादद्वयवस्तु तस्य च भवेन्मेयं ततस्तद्गतेः ।

यद्यत्र प्रमितिं करोति भवति प्रामाण्यमत्रास्य च

स्पष्टं दृष्टमिदं हि युक्तिवटितं रूपे यथा चक्षुषः ॥

The sentence *aham brahmāsmi* wherein the terms stand in syntactic relation is the source of the knowledge (of the self). The absolute self (identical with the inner self) which is immediate is the content of the cognition (arising from the sentence *aham brahmāsmi*) as this knowledge arises from that (sentence). Whichever gives rise to the knowledge of an object, is valid in respect of the object, as the sense of sight with reference to the colour of an object. And this is well known and indeed reasonable also.

[ 294 ]

मानान्तरानधिगतं परिनिष्ठितं य-

द्वेदः समर्पयति चेतसि तत्परः सन् ।

तत्तात्थ्यमेव भवतीति समाश्रयस्व

श्रेयस्करो विधिगिरोऽवगतो यथैव ॥

Just as 'religious rites' known from the injunctive texts are not contradicted (by any other proof), so also you believe that the self, which is self-existent, which is not known through any other proof, and which is made known



by the Upaniṣadic passages that have it as their true purport, is not contradicted (by any proof).

[ 295 ]

निष्पन्नमेव यदि वा पुरुषप्रयत्न-  
निष्पाद्यमस्तु तदनङ्गमिह प्रमेये ।  
एवं विधिर्भवतु शब्दसमन्वयो वा  
प्रामाण्यकारणमिदं न वदन्ति सन्तः ॥

Wise men hold that 'existence' or the 'state of being achieved by human activity' is not the criterion for a thing to become the object of valid knowledge. Similarly, either the injunctive character or the character of conveying an existent object is not the criterion for the validity of a sentence.

*śabdasamanvayaḥ—siddhavākyaṃ, SS.*

[ 296 ]

नीलैकगोचरतया नियतं न चक्षु-  
र्नाप्यस्य पीतविषये नियमोऽस्ति शक्तेः ।  
तद्वन्न वेदवचसामपि शक्तियोगः  
कार्यादिवस्तुषु कथंचन पक्षपाती ॥

The power of the visual sense is not invariably limited to the comprehension of either the blue colour or the yellow one. Similarly, never do the Vedic sentences have any predilection for conveying either the entity that is to be achieved (or the existent entity).

[ 297 ]

यद्वादरायणमतं परिगृह्य पूर्वं श्रेयस्क्रेऽनधिगते खलु चोदनायाः ।  
प्रामाण्यमुक्तमिदमस्य समन्वयस्य वस्तुस्वरूपकथनेऽप्यविशिष्टमस्ति ॥

Following the view of Śrī Bādarayaṇa, it has been stated in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* that the injunctive texts are



Valid in respect of 'religious rites' which are not already known (by any proof). And the validity of the Upaniṣadic texts in conveying the existent entity is identical.

1. *vide*: *Jaimini-sūtra*, I, i, 5.

[ 298 ]

मानान्तरानधिगतं त्ववगम्यमानं  
मेयं भवेदिति हि मेयविदो वदन्ति ॥  
मानान्तरानधिगते विषयेऽवबोधं  
कुर्वत्प्रमाणमिति मानविदां प्रसिद्धिः ॥

Those who know the nature of the object of knowledge maintain thus:- the object of valid knowledge is that which is not already known by any proof, and which is later cognized by a means of knowledge. And those who know the nature of proof hold that it makes known the object that is not already known by any proof.

[ 299 ]

एवं सतीह यदि वेदशिरो न मानं  
श्रेयस्करे विधिगिरोऽपि न मानता स्यात् ।  
श्रेयस्करे विधिगिरो यदि मानता स्यात्  
वस्तुस्वरूपकथनेऽपि समन्वयस्य ॥

When such is the case, if the Upaniṣadic passage is not the source of knowing the self, then the injunctive text also is not the source of the knowledge of religious rite. If the injunctive text is valid regarding the religious rite, then the Upaniṣadic passage also is valid in respect of the self.



[ 300 ]

वस्तुस्वरूपकथने ननु नास्ति पुंसः  
 किञ्चित्फलं विधिवचस्स पुनः प्रवृत्तिः ।  
 संभाव्यते फलमतः किल वस्तुनिष्ठं  
 वाक्यं विधिस्तुतिपरं त्विति जैमिनीयाः ॥

As the Upaniṣadic texts convey only an existent entity there does not result any benefit to one who studies them. But the injunctive texts prompt one to activity and thence ensues the benefit. For this reason alone, the followers of Jaimini hold<sup>1</sup> that the sentence which conveys an existent entity serves only the purpose of commending the injunctions.

The view set forth in SŚ, I, 112 is restated here and is refuted in the following verse.

1. *vide: Jaimini-sūtra*, I, ii, 1 and 7..

[ 301 ]

स्यादेतदेवमनवद्यपुमर्थसिद्धिर्वेदान्त<sup>1</sup>वेद्यविषयावगतौ न चेत्स्यात् ।  
 स्वाराज्यमत्र कवलीकृतभोगभूमिसंपूर्णमस्य विदुषो भवतीति दृष्टम् ॥

This would hold good only if from the realization of the self known from the Upaniṣadic passages there does not result the highest human goal. But it is known that the sage experiences the supreme bliss that transcends all grades of happiness.<sup>1</sup>

1. cf. *Bṛh*, IV, iii, 32.

The objection raised in SŚ, I, 112 and 300 is answered here.

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1. न्तवाक्यवि—T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>8</sub>.



[ 302 ]

यस्यापि 'विप्रुषि कृतार्थतया निषण्णाः  
 शक्रादयो जलचरा इव सागरस्य ।  
 प्रत्यक्स्वभावकमपास्तसमस्तदुःखं  
 तद्वैष्णवं सुखमवाप्तवतः किमन्यत् ॥

Having attained a particle of the supreme bliss, Indra and other gods, like aquatic animals in the ocean, remain contented as if they have attained the highest state. What more is there to be sought for by the sage who has the intuitive knowledge of the supreme status of Viṣṇu, which is of the nature of the inner self and is free from all misery.<sup>1</sup>

1. cf. *Taitt*, II, i, 1.

[ 303 ]

अज्ञानमात्मविषयं <sup>2</sup>भवहेतुभूतं  
 प्रच्छादकं च परमात्मसुखस्य तूर्णम् ।  
 त्रय्यन्तवाक्यजनितात्ममतिर्विपाक-  
 मासाद्य हन्ति यदि तत्र किमर्थनीयम् ॥

Is there anything more to be longed for, if the knowledge of the self arising from the Upaniṣadic passages when fully ripened annihilates immediately *avidyā* which has the self as its object, which is the root-cause of transmigration, and which conceals the bliss-nature of the self?

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1. विप्रुषि B<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>

2. भ्रमहेतु M<sub>1</sub>



[ 304 ]

करमुष्टिनिविष्टमुत्तमं कनकं प्रस्मरणादलब्धवत् ।  
प्रतिभाति तदाप्तवाक्यतः प्रतिपत्त्या लभते यथा जनः ॥

[ 305 ]

परमात्मपदं पराकृतद्वितयं प्राप्तमपि स्वभावतः ।  
अनवाप्तवदेव लिप्सते लभते चैवमयं प्रमाणतः ॥

A golden ornament which is placed inside one's closed fist but has been forgotten seems to be lost. But the person attains it (as if it were unattained) by the knowledge arising from the instruction of a trustworthy person.

Similarly, though the aspirant is of the nature of the supreme self which is absolute, yet, through a (mistaken) notion of its not being attained, he longs for it and attains it (as if it were unattained) through means of valid knowledge (namely, the Upaniṣads).

[ 306 ]

न स्वाध्यायवदाप्यता न च पुनस्त्रेताभिर्वज्जन्यता  
न ब्रीह्यादिवदस्य संस्कृतियुजा नो सोमवद्विक्रिया ।  
पाठाधानजलोक्षणाभिषवणैः कूटस्थरूपं हि त-  
द्ब्रह्मापास्तविकारजन्ममरणं निःश्रेयसं साधनैः ॥

As the self is immutable, it is devoid of modification, origination, and destruction and as such its nature, namely, liberation cannot be attained like one's own branch of Veda by means of study, or produced like the three-fold fire by means of consecration, or purified like grains of rice by sprinkling with water, or modified like the *soma* creeper by the extraction of its juice.



The view set forth in this verse is based on the following *bhāṣya* text.

*yasya tu utpādyo mokṣaḥ tasya mānasaṁ vācikaṁ kāyikaṁ vā kāryaṁ  
apekṣate ityuktam, tathā vikāryatve ca; tayoḥ pakṣayoḥ mokṣasya dhruvaṁ  
anīyatvam.....na ca āpyatvenāpi kāryāpekṣā, svītmārūpatve sati anāpyatvāt  
.....nāpi saṁskāryo mokṣaḥ yena vyāpārāmapekṣeta. saṁskāro hi nāma  
saṁskāryasya guṇādhānena vā syāt doṣāpanayanena vā — na tūvat  
guṇādhānena saṁbhavati, anādheyātīśayabrahmasvarūpatvānmokṣasya; nāpi  
doṣāpanayanena, nityaśuddhabrahmasvarūpatvāt mokṣasya,*

BSB, I, i, 4.

[ 307 ]

ब्रह्मैव सन्निति वचः प्रथमश्रुतत्वा-

दप्येतिशब्दमुपसंहरणस्थमुच्चैः ।

प्रच्यावयत्स्वविषयादुचिताह्वलीयो

ब्रह्मात्मनोरनतिरेकमसाध्यमाह ॥

As the expression *brahmaiva san* occurs at the beginning of the sentence,<sup>1</sup> it is more powerful and (hence) it clearly makes the word *apyeti* discard its primary sense (of attainment). Thus it makes known that the identity of the inner self and the supreme self cannot be achieved (by action).

1. *brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*, *Brh.*, IV, iv, 6.

This verse refutes the possible objection that liberation is the result of action, because it is known from the *śruti* text cited above that the state of the self which is liberation is attained (*apyeti*).

See the following verse.

[ 308 ]

आमेय इत्याद्यपि तद्धितान्तमष्टाकपालादिसमन्वितं सत् ।

आख्यातशब्दस्य धुरं विभर्ति भव्यार्थसंवित्तिनिबन्धनत्वात् ॥



The words such as *āgneya*, etc., formed with the *taddhita* suffixes, being associated with the words such as *aṣṭākāpāla*, etc., function as a verb, as they give rise to the knowledge of what is to be achieved.

It is objected that in a sentence the verb is primary and the nominal word is secondary. As such, the nominal word *brahmaiva san* is secondary and it should be taken in its secondary sense and not the verb *apyeti* as stated in the previous verse.

To this it is said that a nominal word is that which conveys an existent entity, while the verb is that which conveys the thing that is to be achieved. When viewed in this light, the word *apyeti* does not function as a verb (see *ŚŚ*, I, 309) and as such it is not primary:

This point is explained in this verse by citing an illustration. In the Vedic sentence, *āgneyo'ṣṭākāpālo bhavati*, the word *āgneya* which is formed with the *taddhita* suffix conveys that *agni* is the deity of an oblation to be offered (*agnih devatā asya*). The word *aṣṭākāpāla* points out that the oblation is a cake which is prepared by being placed over eight plates. So the word *āgneya* associated with the word *aṣṭākāpāla* signifies the relation of deity and a particular oblation which could be effected only by sacrifice (*yāga*) which also is to be achieved by action.

Thus the word *āgneya* conveys the sense of what is to be achieved and as such it functions as a verb.

See the following verse.

[ 309 ]

आख्यातमेव सदिदं भवतीति नाम  
भव्येतरा<sup>1</sup>र्थमतिजन्मनिबन्धनत्वात् ।  
अप्येतिशब्दमपि तद्वदिमं प्रतीमो  
भव्येतरार्थगतबुद्धिनिबन्धनत्वात् ॥

1. र्थमपि ज—B<sub>1</sub>.



Though the word *bhavati* in the sentence (*āgneyo' ṣṭākāpālo bhavati*) is a verb, yet it functions as a nominal word,<sup>1</sup> as it conveys a sense other than what is to be achieved. We consider the word *apyeti* also to be a nominal word as it conveys a sense other than what is to be achieved.<sup>2</sup>

1. As the word *bhavati* conveys the sense of 'existence' which cannot be achieved, it is considered as a nominal word.

*vide: bhavatyarthasya sattāyā avidheyatvāt tannūmasadrśameveti na pradhānam, SS.*

2. If the word *apyeti* conveys that the state of the self is attained then there arises contradiction with the sense of the word *brahmaiva san* which occurs at the beginning of the sentence and which conveys that the state of the self is self-established. So the word *apyeti* does not convey the sense of what is to be achieved and hence it does not function as a verb, but as a nominal word.

*vide: apyeti śabdo'pi nūmaiva, brahmaiva sanniti prathamaśrutasvataḥ-siddhabrahmabhāvadvivirodhāt, S.*

[ 310 ]

ब्रह्मैव सन्निति गिरं प्रति शेषितायै  
नाप्येतिगीरियमलं कथितोपपत्तेः ।  
आख्यातमेव खलु नामपदस्य शेषि  
नाख्यातमेतदनृतत्वनिवेदकत्वात् ॥

In the light of the arguments set forth above, (it is clear) that the word *apyeti* is not substantive in respect of the word *brahmaiva san*. Indeed the verb is substantive to the nominal word; if the word *apyeti* signifies the sense of attainment, then it would be contrary to the sense of the substantive word (*brahmaiva san*); and so it does not have the force of a verb.

*vide: ayamātmā brahma ityāditatparavākyasiddham ātmano brahmarūpatvam ataḥ tadavāpteh anṛtatvāt tannivedakam apyetipadam bhavyetarārthagata-buddhinibandhanam, ato nākhyātameva, Ved. p. 118.*



[ 311 ]

ब्रह्मैव सन्निति ततः प्रथमश्रुतं स-  
 दप्येतिशब्दमपसारयति स्ववाच्यात् ।  
 अस्याङ्गभावविरहादमुना सहातो  
 ब्रह्मात्मनोरनतिरेकमुशन्ति धीराः ॥

Thus as the expression *brahmaiva san* is not subordinate to the word *apyeti* and occurs at the beginning of the sentence, it makes the word *apyeti* discard its primary sense. The learned men, therefore, accept the identity of the inner self and the supreme self.

[ 312 ]

भव्याय भूतमिति किंच विधिप्रधाने  
 काण्डे नयोऽयमिह तद्विपरीतमाहुः ।  
 भूताय भव्यमिति भूतपरं हि सर्वं  
 वेदावसानमिति सूत्रकृदाचक्षे ॥

Moreover, the principle that the existent entity is subordinate to the one that is to be achieved is applicable only in the *brāhmaṇa* section of the Veda consisting of the injunctive texts. But, here, the wise men hold contrary to it, that is, the one that is to be achieved is subordinate to the existent entity.<sup>1</sup> The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* affirms that the import of the entire Upaniṣadic passages is the existent entity — the self.<sup>2</sup>

1. The sacrifices, penance, etc. which are to be achieved are subordinate to the existent entity, the self, that is, they indirectly lead to the realization of the self.

1. *vide*: BS, III, iv, 26.

2. *vide*: BS, I, i, 4.



[ 313 ]

ब्रह्मैव सन्निति ततोऽपि बलिष्ठमेत-  
 दप्येतिशब्दमवसानगतं व्यपेक्ष्य ।  
 तस्मादमुष्य परिपीडकमेतदेव  
 ब्रह्मैव सन्निति पदं गुणकल्पनायै ॥

For this reason also,<sup>1</sup> the expression *brahmaiva san* is more powerful than the word *apyeti* that occurs at the end. So the expression *brahmaiva san* makes it discard its primary sense and assume a secondary signification.

1. *bhūtāya bhavyam ityuktanyāyādapi, SS.*

[ 314 ]

निःश्रेयसं न खलु साध्यमतः क्रियाभि-  
 ज्ञानेन वा द्वयसमुच्चयवर्त्मना वा ।  
 उत्पत्तिरासिविकृती च न संस्कृतिश्च  
 यस्मान्न संभवति वर्णितवर्त्मनेह ॥

In the light of the grounds mentioned already, attainment, origination, modification, and purification are not possible in respect of liberation; and hence it (namely, liberation) is not effected either by the performance of rituals or by the (intuitive) knowledge (of the self),<sup>1</sup> or by the combination of the two.<sup>2</sup>

1. Liberation being the state of the supreme self is eternal and hence it cannot be achieved by the knowledge of the self. What the knowledge of the self does is that it merely annihilates *avidyā* veiling the self; and, thereby the self which is self-luminous manifests itself.

2. See *SS*, IV, 9-10.



[ 315 ]

तस्मात्प्रवृत्तिविनिवृत्तिविवर्जितत्वं  
 ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुविषयावगतेर्न दोषः ।  
 सर्वप्रवर्तकनिवर्तकमूलदाहात्  
 स्वराज्यहेतुरिति भूषणमेव तन्नः ॥

It is not a blemish that the realization of the one-ness of the self does not prompt one to activity or to desist from it. On the contrary, it constitutes our glory that it (namely, the realization of the self) annihilates (*avidyā* which is) the root-cause (of passion and hatred) that respectively prompts one to activity and desists from it, and that it leads to liberation.

The objection raised in *SS*, I, 112, is refuted in this verse.

cf. *alaṅkāro hi asmākaṁ yat brahmātmāvagatau satyāṁ sarvakartavyatāhāniḥ kṛtakṛtyatā ca*, *BSB*, I, i, 4.

[ 316 ]

अज्ञाततापि घटतेऽत्र दृशोऽनुभूते-  
 र्जानामि नाहमिति दृश्यपि दृश्यते हि ।  
 अज्ञाततानुभवनं न च वास्तवं त-  
 दज्ञाततोद्वहति कल्पित<sup>1</sup>तां हि तस्याः ॥

The presence of *avidyā* in the self is possible, as it is experienced. Even in the self there is indeed the experience of *avidyā* in the form of 'I do not know myself'. But the experience of *avidyā* is not real, as *avidyā* superimposes itself on the self.<sup>1</sup>

1. See *SS*, I, 51-5.

1. तता हि T.



[ 317 ]

अज्ञानमित्यजडबोधतिरस्क्रियात्मा  
जाड्यं च मौढ्यमिति च प्रकृतिः प्रसिद्धा ।  
सा चातिदुःस्थितवपुर्दृशमद्वितीया-  
मालिङ्ग<sup>1</sup>ति स्म घृतपिण्ड इवामिमिद्धम् ॥

It is well known that the primordial cause of the universe which is termed inanimation or ignorance and which veils the pure consciousness is *avidyā*. It is indeterminate and it envelops the absolute self like the lump of ghee, the blazing fire.

[ 318 ]

चिद्वस्तुनश्चिति भवेत्तिमिरं तमिस्रं  
तामिस्रमन्धतमसं जडिमा तमिस्रा ।  
माया जगत्प्रकृतिरच्युतशक्तिरान्ध्यं  
निद्रासुषुप्तिरनृतं प्रलयो गुणैक्यम् ॥

*Avidyā* has the self as its object and as its locus. It is termed darkness, universal darkness, pitch darkness, inanimation, dark night, illusion, primordial cause of the universe, the power of Lord Viṣṇu, blindness, sleep, deep sleep, unreality, dissolution, and the oneness of the three constituents (of *prakṛti*), viz., serenity, activity, and inertia.

[ 319 ]

आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचित्तिरेव केवला ।  
पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचरः ॥

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1. ज्ञते स्म P<sub>2</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>.



Undifferentiated consciousness is the locus as well as the object of *avidyā*. (The embodied soul and God) that come into being subsequent to *avidyā* can neither be the locus nor be the object of *avidyā* which exists prior to them.

The self reflected in the intellect which is the product of *avidyā* is the individual soul. And the self reflected in *avidyā* is God. They cannot be the locus or the object of *avidyā* which exists prior to them.

For details see Introduction, pp. 75-6.

[ 320 ]

नाभावतास्य घटते वरणात्मकत्वा-

न्नाभावमावरणमाहुरभावशौण्डाः ।

अज्ञानमावरणमाह च वासुदेव-

स्तद्भाव रूपमिति तेन वयं प्रतीमः ॥

Since *avidyā* veils the self, it cannot be a non-existent entity. Even those who are adepts in determining the nature of non-existence do not assert that a non-existent entity veils (an object). Lord Kṛṣṇa also has stated that *avidyā-ajñāna* is a veil<sup>1</sup>; and so we consider it to be a positive entity.

1. *vide*: Bh. G., V, 15.

This verse refutes the objection raised in SŚ, I, 121.

[ 321 ]

एकः शत्रुर्न द्वितीयोऽस्ति शत्रुरज्ञानतुल्यः पुरुषस्य राजन् ।

येनावृतः कुरुते संप्रमत्ताः घोराणि कर्माणि सुदारुणानि ॥

Oh! King, man has a unique enemy and that is *avidyā*. There is no second enemy equal to this. Being enveloped



by this, he is infatuated and does very dreadful and horrible acts.

This verse is from the *Mahābhārata*.

[ 322 ]

जाड्यं जगत्यनुगतं खलु भावरूपं  
मौढ्यं च पुंगतमिति प्रतिभाति तादृक् ।  
जाड्यं च मौढ्यमिति चानुभवप्रसिद्ध-  
मज्ञानमाहुरपवर्गपिधानदक्षम् ॥

The insentience pervading the universe is indeed of a positive nature; and similarly the ignorance present in man is of a positive nature. The insentience and ignorance that are well experienced are only *avidyā* which is said to be capable of concealing the true nature of the self.

[ 323 ]

साभासमेतदुपजीव्य चिदद्वितीया  
संसारकारणमिति प्रवदन्ति धीराः ।  
साभासमेतदिति संसृतिकारणत्वे  
द्वारं परं भवति कारणता दृशस्तु ॥

Wise men hold that the absolute consciousness depending on *avidyā* inspired by the reflection of the self is the (transfigurative) material cause of the universe. *Avidyā* identified with the absolute consciousness is the essential operating condition which brings about the material causality of the self in respect of the universe. The characteristic of being a material cause, however, pertains to the self alone.



[ 324 ]

यावद्दृशोऽन्यदिह संसृतिकारणं त  
 द्वेदान्तवादिसमये न मतं जडत्वात् ।  
 यद्यज्जडं भवति संसृतिकारणं त-  
 न्नेति स्फुटं वदति सूत्रकृदत्र यस्मात् ॥

Everything apart from the self is insentient; and anything insentient is not accepted in Advaita as the cause of the universe. The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* clearly states that the unintelligent principle cannot be the cause of the universe.<sup>1</sup>

1. *BS*, I, i, 5; II, ii, 1; and II, ii, 12.

[ 325 ]

अजडकारणभावनिबन्धनं सकलमेव जडं न तु कारणम् ।  
 इति हि वेदशिरस्सु विचक्षणाः कपिलपक्षनिराकरणे जगुः ॥

Adepts in Vedānta, while refuting the Sāṃkhya theory, affirm that the unintelligible principle is not, by itself, the cause of the universe;<sup>1</sup> it merely occasions causality of the self.

1. *vide BS*, II, ii, 1.

[ 326 ]

शबलमात्मपदेन निगद्यते सकलमात्मजमित्यपि च श्रुतिः ।  
 शबलमात्मपदं जगतस्ततः प्रकृतिरित्यपरे च जना जगुः ॥

The word *Ātman* signifies the blend (of the self and the objective element). The Upaniṣadic passage states that everything originates from *Ātman*. Others, therefore,



maintain that the self in the form of the 'blend' is the material cause of the universe.

Some others hold that the self associated with the objective element, that is, *avidyā* is the material cause of the universe. Sarvajñātman, however, holds that the self alone is the material cause of the universe.

[ 327 ]

सुकृतदुष्कृतकर्मणि कर्तृतां मतिगतात्मचितिप्रतिबिम्बकम् ।

व्रजति तद्वदतः परमात्मनो जगति याति तमःप्रतिबिम्बकम् ॥

Just as the reflection of the self in the intellect is the agent of the virtuous and the vicious deeds,<sup>1</sup> so also the reflection of the self in *avidyā* (namely, *Īśvaracaitanya*) is the instrumental cause of the universe.

Those who maintain that the blend of the self and *avidyā* is the material cause of the universe, however, hold that the spiritual element in the 'blend' alone is the instrumental cause of the universe.

1. vide BS, II, iii, 33.

[ 328 ]

सुकृतदुष्कृतयोःशबला यथा भवति कारणमात्मचितिस्तथा ।

गगनवायुपुरःसरकरणं परमचेतनता शबलाकृतिः ॥

Just as the blend of the intellect and consciousness is the material cause of the religious merit and demerit, so also the blend of the self and *avidyā* is the material cause of the universe consisting of ether, air, etc.

Religious merit and demerit are regarded as the modes of *antaḥkaraṇa* inspired by the reflection of the self. Hence it is said that the blend of *antaḥ-karaṇa* and the self is the material cause of



religious merit and demerit. According to Advaita, religious merit and demerit pertain to the intellect and not to the self.

[ 329 ]

शबलताकवलीकृततावशात् परमचेतनतैव निगद्यते ।

शबलमात्मपदेन न कथ्यते शबलमात्मनि वृत्तिनिबन्धनम् ॥

Since the spiritual element is present in the blend (of the self and the objective element), it is secondarily signified by the word *Ātman*. The (true) import of the word *Ātman* is not the blend. The blend serves as the medium through which the word *Ātman* secondarily signifies the self.

*nigadyate—lakṣaṇayā jñāpyate, SS.*

[ 330 ]

शबलतापरिधानसमन्वयात् परमचेतनतात्मगिरः पदम् ।

भवति तेन जनस्य तु विभ्रमः शबलमात्मगिरः पदमित्ययम् ॥

The word *Ātman* (secondarily) signifies the self through the medium, namely, the blend (of the self and the objective element) in which it (namely, the self) is present. So ordinary men have the misconception that the import of the word *Ātman* is the 'blend'.

[ 331 ]

बहु निगद्य किमत्र वदाम्यहं शृणुत संग्रहमद्वयशासने ।

सकलवाङ्मनसातिगता चित्तिः सकलवाङ्मनसव्यवहारभाक् ॥

What is the use of elaborating this point? I shall state the essence of the tenets of Advaita; listen to it. The pure consciousness transcends mind and speech. And it comes within the range of mind and speech.<sup>1</sup>



1. Though the self transcends mind and speech, yet it comes within the range of mind and speech, when it is reflected in the intellect which is superimposed on it by its *avidyā*.

*vide: svabhāvataḥ sakalavyahārūto'pi ātmā svāvidyādyastū-  
harṇikārādyupādhan sakalavyavahārābhāgabhavati. Ved. p. 128.*

[ 332 ]

चित्रायागः पशुफल इति श्रूयमाणेऽपि चित्रा-

पूर्वं द्वारं पशुफलतयाक्षिप्यते तत्र तद्वत् ।

चैतन्यात्मा जगदुदयकृच्छ्रयतेऽत्रापि पश्चा-

न्मायादीनां भवति जगति द्वारभावः फलेऽस्मिन् ॥

Though it is known that the performance of the ritual named *citrā* leads to the attainment of cattle and wealth, yet the *apūrva* resulting from the performance of the *citrā* ritual is presumptively known as the means (of attaining cattle and wealth). Similarly it is known (from the Upaniṣadic passages) that the conscious self is the cause of this universe. Later, as regards the origination of the universe, *avidyā*, etc., are presumptively known as the media.

*māyādīnām* — By *ādi* is to be understood *kāma* and *karma* of the *jīvas*. See *SS*, III, 16.

[ 333 ]

कारणत्वमुपलक्षणं चितेर्ब्रह्मणो न खलु तद्विशेषणम् ।

इत्यपीदमुपपद्यते तदा चेतना भवति कारणं यदा ॥

It is said that causality is the qualification *per accidens* of the self and not its qualifying attribute.<sup>1</sup> This view would hold good only when the self is the cause of the universe.

1. *vide BS*, I. i, 2 and *SS*, I, 549.

See the following verse.

A—40



[ 334 ]

अन्यदेव यदि कारणं भवेत् कारणत्वमुपलक्षणं कथम् ।  
चेतनस्य घटतेऽन्यगामिना वस्तु नान्यदुपलक्ष्यते यतः ॥

How can causality be considered as the qualification *per accidens* of the self, if something else is the cause of the universe? For, the characteristic feature in one object cannot indicate another.

If the blend of the self and the objective element is the cause of the universe, then causality would be the qualification *per accidens* of the blend and not of the self alone. In that case, the true import of the *Brahma-sūtra* — *janmādyasya yataḥ* (I, i, 2) would be contradicted.

[ 335 ]

अनवबुद्धमतः श्रुतिमस्तकैर्विषयतामुपपादयितुं क्षमम् ।  
अनुभवात्मपदं तमसा यतः पिहितमेतदिह प्रतिभासते ॥

As the self which is of the form of experience appears to be concealed by *avidyā* it is unknown and hence it is capable of becoming the object of (the knowledge arising from) the Upaniṣads.

The objection raised in *SS*, I, 113 is answered here.

[ 336 ]

अज्ञानकल्पितमनिर्वचनीयमस्मि-  
न्नाबालवृद्धमविवादपदं प्रसिद्धम् ।  
स्वप्ने तथा च भगवानपि वक्ष्यतीदं  
सन्ध्येऽस्ति सृष्टिरिति पक्षनिराससिद्धयै ॥

It is indisputably known to everybody, young and old, (that the silver appearing in the nacre in the waking state) is superimposed by *avidyā* and as such indeterminable (as



either real or unreal). Similar is the case as regards the objects in the dream state. The venerable author of the *Brahma-sūtra* also maintains the same view while refuting the *prima facie* view that there is creation in the dream state.<sup>1</sup>

1. *vide BS, III, ii, 1.*

This verse refutes the objection raised in *SS, I 120.*

[ 337 ]

मिथ्यासुषिः सवितृमण्डलमध्यवर्ती  
प्रत्यक्षदृष्टिपथमापतितोऽचिरेण ।  
द्रष्टुः शरीरकरणप्रविभागरूपं  
मृत्युं निवेदयति सत्यमिदं प्रसिद्धम् ॥

It is well-known that though the perception of aperture in the centre of the sun's disc is false, yet it indicates that he who perceives that will shortly face his death which is real and which is of the nature of separation between the gross and the subtle bodies.

This verse presupposes the *Āitareya-Āraṇyaka* text—

*na ciramiva jīviṣyātīti vidyāt...chidra iva ādityo drśyate* (III, ii, iv, 7).

See also *SS, III, 116.*

[ 338 ]

स्वप्नः शुभाशुभफलागमसूचकः स्या-  
न्मिथ्यापि सन्निति च सूत्रकृदाह यत्नात् ।  
गुर्वादि सर्वमिदमद्वयबुद्धिहेतु-  
र्मायानिबन्धनमिति प्रतिपादनाय ॥

In order to explain that the teacher, etc., though illusory, can give rise to the real knowledge of the absolute self, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*<sup>1</sup> declares with close application of mind that the dream is an illusion, and yet it is indicative of future good or ill that is real.



1. *vide: sūcakaśca hi śruterūcakṣate ca tadvidah, BS, III, ii, 4.*

*cf: asatyē vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṁ samīhate, Vākyaṇīya, II, 240.*

*cf also: asatyē vartmani sthitvā nirupāyaṁ upeyate, Naiṣkarmya-siddhi III, 104.*

[ 339 ]

भ्रान्तिप्रतीतिविषयो न च सन्न चास-  
न्नाकाशतत्कुसुमयोर्न हि सास्ति नापि ।  
तस्या भवेत्सदसदात्मकगोचरत्वं  
न ह्यस्ति तत्किमपि यत्सदसत्स्वरूपम् ॥

The object of erroneous perception is neither real nor unreal, for the sky (which is real) and the flower sprung from the sky (which is unreal) are not the objects of erroneous cognition. Nor indeed is the object of erroneous cognition one which is real and at the same time unreal; for, there is no object which is both real and unreal (at once).

The verse answers the objection raised in *SS*, I, 128.

[ 340 ]

आलम्बनं च विरह्य न विभ्रमस्य  
ज्ञानात्मनो भवति जन्म कदाचिदत्र ।  
सिद्धं ततः सदसती व्यतिरिच्य किञ्चि-  
दालम्बनं भ्रमधियः सकलप्रवादे ॥

There does not arise any erroneous cognition which is of the form of knowledge without referring to some object. So it is established in all systems of philosophy that an object which is neither 'real' nor 'unreal' but different from both is the content of erroneous cognition.



[ 341 ]

ब्रह्मात्मवस्तु निरवद्यचिदेकरूपं  
 वह्नयुष्णतावदपरोक्षवपुः स्वभावात् ।  
 निर्दोषवेदशिरसो वचनादतोऽस्मिन्  
 ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुनि भवेदपरोक्षबुद्धिः ॥

The self is of the form of pure consciousness which is devoid of any defect. It is naturally immediate as heat is (natural) to fire. So from the statements of the Upaniṣads which are faultless, there arises the immediate knowledge of the self.

The objection raised in SŚ, I, 122 is answered here.

[ 342 ]

सा चोपनेयरहिते विषयिण्यनन्तेऽ-  
 निर्वाच्यमग्रहणमात्रमपाकरोति ।  
 स्वोत्पत्तिलब्धनिजवस्तुबलेन तत्र  
 तापत्रयं समुपशाम्यति निर्निमित्तम् ॥

The mental state (arising from the Upaniṣads), by its mere rise, receives the reflection of the self and on this strength, annihilates the indeterminable *avidyā* present in the unconditioned self in which there is nothing to be brought about by the proof (namely, the Upaniṣadic passages). The three kinds of misery, in the absence of their cause (namely, *avidyā*) cease to exist.

1. Three kinds of misery characterize the lives of men. The first kind relates to all our ailments, physical and mental. The second relates to sorrow arising from natural causes like beasts and fellow-men. The third relates to suffering arising from supernatural causes such as demons, ghosts, etc. All these three are caused by *avidyā* and they are together called *tāpatraya*.



## NIYOGA IS NOT THE IMPORT OF THE UPANIṢADS

[ 343 ]

वाक्यात्प्रवर्तकनिवर्तकरूपभाजः

पुंसः प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य धियोऽनुमानात् ।

कार्यान्विते शिशुरवैति पदस्य शक्ति-

मित्युच्यते यदि तु तत्र वयं वदामः ॥

Let it be contended: by observing activity on the part of a person (who acts) on hearing the sentence that either prompts to activity or desists from it, and by inferring the knowledge (present in him), the beginner learns that a word conveys its sense as related to *niyoga*. Now, we shall answer this contention.

The objection raised in *SS*, I, 130-143, is restated here and is answered in the following verses.

[ 344 ]

योग्येतरान्वितपदार्थनिवेदने तु

शब्दस्य शक्तिरिह वृद्धजनप्रयोगे ।

विज्ञायते न खलु कार्यसमन्वितेऽर्थे

कार्याभिधायिषु पदेष्वपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् ॥

From the usage of the elderly persons it is known that a word is capable of signifying its sense as related to a different but congruous sense and not as related to *niyoga*. For, otherwise, the result would be that the words which convey *niyoga* should convey their meanings as associated with another *niyoga*.

For details see Introduction, p. 53.



[ 345 ]

कार्यान्वितार्थविषया यदि शब्दशक्तिः  
 कार्यार्थवाचिषु लिङादिषु कार्यमन्यत् ।  
 वक्तव्यमापतति तत्र च तत्र चान्य-  
 द्भक्तव्यमेव भवतीत्यनवस्थितिः स्यात् ॥

If a word should signify its sense only as related to *niyoga*, then as regards the endings of potential mood, etc., which convey the *niyoga*, there arises the necessity for accepting another *niyoga*; and for this (latter) *niyoga* another one should be admitted. And so on, *ad infinitum*.

[ 346 ]

सिद्धान्वितं यदि लिङादिपदानि कार्यं  
 ब्रूयुर्विनश्यति तदा नियमस्त्वदीयः ।  
 यो वर्णितः सकलमेव पदं स्वमर्थं  
 कार्यान्वितं वदति नान्यमिति स्वशास्त्रे ॥

If the endings of potential mood, etc., signify their meanings as related to an existent entity, then your rule stands rejected. You have stated in your system that all the words should convey their meanings only as related to *niyoga*<sup>1</sup>.

1. *sarvameva hi padāni kāryānvitam eva svārtham vadati, na tu siddhānvitam, SS.*

[ 347 ]

योग्येतरान्वितनिमित्ताकशब्दशक्ति-  
 व्युत्पत्तिरेव यदि संभवभागिनी स्यात् ।  
 आश्रीयते किमिति कार्यसमन्वितेऽर्थे  
 शब्दस्य शक्तिरसदर्थविशेषणेन ॥



If the principle that a word signifies its sense as related to a different but congruous sense holds good, then why is it held that a word signifies its sense as related to *niyoga*, which involves a futile attribute ?

[ 348 ]

यत्राविशेषितनिमित्ताक'ताविरोधे  
किञ्चिन्निवारकमुदीक्षितमस्तु तत्र ।  
किञ्चिद्विशेषणविशिष्टमभीष्टशक्ते-  
र्वस्तु प्रयोजकमिदं पुनरत्र नास्ति ॥

If any contradiction is noticed when it is accepted that the signification of a word is the sense not qualified by any attributes, then let the sense associated with some attributes be the criterion for the significative power of the word. But when it is accepted that the signification of the word is the related sense, there does not arise any contradiction (and hence there is no need for any attribute as *niyoga*, etc.)

[ 349 ]

कार्यान्वयान्वयिनि वस्तुनि शब्दशक्ति-  
रित्युच्यते यदि तदापि समानमेतम् ।  
अन्वीयमानवचनत्वमतोपपत्तौ  
कार्यान्वयान्वयविशेषणगीर्ण्येति ॥

If it is said that the sense of a word is the relatum of the relation existing between the existent object and *niyoga*, even then there arises the same defect pointed out before. As the view that the word conveys the sense as related holds good, the qualifying attribute 'one of the relata of the relation existing between the existent object and *niyoga*' is futile.



The view set forth in *SS*, I, 130 is restated and refuted here.

[ 350 ]

वक्तृज्ञानविवक्षयोरपि भवेच्छब्दार्थता तावके  
पक्षे शब्दमनु प्रतीतिरुभयोरस्त्येव यस्मात्तायोः ।  
यद्यच्छब्दमनु प्रतीतिपदवीमारोहदुत्प्रेक्ष्यते  
तत्तद्वाच्यमिति स्थितौ न हि तयोः शब्दार्थतावर्जनम् ॥

In your system the import of the word would be the intention and the knowledge of the speaker also. For there arises the knowledge of both on hearing a sentence. The primary sense of a word is that which falls within the scope of auditory perception. When such is the case, it cannot be dismissed that the intention and the knowledge of the speaker are also the primary senses of a word.

The *Prābhākaras* hold: the secular sentences first give rise to the inferential knowledge of the intention and the knowledge of the speaker. The sense of the sentence also which is adjectival in the intention and the knowledge of the speaker is inferentially known. Later the sentence restates the sense.

*vide: Mānameyodaya* (T. P. H. Edition), pp. 103-4.

For details see Introduction, pp. 54-55.

[ 351 ]

वेदे वक्तुरभावतस्तदुभयं नास्तीह यस्मादतः  
शब्दो वाचकशक्तिमुज्झति निजां तत्र स्ववाच्यं विना ।  
वाच्ये वाचकशक्तिमिच्छति <sup>1</sup>भवान्नान्यत्र तत्र श्रुते-  
रप्रामा<sup>2</sup>ण्यमिति स्फुटं तव भवेद्बुद्धेरनुत्पत्तिः ॥

1. भवानन्यत्र P, 2. ण्यमतिस्फु B,



In view of the absence of a speaker for the Vedic sentences, the knowledge and the intention of a speaker are not present. Hence the word of the form of Veda gives up its significative power in conveying its senses (namely, the knowledge and the intention of the speaker) as the two are absent. You admit that a word in the Veda does not convey a sense different from the one conveyed in ordinary experience. So as the Vedic sentence does not give rise to the knowledge (of the intention and the knowledge of the speaker) they are not valid.

For details see Introduction, pp. 54-55.

[ 352 ]

न च सोमयागपदयोरुभयोरपरस्परेण घटतेऽत्र युजा ।  
पदजातमेतदखिलं हि निजं विषयं समर्पयति कार्ययुतम् ॥

There cannot be the mutual relation of the two words *soma* and *yāga* (in the injunctive text *somena yajeta*), because all the words in the sentence, (according to the Prābhākara) convey their senses as related to *niyoga*.

If it is held that a word should convey its sense only as related to *niyoga*, then the sentence *somena yajeta* which enjoins a qualified injunction would become unintelligible.

For details see Introduction, pp. 55-56.

[ 353 ]

कार्यान्वयान्वयिनि शक्तिरिति स्थितौ च  
कार्यान्वयान्वितमतिर्न परस्परेण ।  
संबन्धितामतिरतश्च न सिद्धिमेति  
सर्वो विशिष्टविधिरित्यपि दूषणं वः ॥

If the import of the word is the relatum of the relation existing between the sense of a word conveying existent



entity and a word signifying *niyoga*, then there would arise the knowledge of the relatum (of the relation) existing between the existent entity and *niyoga*, and not the knowledge of the mutual relation (of the words *soma* and *yāga*). So the qualified injunction cannot be established (in the system of Prabhākara).

[ 354 ]

योग्येतरान्वितपदार्थगतैव शब्द-  
शक्तिः स्थिता यदि पुनर्घटते तदायम् ।  
सर्वो विशिष्टविधिरस्तु तथैव तस्मा-  
द्युक्तं तदेतरदितीदमपीह भाष्यम् ॥

If the view that a word signifies its sense as related to a different but congruous sense is maintained, then the qualified injunction can be established. Moreover, the *bhāṣya* text *tadā itarat* also becomes reasonable.

1. The full text is:

*yadā ekasmāt apūrvam tadā itarat tadartham*

(*Śābara-bhāṣya* on *Jaimini-Sūtra*, II, i, 1).

This text means: In a sentence, the potential ending signifies *niyoga* and all the other words are subordinate to the 'sense of the root' (*dhātvartha*) which is the content of *niyoga*.

*ekasyaiva niyogasamarpakatvam, padāntaram tadartham niyogaviśaya-dhātvarthārtham, TB.*

This would hold good only when it is accepted that the words convey their senses as related to a different but congruous sense. If it is held that the words convey their senses as related to *niyoga*, then all the words would become subordinate only to *niyoga* and not to *dhātvartha*, the content of *niyoga*. In that case, the *bhāṣya* text referred to would be contradicted.



[ 355 ]

शब्दः प्रवृत्तिजनको न तु बोधकश्चे-  
न्नैतत्प्रवर्तकधियो जनकत्वहेतोः ।

इष्टाभ्युपायमतिजन्मनिमित्तभूतः

शब्दः प्रवर्तयति नैष पुनः पुमांसम् ॥

If it is said that the potential ending prompts one to activity and does not convey anything, it is not so. For it gives rise to the knowledge that prompts one to activity. The potential ending gives rise to the knowledge that a particular act is the means to realise the desired object; and it does not (directly) prompt a person to activity.

It is said in *SS*, I, 351 that the Vedic sentences are not valid, as they do not give rise to the knowledge of the intention and the knowledge of a speaker. Now, if it is said that they are valid as they prompt one to activity, then this contention is refuted in this verse.

See *Ved*, pp. 136-7

[ 356 ]

तस्मादसंगतमिदं यदुशन्ति केचित्  
कायान्वितार्थविषयैव तु शब्दशक्तिः ।

तत्र प्रयोगमभिवीक्ष्य तथा 'प्रतीतिं  
कल्प्येति वर्णितनिजेष्वविधातहेतोः ॥

By observing the usage of elders and (inferring) the knowledge of the hearer, some hold that the import of a word should be accepted to be the sense related to *niyoga*. And this is not compatible for the reason mentioned before,<sup>1</sup> namely, that the qualified injunction accepted by them (the *Prābhākaras*) would be contradicted.

1. *SS*, I, 352-3.

1. प्रतीतिः *M*<sub>1</sub>, *B*<sub>1</sub>, *P*<sub>2</sub>.



[ 357 ]

वेदैकगम्यमिति कार्यमभीष्टमस्मिन्  
 शक्तिग्रहोऽपि न यदस्य समञ्जसोऽयम् ।  
 शक्तिग्रह च परिहृत्य न बोधकत्वं  
 शब्दस्य शक्यमिह वक्तुमशङ्कितेन ॥

(Moreover) the comprehension of the relation of the potential ending to *niyoga* is not reasonable, as *niyoga* is accepted to be knowledge only through the scripture. A trustworthy person cannot say that the potential ending signifies *niyoga* even though its relation to *niyoga* is not comprehended.

In secular statements, the act (*dhātvartha*) is the *niyoga*. But in Vedic sentences, *apūrva* which results from the 'sacrificial act' (*dhātvartha*) and serves as the antecedent of the result (say) 'heaven' is the *niyoga*.

*vide: kriyādabhinnaṁ yatkāryaṁ vedyam mātāntarairna tat  
 ato mātāntarāpūrvaṁ apurvamiti gīyate, Prakaraṇapañcika, p. 187.*

For details see Introduction, p. p. 51-2

[ 358 ]

शश्वत्स्वयंप्रभमलुप्तचिदात्मभूतं  
 विष्णोः परं पदममुत्र तु शब्दशक्तिः ।  
 शक्या ग्रहीतुमतिबुद्धिमनस्यपीति  
 शास्त्रप्रमाणकमदः प्रवदन्ति सन्तः ॥

Though the supreme status of Viṣṇu which is always self-luminous and which is eternal pure consciousness is beyond the reach of both speech and mind, yet the



relation of the words (*Ātman*, etc.) to it (namely, the self) can be comprehended (as the latter is self-luminous). Hence great men declare that the self is known through the scriptures.

It might be said that the relation of the potential ending to *niyoga* can be comprehended, like the relation of the word *Ātman* to the self. And this contention is refuted here.

[ 359 ]

जातः सुतः सकलवंशविवर्धनस्ते विप्रेति वाक्यसमनन्तरमस्य बुद्धिः ।  
श्रोतुर्मुखाकृतिवशेन तु पुत्रजन्मवस्तुन्यवश्यमनुमीयत एव शब्दैः ॥

Subsequent to the statement 'Oh Brahmin! a son, bringing prosperity to your race is born to you', the learners notice brightness in the face (of the hearer) and on this ground they definitely infer the cognition (in the hearer) that has for its content the birth of a son.

[ 360 ]

भूतार्थनिष्ठवचनादपि शब्दशक्तिः  
शक्या ग्रहीतुमुदितेन पदानभिज्ञैः ।  
तत्र प्रवर्तकनिवर्तकवाक्यमूल-  
शक्तिग्रहैकनियमस्य न हेतुरस्ति ॥

On the lines stated above, it is possible for the beginner to comprehend the relation of a word to its meaning from a sentence that conveys an existent object. (Hence) there is no valid reason to maintain the rule that the relation of the word to its meaning can be comprehended only from sentences that either prompt one to activity or desist from it.



[ 361 ]

सामान्यतः प्रथममेष पदार्थपिण्डो  
 वाच्योऽस्य वाचकमिदं पदपिण्डरूपम् ।  
 इत्याकलय्य पुनरेष विशेषतोऽपि  
 शब्दार्थसंगतिमवैति जनस्तटस्थः ॥

The observer first roughly understands that the relation of the meanings of the words is the import of the sentence and the group of words (constituting the sentence) is expressive of the relation of the meanings of the words. Later, he understands, in a specific manner, the relation of each word to its meaning.

*padārthapindah-padārthasamūhah, S.*

[ 362 ]

काष्ठैः स्थाव्यां पचति विविधैरोदनं पूर्णिकेति  
 श्रुत्वा बालः सपदि मनुते काष्ठशब्दस्य शक्तिम् ।  
 दृष्ट्वा तस्मिन्पचनकरणं प्रज्वलत्काष्ठजातं  
 न्यायोपायादितरवचसां शक्तिषु प्राक्प्रवीणः ॥

On hearing the sentence 'Pūrṇikā is cooking the food in the vessel by using numerous fuel sticks' the beginner, who already knows well the relation of other words to their meanings and who observes the heap of burning fuel sticks being used for cooking, immediately understands the relation of the word 'fuel stick' to its meaning.

[ 363 ]

न च किमपि नः कार्यं नाम प्रमाणपथानुगं  
 यदिह तु पुनर्लिङ्गलोडादेरुपैष्यति वाच्यताम् ।  
 न खलु तदितो धात्वर्थादेः पृथग्व्यवसीयते  
 व्रजतु तदिह श्रेयोहेतुर्लिङ्गादिपदार्थताम् ॥



We do not find anything like *niyoga* through any proof, in which case it may become the sense of potential and imperative endings. It does not differ from the sense of the root, etc. Hence let the sense of potential endings, etc., be that a particular act is the means to a desired end.

[ 364 ]

न खलु जगति श्रेयोहेतुप्रतीत्युदयादृते  
 पुरुषवचनात्क्वापि प्राज्ञः प्रवर्तितुमर्हति ।  
 पुरुषवचनाच्छ्रेयोहेतु'प्रतीत्युदये पुन-  
 स्तदनुवशगो रागोत्पत्तौ ततः स हि चेष्टते ॥

In ordinary experience (it is found) that a wise person never sets about performing an act by the command of an elder person, unless it (namely, command) gives rise to the knowledge that a particular act is the means to realize a desired end. So when there arises the knowledge from the command of the elder person that a rite is the means to prosperity, desire ensues and following it he proceeds to act.

[ 365 ]

नयनिपुणधीर्बालश्चेष्टां समीक्ष्य समीहितुः  
 कृततदुचितव्याप्तिज्ञानः पुरा निज आत्मनि ।  
 परतनुगतं श्रेयोहेतुप्रतीत्युदयोत्थितं  
 चरितविषये रागं तस्य प्रवर्तकमिङ्गति ॥

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1. प्रतीत्युदयात्पुनः B<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>. प्रमित्युदयात्पुनः P<sub>2</sub>.



The beginner who knows well the inferential process and who already possesses within himself the knowledge of invariable concomitance suitable for inference, observes activity on the part of the person who sets about performing some act. He then infers that the desire regarding the act which is present in the person and which has arisen from the knowledge that the act is the means to prosperity, prompts him to activity.

[ 366 ]

प्रवर्तकोत्थाननिबन्धने ततः समीहितोपायविशेषस्तुनि ।  
गिरोऽनुमाय प्रतिपत्तिहेतुतां विशेषसिद्धौ तु समीहते पुनः ॥

Then the beginner infers (roughly) that the sentence gives rise to the knowledge of the act which is the means to a desired end and which gives rise to desire that prompts one to activity. Then he attempts to understand the relation of each word to its meaning.

[ 367 ]

पदान्तरस्यागमनादिहान्यतस्तथा परस्योद्धरणादितो गिरः ।  
विशेषसिद्धिं लभते प्रयत्नवान् 'पदार्थसंबन्धगतां विचक्षणः ॥

Noticing the inclusion of a word from another sentence and the elimination of a word from the sentence at hand, the beginner who is intelligent and who well examines the inclusion and the elimination of the words, understands the relation of each word to its meaning.

[ 368 ]

लडादिशब्देऽपगते लिङादौ प्रत्यागतेऽभीप्सितसाधनत्वम् ।  
प्रतीयते तेन लिङादिशब्दस्तदर्थवाचीति स वेत्ति बालः ॥



When potential ending is employed (in a sentence) after eliminating the ending of present tense from it, it is known that (a particular act) is the means to a desired end. So the beginner understands that the potential ending signifies (that a particular act is) the means to a desired end.

[ 369 ]

योग्येतरान्विततया न च वाच्यतास्य  
कार्यान्वितत्ववपुषा सुतरां न चेष्टा  
किं त्वन्वितत्ववपुषा न विशेषणस्य  
किञ्चित्प्रयोजकमिहास्ति निरूपणायाम् ॥

It is accepted that a word signifies its sense neither as related to another congruous sense, nor indeed as related to *niyoga*. But it conveys its sense as related ; for, on careful examination, it is found that the qualifying attributes (*yogyetara* and *kārya*) do not serve any purpose.

The view put forth in this verse is known as *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* where words themselves convey their meanings as well as the relation among the meanings. See Introduction for details, p. 45.

[ 370 ]

यत्केचिदाहुरभिधाय निजान्पदार्था-  
नेतावतोपरतवन्ति पदानि तेभ्यः ।  
पश्चाद्विशेषणविशेष्यतया तु तेषां  
संसर्गबुद्धिरपरावतरिष्यतीति ॥

Some, however, maintain thus. The words convey their meanings and then cease to function. Later the meanings



of the words give rise to the knowledge of their relation as attribute and substantive.

The view put forth in this verse is advocated by Kumarila and is known as *abhihitānvaya-vāda*. The difference between *abhihitānvaya-vāda* and *anvitābhīdhāna-vāda* is this:

*abhihitānvayavāde hi padāni padārthānabhidhāya upakṣīyante,  
padārthebhyo vākyaṁrthapratipattih, anvitābhīdhānayāde tu padānāmeva vāk-  
yārthapratipādakatvaṁ iti viśeṣaḥ.*

*Vivaraṇa-prameya-Saṅgraha, Varṇaka, ix. p. 333. (Andhra University Series).*

[ 371 ]

तद्दुर्घटं न खलु किञ्चिदपि प्रमाण-

मस्याः प्रसादकमुदीरितकल्पनायाः ।

येनोपलब्धिविषयत्वमुपागतानि

संसृष्टमेव तु पदानि पदार्थमाहुः ॥

And this is incompatible. Indeed there is no proof to support the said view. For, words that fall within the scope of auditory perception convey their meanings only as related (to another sense).

[ 372 ]

नासंसृष्टपदार्थबुद्धिपरयोः पूर्वापरत्वप्रमां

मुक्त्वा कारणकार्यतावगतये कश्चित्समर्थस्तयोः ।

पौर्वापर्यमुदीक्ष्य हेतुफलतां सर्वत्र संगृह्यते

नो चेत्सर्वमसंगतं भवति वः सर्वव्यवस्थाहतेः ॥

No body is capable of understanding the relation of cause and effect between a word and the unrelated sense it conveys, unless he knows that the word is antecedent and



the unrelated sense it conveys is subsequent. The relation of antecedence and subsequence is the basis through which the relation of cause and effect is determined. If not, there would be the loss of any definite rule (regarding the relation of cause and effect) and hence everything would become unrelated.

As the significative relation of a word to an unrelated sense is not comprehended, the view of Kumarila is untenable.

[ 373 ]

पूर्वापरान्वयबलेन हि कारणत्व-  
कार्यत्वसंगतिमिह प्रतियन्ति लोके ।  
नो चेद्वेदनियमो न च तत्र कर्तुं  
कार्याणि कारणविशेषमुपाददीरन् ॥

In ordinary experience the relation of cause and effect is determined on the basis of the relation of antecedence and subsequence. If not there will be no invariable rule and hence one would not seek specific cause (like threads) to produce specific objects (like cloth).

[ 374 ]

पदजातबुद्धिजनिता भवति व्यतिषक्तबुद्धिरिति तावदिह ।  
न विगानमरित भवतामपि चेद् व्यवधानकल्पनमकारणकम् ॥

If you are not at variance with the view that the group of words gives rise to the knowledge of the relation (of their meanings) then the assumption of the intermediary cause (namely, the knowledge of the unrelated sense) is unfounded.

Now some among the followers of Kumarila's school (that is, the Bhāṭṭa school) hold that the words themselves, after conveying their



meanings unrelated to anything, signify their relation. And this view is refuted in this verse on the ground that the intermediary cause, namely, the knowledge of the unrelated sense, has to be unnecessarily assumed.

[ 375 ]

व्यतिषक्तबुद्धिजनकं सकलं पदजातमित्यनुमतं यदि वः ।  
व्यवधानकल्पनविडम्बनया किमिहाञ्जसैव जनकं भवतु ॥

If you accept that the group of words gives rise to the knowledge of the relation (of the meanings of the words), then what is the use of this illusive assumption of the intermediary cause (namely, the knowledge of the unrelated sense)? Let the words directly give rise to the knowledge of the relation of their meanings.

[ 376 ]

पारंपर्यं ह्यगतिकगतिं कारणादाश्रयन्ते  
नोत्सर्गेण स्फुरति विदुषां यत्र तत्र प्रणाडी ।  
श्रुत्या सोमक्रयमनुगतः साधनत्वेन हित्वा  
साक्षाद्भावं ह्यरुणिमगुणः प्रापदेनामशक्तेः ॥

Wise men resort to indirect relation as a last recourse when there is incompatibility. The indirect relation is resorted to only when direct relation is not possible. The red colour, due to instrumental suffix (present in the word conveying it), known to be the direct means of purchasing the *soma* creeper. Later owing to incompatibility it gives up the direct relation and resorts to indirect one.

It might be said: let the words constituting a sentence give rise to the knowledge of the sense of the sentence through the knowledge of their meanings. This contention is refuted by pointing out that indirect



relation is to be resorted to only when direct relation is incompatible. For example, it is known from the Vedic sentence — *aruṇāyā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṁ kṛiṇāti* — that, as the red colour is conveyed by the word having instrumental suffix, it is the means of purchasing the *soma* creeper. But as the red colour is an immaterial quality, it cannot serve as a means and hence it is indirectly related to the sense of purchasing through its being a determining characteristic of the substance 'calf'.

*vide: Sābara-bhāṣya on Jaimini-sūtra, III, i, 12 and also the notes on SŚ, I, 175.*

In the present case, as the words themselves can directly give rise to the knowledge of the sense of the sentence, there is no necessity for admitting that they give rise to the knowledge of the sense of the sentence through the knowledge of their meanings.

[ 377 ]

श्वेतिमानमभिपश्यतः पुरः शृण्वतस्तदनु हेषितध्वनिम् ।  
 १ तद्वदत्र खुरमुद्गरस्वनं श्वेतरूपतुरगोऽटतीति धीः ॥

[ 378 ]

तद्वदत्र पदजातबुद्धिभिर्बोधिताखिलपदार्थहेतुकः ।  
 सर्वशब्दविषयार्थसंगतेः प्रत्ययो भवति योग्यतादिभिः ॥

One who perceives the white colour in front of him and following this hears the neighing sound and similarly the hammering sound of the hoofs gets the knowledge in the form of 'A white horse roams about'.

Similarly, on the strength of compatibility, etc., there arises the knowledge of the relation of the meanings of all the words from the meanings conveyed by the group of words.

1. यद्वदत्र — T, T, T.



Now the followers of the *Bhāṭṭa* school who hold that the meanings of words alone give rise to the knowledge of the sense of the sentence corroborate their view by citing an illustration. The knowledge that a white horse roams about arises from the objects (*padārthas*) even though there is not the cognition of words that would give rise to such a knowledge. Similarly the knowledge of the sense of a sentence can arise from the meanings of the words (*padārthas*).

This verse is a slightly modified form of Kumarila's verse in the *Ślokaṭīkā*, *Vakyaādhikaraṇa*, verse 358.

[ 379 ]

नैतत्कलृप्तनिमित्ततोऽपि घटते संसर्गधीरीदृशी  
 श्वताश्चस्त्वरितोऽभिधावतितरामित्यादिका योत्थिता ।  
 कार्यं कलृप्तनिबन्धनं यदि भवेन्नास्यापरं कारणं  
 कल्प्यं तेन पदार्थजातजनिता नैषा मतिर्लिङ्गजा ॥

It is not so. The knowledge of the relation (of the *padārthas*) which has arisen in the form of 'A white horse roams about' can originate from the well-established sources of knowledge. If a well-known cause can be maintained in respect of an effect, another cause need not be assumed. Hence the knowledge in the form of 'A white horse roams about' has not arisen from the group of objects, but from inference.

The argument on the basis of the illustration cited in *SS*, I, 377 is refuted in this verse.

[ 380 ]

पादार्थं न पृथक्प्रमाणमपरं नानाप्रमाणोद्भवं  
 नाप्येतत्फलमत्र पक्षयुगले कल्प्यं निमित्तान्तरम् ।  
 कलृप्तं लिङ्गमतोऽपि निर्वहति चेत्संसर्गधीरीदृशी  
 पादार्थी न पृथक्प्रमा न च फलं नानाप्रमाणोद्भवम् ॥



The group of objects is not a distinct proof; and the knowledge also does not arise from a blend of several proofs as distinct from the result of accepted proofs. For to both the views we have to assume a different cause. But here inference as a separate proof serves the purpose. When such a knowledge could arise from inference, it need not be accepted that the group of objects is a distinct proof and the knowledge arises from a blend of several proofs.

The white colour is the object of visual perception. And from the neighing sound and the sound of the hoofs it is inferred that a white horse roams about.

*vide: (i) vimataḥ śvetaḥ aśvaḥ, heṣṭadikartṛtvāt,  
(ii) śvetaḥ aśvaḥ dhāvati, avyavadhānena nānādeśeṣu  
dṛśyamānatvāt,*

*tādṛśadevadattavat, SS.*

*klṛptam liṅgam — liṅgeti pratyakṣasyāpi upalakṣaṇam, SS.*

[ 381 ]

नासंसृष्टमतो वदन्ति<sup>1</sup> वचनान्याहुः क्रियासंगतं  
योग्येनान्वितमेव केवलममून्याहुः समर्थं यतः ।  
एवं सत्यपवर्जितक्रियमलं निष्पन्नरूपं सदा  
संसर्गादिविवर्जितं च वदितुं वस्तुस्वरूपं श्रुतिः ॥

Hence the words convey their meanings neither as unrelated to another sense, nor as related to *niyoga*, but as related to a compatible sense. When such is the case, the Upaniṣadic passages are always capable of conveying the oneness of the self which is unrelated to *niyoga* and which is undifferentiated and existent.

*vastusvarūpaṁ — brahmātmaikyam, TB.*

1. न्ति न च तान्याहुः B<sub>1</sub> B<sub>2</sub> M<sub>1</sub>



[ 382 ]

अभिहितघटनाथ वान्वितानामभिहितरस्त्वथ वा न पक्षपातः ।  
 क्वचिदपि समयेऽस्ति नः कदाचित् बहुघटनात्मकवस्तुनिष्ठवाक्ये ॥

We have no predilection to either of the views, namely, the doctrine of relation of what are expressed and the doctrine of the expression of what are related. For these are concerned only with the sentence which is of the form of a relation of many senses of words.

*ghaṭanā — anvayaḥ, SS.*

For details see the following verse.

[ 383 ]

अभिहितघटना न चोपपन्ना परदृशि नाभिहितस्तद्वान्वितानाम् ।  
 अनधिकविकलार्थगोचरत्वान्न तदुभयं श्रुतिमस्तके पदानाम् ॥

As the import of the words of the Upaniṣadic passages is the self which is unitary, the doctrine of the relation of the expressed senses and the doctrine of the expression of the related sense are not reasonable.

The words of the Upaniṣadic passages cannot primarily signify the self by adopting either the doctrine of the relation of the expressed sense or the doctrine of the expression of the related sense.

[ 384 ]

अभिहितघटना यदा तदानीं स्मृतिसमबुद्धियुगं पदे विधत्ताः ।  
 परदृशि पुनरन्विताभिधाने पदयुगलात्स्मृतियुग्ममेव पूर्वम् ॥

In the doctrine of the relation of the expressed sense, the two words (*tat* and *tvam* in the sentence *tat tvam asi*) before (the rise of the knowledge of the sense of the sentence), give rise (through secondary signification) to two



cognitions regarding the self — the cognitions which are similar to recollection. But in the doctrine of the expression of the related, the two words give rise to two cognitions which are of the nature of recollection.

The words of the Upaniṣadic passages secondarily signify the self by adopting either of the two doctrines.

For details see Introduction, pp. 45-6.

[ 385 ]

स्मृतिसमपदजन्यबुद्धियुग्मात् परदृशि मोहनिवर्तनं परेषाम् ।  
परदृशि पदजस्मृतिद्वये स्यात् पदयुगलात्प्रमितेः समुद्भवो नः ॥

In the other view (*abhihitānvaya-vāda*) the knowledge of the self (that is, the sense of the sentence) which annihilates *avidyā* present in the self arises from the two cognitions which are similar to recollection and which arise from the two words (*tat* and *tvam*). In our view, the knowledge of the self arises from the two words subsequent to **the two cognitions** (of the meanings of the words) which **are of the nature** of recollection and which arise from the two words.

See Introduction, pp. 45-6.

BHĀVANĀ: THE IMPORT OF THE VEDIC TEXTS

[ 386 ]

औदासीन्यप्रच्युतिप्रापकेऽर्थे लिङ्लोडादेर्लोकतो ज्ञातशक्तेः ।  
पुंसो वेदे प्रेरकत्वेन कल्प्या लिङ्लोडादेर्भावनैवा'नृतन्त्रे ॥

One understands from the usage of elders that the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, etc., signify 'command', etc., which bring about absence of inaction (that is, which prompt one to activity). In the Vedic texts which are of impersonal origin the function present in the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, etc., is to be assumed as prompting one to activity.



Now the view of the Bhāṭṭas that as the Vedic sentences point to *bhāvanā*, they are not valid in respect of the existent entity, the self, is set forth for critical examination.

[ 387 ]

आज्ञाद्यर्थः प्रेरकः पौरुषेये लिङ्लोडादेर्भावना वेदवाक्ये ।

पुंसोऽभावात्तद्भावाज्ञाद्यभावात् पुंसं<sup>1</sup> बन्धात्प्रेरकास्ते हि वाक्ये ॥

As there is the relation of a person in secular statements, the command, etc., of the person present in them (namely, the statements) prompt one to activity. But as there is no relation of a person (in respect of Vedic statements) there is the absence of command, etc., and (hence) in Vedic statements the function of the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, etc., is to prompt one to activity.

[ 388 ]

लिङ्लोडादिर्भावकस्तत्र भाव्यानुष्ठेयेऽर्थे पुंस्प्रवृत्तिः प्रसिद्धा ।

लिङ्लोडादेः पुंस्प्रवृत्त्यंशनिष्ठो व्यापारो यस्तं विदुर्भावनेति ॥

The productive factor (*bhāvaka*) is the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, etc. The fruit of this (*bhāvanā*) is well-known to be the volitional activity of a person regarding the object to be achieved. The function of the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, etc., which has for its object the volitional activity of a person is the verbal productive operation.

[ 389 ]

करणमिह लिङादेर्ज्ञानमेवाङ्गभागः

पुनरभिरुचिहेतुर्दृश्यते च प्रशंसा ।

विधिरयमिह तन्त्रे जैमिनीये न कार्यं

न च भवति विधिर्नः श्रेयसो हेतुरर्थः ॥

1. संबन्धे T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, T<sub>4</sub>, T.



The knowledge of the endings of potential mood, etc., is the instrument of verbal productive operation; and the subsidiary factor is the commendation which gives rise to desire. In Jaimini's system the sense of the endings of potential mood, etc., is neither *niyoga*, nor the means to prosperity, but the productive operation.

[ 390 ]

विधिरिह गुणभूतः प्रत्ययार्थोऽपि नित्यं

भवति च <sup>1</sup>पुरुषोत्था भावना<sup>2</sup>स्य प्रधानम् ।

भवति दशलकारप्रत्ययैः सामिधेया

विधिविहितलकारैर्भावना शब्दहेतुः ॥

The verbal productive operation though conveyed by the endings (of potential mood, etc.,) is subsidiary and the objective productive operation (*arthabhāvanā*) which is of the nature of human activity is primary to it. The objective productive operation is conveyed by all the ten verbal endings,<sup>1</sup> while verbal productive operation is conveyed by the endings enjoined in the sense of command, that is, by the endings of potential mood, etc.

1. *abhidhābhāvanāmāhuḥ anyāmeva liṅṅdayaḥ*  
*arthātmabhāvanā tu anyā sarvākhyāteṣu gaṁyate,*  
 Kumarila's *Tantra-vārtika*.

For details See Introduction, p. 58.

[ 391 ]

भवति च पुरुषार्थकर्मिकेयं पुरुषनिमित्तकभावना न तद्वत् ।

भवति तु विधिशब्दकर्तृकान्या न हि निरवद्यपुमर्थता प्रवृत्तेः ॥

The human goal, namely, heaven, is the object of objective productive operation. The verbal productive

1. पुरुषार्था T<sub>2</sub>    2. नान्यत्प्र — T<sub>2</sub>.



operation which is of the nature of the function of the endings of potential mood is not so. The volitional activity which is the fruit of verbal productive operation is not a faultless human goal.

For details See Introduction, pp. 57-8.

[ 392 ]

अभिमतपशुपुत्रवृष्टिनाकप्रभृतिकभाव्यगता हि भावनेयम् ।  
अनभिमतसुदुष्करातिदुःखां नयति तु भाव्यपदं प्रवृत्तिमन्या ॥

In the case of objective productive operation, the desired objects like cattle-wealth, son, rain, heaven, etc., are the fruits. But in the case of the other productive operation (that is, the verbal productive operation) the undersirable object, namely, activity which is extremely laborious and hard to achieve is the fruit.

[ 393 ]

प्रत्ययप्रकृतिशब्दतो बहिर्विद्यतेऽभिहितसंगतिश्च नः ।  
प्रत्ययप्रकृतिशब्दयोः पुनर्नित्यमन्वितधियो निमित्ताता ॥

As it is well-known that both root and suffix give rise to the knowledge of (mutually) related sense, we admit the relation of expressed senses (*abhihitānvayavāda*) only in the cases other than root and suffix.

The Bhāṭṭas admit the doctrine of the expression of what are related (that is, *anvitābhidhāna-vāda*) in the case of root and suffix. For example, the root *yaj* and the potential ending (in the word *yajeta*) give rise to the knowledge of mutually related sense.

*vide* the maxim:

*prakṛtipratyayau pratyayārtham sahabrūtaḥ, tayostu  
pratyayaḥ prādhānyena, Mahābhāṣya, III, iv, 67.*

But the two words *yajeta* and *svargakāma* in the sentence *jyotiḥśo-  
mena svargakāmo yajeta* convey their unrelated senses and later the senses



give rise to the knowledge of their relation, and here they accept the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*.

[ 394 ]

भावनाद्वयमतोऽवबोध्यते धातुवाच्यघटितं लिङादिभिः ।  
प्रत्ययार्थगुणवस्तुवाचिनो धातवः प्रकृतयो हि धातवः ॥

Hence the two kinds of *bhāvanā* related to the sense of the root are conveyed by the endings of potential mood, etc. The stems convey the thing subsidiary to the one conveyed by the suffixes. And here the roots are the stems.

[ 395 ]

भव्याय भूतमुपदिश्यत इत्यवोचन्  
पूज्यास्ततः सकलमेव तु वेदशास्त्रम् ।  
कार्यप्रधानमिति निश्चिनुमोऽस्मदीये  
तन्त्रे च कार्यमुदितः पुरुषप्रयत्नः ॥

Venerable persons have said that the existent entity is subsidiary to the thing to be achieved;<sup>1</sup> and hence we affirm that the entire Vedic texts point to *niyoga*. And in our system *niyoga* is said to be volitional activity. (*artha-bhāvanā*).

1. See Notes on *SS*, I, 143.

For details See Introduction, p. 58.

BHĀVANĀ — NOT THE IMPORT OF THE  
VEDIC TEXTS

[ 396 ]

अभिदधाति करोति च लिङ्पदं  
श्रुतिवचस्सु निजामपि भावनाम् ।  
न च करोति न वक्ति च तां पुन-  
र्नवचस्त्विति दुःशकमुच्यते ॥



In the Vedic texts the potential ending signifies 'verbal productive operation' which is its function and (hence) its productive factor also. But in secular statements the potential ending does not convey the 'verbal productive operation' and it is not its productive factor. And this distinction is not reasonable.

In the scripture the potential ending conveys a sense different from the one conveyed by it in secular statements. Hence there arises conflict with the maxim arrived at in *lokavedādhikaraṇa* (*Jaimini-sūtra* 1-3-10/30-35).

For details see Introduction. p. 58.

[ 397 ]

वक्तृत्वमेव घटते यदि लिङ्पदस्य  
सर्वत्र नार्धजरतीयमिदं प्रशस्तम् ।  
सामर्थ्यमेकरसमेव यदोपपन्नं  
नानारसं न खलु तत्परिकल्पनीयम् ॥

When it would hold good that the ending of potential mood only conveys the same sense in both Vedic and secular statements, then the adoption of the maxim of half-way-house is not commendable. As it is reasonable to hold that the potential ending possesses a uniform nature (of conveying only one sense), it need not be postulated that it possesses different nature (in secular and in Vedic statements).<sup>1</sup>

1. See the following verse.

[ 398 ]

श्रेयोहेतुत्ववाची यदि भवति तदा संभवत्येकरूपा  
शक्तिस्तस्याभिधाने न तु भवति तदा कारकोऽयं प्रवृत्तेः ।  
श्रेयोहेतुश्च वाच्यः श्रुतिवचसि तदा पौरुषेये च तुल्यः  
कलृप्तश्चासौ न कल्प्यः श्रुतिवचसि यथा भावना लिङ्निबद्धा ॥



If the ending of the potential mood conveys that a particular act is the means to a desired end, then it possesses the nature of conveying only a uniform sense (in both secular and Vedic statements) and it does not prompt one to activity. If the 'means to a desired end' is the sense of the endings of potential mood, etc., then this sense is similar to both Vedic and secular statements. This sense is well-established and need not be postulated like (verbal) productive operation, the function of the endings of potential mood, etc., in the Vedic sentences.

For details See Introduction, p. 58.

[ 399 ]

धात्वर्थतोऽन्या न च भावनास्ति यां भावनां वक्तुमलं लकारः ।  
धात्वर्थमुद्रिच्य न पुंप्रयत्नो लोके यतो भाति निरूपणायाम् ॥

On careful examination it is found in ordinary experience that objective productive operation (*arthabhāvanā*) does not differ from the root.<sup>1</sup> Hence there is no such thing as *arthabhāvanā* different from the sense of the root, in which case the verbal forms can convey it.

It has been said that the fruit of the verbal productive operation (*śabdabhāvanā*) is the objective productive operation (*artha-bhāvanā*) and it is conveyed by all the ten verbal endings. (see *ŚŚ*, I, 388; 390). And this view is refuted here.

1. As the sense of the root itself is of the form of the activity in the case of *kurvīta*, *yateta*, etc., there is no such thing as *arthabhāvanā* (volitional activity) different from the sense of the root.

*vide*: 'kurvīta', 'yateta' ityādau dhātvarthavyatirikṭāarthabhāvanābhāvāt,  
dhātvarthasyaiva prayatnārūpatvāt, *TB*.

[ 400 ]

न कर्मकाण्डेऽपि ततो नियोगो न भावनाप्युक्तनयेन तस्मिन् ।  
न तद्वयं वेदशिरस्सु तस्मात् ततो न कार्यार्थपराणि तानि ॥



On the grounds adduced before, neither *niyoga* nor productive operation is present even in the ritualistic portion of the Veda. Hence these two are not present in the Upaniṣads and as such the import of the Upaniṣadic texts is not *niyoga*.

[ 401 ]

अपि च प्रतिषेधचोदनाविषयः स्यात्प्रतिषिद्धकर्मणः ।

फलगर्धिनिवृत्तिरेव सा न नियोगो न च तस्य गोचरः ॥

Moreover, the scope of the prohibitory (Vedic) injunction is cessation from longing for the fruit of the prohibited deed; and cessation is neither *niyoga* nor its content.<sup>1</sup>

1. *niṣedhavūkyasya hi niṣidhyamūñahananādigataśreyassādhanatvābhāva evārthaḥ, na ca sū niyogo bhavati, na vā tasya gocaraḥ vidheḥ bhāvārthagocaratvanīyamāt, SS.*

Since only positive factors could be the content of *niyoga*, cessation being of the form of absence cannot be the content.

*phalagardhiḥ — iṣyamūñaphalasādhanatvam, SS.*

[ 402 ]

नञः स्वसंबन्धिपदार्थवस्तुनो निवृत्तिरर्थः सहजः प्रसिद्धितः ।

अनीक्षणादौ व्रतशब्दसंगतेः परप्रयुक्ता खलु मानसी क्रिया ॥

It is well-known that the negative particle *nañ* naturally denotes the absence of the sense of a word with which it is related. But in the case of *anīkṣaṇa* the *nañ* conveys mental activity as the word is related to the word *vrata*.<sup>1</sup> (Hence *nañ* conveys the other sense, namely, activity) owing to some other cause.

1. The primary sense of *nañ* is cessation. But in exceptional cases it signifies exclusion (*paryudāsa*). For instance, in the *prajāpati* *vrata* to be taken by a *brahmachārin* after the completion of the studies we read:



*nekṣeta udyantaṁ ādityaṁ nāstamyantaṁ kadācana  
noparaktaṁ na vāristhaṁ na madhyaṁ nabhasogataṁ*

These commands begin with the sentence *tasya vratam*. The vows are of the nature of determination to carry out something. As the word *anikṣaṇa* is connected with the word *vrata*, the negative particle *nañ* present in it denotes something to be carried out. So the word *anikṣaṇa* secondarily signifies activity in the form of mental resolve of not seeing the rising sun.

*nañāśca eṣaḥ svabhāvaḥ yat svasambandhino'bhīvaṁ  
bodhayati..... tasmāt prasaktakriyānivṛttyaudā sīnyameva  
'brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ' ityādiṣu pratiśedhārthaṁ  
manyāmahe, anyatraprajāpativratādibhyaḥ, BSB, I, i, 4.*

See also SŚ, I, 407.

[ 403 ]

अपि तु प्रतिषेधचोदना न तु मिद्येत भवन्मते विधेः ।  
विधिरेव तु चोदनाखिला न हि वेदे वचनं निवर्तकम् ॥

(If you, the Prābhākaras, say that the prohibitory text also enjoins activity) then according to your view the prohibitory texts do not differ from the affirmative ones.<sup>1</sup> Since all sentences (affirmative and prohibitory) prompt one to activity, there would be no sentence in Veda prohibiting one from activity.

1. The affirmative and the prohibitory texts mutually differ.

*vide* the passage:

*phalabuddhi prameyādhikāribodhaka bhedataḥ  
pañcadhātvyantabhinnavat bhedo vidhiniśedhayoḥ, cited in S.*

[ 404 ]

प्रतिषेधवाक्यवदतः सकलं विधिश्च न्यमेव फलवद्भवतु ।  
वचनं त्रयीशिरसि तत्त्वमसिप्रभृति प्रतीचि तमसोऽपहतेः ॥



Like the prohibitory sentence,' let the Upaniṣadic sentence such as 'tat tvam asi', etc., being devoid of any injunction and being fruitful by dispelling *avidyā* be valid in respect of the self.

1. The prohibitory sentences in the Veda do not enjoin any activity. See *ŚŚ*, I, 401.

[ 405 ]

नामधातुसहितो नञिष्यते पर्युदासविषयो मनीषिभिः ।  
न प्रसक्तविनिवृत्तिवाचकोऽब्राह्मणादिषु तथोपलम्भनात् ॥

Wise men hold that the negative particle *nañ*, when related to a noun or a verbal root conveys the sense of exclusion, and not the negation of an applicable sense. And it is observed so in the case of 'non-brahmin', etc.

The view of the Bhāṭṭas is set forth in this and the following three verses.

[ 406 ]

अब्राह्मणाधर्मगिरोर्नञेष नामान्वयादाश्रितपर्युदासः ।  
अन्यं विरुद्धं च सदाभिधत्ते नोद्यन्तमित्यादिषु धातुयोगात् ॥

The negative particle *nañ*, in view of its relation to noun in the case of the word 'non-brahmin' and 'non-sacrifice' and to the verbal root in the case of the sentence, *nekṣeta udyantamādityam*, etc., always conveys a different and contrary sense.

The negative particle *nañ* related to the noun in the case of the word 'non-brahmin' is taken as a *pariyudāsa* and it signifies one different from a brahmin but similar to him. And when related to the noun 'sacrifice' and to the verbal root *ikṣaṇa*, *nañ* is taken as a *pratiṣedha* and it conveys some action different from sacrifice and some action other than seeing the sun.



*nāma dhātvarthayogena naiva nañ pratiṣedhakaḥ*

*vadato'brāhmaṇādharmau anyamūtravirodhinau, Śloka-vārtika,*

*(Apoha-vāda. 33.)*

[ 407 ]

नोद्यन्तमित्यत्र नञेक्षणार्थसमीपकार्यान्तरमुच्यते हि ।

ततश्च नेक्षिष्य इतीदृशी स्यात् संकल्पना संनिहितत्वहेतोः॥

In the sentence *nekṣeta udyantamādityam*, etc., the negative particle *nañ* denotes some other activity present in the person who is related to the sense of the root, namely, seeing the rising sun. As mental resolve is related to the action prohibited, namely, seeing the rising sun, the particle *nañ* signifies mental resolve of not seeing the rising sun.

*vide* the notes on *ŚŚ*, I, 402.

[ 408 ]

द्विजं न हन्यान्न कलज्जमद्यादित्यादिवाक्ये विधिनास्य योगात् ।

प्रसज्यमानार्थनिवृत्तिमात्रं नञोऽर्थ इत्याश्रितमादरेण ॥

As the negative particle is related to potential ending in the sentence 'Do not kill a brahmin', 'Do not eat garlic', it is accepted with careful thought that it conveys the sense of mere negation of a possible occurrence (that is, killing a brahmin or eating garlic).

See Notes on *ŚŚ* I, 402.

[ 409 ]

नाद्यां न हन्यां न पिबेयमित्यपि

वाक्येषु नञ्वत्सु वदन्ति मानसीम् ।

संकल्परूपां<sup>1</sup> विधिबन्धिनीं क्रियां ।

नोद्यन्तमित्यादिवचस्विवापरे ॥



(The followers of the Prābhākara school hold :)

The negative particle *nañ* present in the sentences<sup>1</sup> denotes activity which comes within the purview of injunction and which is of the nature of mental resolve in the form of 'I will not eat (garlic), nor kill a brahmin, nor drink (wine)', as in the sentences - *nekṣeta udyantamādityam*, etc.

1. *na kalañjam bhakṣayet, brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ, na surāṃ pibet.*

[ 410 ]

वाक्येषु नञ्वत्सु निवृत्तिमात्रं प्रमेयमित्यभ्युपगम्यमाने ।  
प्रत्यक्षमानेन विरुध्यते हि निवृत्तिशास्त्रं न च युज्यते तत् ॥

If it is accepted that the import of the sentences containing the negative particle *nañ* is only 'negation', then the content of the prohibitory text would be contradicted by perception<sup>1</sup> and this is not reasonable.

1. See *SS.* I, 417.

[ 411 ]

प्रवर्तकं वाक्यमुवाच चोदनां  
निवर्तकं नैवमुवाच भाष्यकृत् ।  
ततश्च विद्मो न हि चोदनास्ति सा  
प्रवर्तिका या न भवेदिति स्थितिः ॥

The author of the *bhāṣya* (on *Jaimini-sūtra*) has stated that Vedic text prompts one to activity;<sup>1</sup> but he has not stated that it desists from activity. From this also we understand that there is no Vedic text which does not prompt one to activity. And this is our final view.

1. *vide: codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakam vacanam*  
*Śābara-bhāṣya* on *Jaimini-sūtra*, I, 1, 2.



[ 412 ]

न नामयोगो न च धातुयोगो लिङादियोगोऽपि न कारणं नः ।  
नञः स्वसंबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रं स्वतोऽभिधेयं परतोऽन्यदस्य ॥

The relation of the negative particle *nañ* with either a noun or a verbal root or potential ending is not the criterion for determining its sense.<sup>1</sup> The negative particle *nañ* conveys the sense of negation of the meaning of a word with which it is related. It conveys a different sense owing to some other cause.<sup>2</sup>

1. The view of the Bhāṭṭas set forth in *ŚŚ*, I, 405-8 is refuted here.
2. See *ŚŚ*, I, 401.

[ 413 ]

तथा हि नाग्रे करिणीति नाम्ना गजोऽत्र नास्तीति च धातुयोगे ।  
लिङादियोगेऽपि निवृत्तिरर्थो विषं न खादेदिति नञ्पदस्य ॥

It is thus the prohibitive particle *nañ* is related to noun in the sentence 'There is no cow-elephant in front of you'; to verbal root in the sentence 'Elephant is not here'; and to potential ending in the sentence 'Do not eat poison'. In all these cases it conveys the sense of negation.

[ 414 ]

तथा श्रुतौ नेति वचस्सु नाग्नि नानेह नास्तीति च धातुयोगे ।  
तथा विधाने न कलञ्जमद्यान्नजोऽविशेषेण निवृत्तिरर्थः ॥

Similarly in the scripture the negative particle *nañ* related to noun in the sentence *neti, neti*,<sup>1</sup> to verbal root in the sentence *neha nānāsti*,<sup>2</sup> and to potential ending in the sentence "Do not eat garlic", conveys without any difference the sense of negation.

1. *Bṛh.*, II, iii, 6.
2. *ibid.*, IV, iv, 19.



[ 415 ]

औदासीन्यं पुरुषगतमेवाविशेषान्नञर्थो  
 भ्रान्तिप्राप्ते सति तु विषये यत्र यत्रैष दृष्टः ।  
 नौदासीन्यं पृथगिह भवेदात्मचिन्मात्ररूपात्  
 सिद्धे वस्तुन्यवसितमतो वेदवाक्यं निषेधे ॥

In whichever sentence the negative particle *nañ* is present, there it invariably conveys the sense of cessation present in the person regarding the act which erroneously comes into being, namely, the wish to kill a brahmin. In our system, cessation of an act does differ from the self which is pure consciousness. Hence the Upaniṣadic sentences are valid in respect of the self which is existent and which is devoid of the universe.

*niṣedhe — prapañca śūnye*

[ 416 ]

प्रवर्तकं वाक्यमुवाच चोदनां निधाय बुद्धौ वचनं निवर्तकम् ।  
 द्वितीयसूत्रे भगवान् बहुश्रुतो न चोदनाद्वित्वनिवारणाय तत् ॥

Having in mind the Vedic text whose import is cessation from activity, the venerable and learned (Śabarasvāmin) has stated that Vedic text prompts one to activity. And this is not to deny the two kinds of Vedic texts.

The view set forth in *SS*, I, 411 is refuted here

[ 417 ]

ननु निवृत्तिपरत्वमुदीरित विघटयामि निषेधगिरामहम् ।  
 न हि कलञ्जमिति प्रतिपाद्यते यदि तदा नयनेन विरुध्यते ॥

I shall now disprove what has been said (by the Vedāntins) that the import of the prohibitory sentence is



'negation'. Here the absence of garlic is not stated; for it would be contradicted by the visual perception.

The Prābhākara in this and the following nine verses refutes the Advaitin's view set forth in SŚ I, 412-15.

[ 418 ]

अथ कलञ्जपदार्थगभक्षणं न हि तदाप्यमुनैव विरुध्यते ।  
अथ तदीयफलस्पृहयान्वयो न हि तदप्यनुभूतिपराहतम् ॥

The negative particle *nañ* cannot convey the absence of eating the garlic, as it would be contradicted by perception. Nor is it (namely, the negative particle) related to the desire for the result; for it is contrary to experience.

[ 419 ]

अथ तदीयनियोगनिवर्तनं भवतु भक्षण<sup>1</sup> मस्ति तदिच्छया ।  
न हि नियोगनिवृत्तिनिवेदने सति कलञ्जमभक्ष्यमितीङ्गयते ॥

If it is said that the negative particle *nañ* negates the *niyoga* to eat the garlic, even then there is the eating of garlic out of desire. It is not known that eating garlic leads to undesirable effect, when *nañ* signifies the negation of *niyoga* to eat the garlic.

[ 420 ]

इह कलञ्जपदेन नञन्वयो भवति वास्य नञोऽदिसमागमः ।  
अदिगतेन लिङादिपदेन वा सह समेति नञत्र गतिस्त्रयी ॥

(In the sentence *na kalañjam adyāt*), the negative particle *nañ* could have relation either with the word garlic or with the root *ad* or with the potential suffix added to the root *ad*. Here these three courses alone are possible to it.

1. णमस्तु B<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, T<sub>4</sub>, T<sub>5</sub>.



[ 421 ]

उदितपक्षपरिग्रहकारिणां न च निषेधगिरामुपपादने ।

भवति शक्तिरतस्तु निषेधगीरपि नियोगपराभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥

Those who hold any one of the views set forth above (that is, in the previous verse), cannot prove the validity of the prohibitory statements. So let it be accepted that the import of the prohibitory statements is activity (in the form of mental resolve of not eating the garlic).

[ 422 ]

तथा च यागाद्यनुबन्धभेदाद्विज्ञेषु शास्त्रेषु नियोगभेदः ।

<sup>1</sup>निवृत्तिभेदादपि तद्वदस्य निवृत्तयोऽपि ह्यनुबन्धभूताः ॥

The sacrificial act, etc., bring out the difference among the injunctive texts and hence *niyoga* also differs. Similarly, the cessation from different acts brings out the difference among the prohibitory texts. The cessation too (like sacrificial act, etc.,) is the content of *niyoga* (that is, it is of the nature of mental resolve of not doing the prohibited act).

*anubandhaḥ — anu paścāt badhyate vyavacchedakatayā iti*  
*yāgādi dhātvartho'nubandhaḥ tadrūpo'nubandhaḥ*  
*niyogaviṣayaḥ — SS*

[ 423 ]

निवृत्तिसिद्ध्यापि नियोगसिद्धिः प्रवर्तमानस्य न गर्तपातः ।

निषिद्धचेष्टा निरयस्य हेतुर्नियोगतो नाध्यवसीयते हि ॥

The *niyoga* can be achieved only by observing cessation (that is, activity in the form of mental resolve of not eating the garlic or killing a brahmin). But it is not known



from the *niyoga* having for its content the cessation (that is, activity in the form of mental resolve of not doing a prohibited deed) that the observance of prohibitory deeds leads to hell. Hence one who performs prohibitory deeds does not go to hell.

[ 424 ]

नियोग एवैष पुमान्नि युज्यते नियोगसिद्धयै तु पुनर्नियुज्यते ।  
परत्र कर्मस्वथ वा निवृत्तिषु स्थितिः प्रसिद्धेति नियोगवादिनाम् ॥

The final view of those who uphold the doctrine of *niyoga* is this: an agent is addressed to carry out the *niyoga* alone. In order to achieve this alone, he is addressed either to carry out the sacrificial acts or to refrain from prohibited deeds, both being its content.

*vide : svātmāsiddhyanukūlasya niyojyasya prasiddhaye  
kurvatsvargādikamāpi pradhānam kṛyameva nahī,  
Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 190.*

For details see Introduction, p. 51.

[ 425 ]

प्रवृद्धरागस्य निवृत्तयोऽस्थिरास्ततः स्थिरत्वाय नियुज्यते पुमान् ।  
निवृत्तिदेशेषु नियोगबुद्धितो निवृत्तिमूर्ध्वं परिपालयिष्यति ॥

The state of cessation (namely, activity in the form of mental resolve of not doing the prohibited deeds) is not steady in the case of a very passionate person. So *niyoga* is addressed to him to maintain the state of cessation from the acts that should be avoided. The person, knowing the *niyoga* afterwards maintains the cessation (that is, activity in the form of mental resolve).



[ 426 ]

अनाद्यजग्धेश्च निवृत्तिरिष्टा विशिष्टदन्तोष्ठनिविष्टसंवित् ।  
अनन्यसंसर्गिपदार्थसंविन्निवृत्तिरित्येष हि राजमार्गः ॥

The absence of eating the prohibited things is accepted to be the knowledge of lips and teeth unassociated with the prohibited things. The cognition of the substratum unrelated to the prohibited thing is (what answers to) cessation. And this view is faultless.

According to the Prābhākara, cessation being of the form of absence is not recognized as a separate category. It is not different from the substratum. When we perceive the mere floor and no jar on it, we say that there is no jar. The cognition of the substratum by itself is what answers to the absence.

[ 427 ]

ननु समीहितसाधनता लिङो लशुनगृज्जनभक्षणसंश्रया ।  
भवति वाच्यतयाभिमतस्य नो नञपि ताद्विनिवृत्तिनिवेदकः ॥

In our view, the primary sense of potential ending in the sentence (*na kalañjāṁ bhakṣayet*) is that the eating of white garlic and red onion is the means to realize the desired end. The negative particle *nañ* related to it denotes its absence (that is, it is not a means to a desired end).

[ 428 ]

तदसदिष्टफलोद्भवदर्शनाल्लशुनगृज्जनपर्युषिताशनात् ।  
न हि निषिद्धपदार्थनिमित्तकः सुखलवः पुरुषस्य न विद्यते ॥

This is not correct. It cannot be said that there does not arise even an iota of pleasure to the person from the

1. तिनिष्ठा - P<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, T<sub>5</sub>.



performance of prohibited deed; for, it is found that there arises the desired effect (that is, pleasure) on eating white garlic, red onion, and the food cooked the previous night.

The objection raised by the Prābhākaras against the siddhāntin's view set forth in the previous verse is explained in this verse.

[ 429 ]

अदृष्टदोषं परिहृत्य शंसतः कलञ्जमास्वाद्य सुखित्वमात्मनः ।  
पुमानबोधोपहतः समीहते तदीहिताभावपरा निषेधगीः ॥

The ignorant man, overlooking the unseen defect and seeking pleasure by eating the garlic, takes in the garlic. The prohibitory statement makes known that the eating of garlic is not the means to realize the desired end.

[ 430 ]

नरकपातविवर्जनवर्त्मना भवतु विप्रवधात्परमार्थतः ।  
मम सुखित्वमितीच्छति यत्पुमान्न तदितीह निषेधगिरोच्यते ॥

If a person really wishes: let the killing of a brahmin without leading to hell, give forth pleasure to me, then the prohibitory statement states that it is incorrect.

[ 431 ]

प्रमाणतो नास्ति निषिद्धकर्मणः फलस्पृहादृष्टभयं विना तव ।  
भ्रमादबोधप्रभवात्प्रवर्तसे न तात मानेन फलस्पृहात्र ते ॥

Oh! child, the desire for (such a) result by committing the prohibited act without any fear of sin does not arise from any proof. You commit the prohibited act out of error which is due to ignorance. Your desire for such a result is not based on any proof.



[ 432 ]

इति श्रुतिः शास्ति निषिद्धकर्मणि प्रवृत्तिमन्तं पुरुषं नञन्विता ।  
न चायमर्थोऽपहतः प्रमान्तरैर्न हि प्रमाणैरपरैर्विरुध्यते ॥

Thus the Vedic sentence containing the negative particle *nañ* teaches the person who commits the prohibited act. This sense of Vedic text is neither made known, nor contradicted by other proofs.

[ 433 ]

भुजङ्गभोगं सुकुमारशीतलं निदाघसंतापनिवृत्तये शिशुम् ।  
भ्रमादुपादित्सुमुदीक्ष्य कातरा निवर्तयेत्ताज्जननी यथा तथा ॥

[ 434 ]

भ्रमादनर्थस्य निदानमादरात् कृतार्थतायै लशुनादिभक्षणम् ।  
नञन्विता वैदिकचोदनाप्यसौ विधित्सुमालक्ष्य निवर्तयिष्यति ॥

Just as the anxious mother, on seeing her child who, to get relief from the heat of the summer, attempts to take by hand, by mistake, the serpent's hood which is smooth and cool, will prevent him from doing so, similarly the Vedic text having the negative particle *nañ*, on seeing the person who eagerly attempts to eat garlic which is the cause of evil, under the mistaken notion that it is a means to pleasure, will prevent him from doing so.

[ 435 ]

क्रियानुप्रवेशं विना प्रागभावः प्रसक्तक्रियाया न निर्वोदुमीशः ।  
गुणद्रव्यवन्नित्यनिष्पन्नभावात्पदत्वं नियोगस्य भावार्थवद्भः ॥

Like quality and substance,<sup>1</sup> the antecedent negation of a possible action cannot become the content of *niyoga*,

1. र्थोऽपहतः - P<sub>1</sub>.



unless it is related to some action. Moreover, as it is existent it cannot become the content of *niyoga* unlike the sense of the root (that is, sacrifice) in your view.

1. *guṇaḥ ūruṇyādi, dravyaṁ dadhyādi*

These are known to be the means of purchasing the *soma* creeper and of sacrifice respectively. Hence they are enjoined. As the antecedent negation of a possible action is not the means of any act, it cannot be enjoined, and as such it cannot be the content of *niyoga*.

[ 436 ]

न पाल्यत्वयोगादलंभूष्णभावो यतः पालनं श्रूयते नात्र वाक्ये ।  
न खल्वश्रुतं गृह्यते न्याय'हानाद्यथा न श्रुतं त्यज्यते तद्भयेन ॥

It cannot be said that antecedent negation related to the action of maintaining it is the content of *niyoga*; for, here in the sentence (*na kalañjam bhakṣayet*) the action of maintaining the antecedent negation is not expressed. Indeed when the primary sense of a sentence is intelligible, secondary sense is not resorted to, out of fear of the abandonment of the maxim.<sup>1</sup>

1. *nyāyahūnāt—śrutamukhyārtho' papattau aśrutalakṣaṇākalpane gauravāt, S.*

The translation follows S.

[ 437 ]

उदासीनता च श्रुता नञ्पदार्थो  
नियोगे सति त्याज्यतां याति सद्यः ।  
अतद्योग्यभावादयोग्यः पदार्थो  
न वाक्यार्थभागिष्यते जैमिनीयैः ॥

1. यहीनं - T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, T<sub>5</sub>.



Cessation from activity is known to be the sense of the negative particle *nañ*. This must be immediately given up as being incompatible, if the import of the sentence (containing the particle *nañ*) should be accepted to be a *niyoga*. And the followers of Jaimini also do not accept that an incompatible sense cannot be related to the sense of a sentence.<sup>1</sup>

1. The sense of a sentence, according to Prabhākara is *niyoga*.

*vide : vākyaṛthaḥ — niyogaḥ tadbhāḥ tadanvayityarthaḥ TB.*

[ 438 ]

निषिद्धक्रिया प्रत्यवायाय नेति स्वकर्णौ जनः प्रोर्णुते पापभीरुः ।  
समाकर्ण्य दुर्भाषितं पार्श्ववर्ती न पापाक्षरं किञ्चिदेतादृगन्यत् ॥

On hearing the repugnant utterance that committing a prohibited action does not lead to sin, the person who stands nearby and who is afraid of sin firmly closes his ears feeling that there cannot be another sinful statement like this.

The view put forth in *SS*, I, 423, is refuted in this and the following verses.

[ 439 ]

निषिद्धक्रिया प्रत्यवायाय नो चेत्  
तदा दुःखमाकस्मिकं सर्वपुंसाम् ।  
सुखं पुण्यमूलं यथा सर्वपुंसां  
तथा दुःखमप्यस्तु वः पापमूलम् ॥

If committing a prohibited act does not give rise to sin, then misery experienced by all the persons should be considered as not arising from a definite cause. Just as religious merit is the root-cause of pleasure experienced by all the persons, so also let sin be the root-cause of misery.



[ 440 ]

निषिद्धक्रियां चोदितस्याक्रियां वा  
 विना नास्ति पापस्य निष्पत्तिहेतुः ।  
 ततस्तद्वयं पापनिष्पादकत्वा-  
 द्वेत्प्रत्यवायस्य नित्यं निदानम् ॥

There is no other cause which gives rise to demerit apart from committing the prohibited act and not performing the enjoined ones. Hence these two give rise to sin and as such they are always its root-cause

[ 441 ]

निषिद्धक्रिया दुःखनिष्पत्तिहेतुर्भवेल्लक्षणं चोदितस्याक्रियास्य ।  
 अभावान्न भावस्य निष्पत्तिरिष्टा भवेल्लक्षणं ज्ञायमानस्त्वभावः॥

The act of committing the prohibited deed gives rise to misery, and the non-performance of the enjoined deed is indicative of sin. The rise of an existent thing (namely, demerit) from non-existence is not admitted. And the absence (of the performance of the enjoined deed), being known, is indicative of sin.

In the previous verse it is said that committing the prohibited deed and the non-performance of the enjoined deed give rise to sin. But superficially it is said so. Really the non-performance of the enjoined deed, being a negation, cannot be the cause of an existent thing, like sin. There arises sin from the performance of some other act at the time when the enjoined deed should be performed. And the non-performance of the enjoined deed merely indicates the sin. Just as the smoke being remembered is the cause of the knowledge of the fire, so also the knowledge of the non-performance of the enjoined deed is indicative of sin.



[ 442 ]

निवृत्तिनिष्ठे तु निषेधवाक्ये निषिद्धकर्माचरणादनर्थः ।  
प्रतीयतेऽर्थादिति तत्र युक्तं दुःखं नृणां दुश्चरितैकमूलम् ॥

The import of the prohibitory sentences is cessation. Then it is presumptively known that committing the prohibited deed gives rise to an undesirable result. Hence it is reasonable to hold that committing the prohibited deed is the root-cause of man's misery.

[ 443 ]

समीहितोपायतया लिङन्वयात् प्रतीयमानस्य तु भक्षणादिनः ।  
न पर्युदासाश्रयणेन नञ्पदादनिष्टहेतुत्वमतिर्भविष्यति ॥

It is not correct to say that the negative particle *nañ* related to the potential ending, by conveying the sense of 'exclusion', gives rise to the knowledge that eating garlic, etc., being known to be the means of desired end, is the means to undesirable result.

[ 444 ]

तथा हि संबन्ध्युपमर्दबुद्धये समर्थमुत्सर्गमपेक्ष्य नञ्पदम् ।  
न पर्युदासाय विनापवादकं ततो निवृत्त्यर्थपरं तदिष्यते ॥

The negative particle *nañ* can as a general rule convey the absence of the sense of the word with which it is related. It does not convey the sense of exclusion unless there is some contradiction (to its primary sense). Hence the import of *nañ* is accepted to be cessation.

[ 445 ]

अतः प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधसंभवान्न पर्युदासाश्रयणं प्रशस्यते ।  
न पर्युदासाश्रयणं विना भवेदनिष्टहेतुत्वनञर्थकल्पना ॥



Without resorting to exclusion, it cannot be postulated that *nañ* conveys the sense that (eating garlic) is a source of undesirable result. As *nañ* can convey the sense of prohibiting a possible action, it is not commendable to resort to exclusion.

[ 446 ]

अभीष्टहेतुत्वलिङ्गार्थपृष्ठतो ह्यनर्थहेतुत्वनञर्थकल्पना ।

न पर्युदासं परिहृत्य कल्प्यते न पर्युदासः प्रतिषेधसंभवात् ॥

Following the sense of potential ending, namely, the means of desired end, the postulation of the sense of *nañ* to be the means of undesirable result cannot be made without resorting to 'exclusion'. But as the sense of prohibition (of a possible act) itself is proper, the sense of exclusion (is unwarranted).

[ 447 ]

प्रमाणमिच्छन् प्रतिषेधचोदनां समस्तवेदस्य न कार्यगोचरम् ।

प्रमाणभावं 'प्रतिपत्तुमीश्वरो निषेधवाक्ये तदसंभवाद्यतः ॥

When it is said that the prohibitory sentences are vaild, one cannot maintain that all the Vedic texts are valid by their signifying *niyoga*. For, (as set forth before) the import of the prohibitory statements (which are accepted to be valid) is not *niyoga*.

[ 448 ]

अतो न वेदान्तवचस्सु विद्यते विधिर्नियोगो न च शब्दभावना ।

न कर्मकाण्डेऽपि नियोगतोऽस्त्यसौ यतो निषेधेषु न विद्यते विधिः ॥



Hence in the Upaniṣadic statements there is neither *niyoga* nor 'verbal productive operation'. As the import of the prohibitory statements is not *niyoga*, even in the ritualistic portion of the Veda, *niyoga* is not invariably conveyed,

*vidhirniyogo na ca śabdabhūvanū — vidhirityasyaiva vivarāṇam  
niyogeti, TB.*

[ 449 ]

उपेत्यवादं परिहृत्य चोच्यते नियोगनिष्ठास्तु निषेधगोरपि ।  
तथापि वेदान्तवचस्सु विद्यते विधेर्न गन्धोऽपि विरोधकारणात् ॥

Accepting the Prābhākara's contention that 'let the import of the prohibitory statements be *niyoga*, it is said that even then in the Upaniṣadic statements there is no trace of *niyoga* in view of its contradiction.

## KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE ENJOINED

[ 450 ]

ज्ञानं विधातुं न हि शक्यमेतन्न शक्यते कर्तुमकर्तुमेतत् ॥  
तथान्यथा कर्तुमशक्यमेतत् प्रमाणमेयैकनिबन्धनत्वात् ॥

As 'knowledge' has as its basis proof and object alone, it cannot be either produced or not produced or otherwise produced. Hence it cannot be enjoined.

*jñānam tu pramāṇajanyam, pramāṇam ca yathābhūtavastuviśayam, ato  
jñānam kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum aśakyam; kevalam vastutantra-  
meva tat, na codanātantram nāpi puruṣatantram, BSB, I, i, 4.*



[ 451 ]

ब्रह्मज्ञानं जानता ब्रह्मबुद्धेः कर्तव्यत्वं शक्यते ज्ञातुमेतत् ।  
न ह्यज्ञात्वा ब्रह्मबुद्धिं तदीयं कर्तव्यत्वं कश्चिदिष्टे ग्रहीतुम् ॥

One who comprehends the knowledge of the self can know that it is to be achieved. Without the knowledge of the self one cannot know that it is to be achieved.

Cf. SS, I, 56-62.

[ 452 ]

ब्रह्मज्ञानं ब्रह्मणि ज्ञायमाने ज्ञातुं शक्यं नान्यथा तच्च तद्वत् ।  
विज्ञातं चेद्ब्रह्मणस्तावमस्य प्राप्ता मुक्तिर्नास्ति कृत्यं विधीनाम् ॥

Only when the self is known is it possible to comprehend its knowledge and not otherwise. When the true nature of the self also is known like its knowledge, then liberation is attained and hence the injunction serves no purpose here.

See SS, I, 59-62

[ 453 ]

दृशो विराट्सूत्रशरीरगोचरं परस्पराध्यासमबोधसंभवम् ।  
अनर्थमाहुः श्रुतिमस्तके स्थितास्ततोऽस्य विद्यासमयैव मुक्ताः ।

Those who are deeply versed in the Upaniṣads hold that the mutual superimposition of the subtle and the gross bodies and self which is due to *avidyā* is the cause of bondage of the self. Hence the moment the aspirant realizes the true nature of the self, he is liberated.



[ 454 ]

अनाद्यविद्यापटनेत्रबन्धनं प्रसह्य वेदान्तनिबन्धना मतिः ।

स्वजन्ममात्रेण दृढात्मगोचरा समूलदाहं दहतीति हि श्रुतिः ।

The *śruti* text<sup>1</sup> states that the ripened knowledge of the self arising from the Vedānta texts, by its mere rise destroys completely the beginningless *avidyā* which is of the form of a thick cloth that obstructs clear perception.

1. *Chānd.*, VII, i, 3.

[ 455 ]

विज्ञाते ब्रह्मणि स्याद्विधिरयमफलः प्रत्यये तस्य तद्व-

न्नाज्ञातब्रह्मकर्मा विधिविषय इति प्रत्ययो बुद्धियोग्यः ।

ब्रह्मात्मप्रत्ययेऽतो विधिरनवसरः सर्वथा चिन्त्यमान-

स्तस्माद्ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुन्यवसितमखिलं विद्धि वेदान्तवाक्यम् ॥

If the self is known, then the injunction of its knowledge serves no purpose. Similarly it is not intelligible (to hold) that the knowledge of the unknown self is the object of injunction. Thus when being thoroughly examined it seems there is no scope for the injunction regarding the knowledge of the self. Hence you understand that all the Vedānta texts point to the oneness of the supreme and the inner self.

[ 456 ]

विरुद्धत्रिकस्य द्वयापत्तिदोषान्न शक्यं विधानं धियः संग्रहीतुम् ॥

यथा वाजपेये गुणस्येह तद्वत्ततो नास्ति वेदान्तवाक्ये विधानम् ॥

As there would arise two sets of three-fold conflicting attributes, it is not possible to enjoin the knowledge of the self, like substance *vājapeya* which cannot be enjoined



as subsidiary to the sacrifice (in the sentence *vājapeyena svārājyakāmo yajeta* in view of the said defect). Hence the Upaniṣadic statements do not enjoin the knowledge of the self.

The sentence *vājapeyena svārājyakāmo yajeta* enjoins sacrifice having the heaven as its fruit. Now there arises the objection whether this sentence enjoins *vājapeya* as subsidiary to the sacrifice or the word *vājapeya* designates the sacrifice. It is answered that the sentence does not enjoin *vājapeya* as subsidiary to the sacrifice, for there would arise two sets of threefold conflicting attributes in the sacrifice. Hence it is concluded that the word *vājapeya* designates the sacrifice.

This is discussed in the *Jaimini-sūtra*, I, iv, 68. For details see ŚŚ I, 460. And for the two sets of three-fold conflicting attributes see the following verse.

[ 457 ]

उद्दिश्यमानत्वमनूद्यमानभावः प्रधानत्वमितीदमेकम् ।  
तथाप्युपादेयविधेयशेषभावप्रभेदं त्रिकमन्यदत्र ॥

Being mentioned as already existing, being what is restated, and being principal, these constitute one set of three attributes. Similarly, being mentioned as achievable, being made known afresh, and being secondary, these constitute the other set of three attributes.

*uddiśyamānatvam* — *kiñcidvidhūtuṃ siddhavannirddiśyamānatvam*

*anūdyamānabhāvaḥ* — *prāgavagatasya paścādvadūḥ viśayaḥ*

*upādeyam* — *anuṣṭheya ayā nirdeśyam*

*vidheyam* — *ajñātaṃ sat jñāpyam, SS*

The three attributes *uddeśyatva*, *anuvedyatva*, and *pradhānatva* are respectively contrary to *upādeyatva*, *vidheyatva*, and *guṇatva*.



[ 458 ]

एकेन वाक्येन धियो विधानं प्रत्यक्प्रमित्सा च यदि प्रतीचि ।  
त्रिकद्वयं तत्र विरुद्धमेतत् प्रसज्यते कष्टमतः किमन्यत् ॥

If it is accepted that in one sentence the knowledge is enjoined with reference to the self, and the knowledge of the self which is desired is enjoined (with reference to liberation) then there would arise in the self the two sets of three-fold conflicting attributes. Is there any position worse than this?

The author explains in the following verse how the conflicting attributes arise in the self.

[ 459 ]

उद्दिश्यमानं तदनूद्यमानभूतं प्रधानं च धियो विधाने ।  
प्रमीयमाणं पुनरात्मवस्तु तदास्पदं स्यादितरत्रिकस्य ॥

If the knowledge (with reference to the self) is enjoined, then one set of three attributes, namely, being mentioned as already existing, being what is restated, and being principal is present in the self. (If the knowledge of the self is enjoined with reference to liberation) the self which is the content of the knowledge becomes the substratum of the other set of three attributes.

One who holds the view that the knowledge of the self is enjoined must assume a text thus: *mokṣakāmaḥ ātmānaṁ jñāniyāt*. By this text, knowledge is enjoined with reference to the self. and the knowledge of the self is enjoined with reference to liberation. When knowledge is enjoined with reference to the self, then the self is being mentioned as already existing, and so it is principal. As it is existent, it is restated here. So the first set of three attributes is present in the



self. When the knowledge of the self is enjoined with reference to liberation, then the self which is subsidiary to the knowledge is also enjoined (*upādheya*). As the injunctive text makes known the unknown object, the self also is to be considered as made known (*vidheya*) by the injunctive text. Thus the second set of three attributes also are present in the self. Hence there arises the conflict.

[ 460 ]

प्रथमत्रिकं यजिनिगद्यगतं गुणसंगतेरवगमे भवति ।

चरमत्रिकं यजिनिगद्यगतं फलसंगतेरवगमे तु पुनः ॥

If it is admitted that the substance (*vājapeya*) is enjoined with reference to (the sacrifice), then the first set of three attributes is present in the sacrifice which is the sense of the root *yaj*. If sacrifice is enjoined with reference to the fruit, then the other set of three attributes is present in the sacrifice which is the sense of the root *yaj*.

When the substance *vājapeya* is enjoined with reference to the sacrifice, then the latter is *uddheśya*, *anuvādyā*, and *pradhāna*. This is *guṇa-vidhi*. When the sacrifice is enjoined with reference to the fruit, then the sacrifice is *upādheya*, *vidheya*, and *śeṣa*. This is *phala-vidhi*.

Thus the two sets of conflicting attributes would be present in the self. For details see notes SŚ, I, 4 59.

[ 461 ]

सकृदुच्चरन् यजतिरेष गुणं न फलं च संगमयितुं क्षमते ।

कथितत्रिकद्वयविरोधवशाद् यजिवस्तुनीति ननु नीतिविदः ॥

Indeed those who know the principles of interpretation hold that, in view of the conflict of the two sets of three attributes set forth before, this root *yaj*, mentioned only once, is not capable of bringing about the relation of both the subsidiary substance and the fruit to the sacrifice.



[ 462 ]

इति वाजपेयगतनीतिवशादपि नात्मवस्तुविषयावगतौ ।  
विधिरस्ति तेन विधिःशून्यतया परमात्मवस्तुविषयोपनिषत् ॥

According to the maxim arrived at from the interpretation of the *vājapeya* text, there can be no injunction of the knowledge of the self. Hence the import of the Upaniṣadic sentences, being devoid of injunction, is the self.

### THE IMPORT OF THE TEXTS THAT CONVEY THE QUALIFIED SELF

[ 463 ]

सगुणवाक्यमपीह समन्वितं भवति निर्गुणवस्तुनि सर्वशः ।  
न खलु निर्गुणवस्तुसमन्वयं न सहते 'सगुणस्य समन्वयः ॥

The text conveying the qualified self points to the attributeless self in all respects. It is not conflicting if the text conveying the qualified self has its import in the attributeless self.

[ 464 ]

सत्यासत्यवपुस्तथा हि सगुणं ब्रह्मास्य विद्या तथा  
तद्वत्ताद्विषयस्य वेदवचसस्तात्पर्यमेवंविधम् ।  
तेनावन्तरमस्य वेदवचसस्तात्पर्यमन्यादृशं  
चान्यन्निर्गुणवस्तुतत्त्वविषयं संकीर्त्यते भागशः ॥

It is thus: the qualified self is of the form (of the blend) of the real (that is, the spiritual) and the unreal (that is, the phenomenal) element. Likewise its knowledge and the import of the Upaniṣadic texts having it as their



object are of this nature. Hence the import of the Upaniṣadic texts is differentiated (into two) and it is said that their intermediate import is of one nature<sup>1</sup> and the primary import in the attributeless self is of a different nature.<sup>2</sup>

1. *satyāṇṛtaśabalaviṣayam*

2. *paramūrthaikarasavastuviṣayam, AP.*

[ 465 ]

रूप्यज्ञानं रजतमिदमित्येवमुत्पद्यमानं  
मत्यासत्यं विषयमपृथग्दर्शयत्येकमेव ।  
तद्वन्मानं सगुणविषयं सत्यमिध्यावभासं  
'संसृष्टार्थद्वयमिति दृढं दर्शयत्येकमेतत् ॥

The single knowledge of silver arising in the form of 'This is silver' points to its content as the blend of real and unreal objects. Similarly the knowledge of the sentence, which conveys the qualified self and which points to the real and unreal objects indisputably shows that its content is the blend of real and unreal objects.

#### UPANIṢADS POINT TO THE EXISTENT ENTITY

[ 466 ]

तद्बुद्धिमात्रफलतैव च तत्परत्वं  
वेदान्तवादिसमये न तु शेषभावः ।  
शेषत्वमक्षरकलापगतासिमात्रं  
प्रत्येव नाध्ययनमर्थधियोऽपि शेषः ॥

According to the Advaita school, the purport of a sentence is to have as its fruit the knowledge of the sense

1. संसृष्टार्थ - B<sub>2</sub>.



arising from it, and not the state of being subsidiary to the knowledge arising from it. The Vedic study is subsidiary only to the learning by rote the Vedic texts, and not to the knowledge of the sense of the Veda.

According to Mīmāṃsakas the knowledge of the sense of the Veda is the purport of the Veda, as the study of the latter is subsidiary to the former. The Advaitins do not accept this contention and hold that the purport of a sentence is the knowledge of the sense arising from it. And they maintain that the knowledge of the Veda is the purport of the Veda.

[ 467 ]

तच्छेषभावमनपेक्ष्य च तत्फलं स्या-

दाधानवन्न हि तदङ्गमिह क्रतूनाम् ।

अग्न्यङ्गमेव हि तदिष्टमथापि तस्य

सर्वक्रतुष्वधिकृतिः फलमभ्युपेतम् ॥

Though (the Vedic study) is not subordinate to (the knowledge of the sense of the Veda), yet the latter may be the fruit (of the Vedic study) like the consecration of fire. The consecration of fire is not subservient to the sacrifices; and it is accepted to be subsidiary to the (sacred) fire alone. Even then its fruit is the competence to perform all the sacrifices.

[ 468 ]

मन्त्रार्थवादगतमध्ययनं तदर्थमात्रप्रतीतिफलमित्यपि नाभ्युपेतम् ।

विध्यर्थबुद्धिमनुसृत्य फलावमाना सा तद्वतीति तदतत्परतोपपत्तिः ॥

It is not accepted (by the followers of Jaimini) that the fruit of the study of the Vedic hymns and the commendatory texts is the cognition of their meanings alone. The knowledge of the Vedic hymns and the commen-



datory texts becomes fruitful by adhering to the fruitful knowledge of the sense of the injunctive texts. Hence their purport is not in their primary senses.

The commendatory texts (*arthavāda*) are valid only by praising the sense of the injunctive texts. Similarly the Vedic hymns are valid by reminding the sacrificer of the several details of the sacrifice to be performed.

[ 469 ]

सप्रयोजनकबुद्धिकारणं वाक्यमाहुरिह तत्परं बुधाः ।

सप्रयोजनकबुद्धिशेषधीहेतुमन्यपरमाश्रयन्ति च ॥

Wise men hold that a sentence which gives rise to the fruitful knowledge (of a sense) has that sense as its import. They maintain that a sentence which gives rise to the knowledge (of a sense) which is subordinate to the fruitful knowledge (of a sense) has something else as its import.

[ 470 ]

मन्त्रार्थवादवचसामपि गोचरेषु

सौवैष्ववान्तरमुशन्ति च तत्परत्वम् ।

केचित्त्रयीशिरसि खिन्नधियो मुनीन्द्रा-

स्तत्तद्धियो विधिषु शेषतया निवेशात् ॥

The great sages who are adepts in the inquiry into the (import of the) Upaniṣadic texts accept that Vedic hymns and the commendatory texts have for their intermediate import their own senses. For the knowledge of their senses is introduced as subsidiary to the sense of the injunctive texts.

Śrī Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara are here referred to as the great sages.

vide: BS, I, iii, 33 and BSB thereon.



[ 471 ]

श्रेयस्साधनता लिङ्गर्थ इति च प्रागुक्तमत्यादरा-  
 च्छ्रेयस्साधनयागदानहवनाद्यर्थैकनिष्ठं ततः ।  
 सर्वं कर्मवचो नियोगपरता तस्यापि नालोचने  
 'वक्तव्यं किमुतास्य वेदशिरसः सा नेति भूयोऽपि नः ॥

It has been set forth very carefully that the sense of the potential ending is the means to a desired end. Hence the import of all the ritualistic Vedic texts is not *niyoga*, but sacrifice, making gifts, and offering in fire which are the means to desired end. On careful examination, the ritualistic Vedic texts cannot be said to have *niyoga* as their import. (When such is the case) what need is there to say that *niyoga* is not the import of the Upaniṣadic texts?

[ 472 ]

श्रेयस्साधनयागदानहवनाद्यर्थेषु कार्यात्मसु  
 सर्वं कर्मवचः प्रमाणमिति तु ग्राह्यं वचो जैमिनेः ।  
 भाष्यं पश्यत शाबरं स्फुटतरं यो यागमित्यादिकं  
 श्रेयस्साधनयागमात्रवचनं धर्माभिधानं वदत् ॥

The *Sūtra* of Jaimini<sup>1</sup> should be understood in the sense that all the ritualistic Vedic sentences are valid in respect of sacrifice, making gifts, and offering in fire, which are to be achieved and which are the means to prosperity. Look into the text of Śabara's *bhāṣya* 'one who performs sacrifice' etc.<sup>2</sup> which clearly states that the word *dharma* is significative of sacrifice alone which is the means to prosperity.

1. vide: *codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmah*, I, i, 2.

1. वक्तव्या - M<sub>1</sub>



2. *yo yāgamanutiṣṭhati taṁ dhārmikamityācakṣate,*  
 Śabara's *bhāṣya* on *Jaimini-Sūtra*, I, i, 2.

Jaimini holds that the import of the ritualistic Vedic texts is *dharma*, and *dharma* is not *niyoga*, but only sacrifice, etc., as Śabara points out that one who performs sacrifice is known to be a *dhārmika*.

[ 473 ]

पुलिङ्गतापि घटते क्रतुगामिनोऽस्य  
 सूक्ष्मात्मना भवति हि क्रतुरप्यपूर्वम् ।  
 तेन क्रतोरुपचरन्नभिदां पुमान्स्यात्  
 क्लीबस्तु धर्ममिति हि क्रतुवाचकत्वे ॥

The word *dharma* which is significative of sacrifice can well be used in masculine gender. The sacrifice in its subtle form becomes *apūrva*. And figuratively identifying the sacrifice with *apūrva*, the word *dharma* is masculine in gender. If it signifies the sacrifice alone (which is not identified with *apūrva*), then it is neuter in gender.

This verse answers the objection that may be raised on the basis of the *kośa* text:

*adṛṣṭe puṁsi dharmah syāt klībo yāgūdtko mataḥ* [cited in S.]

[ 474 ]

इष्टाभ्युपायवचनो लिङिति स्थितौ च  
 स्याद्भावनावचनास्य यदा 'तदा च ।  
 कर्तुर्भवेदधिकृतिस्तु नियोगवादे  
 स्वाम्ये स्थिते सति भवेदथ कर्तृभावः ॥

In the view<sup>1</sup> that the sense of the potential ending is the means to a desired end, and in the view<sup>2</sup> that it means productive operation, the agent becomes the enjoyer

1. तदापि - T.



of the fruit. But in the doctrine of *niyoga*, the aspirant is related to *niyoga* as its owner and then to sacrifice as the agent.

1. SS, I, 398,

2. SS, I, 386-92.

In the first two views, the aspirant is related to the sacrifice as the agent and then he becomes the enjoyer of its fruits. But in the doctrine of *niyoga*, the aspirant is related to *niyoga* as its owner and then he is related as an agent to the sacrifice which is the content of *niyoga*.

[ 475 ]

इष्टाभ्युपायो विधिरात्मनीच्छामुत्पादयन्प्रेरकतामुपैति ।

इष्टाभ्युपायेऽवगते लिङादेरिच्छा फलादेनमुपैति सद्यः ॥

The sacrifice which is known to be the means to a desired end gives rise to the desire for itself, and (through it) it prompts one to activity. After the rise of the desire for the result, the means of the desired result is known from the potential ending. Then immediately there arises the desire for the sacrifice (which is the means to a desired end).

*vidhiḥ — vidhiyate iti vidhiḥ (yāgaḥ)*

*phalāt — phalecchānantaram. SS.*

[ 476 ]

नियोगकोट्यापि नरो न कश्चिदिच्छां विना दुःखनिदानभूतम् ।

करोति कर्मेह पुमर्थरागात् प्रवृत्तिरेवेति हि राजमार्गः ॥

Though prompted by numerous mandates, a person does not perform the laborious sacrifice, unless he desires



(the result of the sacrifice). So the desire for the result alone prompts one to activity and this view is the right course.

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इष्टाभ्युपायस्य च कार्यभावः प्रयत्ननिष्पाद्यतयोपपन्नः ।

स चावसेयो वचनाल्लिङादेः प्रत्यक्षतो रागनिबन्धनस्तु ॥

It is reasonable that sacrifice which is the means to a desired end is one to be achieved by human effort. And this sense should be known from the potential ending, etc. (The desire for the sacrifice) arising from desire for the result is known through perception (and it is not the sense of the potential ending, etc.).

The potential ending, etc., convey that the sacrifice is the means to a desired end and it is to be achieved by human effort. The potential ending does not signify desire for the sacrifice, as the latter (that is, the desire for the sacrifice) is known through perception.

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कार्यत्वमिच्छावशवति किञ्चिदिष्टाभ्युपाये निजमस्य किञ्चित् ।

निजं लिङादेरवसेयमस्य साक्षिप्रसादादितरप्रतीतिः ॥

One aspect of being an act<sup>1</sup> caused by the desire for the result is present in the means to a desired end. Another aspect of being an act which is natural to the means to a desired end<sup>2</sup> is present in the latter. The aspect of being an act which is natural is known from the potential ending, etc., and the other is known through perception.

1. The desire for the sacrifice arising from the desire for its result is known through perception and it prompts one to activity. The sacrifice thus becomes an object of human effort and in this sense it is a *kārya* or an act (*kṛtyuddēśyatvarūpam kāryatvam*). This aspect of



being an act present in the sacrifice is known through perception and not from the endings of potential mood, etc., as it is based on the desire for the sacrifice which is known through perception alone.

2 Another aspect of being an act present in the sacrifice is : the sacrifice itself is of the nature of an act; and so it is to be achieved by the volitional activity. And in this sense it is a *kūrya* or an act. (*kṛtisādhyatvarūpaṁ kuryatvam*). This aspect of being an act is known only from the endings of potential mood, etc.

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जानात्यर्थे लिङ्पदं गौणमाहुर्जानात्यर्थः कर्तृतन्त्रो न हीष्टः ।  
यागाद्यर्थे कर्तृतन्त्रे हि मुख्यो लिङ्लोडादिः श्रेयसो हेतुभूते ॥

Wise men hold as knowledge is not accepted to depend on human agency, the potential ending used in respect of it (in the Upaniṣadic texts like *ātmānaṁ paśyet*)<sup>1</sup> is to be taken in its secondary sense. As sacrifice, etc., which are the means of desired end depend on human activity, the endings of potential mood, imperative mood, etc., used with reference to them (that is, sacrifices, etc.) are to be taken in their primary senses.

1. *vide Brh IV, iv, 23.*

2. Cf: *yathābhūtabrahmātmaviśayamāpi jñānaṁ codanātantram, tadviśaye liṅṅdayaḥ śrūyamāṇā api aniyojyaviśayatvāt kuṇṭhībhavanti upalādiṣu prayukta kṣurataikṣṇyādivat*, BSB. I. i, 4.

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जानात्यर्थे श्रेयसो हेतुभावभागोऽबुद्धो बोध्यते लिङ्पदेन ।  
यागाद्यर्थे श्रेयसो हेतुभावो मुख्यो बोध्यः कर्तृतन्त्रो न गौणः ॥

The potential ending used in respect of knowledge conveys a part of its sense which is unknown, namely, that the knowledge is the means to liberation. As sacrifice, etc., depend on human effort, the potential ending



which signifies the means to a desired end and which is used with reference to sacrifice, etc., is to be taken in its primary sense and not in its secondary sense.

The potential ending conveys that a particular thing is the means to a desired end and it is to be achieved by human effort. The potential ending used in respect of the knowledge of the self (in the sentence *ātmānam paśyet*) conveys that the knowledge is the means to liberation, but does not convey the sense that it is to be achieved. Hence the potential ending in this case is taken in its secondary sense. In the case of sacrifice, etc., the potential ending conveys that they are the means of desired end and they are to be achieved. Hence the potential ending in this case is taken in its primary sense.

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यागाद्यर्थे मुख्यता यद्वदस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानस्यान्तरङ्गेषु तद्वत् ।  
तर्कादीनां कर्तृतन्त्रत्वेतोर्ज्ञानाद्वर्गागौणताहेत्वभावात् ॥

The potential ending is used in respect of sacrifice, etc., in its primary sense. Similarly, reasoning, etc., which are the proximate means to the realization of the self, depend on human agency and as such in respect of them the potential ending is used in its primary sense, there being no (valid) reason for taking the potential ending (used in respect of reasoning, etc.,) in its secondary sense before the realization of the self.

*ātmāsākṣātkārodyaūtpṛāk kartuḥ karomityabhimānasyānapāyāt śravaṇā-  
dividhau liṅādergaṇatvākālpānyān pramāṇābhāvāt. AP.*

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भूतस्य भव्याय यथोपदेशः क्रियापरे वस्तुपरे तु काण्डे ।  
न हीष्टमेवं विपरीतमस्मिन् भव्यस्य भूताय सदोपदेशः ॥



In the ritualistic section of the Veda, the existent entity is taught as subservient to the things that are to be achieved.<sup>1</sup> But this view is not accepted in the Vedānta section where the reverse is held, that is, the thing to be achieved is always subservient to the existent entity.

1. *bhūtaīm bhavyāya upadiśyate, Śābara-bhāṣya on Jaimini-sūtra*,  
III, iv, 40

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भव्यप्रतितावुपयोगभाजो भवन्ति कात्स्न्येन हि सिद्धवादाः ।  
क्रियाप्रधाने न तथात्र किंतु भूतप्रतीतौ खलु भव्यवादाः ॥

In the ritualistic portion of the Veda, the sentences conveying the existent entity are wholly useful to the knowledge of the objects that are to be achieved. But in the Vedānta section, the things that are to be achieved (namely, Vedāntic study, reasoning, and meditation) are useful to the knowledge of the existent entity.

Vedāntic study, reasoning, and meditation are enjoined in respect of the knowledge of the self.

*vide: Brh, II, iv, v; IV, v, 6.*

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भव्यप्रतीतौ न हि कश्चिदर्थो भूतप्रतीतौ पुनरस्ति मुक्तिः ।  
श्रोतव्य इत्यादि ततो विधानं भूतोपदेशानुगुणं समस्तम् ॥

The knowledge of the things that are to be achieved does not lead to any ultimate purpose. But the knowledge of the self leads to liberation.<sup>1</sup> Hence all the injunctive texts such as *śrotavyaḥ* etc.,<sup>2</sup> are subsidiary to the sentences that convey the existent self.

1. *Muṇḍ, III, ii, 9.*

2. *Brh, II, iv, 5; IV, v, 6.*

*bhūtopadeśānugūṇam - bhūtopadeśaśeṣaḥ, AP.*



[ 485 ]

आदाय मुख्यगुणलाक्षणिकप्रवृत्तीर्भव्यप्रतीतिजनकैः सह भूतवादाः।  
संबन्धिनो विधिवचस्सु तथात्र सर्वे भव्यार्पणाः परिवृढप्रतिपादकेन ॥

In the ritualistic portion of the Veda, the sentences conveying existent entity become related to the sentences that enjoin the things that are to be achieved, by resorting to either primary signification or secondary one or the one based on the knowledge of similarity. Similarly in the Vedānta section, all the sentences conveying the things that are to be achieved become related to the sentences that convey the self.

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सिद्धार्थवादिवचनेषु न गौणतादिदोषाय कर्मपरवाक्यगतेषु यद्वत् ।  
कार्यार्थवादिवचनेषु न गौणतादिदोषस्तथोपनिषदीति समानमेतत् ॥

It is not a defect to take in their secondary senses the words which convey the existent entities and which are related to the injunctive texts. Similarly in the Vedānta section, it is not a defect to take the words which convey the things to be achieved in their secondary senses.'

The word *apyeti* in the sentence *brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti* (*Brh*, IV, iv, 6) is taken in its secondary sense.

See *SS*, I, 307, 310-3.

[ 487 ]

मानेन मेयावगतिश्च युक्ता धर्मस्य जाड्याद्विधिनिष्ठकाण्डे ।  
मेयेन मानावगतिश्च युक्ता वेदान्तवाक्येष्वजडं हि मेयम् ॥

Religious rite is insentient and hence it is reasonable to hold that in the ritualistic portion of the Veda, the object is known through proof. But as the self which is the object of the Upaniṣadic sentences is sentient, it is reason-



able to hold that in the Vedānta section the proofs are known through the object (namely, the self).

[ 488 ]

कर्मप्रधानेऽतिगते च काण्डे वाक्यत्वमाख्यातपदप्रयुक्तम् ।  
ब्रह्मप्रधाने श्रुतिमस्तकेऽस्मिन्नामप्रधानं वचनं समस्तम् ॥

In the ritualistic portion of the Veda which is primarily concerned with rituals, the sentence is determined by the presence of a verb. In the Vedānta section which is primarily concerned with the self, the noun is primary in all the sentences.

[ 489 ]

कार्यप्रधानमखिलं च पदं सुबन्त-  
माख्यातमेव फलतः खलु कर्मकाण्डे ।  
तद्वत्तिङन्तमपि वेदशिरस्सु सर्वं  
नामैव तद्धि परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनिष्ठम् ॥

In the ritualistic portion of the Veda if a word, though a noun, conveys the sense of what is to be achieved, then it is in effect a finite verb. Similarly, as all the verbs in the Upaniṣadic sentences point to the existent entity, they are in effect nouns.

The idea contained in ŚŚ, I, 282-3 is restated here.

[ 490 ]

आग्नेयमाश्विनमथैन्द्रमितीदृशं हि सर्वं सुबन्तमपि भव्यपरं प्रतिष्ठम् ।  
सास्येति ताद्वितमन्वितसंनिधाने नामैव तद्ववति यद्ववतीति तद्वत् ॥

Though the words such as *āgneya*, *āśvina*, *aindra*, etc. are nouns, yet it is well-known that they convey the things



that are to be achieved. The word *bhavati* which is placed by the side of the words having the *taddhita* suffix enjoined by (the *sūtra*) *sā asya devatā*, functions merely as a noun.

The idea contained in this verse has already been explained in SS, I, 308-9.

The Vedic texts where the words referred to in this verse occur are:

1. *āgneyo'ṣṭīkapūlo bhavati*
2. *aindraṁ dadhyamāvāsyaāyām*
3. *āśvinam dhīmramālabheta*, Cited in S.

[ 491 ]

अस्त्यस्म्यसीति च तिङन्तपदानि सन्ति  
वेदान्तवाक्यनिलयानि तथापि तानि ।  
नाख्यातशब्दनिजशक्तिधुरं 'वहेयु-  
रस्ति त्वमात्रविषया हि निषक्तिरेषाम् ॥

The finite verbs such as *asti*, *asmi*, and *asi* are present in the Upaniṣadic sentences.<sup>1</sup> Even then they do not function as finite verbs. For their import is mere existence.

1. See SS, I, 283.

*niṣaktiḥ* — *paryavasānam*, AP.

[ 492 ]

पूर्वापरीभूतपदार्थनिष्ठमाख्यातमाख्यातविदो वदन्ति ।  
कूटस्थसत्तावगतिप्रधानमाख्यातवत्साधु तिङन्तमाहुः ॥

Those who know the nature of the finite verbs hold that the import of a finite verb is the thing to be achieved. It has been well-said that the finite verb which gives rise

1. वहेयु - T.



to the knowledge of the existence alone which is immutable is figuratively spoken of as a verb.

[ 493 ]

अस्तित्वस्तुविषयोपनिषन्निषक्तिराश्रीयते यदि तदा प्रमितं प्रमेयम् ॥  
तस्यास्तवापतति मानमितत्वमेव ह्यस्तित्वमात्मगतमभ्युपयन्ति धीराः॥

If it is admitted that the import of the Upanisadic sentences is 'existence', then in your system there is the possibility of the (object of the) Upaniṣads being known by other means of valid knowledge. For the wise ones (that is, the Prābhākaras) admit that the existence of the self is cognized by other means of knowledge.

The objection raised by the Prābhākaras is put forth in this verse. See SS, I, 284.

The Prābhākaras hold that existence is cognized by other means of knowledge. They argue that if it is held by the Advaitins that the Upaniṣads convey the self and the self is existence, then it comes to this that the Upaniṣads convey an entity which is the object of other means of knowledge. In that case, the Upaniṣads are exposed to the fault of losing their self-validity. That is, they convey a thing that is known by other means of knowledge.

It must be noted here that the Prābhākaras only say that existence is cognized by other means of knowledge. They do not say that existence is self and that is cognized by other means of knowledge. But, since existence according to Advaita is of the nature of the self, it is said here that the Prābhākara's criticism would be that existence which is the self according to Advaita would become the object of other means of knowledge.

*vide : ātmagatamiti tu prastutābhiprāyām, SS.*

[ 494 ]

अथ वा मितियेग्यतास्तिता निरवद्यास्तु समस्तवस्तुषु ।  
परमात्मनि तत्प्रतीयते सकलं वेदशिरः प्रवर्तताम् ॥



Or else, let the existence of all the objects be their fitness to become the content of valid knowledge; and this view is faultless. And, let the Upanisadic statements function in order to give rise to the knowledge of existence, that is, the self.

As 'existence' is the fitness of the object to become the object of a proof other than verbal testimony, the Upanisadic statements which signify the self which is of the nature of 'existence' are exposed to the fault of losing their intrinsic validity.

[ 495 ]

तदसुन्दरमात्मसंविदोरपि सत्ता भवताभ्युपेयते ।  
न तयोर्विषयत्वहीनयोर्मितियोग्यत्वमितत्वसंभवः ॥

It is unsound. It is also admitted by you that 'soul' and 'knowledge' possess existence. But they are neither capable of becoming the objects of knowledge nor are they the objects of cognition,' for they are never objects.

The objection raised by the Prābhākaras is refuted in this verse.

1. The Prābhākaras hold that knowledge is self-luminous and the soul is manifested as its substratum. Hence both are not objects.

WORLD : THE EFFECT OF A SENTIENT BEING

[ 496 ]

क्षितिजलदहनानिलाम्बराणां जनिमनुमाय विभक्तताबलेन ।  
जगति हि जनिमद्विभज्यमानं घटघटिकादि समीक्ष्यते समस्तम् ॥

It is seen in the world that the things which are disparate like pot, jar, etc., are produced from something. Hence they infer that earth, water, fire, air, and ether being disparate are produced from something (and then they think out the cause from which they have originated).



[ 497 ]

क्षितिजलदहनेषु तत्प्रदेशाज्जनिसहितानुपलभ्य तद्वलेन ।

क्षितिजलदहनत्वलिङ्गमार्गादपि जनिमेष्वनुमाय तर्कयन्ति ॥

Noticing origination in the parts of earth, water, and fire, and citing them (namely, the parts of earth, etc.) as the example, they infer that earth, water, and fire, which are respectively of the nature of being earth, water, and fire, are produced from something.

We notice the origin of earth in its parts such as pot, etc. The origin of water is seen in the moon-stone; and the origin of fire is observed when fire is kindled by rubbing one stick against another.

Now it is inferred thus :

*mahāpṛthivī janīmatī, pṛthivītvāt, ghaṭavat.*

[ 498 ]

जनिमदभवदेतच्चेतनादेव हेतो-

र्घटवदिति पुनस्तत्कारणे चेतनत्वम् ।

अनुमिमत् उदके कार्यतालिङ्गतोऽमी

जगति हि परिदृष्टं चेतनादेव कार्यम् ॥

Then they infer that like pot, etc., earth and other elements which are produced must have originated from a sentient being. Thus they think out that earth, etc., in view of their being effects, must have a cause and that should be sentient; for it is perceived in ordinary experience that the effects (like pot, etc.) are produced by a sentient being.

[ 499 ]

जगदुदयनिमित्तं चेतनं किं तु नाना

किमु भवतु तदेकं सर्ववित्सर्वशक्ति ।

इति भवति तु पश्चात्कारणे चेतनेऽस्मि-

न्ननवगतिनिमित्तः संशयो दुर्निवारः ॥



Later, owing to ignorance there arises an unavoidable doubt whether the sentient being which is the cause of the universe is manifold or only one endowed with omniscience and omnipotence.

[ 500 ]

श्रुतिवचनविशेषाच्चेतने कारणेऽस्मिन्  
यत इति निरवद्यादेकताधीर<sup>1</sup>थागात् ।  
प्रकृतिरिति च तास्मिन्कारणे पञ्चमीयं  
जनयति दृढबुद्धिं तद्विधानादिहैव ॥

From the faultless Upaniṣadic sentence *yato vā* etc.<sup>1</sup> there arises the knowledge that the sentient being is one. Ane, later the word in the ablative case (*yataḥ*) gives rise to the firm belief that the sentient being is the material cause of the universe; for the ablative case is enjoined in the sense of the source.<sup>2</sup>

1. *Taitt*, III, i, 1

2. *vide: Pāṇini-Sūtra* — *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*, I, iv, 30.

[ 501 ]

एकत्वमेकवचनादवगम्यमानं  
यच्छब्दवाच्यनित्यं यत इत्यमुष्मिन् ।  
वाक्ये जगत्प्रकृतिगामितया <sup>2</sup>न विद्मः  
संख्यां विभक्त्यभिहिते वचनं हि नाह ॥

In the sentence *yataḥ*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> the singular number conveyed by the singular case-ending is related to the sense of the stem *yat*. (We do not find it) as related to the other sense of the case-ending (that is, *kāraka*)—the source of the universe.

1. थाद्या - P<sub>2</sub>.

2. निविष्टां - P<sub>2</sub>.



1. The full text is: *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayantyaḥ hisaṁviśanti... tad brahmeti* (Taitt. III, i, 1.)

The case-ending conveys two concepts, namely, number and *kāraka*. Here the ablative case-ending in *yataḥ* conveys the singular number and the *apādāna-kāraka*.

*vide: apādāne pañcamī, Pāṇini-sūtra, II. iii, 28.* And the *apādāna-kāraka* signifies *prakṛti* or source.

*vide: janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ, Pāṇini-sūtra, I, iv, 30.*

The *pūrvapakṣin* in this and the following six verses argues that number is not directly related to the sense of the *apādāna-kāraka*, that is, *prakṛti*, in which case only it can be admitted that the source of the universe is one only.

[ 502 ]

न हि विभक्त्यभिधेयपदार्थगं वचनमाह निजं विषयं क्वचित् ।  
वचनवाच्यगतं न वदन्ति च स्वमभिधेयमशेषविभक्तयः ॥

Nowhere the case-ending denoting number conveys its sense as related to the (other) sense (*kāraka*) conveyed by the same case-ending. And no case-ending conveys its sense (*kāraka*) as related to the (other) sense of the same case-ending denoting number.

[ 503 ]

प्रातिपदिकार्थगतमेव वचनानि स्वं स्वमभिधेयमभिधातुमलमर्थम् ।  
प्रातिपदिकार्थगतमेव निजमर्थं वक्ति च विभक्तिरपि नेह वचनार्थे ॥

The case-endings denoting number are capable of conveying their own senses as related to the sense of the stem. The case-ending also conveys its sense (*kāraka*) as related to the sense of the stem and not as related to the other sense of the case-ending, namely, number.



[ 504 ]

पशुनेति पदे तृतीयया करणत्वं हि पशोर्निवेद्यते ।  
वचनेन पशोरिहैकता न पुनः सा करणस्य कथ्यते ॥

By the instrumental ending present in the word *paśunā* (in the Vedic text *paśunā yajeta*), it is made known that the animal is the means (to the sacrifice); and, by the same case-ending denoting number, it is made known that that animal is one in number and not that the means is one in number.

It might be said: the instrumental case-ending in *paśunā* in the Vedic text — *paśunā yajeta* conveys two concepts — singular number and 'means'; and these two are mutually related. So there arises the knowledge that one animal is the means. Similarly, here the singular number and the sense of *apādāna-kāraka*, that is, *prakṛti* are mutually related and so there could arise the knowledge that one individual is the source of the universe. This contention is refuted in this verse.

It may be questioned: how does there arise the knowledge from the Vedic text — *paśunā yajeta* that one animal is the means to sacrifice, the knowledge which presupposes the knowledge of the mutual relation of the singular number and means?

This question is answered in the following two verses.

[ 505 ]

अनुपपत्तिबलेन विधेस्तयोः करणतैकतयोरवगम्यते ।  
करणतैकपशोरिति संगतिर्न घटते हि विधिर्विरह्य ताम् ॥

The injunction would not become intelligible without the relation of the 'means' and the 'singular number'. Hence, in view of the incompatibility of injunction, the relation of the 'means' and the 'singular number' is known in the form 'one animal is the means'.

See the following verse.



[ 506 ]

उपादानतः संख्यया संगतिः स्यादवच्छेदकत्वेन संख्यानिवेशात् ।  
पशोरेतयोस्तेन मार्गेण कार्ये निवेशोपपत्तेरुपादानमानात् ॥

The relation of the 'means' to the singular number is presumptively known from injunction. The singular number, being the delimiting characteristic of the animal, is related (to the means). It is reasonable to hold that by presumption the means and the singular number, through their relation to the animal are related to the *niyoga*.

In the word, *paśunā*, in the sentence, *paśunā yajeta* the stem conveys the animal and the case-ending conveys the 'means' and the singular number. All these three are related to *niyoga*. But they cannot be directly related. The *niyoga* cannot be achieved, unless its content, the sacrifice, is achieved. And the sacrifice can be achieved only when the animal is related to it as its means. And the singular number is related to the 'means' as the delimiting characteristic of the animal. Thus there results, by presumption, the relation of the singular number and the 'means'. See SS.

[ 507 ]

न चैवं विधिः कश्चिदत्रेति न स्यादुपादानतः संगतिर्यत्पदार्थे ।  
विभक्त्यर्थसंख्यार्थयोर्नेह कश्चिद्यतो वा इमानीति वाक्ये विधिर्नः ॥

According to our view, there is no injunction in the Upaniṣadic text *yato vā imāni*, etc. Hence, by presumption, there cannot be the mutual relation of number and the sense of *kāraṇa* (that is, *prakṛti*) as related to the sense of the stem *yat*.

[ 508 ]

अवितथमिदमेवमेतदस्मिन्न खलु विधेर्वचनं पठन्ति वाक्ये ।  
यत इति घटते तथापि योगो वचनविभक्तिनिगद्ययोरिहापि ॥

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1. रेनयोस्ते - T<sub>2</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>.



It is true (that the relation of the singular number and the 'means' is known presumptively). It is also true that there is no injunction in the Upaniṣadic passage (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc.) Yet there could be the (mutual) relation of the sense of the case-ending denoting number and the other sense of the same case-ending (*kāraka*).

[ 509 ]

एकत्वमेकवनेन समर्पितं यद्यच्छब्दवाच्यनिलयं यत इत्यमुष्मिन् ।  
पञ्चम्युपात्तमपि यत्प्रकृतित्वमस्मिन् संगच्छते तदुभयं पशुवस्तुनीव ॥

Just as there is the mutual relation of the means and singular number in respect of the animal, so also in respect of the sense of the word *yataḥ* present in the sentence *yato vā*, etc., there is the mutual relation of the singular number conveyed by the case-ending and the sense of the source conveyed by the same case-ending.

[ 510 ]

एका या प्रकृतिः समस्तजननी तद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यता-  
मित्यत्रापि हि वस्तुनिष्ठवचने शक्यैव तत्संगतिः ।  
विज्ञातुं विधिमन्तरेण च तथानर्थक्यभीत्या न हि  
स्वाध्यायाध्ययनैकगोचरविधेरायातमर्थं विना ॥

The import of the sentence 'The primordial cause which is one is the source of the universe and that is the self and let that be realized' is the existent entity (the self). Even in this sentence the mutual relation [of the singular number and the sense of source (*prakṛti*)] can be known without any injunction. Or else, the mutual relation (of the singular number and the sense of source) can be presumptively known from the apparent futility of the injunctive text. The Upaniṣadic text (*yato vā*, etc.) could



not come within the range of the injunctive text 'One's own recension of the Veda should be studied', unless it conveys a sense that leads to ultimate purpose.

The knowledge of the sense of the Veda that leads to ultimate purpose is indirectly the fruit of the injunction regarding the study of one's own branch of the Veda (*svādhyāyo'dhyetaavyah*). The Upaniṣadic texts also come within the scope of this injunction and they should also convey the sense that would lead to ultimate value. When such is the case, in the sentence *yato vā*, etc., if there is no mutual relation of the singular number and the source of the universe, then the sentence does not convey sense that would lead to ultimate purpose, namely, liberation; for only the knowledge of the oneness of the source of the universe leads to liberation.

*vide: upādāna-ekatva-jñānasyaiva puruṣārthatvāt, TB.*

In the absence of any fruit, the injunctive text would not prompt one to the study of the Veda. Hence in view of the futility of injunctive text, we should admit that there is the mutual relation of the sense of singular number and the sense of the source of the universe.

1. *Taitt*, III, i, 1.

[ 511 ]

वचनार्थविभक्तिवाच्ययोरुपपन्नान्वयबुद्धिरर्थतः ।

पशुनेति पदे यथा तथा यत इत्यादिपदेऽपि लक्षणे ॥

Just as in the word *paśunā* (in the sentence *paśunā yajeta*) the knowledge of the relation of number denoted by the case-ending *und* *kāraka* denoted by the same case-ending is reasonable by presumption, so also in the word *yataḥ* in the sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*) which defines the self, (the knowledge of the relation of the number denoted by the case-ending and the sense of the source denoted by the same case-ending got by presumption is reasonable).



[ 512 ]

विधिनिष्ठवाक्यमपि बोधयति स्वमपेक्षितं विषयमर्थवशात् ।  
परमात्मनिष्ठमपि तुल्यमिदं वचसोर्द्वयोरपि तु रूपमतः ॥

The injunctive text also presumptively makes known its intended sense. Similar is the case with the sentence conveying the self. So the nature of conveying the import by presumption is similar in the two kinds of texts.

[ 513 ]

एकं चेतनमस्य यत्प्रकृतितामापन्नमुत्प्रेक्षते  
तद्ब्रूहेति निशामयेति निपुणं ब्रूते परब्रह्मणः ।  
सिद्धं लक्षणमादरेण महता व्यावर्तयद्ब्रह्मण-  
स्तत्त्वं तत्त्वमसीति वाक्यनिलयं तच्छब्दलक्ष्यं वचः ॥

The sentient being which is accepted as the source of this universe is one. The sentence (*yato vā imāṇi bhūtāni jāyante*) restates this definition of the self established by inference and then clearly states that that is the self and (you) know it by enquiry. This definition differentiates the self which is secondarily signified by the word *tat* present in the sentence *tat tvam asi* (from all other things accepted as the source of the universe by the various other schools like Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, etc.)

### THE THREE KINDS OF DEFINITION

[ 514 ]

लक्ष्यस्य लक्षणमिह त्रिविधं प्रसिद्धं  
लोके स्वलक्षणममुष्य विशेषणं वा ।  
यद्वोपलक्षणमिमानि च लक्षणेन  
व्यावर्णयामि पृथगेव तु तत्प्रतीहि ॥



In ordinary experience definitions of an object defined are known to be three-fold. They are essential characteristic definition, attributive definition, and indicative definition. I shall define these severally and you understand them.

[ 515 ]

लक्ष्यार्थनिष्ठमुपलब्धमतोऽन्यतोऽर्था-

न्निःशेषतो यदतिरिच्य तदर्थवस्तु ।

लक्ष्यं निवेदयति लक्षणमेतदाहुः

सामान्यलक्षणमिदं त्रिषु लक्षणेषु ॥

The characteristic feature which is present in the object defined and which completely differentiates it (namely, the object) from the other objects is held to be the definition (of that object). This is the general definition of all the three definitions.

[ 516 ]

लक्ष्यस्वरूपमपि सद्यदमुष्य साक्षादर्थान्तराद्भवति भेदकमेतदाहुः ।

अस्य स्वलक्षणतयैव तु लक्षणं खं छिद्रं द्रवं जलमितीदृशमत्र लोके ॥

The characteristic feature which is the essential nature of the object defined and which naturally differentiates the latter from the other objects is said to be the essential characteristic, like 'The sky is hollow'; 'Water is liquid', etc., in ordinary experience.

[ 517 ]

स्वानुरक्तमतिजन्म<sup>1</sup> कारणं यत्पुन<sup>2</sup> भवति लक्ष्यवस्तुनि ।

तद्विशेषणतयास्य लक्षणं केसरादिकमिवाश्ववस्तुनि ॥

1. न्महेतुतां - P<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>.

2. P<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>4</sub>.



The characteristic feature which gives rise to the knowledge of its relation to the object defined is said to be the attributive definition of the object like the mane to the horse.

[ 518 ]

स्वानुरक्तमतिजन्महेतुतां लक्ष्यवस्तुनि निरस्य लक्षणम् ।  
अस्वरूपमपि तस्य यद्भवेत् काकवत्तादुपलक्षणं विदुः ॥

The characteristic feature which indicates the object to be defined, but which is not its essential nature, and which abandons the nature of giving rise to the knowledge of its relation to it (namely, the object defined) is held to be the indicative definition, like crow (to a house).

### THE DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN

[ 519 ]

विश्वोद्भवस्थितिलयप्रकृतित्वमस्य चिद्वस्तुनो यदसहायपरिग्रहस्य ।  
तद्वर्णनीयमुपलक्षणमेव कस्माद् ब्रह्मेति लक्ष्यपदशक्त्यविरोधहेतोः ॥

The pure consciousness, being devoid of any extraneous means, is the cause of the origination, sustenance, and destruction of the universe. (The causality) is to be explained as the indicative definition of the self. Why so? For then only there will be no contradiction to the significative power of the word 'Brahman' which conveys the thing that is to be defined.

See the following verse.

[ 520 ]

विश्वोद्भवस्थितिलयप्रकृतित्वरूपमेकाकिनो यदिह लक्षणमुच्यमानम् ।  
तद्ब्रह्मणो यदि विशेषणरूपमिष्टं ब्रह्मेति लक्ष्यविषयस्य पदस्य भङ्गः ॥



If the causality of the origination, sustenance, and destruction of the universe being stated as the definition of the self is its attributive definition, then there would be contradiction to the significative power of the word 'Brahman' which conveys the thing to be defined.

*yadidaṁ lakṣaṇamucyamānaṁ dr̥śyate, taccet viśeṣaṇaṁ syāt, tasya brahmadharmatvena satyatvāt bṛhatyarthasya aparicchadasya bhaṁgāt lakṣyavācibrahmapadaśaktisaṅkocaḥ syāt, S.*

Sarvajñātman in the third *adhyāya* explains why causality being stated as the definition of the self cannot be considered as the essential characteristic (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) of the self. See *SS*, III, 184-93.

[ 521 ]

लक्ष्यार्थवाचि पदमत्र हि लक्षणार्थे

वाक्ये प्रधानमितरद्गुणभूतमाहुः ।

ब्रह्मेति लक्ष्यविषयं च पदं समर्थं

भूमानमेव वदितुं न तु मर्त्यमल्पम् ॥

In the sentence which serves as the definition of the self the word which conveys the thing to be defined is primary and the other words are secondary. The word 'Brahman' significative of the thing to be defined is capable of conveying only the absolute self and not a limited thing which is subject to destruction.

For the explanation of the words *bhūman*, *martyam*, and *alpam*, vide *Chānd*, VII, xxiv, 1.

[ 522 ]

तस्मात्प्रधानपदमङ्गभयाद्गुणानां युक्तं ग्रहीतुमुपलक्षणगोचरत्वम् ।

ब्रह्मेति चैतदुपलक्ष्यसमर्पणार्थमेवं समञ्जसमिदं पदजातमस्मिन् ॥

Hence in view of the fear of contradiction to the significative power of the principal word it is reasonable to take



the subsidiary words as indicative attributes. And the word 'Brahman' conveys the sense of what is to be indicated (*upalakṣya*). Thus in this sentence (namely, *yato vā imāṇi bhūtāni jāyante*) all the words are syntactically related.

[ 523 ]

लक्ष्यस्वरूपकथनाय न लक्षणानि  
 नाप्यस्य वाचकमिदं पदमित्यमुष्मै ॥  
 व्यावृत्तमेतदखिलादितरार्थजाता-  
 दित्येतदेव वदितुं ननु लक्षणानि ॥

The definitions do not convey the nature of the object to be defined; nor do they state that a particular word is significative of a particular sense. Indeed they are only to differentiate the object defined from all other objects.

[ 524 ]

लक्ष्यस्वरूपमुपलभ्य तदेकनिष्ठं  
 दृष्ट्वा च लक्षणमनेन तदेव लक्ष्यम् ।  
 व्यावर्त्य बोधयितुमुत्सहते जनोऽयं  
 तत्त्वान्तरादिति यतः प्रतिपन्नमेतत् ॥

Perceiving the nature of the object defined, and noticing the definition present in it alone, one wishes to convey the object defined, by differentiating it from other objects with the help of the definition. And this is well known to be so.

[ 525 ]

संज्ञासंज्ञिसमन्वयावगतये नेष्टं क्वचिल्लक्षणं  
 व्यावृत्तिप्रतिपत्तिमात्रजनकं लक्ष्ये भवेदन्यतः ।  
 लक्ष्यं लक्षणवर्त्मना हि जगति व्यावर्त्यन्तोऽन्यत-  
 स्तत्तल्लक्षणमादरेण महता संगृह्यते वादिनः ॥



Nowhere is it accepted that a definition gives rise to the knowledge of the relation of a word to its sense. But, in respect of the object defined, it gives rise to the knowledge of its difference from other objects. In ordinary experience, the representatives of all the systems earnestly resort to the definitions only to differentiate the object defined from all other objects.

[ 526 ]

तस्माद्ब्रह्मणि वाच्यवाचकयुजासिद्धयै श्रुतिर्नाभ्यधा-  
 ज्जन्माद्यस्य समीक्षितस्य जगतो यद्ब्रह्मणो लक्षणम् ।  
 नापीदं स्वकरूपबोधनपरं संकीर्तितं ब्रह्मणः  
 किं त्वब्रह्मपदार्थतोऽस्य सकलाद्वयावृत्तासिद्धये ॥

The Upaniṣadic sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc.) states the definition of the self as the source of this perceived universe, neither to convey the relation of the word 'Brahman' to its sense, nor to teach the essential nature of the self. But it is intended to differentiate the self from all other objects.

[ 527 ]

परिच्छिन्नवस्तुव्यवच्छेदसिद्धयै जगाद श्रुतिर्लक्षणं ब्रह्मणस्तत् ।  
 परिच्छिन्नता प्रापिता पूर्वपक्षे परब्रह्मणस्तन्निषेधार्थमेतत् ॥

The Upaniṣadic sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc.) states the definition of the self to differentiate it from limited objects (such as *pradhāna*, *atom*, etc.). In the *prima facie* view, it is held that the source of the universe is a limited object; and this definition is intended to refute that view.



[ 528 ]

कालस्वभावपरमाण्वसुभृत्प्रधानस्कन्धप्रतीत्यखिलशून्यकथाप्रसङ्गे ।  
जन्मादिसूत्रमवतीर्णमियं श्रुतिश्च तस्मादिदं परमिदं द्वितयं प्रवृत्तम् ॥

When there is the discussion that time, nature, atom, individual soul, primordial matter, five skandhas, momentary cognition, and void are the sources of the universe, the Upaniṣadic sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc) and the *Brahma-sūtra*—*janmādyasya yataḥ* are introduced. Hence the import of these two (*śruti* and *sūtra*) is to differentiate the source of the universe from the limited things (stated above).

[ 529 ]

अधिष्ठात्रधिष्ठेयभावेन योनिर्निमित्तं च यत्कारणं जन्मभाजाम् ।  
परिच्छिन्नतास्यापि संभावितैव प्रतीचोऽस्य भेदे परैरुच्यमाने ॥

The self is the material and the efficient cause of all products. But when it is said by others (namely, the Naiyāyikas) that there is difference between the source of the universe and the individual soul as they are related as controller and controlled, then there is every possibility of the source of the universe being limited.

*adhiṣṭhātr-adhiṣṭheya bhāvena — niyāmya-niyāmakabhāvena*, AP

[ 530 ]

ततस्तन्निषेधार्थमेतद्वभाषे श्रुतिर्ब्रह्म तद्विन्नता तस्य कस्मात् ।  
प्रतीचोऽपि हि ब्रह्मता नित्यसिद्धा दृशो भेदसिद्धिर्निराल<sup>1</sup>म्बनैव ॥

In order to negate this, the Upaniṣadic sentence defines the self (as the source of the universe). How could

1. म्बनेति - T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>4</sub>, T<sub>6</sub>.



the self be different from the individual soul? That the individual soul is identical with the (supreme) self is ever established; and the cognition of difference in the (supreme) self is baseless.

[ 531 ]

जगत्कारणत्वं पुनर्यत्र दृष्टं न तल्लक्षणं तत्स्वरूपप्रसिद्धयै ।  
'स्वरूपे यतो लक्षणे दृश्यमाने प्रसिद्धं ततो लक्ष्यवस्तुस्वरूपम् ॥

As the essential nature of an object defined is known at the time of perceiving the definition present in it, the definition of the self does not convey its essential nature.

[ 532 ]

निमित्तं च योनिश्च यत्कारणं तत् परं ब्रह्म सर्वस्य जन्मादिभाजः ।  
इति स्पष्टमाचष्ट एषा श्रुतिर्नः कथं सिद्धवल्लक्षणं सिद्धिबाह्यम् ॥

The (*Pūrvapakṣin* objects:)

The Upaniṣadic sentence ((*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc.) conveys to us that the material and the efficient cause of all the things that have origination, etc., is the self. How could the Upaniṣadic sentence clearly state the definition unknown in ordinary experience,<sup>1</sup> as if it is already known by some proof?

1. See the following verse.

[ 533 ]

न खल्वीदृशं कारणं लोकसिद्धं यतोऽनूद्य तल्लक्षणं तेन लक्ष्यम् ।  
व्यवस्थापयन्ती प्रवृत्तौवमेषा विधत्ते नु वक्तीति चैतद्विरुद्धम् ॥

The characteristic of being the material and efficient cause is unknown in ordinary experience. But the

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1. स्वरूपं - T<sub>1</sub>.



Upaniṣadic sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*) restates this definition and determines it in respect of the object defined (namely, the self). It is contradictory to hold that the Upaniṣadic sentence conveys the unknown and also restates what is known.

[ 534 ]

अनुवददिदमेव वाक्यमर्थादुपनयतीदृशकारणं प्रसिद्धम् ।  
अनुवदनमशक्यमन्यथा स्यादवगतगोचरमेव हीदमिष्टम् ॥

(The *Siddhāntin* answers): the sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*) restates this causality known (by its significative power), and conveys it by presumption. Restatement (of causality) is impossible if (causality) is not previously known; for, it is accepted that only those objects which are previously known can be restated.

[ 535 ]

यथा विशिष्टस्य विधानतोऽर्थाद्विशेषणानां घटते विधानम् ।  
स्थितेऽनुवादेऽपि तथेह योज्यमनूद्यमानेऽपि जगन्निदाने ॥

Just as the injunction of the substance (*soma*) is reasonable by presumption when the qualified entity (namely, the sacrifice qualified by *soma*) is enjoined, so also here (in the sentence *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc.) which restates the causality existing in the self, it should be held that the causality which is restated, is presumptively known already.

The Vedic text - *somena yajeta* enjoins the sacrifice qualified by *soma*. And the injunction of the substance *soma* is presumptively known.

[ 536 ]

अथ वानुवादमुपलभ्य ततोऽनुपपद्यमानवपुषः प्रमितेः ।  
अपरं निमित्तमिह कल्प्यमिति प्रवदन्ति केचिदभियुक्तराः ॥



Or else, noticing the restatement of the sense which is incompatible without its previous knowledge, some venerable authorities hold that another sentence which would give rise to the knowledge of the (restated) sense should be assumed.

[ 537 ]

अपि विशिष्टविधौ वचनान्तरादनुपपत्तिबलानुमितादिह ।

विधिरशेषविशेषणगोचरो न तु पुनस्तत एव विधानतः ॥

In the case of the injunction of the qualified entity (namely, sacrifice qualified by *soma*), another sentence which is assumed in view of the fear of incompatibility of the qualified injunction, enjoins the substance. The same sentence (*somena jayeta*) does not cojoin the attribute (*soma*).

The sentence *somena jayeta* conveys *somavatā yāgena iṣṭam bhūvayet*. Then we assume another injunction *somena yāgam bhūvayet*, enjoining the substance *soma* with reference to sacrifice.

[ 538 ]

जन्मादिलक्षणमिदं जगतो यदुक्तं सद्ब्रह्मणस्तदिह चिह्नतयोपदिष्टम् ।

नास्मिन्प्रमाणमपरे पुनरेतदेव ब्रह्मप्रमाणमनुमानमुदीरयन्ति ॥

The characteristic of being the cause of the origination, etc., of the universe which is given as the definition of the self is taught as the indicative definition; and this Upaniṣadic sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc.) is not the source of the knowledge of the self. Others,<sup>1</sup> however, hold that this sentence itself is (of the form of) inference which is the source of the knowledge of the self.<sup>2</sup>

1. *apare-vaiśeṣikādayaḥ*. SS

2. cf. *etadeva anumānaṁ saṁsārivyatirikta-īśvarāstitvasādhanam manyante īśvarakūṛāṇavādināḥ*, BSB, I, i, 2.



[ 539 ]

कार्यानुमानपरतन्त्रमिदं हि शास्त्रं  
 शास्त्रस्य नोपकरणं तदितीक्षमाणाः ।  
 तद्दुर्घटं न खलु कारणमद्वितीयं  
 चैतन्ययुक्तमिति कार्यवशात्प्रतीमः ॥

They hold that the Upaniṣadic text (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*) is subservient to inference; and the latter is not an accessory to the Upaniṣadic text. But this is incompatible; for, we do not know from the *probans* 'the nature of being an effect' that the cause of the universe is absolute consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

The view of the Vaiśeṣikas is refuted in this verse.

1. From the inference, *kṣīṭyaṅkurādīkam sakartṛkaṁ kāryato'at ghaṭavat*, we do not know that the cause of the universe is the self which is absolute consciousness.

[ 540 ]

वेदान्तवाक्यमिह येन पथा प्रवृत्तं  
 लोकप्रसिद्धपदशक्तिमुपाददानम् ।  
 विश्वोद्भवस्थितिलयप्रकृतौ निमित्ते  
 सच्चित्सुखात्मनि परात्मनि नैवमन्यत् ॥

The Upaniṣadic text, resorting to the significative power well known in ordinary experience conveys that the supreme self which is of the nature of truth, consciousness, and bliss is the material and the efficient cause of the origination, sustenance, and destruction of this universe. And this self is not conveyed by any other proof.



[ 541 ]

भङ्क्त्वा कथंचिदनुमानवशेन सिद्धे  
 सर्वेश्वरे कणभुगादिभिरुच्यमाने ।  
 वेदान्तवाक्यमपि योज्यमतोऽनुमाने  
 सापेक्षतोपनिषदां यदि साहसं तत् ॥

Discarding its true import, the Upaniṣadic text should somehow be related to God — the lord of all beings who is said to be established by inference by the Vaiśeṣikas. It is inconsiderate to hold that the Upaniṣadic text depends on inference to convey its sense.

If it is said that the import of the Upaniṣadic text is the sense conveyed by inference, then the Upaniṣadic text is exposed to the fault of losing its self-validity.

[ 542 ]

निष्कारणं श्रुतिशिरोवचनस्य भङ्गं  
 ये वर्णयन्ति सहसा स्वमनोरथेन ।  
 दीप्तस्य दावदहनस्य न ते किमर्थं  
 ज्वालां पिबन्ति कथनीयमिदं बहुज्ञैः ॥

It should be stated by the wise men why those who boldly discard the true import of the Upaniṣadic sentence at their will without any reason, do not drink the flame of fire.

The Vaiśeṣikas assign an important place to inference, and they hold that God is inferred as the source of the universe. It is asked why they do not drink the flame of fire on the basis of the inference that it is cool, because it is a substance like water.



[ 543 ]

ननु सच्चिदादिवपुषो जगतः प्रकृतित्वबोधनमकारणकम् ।  
परमात्मनो न हि पदार्थयुजा रहितेह संभवति योग्यतया ॥

(The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues):

It is indeed unfounded to state that the self which is of the form of truth and consciousness is the source of the universe. Indeed there cannot be any relation between the incongruous sense (namely, the self and the sense of the universe).

See the following verse.

[ 544 ]

उपादानता सच्चिदानन्दमूर्तेर्विरुद्धा जडेष्वेव सा दृश्यते हि ।  
विरुद्धैः पदार्थैर्न वाक्यार्थसिद्धिर्न खल्वग्निनोक्षेदितीहान्वयोऽस्ति ॥

It is contrary (to experience) that the self which is truth, consciousness, and bliss is the source of the universe. For, only insentient objects are found to be the material cause. There cannot arise (any valid knowledge of) the sense of the sentence from (the relation of) the incongruous senses (namely, the self and the sense of the source of the universe). Indeed there is no relation between the senses of the words in the sentence 'sprinkle with fire'.

[ 545 ]

उपादानता चेतनस्यापि दृष्टा यथा स्वप्नसर्गे विचित्रे प्रतीचः ।  
यथा चोर्णनाभस्य सूत्रेषु षुंसां यथा केशलोमादिसृष्टौ च दृष्टा ॥



(The *Siddhāntin* answers):

The sentient being also is seen to be the material cause (of effects). The sentient self is known to be the material cause of the manifold creations in the dream state; the spider to be the material cause of its thread, and the individual soul to be the material cause of the hair on the head and body.

The idea contained in this verse is based on the *Muṇḍ.*, I, i, 7.

[ 546 ]

बुद्ध्यादिकार्येष्वपि चेतनोऽयं भवेदुपादानमितीष्यते च ।  
आत्मा गुणी ते च गुणाः प्रसिद्धा गुणी गुणानां प्रकृतिश्च सिद्धा ॥

It is accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas* that the soul is the material cause of the effects like knowledge, etc. The soul is the substance and the effects such as knowledge, etc., are known to be qualities. It is well known that the substance is the material cause<sup>1</sup> of the qualities.

1. 'Material cause' here means 'inherent cause' (*samavāyikāraja*) of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system.

[ 547 ]

आकाङ्क्षादिर्विद्यते योग्यतान्ता यस्मादस्मिन्नागमे जायमाने ।  
सामाग्री या वैदिकैरस्य दृष्टा तस्माद्युक्ता योनिता चेतनस्य ॥

Expectancy, etc., ending with congruity which are accepted by the *Mīmāṃsakas* as the means of a sentence in giving rise to knowledge are present in the sentence (*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc.) and hence it could give rise to the knowledge of the self (as the material cause of the universe). Hence it is reasonable that the self is the material cause.

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1. *ज्ञागमाज्ञा* — B.



[ 548 ]

तस्मादेतल्लक्षणं चिह्नमाहुर्नैतत्तस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि स्यात्प्रमाणम् ।  
आम्नायस्य स्वप्रधानत्वहेतोर्लिङ्गस्यास्मिञ्छेषभावाच्च नित्यम् ॥

Hence this definition is the indicative attribute of the self and this sentence is not the proof of the self as providing an inference. For the Upanisadic texts are intrinsically valid, and the *probans* (of the inference), namely, 'the nature of being an effect' is always subservient to them (namely, the Upanisadic texts).

[ 549 ]

इत्थं जगत्कारणवादिवाक्यं समन्वितं ब्रह्मणि तत्पदार्थे ।  
तल्लक्षणं तस्य तटस्थभूतमानन्त्यसिद्धयै कथयद्यथोक्तम् ॥

To establish the infinite nature of the self, the sentence states its definition which is its indicative attribute. Thus the sentence that states the source of the universe points to the self which is the (secondary) sense of the term *tat*.

[ 550 ]

स्वात्मानमेव जगतः प्रकृतिं यदेकं सगै विवर्तयति तत्र निमित्तभूतम् ।  
कर्माकलय्य रमणीयकपूयमिश्रं पश्यन्नृणां परिवृढं तदितीयमाणम् ॥

At the time of creation, the absolute self signified by the word *tat* comprehends the meritorious, sinful, and the blend of these two deeds of men which are the operative causes of creation. (Then) through these causes, the self, though one, transfigures itself as the universe.

[ 551 ]

पदवृत्तिसमन्वयावुभौ प्रतिपाद्यौ प्रथमे हि लक्षणे ।  
तदवान्तरवाक्यवर्त्मना पदवृत्तिः प्रथमं प्रकीर्तिता ॥



The import of the terms (*tat* and *tvam* constituting the sentence *tat tvam asi*) and the sentence (*tat tvam asi*) are to be dealt with in the first chapter (of the *Brahma-sūtra*). Hence the import of the terms are first put forth by means of enquiry into the subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts.

For the definition of the subsidiary Upaniṣadic text, see *SS*, III, 312.

[ 552 ]

आद्ये सूत्रे त्वंपदस्योदितत्वाद्वृत्तेरस्मिंस्तत्पदस्योच्यमाना ।  
वृत्तिर्ज्ञेया तत्पदार्थेऽद्वितीये प्रत्यङ्मात्रे त्वंपदस्योदितैव ॥

As the sense of the term *tvam* has been stated in the first aphorism,<sup>1</sup> it should be known that the sense of the term *tat* is stated in this (that is, the second)<sup>2</sup> aphorism. The import of the term *tat* is the absolute self, while the import of the term *tvam* is the inner self.

1. *BS*, I, i, 1.

*jijñāsūtre hi tvampadaṃ vṛttirathātāśśabdābhyām adhikārinirūpaṇac  
chalenoktā, S.*

2. *BS*, I, i, 2.

[ 553 ]

अनधिकारिणि शुद्धचिदात्मके दृग्दृशोरितरेतरविभ्रमात् ।  
शमदमादिसमन्विततेष्यते भवति तेन चितोऽप्यधिकारिता ॥

Though the pure consciousness has no competence (to the Vedāntic study) yet, owing to the mutual superimposition of the intellect and the self, it is admitted that the self acquires the qualities such as control of the mind and the external senses. Hence the self attains the competence (to the study of Vedānta).



[ 554 ]

अनधिकारितया दृगवस्थिता स्वरसतः परमेश्वरविग्रहा ।

घनतमःपटलावरणान्वयादुपगता श्रवणाद्यधिकारिताम् ॥

Naturally the inner self is of the form of the supreme self and hence it has no competence (to the study of Vedānta). Yet, owing to its relation with *avidyā* which is a veil like darkness (and with intellect), it acquires the competence to the Vedāntic study, etc.

[ 555 ]

अज्ञानतज्जघटना चिदधिक्रियायां

द्वारं परं भवति नाधिकृतत्वमस्याः ।

नाचेतनस्य घटतेऽधिकृतिः कदाचित्

कर्तृत्वशक्तिविरहादिति वक्ष्यते हि ॥

The relation of *avidyā* and its effects is the essential operating condition in respect of the competence of the self (to the study of Vedānta). But *avidyā* (and its effects) have no competence. For the insentient objects, being devoid of agency, never have competence; and this (the author of the *sūtra*) explains later (in the second *adhyāya*).<sup>1</sup>

1. *vide*: BS. II, iii, 33.

[ 556 ]

उपसत्तिवाक्यमधिकारिणि यत् कथितं समन्विततया प्रथमम् ।

इदमेव चेतसि निधाय तु तत् मुनिना प्रकीर्तितमुदारधिया ॥

It has been previously<sup>1</sup> said that the (Upaniṣadic) sentence<sup>2</sup> which sets forth the method of approaching (the



preceptor) points to the spiritual aspirant. Having this in his mind, the venerable author of the sūtras indicates the spiritual aspirant (in the first aphorism).

1. See SS, I, 65.

2. *Mund.* II, 12,

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* in the aphorism *athāto brahmajijñāsū* refers to the spiritual aspirant by the words *atha* and *atah*.

See Notes on SS, I, 552.

[ 557 ]

शिष्योपसत्तिवचनानि समन्वितानि

शिष्ये चिदात्मनि परात्मनि नित्यमुक्ते ।

इत्येतदत्र कथितं मुनिना त्वमर्थे

त्वंशब्दवृत्तिकथनाय परे प्रतीचि ॥

In order to state that the import of the term *tvam* is the pure self, it has been said by the sage that the sentences<sup>1</sup> setting forth the aspirant's approach to the preceptor, point to the aspirant who is the conscious, unconditioned, and ever-free self.

1. *Mund.*, II, 12.

[ 558 ]

उपसदनवचोविचारमार्गात् त्वमिति पदस्य परात्मनीह वृत्तिम् ।

कथयति भगवान् द्वितीयसूत्रे तदिति पदस्य परात्मनीति भेदः ॥

Thus, by enquiring into the sentence setting forth the method of approaching the preceptor, the venerable author of the *Brahma-sūtra* states (in the first aphorism) that the import of the term *tvam* is the witness-self and states in the second aphorism that the import of the term *tat* is the absolute self. And this is the difference.



The word *parātmani* in the first quarter of this verse means *dehendriyāṁkārādivilakṣaṇe sākṣiṇi* and the one in the last quarter means *jagatkāraṇe adhiṣṭhāne advitiye, SS.*

[ 559 ]

आवृत्त्या वा तन्त्रवृत्त्याथवेदं सूत्रं युक्तिं वेदवाक्योपयुक्तम् ।  
अप्याचष्टे बृंहणीमन्तरेण स्वार्थे युक्तिं वेदवाक्यं न पुष्टम् ॥

This *sūtra* (*janmādyasya yataḥ*) furnishes the ground required for determining the sense of the Upaniṣadic text either by repetition or by single pronouncement. The Upaniṣadic text is not capable of conveying its sense well without the reasoning that would substantiate that sense.

The *sūtra janmādyasya yataḥ* expresses the definition of the self and the ground for determining the sense of the text, namely, the self. So it is admitted that the *sūtra* indicates two ideas or the *sūtra* is repeated twice to arrive at this dual significance. A single pronouncement to indicate two ideas is *tantra* and repetition of a statement twice is *āvṛtti*.

[ 560 ]

त्वंपदार्थविषयं समन्वयं तत्पदार्थविषयं ततः क्रमात् ।  
तस्य शेषमपरं च वर्णयन् उक्तवानथ महावचोगतम् ॥

(The author of the *sūtras*) explains (in the first aphorism) that the import (of the sentences) setting forth the nature (of the individual soul) is the (secondary) sense of the term *tvam*, and subsequently (in the second aphorism) he explains that the import (of the sentences such as *satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma*) is the (secondary) sense of the term *tat*. (In the third aphorism) he states another reasoning to substantiate the sense of the term *tat*. Then he puts forth the import of the major texts.



[ 561 ]

त्वंपदस्य द्विषि वृत्तिमद्वये तत्पदस्य च निवेदयन्मुनिः ।

प्रत्यगद्वयपरं समन्वयं शेषिणं पुनरथाब्रवीत्तयोः ॥

Stating the import of the term *tvam* to be the inner self and of the term *tat* to be the absolute self, the sage, then declares the import of the sentence (*tat tvam asi*) to be the oneness of the self which is principal to the senses of the two terms.

[ 562 ]

शक्नोति सिद्धमवबोधयितुं च वाक्यं

शक्नोति कार्यरहितं वदितुं च वाक्यम् ।

शक्नोत्यखण्डमवबोधयितुं च वाक्यं

शक्नोति मुक्तिफलमर्पयितुं च वाक्यम् ॥

The (Upaniṣadic sentence) is capable of conveying the existent entity. It can convey (the self) not subordinate to *niyoga*, and it can also signify partless entity. (Finally) it is capable of giving rise to the knowledge of the self that has liberation as its fruit.

[ 563 ]

एतत्समन्वयनिरूपणमेवमस्मिन्

बुद्धिस्थतामुपगते सति वाक्यजन्यम् ।

विज्ञानमद्वयगतं न ततोऽन्यदन्यत्

पुंसोऽपराधकृतमित्युदियात् प्रतीतिः ॥

So far the determination of the import (of the Upaniṣadic text). When the import is known, the knowledge of the absolute self alone arises from the Upaniṣadic texts and none else. And there will arise the knowledge that it is due to the fault of a person that there is the cognition of difference.



The aphorism *tat tu samanvayāt* (BS,I,i,4) means that the Upaniṣadic texts have the non-dual Brahman as their import. The phenomenal world is indeterminable and the individual soul is identical with Brahman. So there is no contradiction to the absolute or non-dual nature of Brahman.



## ॥ द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ॥

OBJECTION: UPANIṢADIC TEACHING  
IS STULTIFIED BY PERCEPTION, ETC.

[ 1 ]

एवं समन्वयनिरूपणयावबोधो  
जातोऽप्यखण्डविषयो ननु वाक्यजन्यः ।  
मानान्तरेण परिपीडित एव जातो  
भेदप्रकाशनकृताक्षनिबन्धनेन ॥

The knowledge of the partless Brahman-Ātman arisen from the Upaniṣads and confirmed by the determination of the import (of them) is contradicted by other proofs based on perception which cognize difference.

*sarveṣāṃ vedāntānāṃ advītiye brahmaṇi samanvayaḥ upapāditah, sa ca anupapannah, bhedagrāhipratyakṣavirodhāt, TB.*

[ 2 ]

मज्जत्यलाबु सहसाप्सु शिलाः प्लवन्त  
इत्यादिकादभिहितादिव वाक्यजातात्  
जातापि बुद्धिरपबाधितगोचरैव-  
मद्वैतबुद्धिरपि भेदधियात्मनि स्यात् ॥

Just as the knowledge arising from the utterance of series of sentences such as 'A dry gourd sinks in water', 'Stones float on water', is contradicted (by perception), similarly the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman-Ātman is contradicted by the cognition of difference.



[ 3 ]

अध्यक्षगोचरमनर्थमवैमि वाक्यं निर्मुक्तमाह मम रूपमनर्थहेतोः ।  
एवं च वेदशिरसोऽक्षनिबन्धनेन ज्ञानेन बाधनमतीव हि दुर्निवारम् ॥

I understand my nature from perception to be miserable. (But) the Upaniṣadic sentence<sup>1</sup> states my nature to be free from the cause of misery. Thus the stultification of the Upaniṣadic teaching by perception is indeed difficult to be prevented.

1. vide: (i) *yo' aśanāvāpīpāse*, *Bṛh.*, III, v, 1.  
(ii) *na līpyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyaḥ*, *Kāth.*, V, 11.

[ 4 ]

कर्तृत्वमाह मम कर्मवि<sup>०</sup>धिर्नियोग  
संबन्धपूर्वकमपास्तसमस्तभेदम् ।  
मामाह वेदशिरसो वचनं तथा च  
सत्यस्य दुःस्थितमिवापतति प्रमात्वम् ॥

The injunction of rituals, by stating the relation of *niyoga* (to myself) conveys my nature as associated with agency. (But) the Upaniṣadic sentences declare my nature as one from which all kinds of differences have been removed. When such is the case, the validity of the knowledge (arising from the Upaniṣadic sentence) appears to be unfounded.

*duḥshītamiva āpatati* — *anupāṇnameva bhavati*, *TB*.

[ 5 ]

प्रत्यक्षकर्मवचसोरुभयोः समूहः सामर्थ्यावानुपनिषद्विषयापहारे ।  
एकैकमेव तु न पारयतेऽपहर्तुं स्वार्थप्रकाशनविधावुभयोः समत्वम् ॥

The combination of perception and the ritualistic texts is capable of contradicting the Upaniṣadic teaching. As the two (namely, perception and the injunctive texts on the

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1. दुर्निरूप्यम् — P<sub>2</sub> दुर्निरूपम् — T<sub>1</sub>.
  2. धिर्नियोगः संव — P<sub>1</sub> P<sub>2</sub>.



one hand, and the Upaniṣadic texts on the other) are similar in manifesting their content, (perception and injunctive texts) cannot severally contradict the Upaniṣadic teaching.

[ 6 ]

ज्यैष्ठात्समर्थमथवाक्षजमेकमेव तस्यैव कर्मविधिस्तु सहायभूतः ।  
प्रत्यक्षमेव विधिवाक्यसहायमेवं ब्रह्मात्मवस्त्वपहरिष्यति को विरोधः ॥

Or, perceptual knowledge alone, in view of its precedence, is capable (of contradicting the Upaniṣadic teaching). And, let the injunctive texts be the aid to it. Hence, what objection can there be, if perception alone aided by the injunctive texts should stultify (the knowledge of) the oneness of the self.

The proofs such as inference, comparison, verbal testimony, etc., depend on perception. Hence the latter is called *jyēṣṭha-pramāṇa*.

### UPANIṢADIC TEACHING NOT CONTRADICTED BY PERCEPTION, ETC.

[ 7 ]

अत्रोच्यते न खलु वेदशिरांसि मुक्त्वा  
किञ्चित्प्रमाणमिह तत्त्वनिवेदनाय ।  
शक्नोति येन भवतीह विरोधशङ्का  
वेदान्तवाक्यमुखतोऽवगते प्रतीचि ॥

It is replied: there is no proof, except the Upaniṣadic sentences, that could convey the self; and in which case alone there would be the objection of conflict regarding the inner self known from the Upaniṣadic sentences.



The view set forth in this verse is based on the following *bhāṣya* text:

*na hi ahampratyayaviṣayavyatirekeṇa tatsākṣī sarvabhūtaṣṭhaḥ sama  
ekah...vidhikāṇḍe tarkasamaye vā kenacidadhigataḥ sarvasyātmā, BSB,  
I, i, 4.*

[ 8 ]

अज्ञातमर्थमवबोधयदेव मानं

तच्च प्रकाशकरणक्षममित्यभिज्ञाः ।

न प्रत्यगात्मविषयादपरस्य तच्च

मानस्य संभवति कस्यचिदत्र युक्त्या ॥

Wise men hold that a proof is that which makes known the unknown object; and, it is capable of revealing its object. This (definition) is not reasonably applicable to any proof except the one which has the inner self as its content.

It is always the self that can be veiled by *avidyā*, for that alone is luminous. Everything else, is itself insentient, and needs no external cause for being obscured. Hence the self alone being veiled by *avidyā* is unknown in its specific nature.

[ 9 ]

सर्वं पराग्विषयमेव हि मानजातं वेदावसानवचनानि तु वर्जयित्वा ।  
यद्वैतिकं किमपि भौतिकगोचरं तद्रूपप्रदीपकनिदर्शनतः प्रसिद्धम् ॥

All proofs except the Upaniṣadic sentences comprehend the external objects. It is well known from the example of the lamp manifesting colour that anything made up of fundamental elements comprehends only a similar material thing.<sup>1</sup>

1. *vide: pratyakṣādikāṃ bhautikamātragocaraṃ, bhautikatve sati prakāśakatvāt, rūpādīprakāśakapradīpavat, SS.*

1. तत्त्वप्रकाश — M<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.



[ 10 ]

यद्वयञ्जकं किमपि लौकिकमीक्षितं तद्  
 व्यङ्ग्येन तुल्यमवलोकितमत्र जात्या ।  
 दीपः प्रकाशकतया विदितो हि लोके  
 रूपेण तैजसतया सदृशः प्रसिद्धः ॥

In ordinary experience it is found that anything which manifests (an object) is similar to the object manifested, through the generic attribute. It is well known in the world that a lamp manifests colour. And it is found to be similar to colour, as both are made out of fire.

[ 11 ]

बुद्धिः समस्तविषयावगमे प्रवृत्ता  
 सापि 'प्रकाशविषयेण समानजातिः ।  
 बुद्धिश्च भौतिकतया श्रुतिषु प्रसिद्धा  
 तेनास्तु सापि खलु भौतिकगोचरैव ॥

The intellect gives rise to the knowledge of all objects, and it is also similar in character to the objects it manifests. It is well known in the Vedic texts that the intellect is an element.<sup>1</sup> Hence it too has the elements as its objects.

1. *annamayam hi saumya manah, Chānd., VI, v, 4.*

[ 12 ]

एवं प्रमाणमखिलं बहिरर्थनिष्ठं वेदान्तवाक्यमपहाय यथोक्तहेतोः ।  
 न प्रत्यगात्मविषयं श्रुतिरप्युवाच स्पष्टं पराञ्चिवचसार्थमिमं यथोक्तम् ॥

In view of the arguments put forth above, all proofs except the Upaniṣadic sentences, comprehend the external

1. प्रकाश्यवि — B<sub>2</sub>, P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>0</sub>.



objects and not the inner self. The *śruti* too, in the passage —*parāñci*, etc.,<sup>1</sup>—clearly states this view.

1. The full *śruti* text is cited in the following verse.

[ 13 ]

पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत् स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन् ।  
कश्चिद्धीरः प्रत्यगात्मानमैक्षदावृत्ताचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन् ॥

The supreme self inflicted an injury upon the senses in creating them as comprehending the external objects; hence a man comprehends only external objects with them and not the inner self. But a man of self-control, longing for immortality, beholds the inner self with his senses withdrawn from external objects.

This verse is from the *Kāthopaniṣad*, IV, 1.

[ 14 ]

यत् कर्मभाव 'मनपास्य निजप्रमेये  
संवित्सिद्धनतया जगति प्रसिद्धम् ।  
मानं जडार्थविषयं तदिहाभ्युपेयं  
न प्रत्यगात्मविषयं कथितोपपत्तेः ॥

The proof which is well known as giving rise to the knowledge (of its object) by introducing the character of an object; to it<sup>2</sup> should be admitted as one comprehending the external objects; and it does not comprehend the self in view of the argument stated above.<sup>3</sup>

1. See *SS*, I, 241 and 249.

2. See *SS*, II, 10.

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1. मनिवार्य — B<sub>2</sub>.



## DEFINITION OF A PROOF

[ 15 ]

यत्तु प्रमाणमवधीर्य निजप्रमेये कर्मत्वमर्थमवबोधयितुं प्रवृत्ताम् ।  
तत् प्रत्यगात्मविषयं भवितुं क्षमेत तत्तत्त्वमादिवचनं न ततोऽन्यदस्ति॥

The proof which reveals its object without introducing the character of an object to it is capable of comprehending the inner self; and that proof is the Upaniṣadic texts like *tat tvam asi*, etc., and none else.

For details See SŚ, I, 241 and 249.

[ 16 ]

नाज्ञाततावगतिरस्ति जडेषु पूर्व मेयेषु तत्स्फुरणकारणवर्जितत्वात् ।  
मानोदयान्न हि पुरा किमपीह मानं नापि प्रमेयबलतो जडता हि तस्य ।

The knowledge that the insentient objects are unknown (that is, veiled by *avidyā*) cannot be had before the rise of any proof, as at that time there is no proof to manifest the objects (themselves).<sup>1</sup> There is also no proof to give rise to it (namely, the knowledge that the insentient objects are veiled by *avidyā*) before the rise of any proof; nor is it known from the object itself, as the latter is insentient.

1. It is impossible to have the knowledge that an insentient object is veiled by *avidyā*, if the insentient object itself is unknown.

[ 17 ]

नाज्ञाततावगतये स्वयमेव बाह्यं  
मेयं समर्थमवबोधविलक्षणत्वात् ।  
नापि प्रमाणमवबोधकमस्ति किञ्चि-  
न्मानोदयात्पुर इति स्फुटमभ्युपेयम् ॥



The external object itself, being insentient, is not capable of giving rise to the knowledge that it is unknown (that is, veiled by *avidyā*); and it should be accepted that there is no proof which could clearly reveal that the object is unknown, before the rise of any proof.

*avabodhavalakṣaṇatvāt — jādātvaāt, TB.*

[ 18 ]

नाज्ञाततामनवगम्य पुरा प्रवेशा-  
 न्मानस्य किञ्चिदपि मानबलेन बोद्धुम् ।  
 शक्नोति कश्चिदपि मानबलेन बुद्धं  
 किं वा स्वभाव इति निश्चयहेत्वभावात् ॥

Unless one knows that the object is unknown before the rise of any proof, one cannot say that that object is known through a proof. For there is no valid reason to prove whether the object is known through a proof or known intrinsically.

*mānabalena bodddhum — pramāṇabalenaiva jñātum tathā vā*

*vyavahartum, TB.*

See the following verses.

[ 19 ]

प्रक्षालनेन धवलं किमिदं बभूव  
 किं वा पुरापि धवलं स्वयमेव वस्त्रम् ।  
 इत्येवमेष न विवेक्तुमलं कदाचित्  
 यो दृष्टवान्न मलिनं वसनं पुरस्तात् ॥

One who (perceives a garment only when it is white and) has not seen it when it was dirty, can never know clearly whether the garment was naturally white before or it has become white after washing.



[ 20 ]

एवं पुरानधिगतं यदि नानुभूतं मानेन बोधितमिदं प्रतिभाति मेयम् ।  
न स्वप्रकाशमिति शक्यमिदं विवेक्तुं केनापि नैव तदवस्थतयैव दृष्टे ॥

Similarly, if one has not the knowledge that an object is unknown (that is, veiled by *avidyā*) before the rise of any proof, then one cannot clearly know that the object is known through proof and not known intrinsically, for, one has seen the object only in its revealed state.

Sarvajñātmā concludes that it cannot be said that the insentient objects are unknown (that is, veiled by *avidyā*). Hence *avidyā* is not present in the insentient objects.

[ 21 ]

अज्ञातमर्थमवबोधयितुं न शक्तमेवं प्रमाणमखिलं जडवस्तुनिष्ठम् ।  
किं त्वप्रबुद्धपुरुषं व्यवहारकाले संश्रित्य संजनयति व्यवहारमात्रम् ॥

Hence all proofs (except the Upaniṣadic sentences) which comprehend only external objects are not capable of revealing the unknown object. But in empirical activity, a proof depending on a person characterized by *avidyā* gives rise to verbal usage (like 'this is pot' etc.).

A proof is defined as one which reveals an unknown object. And, an object which is veiled by *avidyā* is said to be unknown. As has been shown, the inner self alone is veiled by *avidyā* and not the insentient objects. So the Upaniṣadic text alone can rightly be called a proof, as it reveals the unknown object, the self. And perception, etc., cannot be called 'proofs' as they do not reveal the unknown object, the self. But perception, etc., remove *avidyā* present in the consciousness delimited by pot, etc., and by the removal of *avidyā*, the consciousness delimited by pot, etc., manifests itself and it (namely, the consciousness) reveals the pot, etc. Thereby perception, etc., give rise to empirical usages such as 'This is pot', etc., and this function alone answers to their validity.



*vide: ghaṭādyavacchinnacinniṣṭhājñānanivṛtṭyā tadvyavahāraheturvam-  
eva tat prāmāṇyam, S.*

## DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND INDETERMINABLE OBJECTS

[ 22 ]

आबोधतः सकलमेव हि सत्यमिथ्या-  
भ्रान्तिप्रमाणविनिवर्त्यनिवर्तकत्वम् ।  
स्वप्नेऽपि दृष्टमिदमेवमिहापि जाग्र-  
त्काले भवत्वखिलमापरमात्मबोधात् ॥

The distinction of real and unreal objects, erroneous and valid knowledge, and the object annihilated and the one which annihilates, is present in the dream state also, until one comes back to the waking state. Similarly, in the waking state also let such a distinction exist until the realization of the self.

[ 23 ]

स्वप्ने तप्तशिलाधिरोहणगता निश्चेयसोपायता  
मिथ्या ब्राह्मणतर्पणादिनिलया सत्या तथा लौकिकी ।  
स्रक् सत्या तदहिर्मृषैव विदितो निद्रानिवृत्तौ पुनः  
स्वप्ने दृष्टमशेषमेव वितथं ग्राह्यं तथा जागरे ॥

In the dream state, ascending the heated stone as the means to liberation is false, and feeding the brahmins as the means to prosperity is true. Similarly, (in that state) the thing related to ordinary life such as garland is true and the snake appearing on it is false. But, everything seen in dream becomes false at the cessation of sleep. Similarly, the objects seen in the waking state also become false (when the oneness of the self is realized).

*taptasilādhirohaṇam bauddhagamaprasiddham, S.*



[ 24 ]

श्रेयस्साधनताग्निहोत्रनिलया सत्येति संगृह्यते  
 मिथ्या तप्तशिलाधिरोहणगता शिष्टैः परित्यज्यते ।  
 रज्जुः सत्यतया स्थितैव तदहिर्मिथ्यैव तावद्भवेत्  
 यावन्मूलतमोविदारणपटुर्विद्योदयो नागमत् ॥

In the waking state also, as long as the knowledge of the self which is effective in dispelling the primordial *avidyā* has not arisen, the orthodox men accept it to be true that the rite named *agnihotra* is the means to prosperity; and they discard it to be false, that ascending the heated stone is the means to liberation. Similarly, the rope is known to be true, and its appearing as serpent is false.

OBJECTION:- ADVAITA VIEW IS IDENTICAL  
 WITH VIJÑĀNA - VĀDA

[ 25 ]

ननु शाक्यभिक्षुसमयेन समः प्रतिभात्ययं च भगवत्समयः ।  
 यदि बाह्यवस्तु वितथं नु कथं समयाविमौ न सदृशौ भवतः ॥

Indeed the doctrine of the venerable Śaṅkara appears to be identical with that of Buddha. How are the two doctrines not similar, if the external objects are (admitted to be) false?

[ 26 ]

यदि बोध एव परमार्थवपुः न बोध्यमित्यभिमतं भवति ।  
 ननु चाश्रितं भवति बुद्धमुनेर्मतमेव कृत्स्नमिह मस्करिभिः ॥

If it is accepted that consciousness alone is absolutely real and not the objects, then indeed the doctrine of

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1. नागमात् — M<sub>2</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>.



Buddha alone is completely followed by the religious mendicants (that is, the followers of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa).

In the following verses, Sarvajñātman refutes the contention set forth in this verse, namely, that the doctrine of Advaita is similar to that of Buddha.

See Introduction pp., 123—125.

### DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADVAITA AND VIJÑĀNA - VĀDA

[ 27 ]

ननु मातृमानविषयावगतीरपरस्परं प्रति विभागवतीः ।  
उपयन् भदन्तमुनिना सदृशः कथमेष वैदिकमुनिर्भवति ॥

How does this sage of Vedic order become similar to Buddha, as he (the sage of Vedic order) admits that the knower, proof, objects, and knowledge are mutually disparate?

It should be noted here that the Vijñāna-vāda school of Buddhism admits that knowledge alone is true and the knower, object, and proof are its forms and they are not mutually different.

[ 28 ]

परमात्मसंश्रयतमोजनितं प्रविभक्तमेव तु परस्परतः ।  
स्थिरमभ्युपेतमिह नः समये ननु मातृमानविषयप्रभृति ॥

Indeed it has been admitted in our system that the knower, means, and objects of knowledge, etc., are permanent (till the realisation of the self) and they are produced by *avidyā* abiding in the self and are mutually different.

[ 29 ]

तमसा विनिर्मितमिदं सकलं चतुरः स पश्यति परः पुरुषः ।  
अविकारिबोधवपुरद्वयकः करणैर्विना सकलसाक्षितया ॥



The supreme self is of the form of immutable consciousness and is absolute. As the witness of all, it perceives all these four factors, (namely, knower, knowledge, its means, and object) without any instruments (such as sense of sight, etc.).

[ 30 ]

निजमायया परिगतः पुरुषः परतन्त्रया तु निजया प्रभया ।  
परिकल्पितं सकलमाकलयन् स हि साक्षितामुपगतो भवति ॥

The self being associated with the subservient *avidyā* perceives with its own light the entire universe superimposed on it and thus becomes the witness of all.

*ākālayan—paśyan, TB.*

[ 31 ]

ग्राह्यग्राहकयोः स्थिरत्वगमनी तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमा  
नोपापत्स्यत चेदसेत्स्यदपि नौ सिद्धान्तयोस्तुल्यता ।  
सा निर्वक्ष्यति सिध्यतीति 'जगतः स्थैर्यं स्वरूपात्मकं  
चैतन्यस्य च भङ्गुरत्वमिव मे सर्वस्य ते दर्शने ॥

If recognition that substantiates the permanence of the matter and self were not reasonable, then (matter and self should be held as momentary and as such) the similarity between our doctrines would be established. But recognition (as a proof) holds good, and just as in your (Buddhistic) view momentariness is the characteristic of everything, similarly in our view permanence which is the nature of the universe and the self is established.

For details regarding the concept of *pratyabhijñā*, see *Vivaraṇāpramēya-saṅgraha*, pp. 91-96.

1. नयतः — T<sub>1</sub>, T.



## OBJECTION—WAKING AND DREAM STATES ARE IDENTICAL

[ 32 ]

ननु कल्पितं यदि हि जागरितं वद कीदृशी खलु विलक्षणता ।  
स्वपनादमुष्य भवतोऽभिमतता परिकल्पितत्वमुभयोस्तु समम् ॥

If you accept that the objects of the waking state (also) are superimposed, then tell me the manner in which they differ from (the objects of) the dream state. For both alike are superimposed on the self.

## DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WAKING AND THE DREAM STATES

[ 33 ]

न प्रमातरि सति प्रबाध्यते जागरः स्वपनदृष्टवस्तुवत् ।  
मातृमानविषयोपलब्धिभिः साकमेव तमसो निराकृतेः ॥

The objects of the waking state, unlike the objects of the dream state, are not annihilated when the knower exists. For *avidyā* is annihilated only along with knower, proof, objects, and knowledge.

[ 34 ]

देशकालपुरुषैरवस्थया जागरस्य खलु कारणं तमः ।  
साकमेव सहसा निरस्यते वेदवाक्यजनितात्मसंविदा ॥

*Avidyā* which is the cause of the waking state is annihilated along with place, time, knower, and the three states (of waking, dream, and deep sleep) by the realization of the self arising from the Upaniṣadic sentences.



[ 35 ]

स्वप्नदृष्टमिह रज्जुसर्पवद्देशकालपुरुषेषु बाध्यते ।

जागरः पुनरयं तथाविधं बाधकं न लभतेऽसमीक्षणात् ॥

The objects seen in the dream state, like the serpent appearing on the rope are annihilated when the place, time, and the knower exist. But the objects in the waking state do not experience this kind of stultification, as it is not observed to be so (either by perception or by any other proof).

[ 36 ]

तेन सत्यमिह जागरं विदुः स्वप्नविभ्रमविरुद्धधर्मकम् ।

आपरात्मपरमार्थदर्शनात् तेन बाधितः पुन सत्क्वचित् ॥

Hence as the waking state is of a different nature from the erroneous dream state, it is held to be real until the realization of the supreme self. Being annihilated by it (namely, the realization of the self), the waking state is no more real.

[ 37 ]

तत्र सत्यमनृतं च भेदतः प्रत्यगात्मतमसा विकल्पितम् ।

प्रक्षिणोति परमात्मवस्तुगा बुद्धिवृत्तिरविचालिनी सती ॥

The mental state of the form of the supreme self, free from any impediment, completely annihilates the waking and dream states which are (respectively) superimposed as real and unreal<sup>1</sup> by *avidyā* abiding in the self.

1. See SŚ, II, 33-5.

[ 38 ]

नित्यबोधपरिपीडितं जगद्विभ्रमं नुदति वाक्यजा मतिः ।

वासुदेवनिहतं धनञ्जयो हन्ति कौरवकुलं यथा पुनः ॥



Just as Arjuna destroys the race of the Kauravas that has already been destroyed by Lord Kṛṣṇa, similarly the knowledge of the self arising from the Upaniṣadic texts dispels the illusory universe which has already been deprived of its reality by the ever conscious self.

The universe which is superimposed on the self has no separate reality apart from the self. Hence it is figuratively stated here that the reality of the universe has already been taken away by the self. And, the knowledge of the self dispels the appearance of the universe. And this idea is corroborated by the illustration of Arjuna killing the Kauravas who are already killed by Kṛṣṇa.

*vide: BhG, xii, 3.*

### DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REAL AND INDETERMINABLE OBJECTS IS POSSIBLE ONLY IN ADVAITA

[ 39 ]

सत्यमेवमनृतं च दुर्लभं ब्रह्मवादिसमयाह्वहिः पुनः ।

सत्यतो यदि पृथङ् मृषा भवेत् सत्यमेव तदपि प्रसज्यते ॥

The distinction of the real and the unreal in this way is not possible in any school other than the one of the Advaitins. If the unreal were different from the real then it follows that that also is real.

If silver that illusorily appears in the nacre is said to be different from a real object, then 'difference' exists in the silver and in the real object. The silver is known as *dharmi* or the substratum while the real object is known or *pratiyogin* or counter-correlative. As the substratum of difference whose counter-correlative is real, cannot be unreal, the illusory silver which is the substratum of difference should be held as real.



[ 40 ]

सत्यतो यदि मृषा न भिद्यते सत्यमेव सुतरां तदिष्यताम् ।  
न द्वायात्मकतयानृतं मतं पक्षयोः कथितदूषणद्वयात् ॥

If the unreal object were not different from the real one, then let it be well accepted that that (unreal object) also is real. Nor is it (namely the unreal object) accepted as different from and identical with the real object; for there would arise (the contingency of) the two defects pointed out in the two views (namely, the unreal object is identical with the real object and different from the real object).

If the unreal object is different from the real object, then the unreal object also should be held as real (See Notes on SS, II, 39). If it is identical, then also the unreal object is real.

[ 41 ]

वेदवाक्यविषयस्य सत्यता बुद्धवाक्यविषयो मृषा भवेत् ।  
इत्यदः कथयितुं न शक्नुयात् ब्रह्मवादिसमयाद्वहिर्मुखः ॥

One whose mind is directed towards a school other than that of the Advaitins cannot maintain that the sense of the Vedic scripture is true and the sense of the Buddhistic scripture is false.

[ 42 ]

सत्यमेवमनृतं च भेदतः कल्पितं भवतु वर्णिता न्नयात् ।  
तत्र तद्घटयितुं हि शक्यते नेतरत्र कथितोपपत्तिभिः ॥

In the light of the arguments mentioned before,<sup>1</sup> let the real and the unreal objects be superimposed (on the self) as mutually different. In the view of the Advaitins the difference between the real and the unreal objects can be explained; but not in any other system, in view of the arguments put forth before.<sup>2</sup>



1. SŚ, II, 33.
2. SŚ, II, 39-40.

[ 43 ]

व्यावहारिकमतोऽवगम्यतां मानजातमखिलं न तात्त्विकम् ।  
बाह्यवस्तुविषयं विरोधतोऽबुद्बोधविधिशक्यसंभवात् ॥

As there would be contradiction (with the sruti text, *parāñci*, etc.), any proof which comprehends the external objects cannot reveal the unknown object, (namely, the self) and hence let it be understood that all the proofs reveal the objects that are empirically real and not the object that is absolutely real.

1. See, SŚ, II, 13.

[ 44 ]

एवं तत्त्वविनिवेदनशक्तियोगः  
संभाव्यतेऽनधिगताधिगतेरयोगात् ।  
मानान्तरस्य सकलस्य ततश्च तेन  
बाधस्त्रयीशिरसि वर्णयितुं न शक्यः ॥

Thus none of the proofs (with the exception of the Upaniṣadic sentence) are capable of revealing the reality (that is, the self), as they cannot manifest the unknown object. Hence it is not possible to speak of the stultification of the Upaniṣadic teaching by any other proof.

PERCEPTION DOES NOT REVEAL THE REALITY

[ 45 ]

आरम्भणादिवचसा खलु निर्विकल्प-  
प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिमनुसृत्य विकल्पबुद्धेः ।  
आभासतां मुनिरुवाच तदास्य भावो  
विज्ञायते स्फुटतरो गुडजिह्विकायाम् ॥



The sage (Śrī Bādarāyaṇa) has stated in the aphorism, (*tadananyatvam*) *ārambhaṇa* (*śabdādibhyaḥ*) that the perception of causal substance is valid and the perception of modifications is false. From this it is clearly known that the sage has in view the maxim of tongue coated with sugar.

Just as a mother coats her child's tongue with sugar before giving an unpalatable dose of medicine, so the author of the *sūtra*, on the strength of the *śruti* text — *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketyeva satyam* (*Chānd.*, VI, i, 4) gives in the *sūtra* — *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ* (II, i, 14) the first impression that the products like jar, etc., are names only, while there exists no such thing as a modification; and the cause, that is, the clay alone is true. But his intention is that the entire body of products including clay, etc., has no existence apart from the self; and the self alone is absolutely real.

*vide: brahmavyatirekeṇa kāryajālasyābhūva iti gamyate BSB*, II, i, 14.

i. *nirvikalpapratyakṣabuddhiḥ — kāraṇamātrasya pratyakṣabuddhiḥ.*

ii. *vikalpabuddhiḥ — ghaṭādivikārabuddhiḥ, SS.*

[ 46 ]

सत्संप्रयोग इति जैमिनिरप्युवाच

यल्लक्षणं तदुभयोः सममेव विद्यात् ।

आपाततस्तदथ युक्तिनिषीडितं सत्

सन्मात्रसंविदि निषीदति निर्विशङ्कम् ॥

Jaimini too has stated the definition of perception *satsamprayoge*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> that equally applies to the two kinds of perception,<sup>2</sup> only superficially. But on examination it is found that the definition indisputably fits in with (giving rise to) the knowledge of mere self (the cause).

1. *vide: satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām*

*buddhijanma tatpratyakṣasamānimittam vidyamānopalamambhanatvāt,*

(*Jaimini-sūtra*, I, 1, 4.)



2. The perception of the causal substance and the perception of modifications.

[ 47 ]

तत्रापि दुर्घटमवैति यदा तु तत्त्व-  
 बोधं विवक्षति विसृज्य विकल्पजालम् ।  
 किं कारणं वदति येन स तत्त्वगामि-  
 विज्ञानमर्थमवबोधयदप्रबुद्धम् ॥

When he considers that this definition is incompatible with reference to the (objects of the) two kinds of perception, he leaves out the perception of matter and intends the knowledge of the self. How is this known? For he says that that knowledge alone which has for its content the unknown object comprehends the reality.

[ 48 ]

औत्पत्तिके हि भगवानयमप्रबुद्धमर्थं प्रमाणविषयं कथयांबभूव ।  
 अत्राह तत्र ननु धर्मगतं प्रमाणं तत्त्वार्थगामि कथितं न परात्मगामि ॥

Venerable Jaimini has stated in the *sūtra*, *autpattika*,<sup>1</sup> etc., that the unknown object is the content of a proof. Now it is objected that there it is said that the proof of religious rite (namely, the injunctive texts) alone reveals the unknown object (religious rite) and not the proof of the self (namely, the Upaniṣadic passages).

1. *autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ tasya jñānamupadeśaḥ  
 avyatiṛekasā arthe anupalabdhe tatpramāṇam bīdarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt,  
 Jaimini-sūtra, I, i, 5.  
 tattoṛthagāmi-anadhigatārthabodhakam, AP.*



[ 49 ]

सत्यं यदाह पितृमान् व्यवहारदृष्टि-  
 माश्रित्य तत्कथितवान्प्रकृतोपयोगात् ।  
 दूरप्रसारितनिसृष्टनिगूढभाव-  
 स्तद्वादरायणमतानयनात्प्रतीतः ॥

What you, a person of well-trained intellect, have said is true. From the empirical stand-point, Jaimini<sup>1</sup> has said (that the injunctive texts are valid in respect of religious rite) as it is applicable to the context (namely, enquiry into the religious rite). But we learn from his reference to the view of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa<sup>2</sup> that he has a natural but well-concealed import in the sense that is elucidated in the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*.

Religious rite, being insentient, cannot be characterized by *avidyā*. Hence the injunctive texts which are said to be its proof do not reveal the unknown object and as such they are not valid in the strict sense of the term. Hence it is said that Jaimini has said from the empirical stand-point that they are valid.

1. *vide: Jaimini-Sūtra*, 1, 1, 5.

2. In the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, Śrī Bādarāyaṇa holds that the Upaniṣads are valid in respect of the self which is unknown (that is, veiled by *avidyā*).

[ 50 ]

द्रष्टव्य इत्यपि विधिर्न विधिप्रमेय-  
 मात्मानमेव विनियच्छति तत्कृतश्चेत् ।  
 अज्ञातता च परमात्मन एव यस्मा-  
 द्यस्माच्च कर्तृवशवर्ति न दर्शनं तत् ॥

The term *draṣṭavyaḥ*<sup>1</sup> is not injunctive in (character). It presents the self alone as the object of the proof (namely, the Upaniṣads). Why is it so? It is because the self alone



is unknown (that is, veiled by *avidyā*) and its knowledge is not dependent on human agency.

1. The term *draṣṭavyaḥ* is present in the sentence — *ātman vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*, *Brh.*, IV, v, 6.

[ 51 ]

अर्हे कृत्यतृचश्च पाणिनिवचः स्पष्टं विधत्ते यत-  
स्तस्माद्दर्शनयोग्यतां वदति नस्तव्यो न तत्त्वान्तरम् ।  
तस्मादात्मपदार्थमात्रनियतं मेयत्वमेकान्ततो  
द्रष्टव्यादिवचो वदत्यनुभवादज्ञात आत्मा यतः ॥

As the aphorism of Pāṇini *arhe kṛtyatrcaśca*<sup>1</sup> clearly conveys (the sense of fitness), the gerundive suffix *lavya* conveys the sense that the self is fit to be known, and not any other sense. The sentence *draṣṭavyaḥ*<sup>2</sup>, etc., conveys as its import, the knowability exclusively present in the self, as the self alone is experienced to be unknown (that is, veiled by *avidyā*).

1. *Pāṇini-Sūtra*, III, iii, 169.

2. *Brh.*, IV, v, 6.

*ekāntataḥ — tātpariyataḥ*, *TB*.

[ 52 ]

रूप्यादिविभ्रममपेक्ष्य हि शुक्तिकादौ  
सत्संप्रयोगजनितैव तु बुद्धिवृत्तिः ।  
तामप्यपेक्ष्य सति संहतसर्वभेदे  
सत्संप्रयोगजनिता मतिरभ्युपेया ॥

The mental state of the form of shell, etc., may be regarded as arising from the contact of sense of sight with a real object (shell) only when contrasted with the mental state of illusory silver. But when contrasted with the mental



state of shell, the mental state of the self which is free from any difference should be accepted as arising from the association of the sense (that is, intellect) with a real object (the self).

Shell is more real than the illusory silver. Hence its perception arises from the contact of sense of sight with a real object — shell. But the self is more real than the shell. Hence its knowledge alone, when contrasted with the knowledge of shell, should be accepted as arising from the association of sense (that is, intellect) with the absolutely real object. It should, however, be noticed here that from the stand-point of other schools, it is said that the knowledge of the self arises from the association of the intellect with the self.

*vide : atra ātmamateḥ satsamprayogajanyaivaṁ pararityū uktam, SS.*

According to Advaita, the knowledge of the self arises from the Upaniṣadic texts. See *SS*, III, 295.

[ 53 ]

वेदान्तवाक्यजनितां परमात्मबुद्धि-

वृत्तिं व्यपेक्ष्य पुनरत्र न काचिदस्ति ।

सत्संप्रयोगजनिता भुवनत्रयेऽपि

बुद्धिस्तमोविरचितं हि जगत्समस्तम् ॥

Apart from the knowledge of the self arising from the Vedāntas, there is no knowledge in the three worlds (which may be regarded as) arising from the association of the senses with the real object; for, (there is no real object except the self), as everything (apart from the self) in the universe is the creation of *avidyā*.

[ 54 ]

धर्मेऽपि तत्त्वमतिरेव तु चोदनायाः

सत्त्वादिवस्तुनि यथाक्षनिबन्धना धीः ।

अज्ञाततापि सदृशी व्यवहारकाले

तत्त्वावबोधसमये न तु तत्त्वबुद्धिः ॥



Just as the perceptual knowledge of the existent objects is real (from the empirical standpoint) so also the knowledge of religious rite arising from the injunctive text is (empirically) real. In empirical activity both (religious rite and the existent objects) are unknown. But at the time of the realization of the self (the knowledge of religious rite and existent objects) is no longer real.

[ 55 ]

आरम्भणादिवचनं सकलं प्रवृत्तं प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिविषयादपहर्तुमुच्चैः ।  
तत्त्वं यथोदितनयेन विवर्तवादमाश्रित्य सत्यपरिणामनिवारणेन ॥

The *śruti* text—*vācārambhaṇam*,<sup>1</sup> etc., by discarding the theory of transformation and adopting the theory of transfiguration is intent upon totally depriving the perceptible objects of reality.

1. *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam*, *Chānd*, VI, i, 4.

### BASIS FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PARINĀMA-VĀDA

[ 56 ]

वाक्यप्रवृत्तिमनुसृत्य च सूत्रकारः सिद्धान्ततामनयदत्र विवर्तवादम् ।  
तत्त्वप्रकाशनविधावपहत्य शक्तिमारम्भणादिवचनादपरप्रमायाः ॥

Following the import of the text (found in the beginning)<sup>1</sup> and on the strength of the text *vācārambhaṇam*,<sup>2</sup> etc., the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* deprives the other proofs of their capacity to reveal the real object. Thus he puts forth the doctrine of transfiguration as his final conclusion.

1. *yenāśrutam śrutam bhavati*, etc., *Chānd*, VI, i, 3.  
2. *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam*, *ibid*, VI, i, 4.

For details see Introduction, p. 122.



[ 57 ]

आरम्भसंहतिविकारविवर्तवादानाश्रित्य वादिजनता खलु वावदीति ।  
आरम्भसंहतिमते परिहृत्य वादौ द्वावत्र संग्रहपदं नयते मुनीन्द्रः ॥

The disputants frequently argue in favour of the theories of creation, aggregation, transformation, and transfiguration. The venerable sage accepts the two theories (transformation and transfiguration) by discarding the theories of creation and aggregation.

[ 58 ]

तत्रापि पूर्वमुपगम्य विकारवादं भोक्त्रादिसूत्रमवतार्य विरोधनुत्त्यै ।  
प्रावर्तत व्यवहृतेः परिरक्षणाय कर्मादिगोचरविधावुपयोगहेतोः ॥

The author of the *sūtra*, in order to remove the conflict (of the Upaniṣadic teaching with perception), and to preserve empirical activity necessary to carry out the injunction of rituals, etc., accepts the theory of transformation and introduces the *sūtra* — *bhoktrāpatteḥ*, etc.<sup>1</sup>

1. *vide: bhoktrāpatteḥ avibhūgaścet syālllokavat. BS, II, i, 13.*

For details see Introduction, pp. 122-3.

[ 59 ]

साक्षादिहाभिमतमेव विवर्तवादमाहृत्य सूचयति पूर्वमपेक्षमाणः ।  
आरम्भणादिवचनेन विवर्तवादं शक्नोति वक्तुमुदिते परिणामवादे ॥

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* conclusively puts forth the doctrine of transfiguration alone as his final view as contrasted with the doctrine of transformation. But the theory of transfiguration could be maintained in the *sūtra*, *tadananyatvamārambhāṇasabdādibhyaḥ* only when the theory of transformation has been stated (as a prelude to it).



[ 60 ]

आरुह्य भूमिमधरामितराधिरोढुं शक्येति शास्त्रमपि कारणकार्यभावम् ।  
उक्त्वा पुरा परिणतिप्रतिपादनेन संप्रत्यपोहति विकारमृषात्वसिद्धयै ॥

Only after having ascended the ground floor one can mount the next floor. (In accordance with this principle) the Upaniṣadic text also states the theory of transformation first and thereby brings out the relation of cause and effect. Later it rejects the theory of transformation in order to establish the unreality of the modifications.<sup>1</sup>

1. See SS, II, 67.

[ 61 ]

विवर्तवादस्य हि पूर्वभूमिर्वेदान्तवादे परिणामवादः ।  
व्यवस्थितेऽस्मिन्परिणामवादे स्वयं समायाति विवर्तवादः ॥

In the doctrine of the Upaniṣads, the theory of transformation is a prelude to the theory of transfiguration. When once the theory of transformation is presented, then the doctrine of transfiguration naturally follows.

See Introduction, p. 123.

[ 62 ]

उपायमातिष्ठति पूर्वमुच्चैरुपेयमाप्तुं जनता यथैव ।  
श्रुतिर्मुनीन्द्रश्च विवर्तसिद्धयै विकारवादं वदतस्तथैव ॥

Just as men pursue the means with keen desire to achieve the end, the *śruti* text and the venerable sage (Śrī Bādarāyaṇa) speak of the theory of transformation in order to establish the theory of transfiguration.



[ 63 ]

आरम्भवदः कणभक्षपक्षः संघातवादस्तु भदन्तपक्षः ।  
सांख्यादिपक्षः परिणामवादो वेदान्तपक्षस्तु विवर्तवादः ॥

Kaṇāda advocates the creationist theory, and the Buddha, the theory of aggregation. The Sāṅkhya and others advance the theory of transformation, while the Vedāntins (Advaitins) the theory of transfiguration.

*sāṅkhyādi — sāṅkhyāḥ kapilāḥ, ādipadāt patañjaliḥ, SS.*

[ 64 ]

विकारवादं कपिलादिपक्षमुपेत्यवादेन तु सूत्रकारः ।  
श्रुतिश्च संजल्पति पूर्वभूमौ स्थित्वा विवर्तप्रतिपादनाय ॥

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *śruti* texts, as a preliminary stage, accept for the sake of argument the view of Kapila, namely, the theory of transformation, and speak of it in order to propound the theory of transfiguration.

[ 65 ]

अभेदिनः सावयवस्य सत्यविचित्ररूपान्तरदर्शकत्वम् ।  
वदन्ति धीराः परिणाममस्या वसुन्धराया इव सत्यसृष्टिम् ॥

Wise men hold that the production of real and varied objects from the one composite object is transformation, like the production of plants from the earth.

[ 66 ]

अभेदिनो निर्विकृतेरनेकमृषास्वरूपान्तरदर्शकत्वम् ।  
विवर्तशब्दार्थ इह प्रसिद्धस्तरङ्गभेदादिव चन्द्रभेदः ॥



The appearance of many unreal and varied forms from an immutable object is well known to be transfiguration, like the (appearance of) different moons owing to different waves.

## UPANIṢADS ADMIT ONLY THE VIVARTA-VĀDA

[ 67 ]

अहं प्रजायेय बहु स्वयं स्यामित्यादिनादौ परिणाममुक्त्वा ।  
विकारमिथ्यात्वमथ ब्रुवाणा विवर्तवादं श्रुतिरानिनाय ॥

The *śruti* text, stating the theory of transformation first in the words 'Let me be born and multiply' and then stating the unreality of modifications, establishes the theory of transfiguration.

The *śruti* text *bahu syāṁ prajāyeya*, (*Chānd.*, VI, ii, 3 ) states the theory of transformation.

Then the Upaniṣadic text --

*yadagne rohitāṁ rūpāṁ tejasaḥ tadrūpāṁ, yacchuklaṁ tadapāṁ, yatkr-  
ṣṇāṁ tadannasya apṛgṛadagneragnitvaṁ, vācūrambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyāṁ  
trīṇi rūpāṇityeva satyam*, (*Chānd.*, VI, iv, 1) states that the modifications,  
that is, fire, etc., are indeterminable. Thus the *śruti* text indicates that  
fire, etc., are the unreal modifications or the transfigurations of the  
self.

[ 68 ]

मायाश्रुतिस्मृतिवचः सकलं तथा च वस्तुत्वमर्दनपरं घटते विवर्ते ।  
सर्वस्य कारणविकारविभागभाजः प्रागादृतस्य परमार्थतया प्रतीतेः ॥

The *śruti*<sup>1</sup> and the *smṛti*<sup>2</sup> texts which declare *avidyā* (to be the material cause of the universe) befit the doctrine of transfiguration by depriving the universe of reality — the universe, which is differentiated as cause and effect and which is taken to be real on the basis of its perception in the pre-realization state.



1. *vide: indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate, Bṛh., II, xv, 19.*
2. *vide: prakṛtiṁ svām adhiṣṭhāya sambhavāmyūta-māyayā, Bh.G. IV, 6.*

## REFUTATION OF THE SAṂGHĀTA-VĀDA

[ 69 ]

संघातवादमुपगम्य तु तत्र पक्षे  
 संहन्त्रभाव इति सूत्रकृदाह दोषम् ।  
 स्थायी भदन्तसमये न हि कश्चिदत्र  
 संघातसंजननशक्तिसमन्वितोऽस्ति

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* refers to the theory of aggregation<sup>1</sup> and points out the absence of the uniting factor as a defect in that theory. For there is no permanent uniting factor possessed of the power to bring about the aggregation.

1. *BS, II, ii, 18.*

For details see Introduction, p. 112.

## REFUTATION OF THE ĀRAMBHA-VĀDA

[ 70 ]

आरम्भवादमुपगम्य तदीययुक्तेस्तत्प्रक्रियामनुसरन् व्यभिचारमाह ।  
 वैशेषिकं प्रति महद्वदिदं हि योज्यं यद्वापि दीर्घवदिदं जडमित्यनेन ॥

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* states the theory of creative evolution and points out to the *Veīṣeṣika* the contradictions in his arguments from his own standpoint. It should be understood that just as the visible size and length (arise from the invisible size and minuteness), the insentient universe (originates from the sentient Brahman).



[ 71 ]

ह्रस्वारब्धं त्र्यणुकमणुभिस्तद्वदारब्धमेतद्  
ह्रस्वं नो तन्न च तदणुवत्संमतं तद्वदेतत् ।  
सर्वं कार्यं गगनधरणीमध्यगं चेतनोत्थं  
निश्चित्कं नो जडिमघटितं युक्तमित्याचक्षे ॥

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* says that just as the ternary compound, produced from the binary compounds (that have invisible size and minuteness) is not accepted as having invisible size and minuteness, it is reasonable that the universe originating from sentient Brahman is (not accepted to be sentient) but devoid of consciousness and hence insentient.

[ 72 ]

ह्रस्वाणुत्वे कारणद्वित्वहेतोर्जाति नैते पारिमाण्डल्यहेतोः ।  
दीर्घत्वं यद्यच्च दीर्घे महत्त्वं द्रव्ये ते द्वे कारणत्रित्वहेतोः ॥

The invisible size and minuteness present in the binary compound arise not from the atomic size (present in its cause, namely, atom) but from duality existing in its cause that is, two atoms). Similarly, the visible size and length



present in the ternary compound originate from triplicity of its cause (that is, three binary compounds).<sup>1</sup>

1. *vide: kārāṇābahutvāt-kārāṇamahattvāt pracaya-viśeṣāt ca mahat, Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, VII, i, 9.*

[ 73 ]

व्यणुकस्य जन्म परमाणुयुगात् परिमण्डलादिति कणादमतम् ।  
व्यणुकत्रयात्त्र्यणुकजन्म पुनर्नियमं न कश्यपसुतो वदति ॥

The view of Kaṇāda is that a binary compound arises from the combination of two atoms of invisible size and a ternary compound from (the combination of) three binary compounds. Nevertheless, Kaṇāda does not maintain this rule of causality regarding the effect 'visible size' and 'length' present in the ternary product from 'invisible size' and minuteness present in its cause — the binary product.<sup>1</sup>

1. See the previous verse.

[ 74 ]

व्यणुकत्र्यणुकव्यपाश्रयं परिमाणं प्रति कारणाश्रयः ।  
न तु कारणमिष्यते गुणस्तदवष्टभ्य वयं जिगीषवः ॥

The quality inhering in the cause is not considered as an invariable antecedent to the size existing in the binary and the ternary compounds. Having this as the ground, we are desirous of vanquishing you.

[ 75 ]

यदि कारणसंश्रयाद्गुणात् व्यणुकादेः परिमाणमिच्छति ।  
व्यणुकादिसमाश्रये तदा परिमाणेऽतिशयो विरुध्यते ॥

If the Vaiśeṣika accepts the origination of the size of the binary compounds (the ternary compounds and other



higher products) from the quality existing in their cause, then the difference in the size existing in the binary compounds, etc., (from the one existing in the cause) would be open to contradiction.

[ 76 ]

परिणामवादमुपगम्य तथा रचनाद्यसंभवमुवाच मुनिः ।

परमेश्वरं न हि विना घटते जडरूपवस्तुपरिणाम इति ॥

Similarly, the author of the *sūtra* refers<sup>1</sup> to the theory of transformation (of the insentient *prakṛti* into the universe) and points out that it is impossible to explain the orderly arrangement (of the universe on the basis of that theory). For it is not fitting that there is transformation of the insentient object without (the control of) God.

1. BS, II, ii, 1.

### METHOD OF REFUTATION OF THE RIVAL THEORIES

[ 77 ]

क्वचिदभ्युपेत्य कथनं कुरुते परपक्षदूषणकथावसरे ।

निजपक्षदोषपरिहारपरः क्वचिदभ्युपेत्य वदतीह मुनिः ॥

While refuting the views of other systems, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* refers to certain views only to refute them. But he adverts to certain other views to answer the objections raised against his views.

See the following verse.

[ 78 ]

परपक्षनिषेधमाचरन् क्वचिदङ्गीकरणं करोति सः ।

परदर्शितदोषनुत्ताये क्वचिदित्येष विशेष ईरितः ॥



The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* introduces certain views to refute them. But he refers to some other views to meet the objections pointed out against his view by the other schools. And this is the difference.

The theory of aggregation is referred to only to be refuted. But the theory of creation (*ārambha-vāda*) is examined to meet the objection how the insentient universe arises from the sentient self.

[ 79 ]

भोक्त्रादिसूत्रे परिणामवादमाश्रित्य तद्वादिभिरुक्तदोषम् ।  
समादधानो मुनिराह तस्मात् सिद्धान्तसिद्धिः पुनरुत्तरत्र ॥

In the aphorism *bhoktrāpatteḥ*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> the sage (Bādarāyaṇa) answers the objections of the opponents from the view-point of the theory of transformation. He, however, states his final view in the next aphorism.<sup>2</sup>

1. *BS*, II, i, 13.      2. *ibid.*, II, i, 14.

[ 80 ]

प्रत्यासन्ना परिणतिरियं विप्रकृष्टस्तु पूर्वः  
संघातादिः सकल उदितो वेदसिद्धान्तसिद्धेः ।  
एतावत्त्वादियमभिमतं सूत्रकारस्य भाति  
अन्तिभ्रष्टस्फुटनिजमनः कौशलानां नराणाम् ॥

The theory of transformation is very near to the establishment of (the theory of transfiguration which is) the final view of the Vedāntas;<sup>1</sup> and the theories of aggregation, etc., referred to before, are remote. On this ground, it seems to some men who have lost through ignorance their clear discriminating faculty that the theory of transformation is quite acceptable to the author of the *sūtra*.

1. cf: *sa ca (pradhānakāraṇavādaḥ) kārya-kāraṇa-ananyatvābhyupagamāt pratyāsanno vedāntavādasya*, *BSB*, I, iv, 28. Here the term *pradhānakāraṇavāda* refers to the theory of transformation.



## THREE POINTS OF VIEW

[ 81 ]

आरोपदृष्टिरपवादकदृष्टिरेवं व्यामिश्रदृष्टिरिति दृष्टिविभागमेनम् ।  
संगृह्य सूत्रकृदयं पुरुषं मुमुक्षुं सम्यक्प्रबोधयितुमुत्सहते क्रमेण ॥

• The author of the *sūtra* endeavours to enlighten easily and gradually the spiritual aspirant who longs for liberation, by adopting three distinct views, namely, superposition, negation, and the blend of these two.

*samyak—akleśena, SS*

[ 82 ]

आरोपदृष्टिरुदिता परिणामदृष्टिर्द्वैतोपशान्तिरपवादकदृष्टिरन्त्या ।  
मध्ये विवर्तविषया द्वयमिश्रदृष्टिर्व्यामिश्रदृष्टिरधरोत्तरभूमिभावात् ॥

The view of superposition mentioned (in the previous verse) points to the theory of transformation; and the view of negation which is the ultimate refers to the realization of the self that annihilates all duality. The blend of these two views suggests the theory of transfiguration and it comes in between the two views, as it involves a reference to both the preliminary and ultimate views.

*dvaitopasāntiḥ — savilāśāvidyopasamakūdvaitabrahmasākṣātākārah, SS.*

[ 83 ]

तत्त्वावेदकमानदृष्टिरधमा तत्त्वक्षतिर्मध्यमा  
नत्त्वप्रच्युतिविभ्रमक्षतिकरी तत्रान्त्यदृष्टिर्मता ।  
जीवैकत्वमुमुक्षुभेदगतितो व्यामिश्रदृष्टिर्द्विधा  
भिन्ना तत्र च पूर्वपूर्वमिलयादूर्ध्वोर्ध्वलब्धिर्भवेत्



The view that the universe is real is the lowest (preliminary); and the view that the universe is not real lies in between (the lowest and the ultimate views). The knowledge which instructs the universe to be unreal and which annihilates the illusive universe is ultimate. The blend (of the lowest and the ultimate views) is twofold as the notion of the existence of only one individual soul and the notion of existence of many souls longing for liberation. Here the negation of each preceding view leads to each succeeding view.

[ 84 ]

परिणामबुद्धिमुपभृद्य पुमान् विनिवर्तयत्यथ विवर्तमतिम् ।  
उपमृद्य तामपि पदार्थधिया परिपूर्णदृष्टिमुपसर्पति सः ॥

The aspirant sets aside the notion of transformation and then cultivates the notion of transfiguration. Disregarding even that by the knowledge of the (secondary) senses of the terms (*tat* and *tvam* in the sentence *tat tvam asi*) he attains the knowledge of the oneness of the self.

*vinivartayati* — *viśeṣeṇa niscitya vartayati utpādayati*, SS.

[ 85 ]

अधशब्दसूचितमुमुक्षुरिमं खलु दृष्टिभेदमुदितक्रमतः ।  
उपदौकते विगलिताखिलधीरवतिष्ठते निजमहिम्नि ततः ॥

The aspirant who longs for liberation and who is intended to be conveyed by the word *atha*<sup>1</sup> pursues the variety of notions in due sequence as mentioned above. Then, being freed from the knowledge of all duality, he remains in his own supreme nature.

1. The word *atha* in the *sūtra*—*athāto brahmajijñātsā* (I, i, 1) refers to the aspirant.



[ 86 ]

परिणाम इत्यथ विवर्त इति बहवोऽहमेव च मुमुक्षुरिति ।  
परिपुष्कलं च परमं पदमित्यवगत्य तिष्ठति महिम्नि निजे ॥

The aspirant first considers (the universe to be) the transformation of the spirit and then as its transfiguration. Here he first thinks that there are many individual souls longing for liberation and then he concludes that there is only one soul desiring release. Then, realising the supreme self (to be his true nature), he remains in his own supreme nature (that is, as the absolute self).

[ 87 ]

परिणामधियो विवर्तधीरपवादात्मतया व्यवस्थिता ।  
सकलद्वयमर्दिनीं धियं प्रति सारोपगिराभिधीयते ॥

The notion of transfiguration is determined as negating the notion of transformation. (But) it is also called 'superposition' with reference to the knowledge that annihilates all duality.

The notion of transfiguration is *apavāda* or negating factor as it negates the notion of transformation. But as it is negated by the realization of the self, it is termed 'superposition' (*āropa*) also.

[ 88 ]

उभयव्यतिमिश्ररूपतां भजते तेन विवर्तधीरियम् ।  
प्रथमोत्तमयोर्द्वयोः पुनर्व्यतिमिश्रीभवनं न विद्यते ॥

Hence the notion of transfiguration becomes the blend of the notion of transformation and the knowledge of the self. But the preliminary and ultimate views (namely, the notion of transformation and the knowledge of the self) are not of the form of 'blend'.



# OBJECTION: THREE POINTS OF VIEW RELATE TO THREE TYPES OF ASPIRANTS

[ 89 ]

कृपणधीः परिणाममुदीक्षते क्षपितकल्मषधीस्तु विवर्तताम् ।  
स्थिरमतिः पुरुषः पुनरीक्षते व्यपगतद्वितयं परमं पदम् ॥

One whose mind is not free from desire (for enjoyment) here or hereafter considers the world to be the transformation of Brahman; while the other whose mind is free from sin regards the universe as the transfiguration of the self. The steady-minded aspirant, on the other hand, sees the supreme self which is free from duality.

In this and the following verses it is said that the three points of view are put forth not with reference to only one person but with reference to three different kinds of persons. This view is refuted in verse 91.

[ 90 ]

पुरुषभेदवशाद्विविधा भवेत् क्षपितकल्मषधीरपि मध्यमा ।  
जगदनेकमुमुक्षुकमीक्षते पुरुष एकतरो न तथेतरः ॥

The intermediate notion of transfiguration present in a person whose mind is freed from sin is two-fold in view of two kinds of persons. One of the two observes the world as having many souls longing for release, while the other is not so (that is, considers it as having only one individual soul desiring release).

# THE THREE POINTS OF VIEW RELATE TO ONLY ONE ASPIRANT

[ 91 ]

इति तु केचिदुशन्ति महाधियस्तदपि संभवतीति न दुष्यति ।  
इह तु सूत्रकृताथगिरोदितः पुरुष एकविधस्त्रिविधो न तु ॥



Some men of great intellect maintain thus. That view, being impossible, is defective. The author of the *sūtra*, by the word *atha*<sup>1</sup>, points out one aspirant and not three kinds of aspirants.

1. *vide*: BS, I, i, 1.

[ 92 ]

तिसृषु भूमिषु तस्य च तिष्ठतः क्रमवशात्स्वयमुत्तमभूमिका ।  
समुपसर्पति तत्र च तिष्ठतः समुपशाम्यति कारणकार्यधीः ॥

The highest stage (that is, the third stage) naturally approaches the aspirant who is gradually functioning in the three stages. To him who remains in that stage, the distinctive knowledge of cause and effect (*avidyā* and its products) ceases to exist.

*uttamabhūmikā — akhaṇḍasākṣātātūralakṣaṇā apavādadṛṣṭiḥ, TB.*

[ 93 ]

श्रुतिवचांसि मुनिस्मरणानि च द्वयविशारदगीरपि सर्वशः ।  
त्रयमपेक्ष्य दशात्रितयं विना न हि घटामुपयाति कदाचन ॥

The Upaniṣadic sentences,<sup>1</sup> the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, and the words of Śrī Śaṅkara, who is the expert in determining the import of these two, would never become appropriate without the three stages mentioned in respect of the three points of view.

This verse is restated in SS, III, 241.

[ 94 ]

अतोऽनपोद्यैव च तत्त्वसंविदुत्पादनेऽध्यक्षमितेः पुरस्तात् ।  
सामर्थ्यमक्षादिविरोधमस्य निवारयामास समन्वयस्य ॥

1. पोद्यैव — P<sub>2</sub>

2. मतेः — P<sub>2</sub>



Hence the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, before stating his final view, eliminated the conflict of the Upaniṣadic teaching with perception, etc., by not rejecting the view that perception, etc., are capable of revealing a real object.

[ 95 ]

इहाधुनारम्भणशब्दशक्तिं संश्रित्य तत्त्वावगतिक्षमत्वम् ।  
अक्षादिमानस्य निराकरोति समन्वयस्यापनयन् विरोधम् ॥

Here, on the basis of the *śruti* text - *vācārambhaṇam*, etc.', the author of the *sūtra*, in order to remove the conflict of the import of the Upaniṣadic passages with perception, etc., rejects the capacity of perception, etc., in revealing a real object.

1. *vide Chānd.*, VI, i, 4.

[ 96 ]

अखण्डवाक्यार्थमनुव्रजन्ती समन्वयोत्थापितबुद्धिवृत्तिः ।  
अक्षादिभिस्तत्त्वनिवेदने हि सद्यः परिम्लायति निर्विशङ्कम् ॥

The knowledge, arising from the sentences whose import (has been determined) and having for its content the partless (self), will doubtless fade away at once, if perception, etc., reveal the real objects.

[ 97 ]

अखण्डमेवाद्वयमात्मतत्त्वं त्रयीशिरोवाक्यमनुप्रविष्टाः ।  
वदन्ति शब्दा इति शब्दशक्तिनिरूपणे पूर्वमुदीरितं हि ॥

While determining the significative power of the words it has been said before (that is, in the first *adhyāya* of the present work) that the terms (*tat* and *tvam*) present in the Upaniṣadic sentence (*tat tvam asi*) convey the partless and absolute self.



[ 98 ]

अतो विरोधस्य निराससिद्धयै निरस्यतेऽक्षादिषु तत्त्वभागः ।  
संरक्ष्यते संव्यवहारशक्तिभागः पुनः सर्वमतोऽनवद्यम् ॥

Hence to establish the removal of conflict (of the Upaniṣadic teaching with perception, etc.), we have refuted the view that perception, etc., reveal a real object. But their empirical validity is conserved and hence everything (namely, the import of the Upaniṣadic teaching and the empirical validity) is faultless.

[ 99 ]

चितिवस्तुनः स्वमहिमस्फुरणे स्वयमेव कारणमिति प्रगतम् ।  
प्रतिबध्य तच्चितिगताग्रहणं विपरीतबुद्धिमुपदौकयति ॥

It is well known that the conscious self itself is the cause of its manifestation. But *avidyā* abiding in the consciousness veils it and presents contrary notions.

[ 100 ]

व्यवहारनिर्वहणशक्तिमसौ न चिदग्रहोऽस्य विनिवारयति ।  
परमार्थवेदनविधिक्षमतामखण्डयन्नपि मनः प्रभृतेः ॥

Though *avidyā* present in the self rules out the capacity of mind, etc., in revealing a real object, yet it does not preclude their capacity in maintaining empirical validity (of the phenomenal world).

[ 101 ]

चितिवस्तुबुद्धिजनकस्य पुनर्वचसो न खण्डयति शक्तिमसौ ।  
स्वनिबन्धनस्फुरणमेव चितेः प्रतिबध्य तिष्ठति न वाचनिकम् ॥



*Avidyā* does not obstruct the power of the Upaniṣadic sentences in giving rise to the knowledge of the self. It only obstructs the manifestation of the self arising by itself (namely, the self) and not the knowledge of the self arising from the Upaniṣadic sentences.

[ 102 ]

प्रत्यक्षादेरेष दोषस्ततोऽयं वेदान्तानां नैव दोषा<sup>1</sup>नुबन्धः।  
सत्यं वस्तु च्छादयन्नद्वितीयं द्वैतं यस्मादानयत्येष दोषः ॥

*Avidyā* is a defect in respect of perception, etc., and not in respect of the Upaniṣadic texts. As it veils the absolute and true self and brings about duality, it is a defect.

[ 103 ]

किं च प्रतीचि सकलोपनिषत्प्रसिद्धा  
मानान्तरं सकलमेव तु तत्पराचि ।  
प्रत्यक्पराग्विषयगोचरयो<sup>2</sup>स्तु बुद्ध्योः  
स्पर्धा न संभवति मेयविभागसिद्धेः ॥

All the Upaniṣads convey the inner self while the other proofs are directed only towards the external objects. There cannot be any conflict between the knowledge of the inner self and the knowledge of the external objects, as the two objects are clearly marked off.

[ 104 ]

अभिन्न एवैष पटः समीक्ष्यते न भेदगन्धोऽपि पटे समीक्ष्यते ।  
पटेऽपि भेदो यदि कल्प्यते तदा पटो विदीर्येत कुतस्तदा पटः ॥

1. नुबन्धः — P<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>4</sub>2. योश्च — M<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>



The cloth is perceived as unitary and not even a trace of difference is found in it. If difference is admitted in the cloth, then it would be torn to shreds. Where then is (the existence of) the cloth?

For details see Introduction, p. 62.

[ 105 ]

घटात्पटो भिन्न इतीष्यते यदि स्फुटं प्रसज्येत विकल्पिता भिदा ।  
न सत्यमापेक्षिकमीक्षितं क्वचित् तथा च यत्नेन निरूपयिष्यते ॥

If it is admitted that the cloth is different from pot, then there is the contingency of difference being superimposed. A thing which depends on another thing for its existence is not real (that is, superimposed). And this point will be explained (later)<sup>1</sup> carefully.

1. *vide*: ŚŚ, III, 188-93.

'Difference from pot' exists in cloth. Here 'difference' existing in cloth involves a reference to 'pot' and hence it depends on 'pot' for its existence and as such it is not real.

[ 106 ]

न भेदबुद्धिर्घटते प्रमाणतो विनापि धर्मप्रतियोगिसंविदा ।  
न भेदबुद्धिं विरह्य कल्पते तथैव धर्मप्रतियोगिधीरपि ॥

The cognition of difference is not reasonable without a previous knowledge of the correlative and counter-correlative. And the knowledge of correlative and counter-correlative is not reasonable without a prior knowledge of difference.

For details see Introduction, p. 62.



[ 107 ]

परस्पराभावधिया न भेदधीर्विनोपपन्ना न तया विनेतरा ।  
इतीदमन्योन्यसमाश्रयं यतो मतिद्वयं तेन तदस्तु कल्पितम् ॥

The cognition (that two objects possess) contradictory attributes is not reasonable without a previous knowledge that the two objects are mutually different. And the latter also does not hold good without the former. Thus there results the defect of mutual dependence. Hence let the two cognitions be superimposed.

[ 108 ]

असन्नवृत्तिर्न च सन्नवृत्तिर्न चोपपन्ना सदसन्नवृत्तिः ।  
जडप्रमाणस्य फलं ततोऽपि न तेन वेदान्तजबुद्धिबाधः ॥

The result of the proofs of external objects is not the removal of (doubt which should be) either an existent entity or a non-existent entity or an entity which is existent and non-existent at once. For this reason also, perception, etc., do not contradict the knowledge (of the self) arising from the Upaniṣadic sentences.

Perception, etc., are not valid because they do not produce any tangible result. If it be said that the removal of doubt regarding the object is the result of perception, then it does not hold good. For the doubt of the object that is said to be removed should either be real or unreal or both. A real thing, like the self, cannot be removed. An unreal thing also, like the horn of a hare, does not exist and hence cannot be removed. And an object cannot be real and unreal at once; for, such a notion is discrepant. Other systems of philosophy do not accept the concept of *anirvacanīya*, in which case it can be said that the proofs remove the object which is *anirvacanīya*. Hence perception, etc., do not produce any result and hence they are not valid. When such is the case, there is no question of their contradicting the knowledge of the self arising from the Upaniṣads.



[ 109 ]

असत्प्रसूतिर्न च सत्प्रसूतिर्न चोपपन्ना सदसत्प्रसूतिः ।  
जडप्रमाणस्य फलं ततोऽपि न तेन वेदान्तजबुद्धिबाधः ॥

The result of the proofs of external objects is not the rise (of knowledge) which is either non-existent or existent or existent and non-existent at once. For this reason also, perception, etc., (are not valid and hence they) do not contradict the Upaniṣadic teaching.

[ 110 ]

जडार्थसंविन्न हि कुर्वतः फलं तदा हि कुर्वत्त्वमपीदृशं भवेत् ।  
अकुर्वतस्तत्फलमित्युदीरयन् विहस्यते दुर्मतिरभक्कैरपि ॥

The knowledge of insentient objects is not the result (of sense of sight and other senses) that function; for function also (being an effect) should be accepted as the result of a thing that functions. (And so on, *ad infinitum*.) If one says that (the knowledge of insentient objects) is the result (of sense of sight, etc.) that do not function, then this evil-minded person will be laughed at even by children.

[ 111 ]

सती न संवित्क्रियते हि सत्त्वान्न चासती तद्वदसत्त्वहेतोः ।  
न चोपपन्नं सदसत्त्वमस्यास्ततो न कार्यत्वमुपैति संवित् ॥

If knowledge is existent, then it cannot be produced because of its very existence (like the self). If it is non-existent, then also it cannot be produced, because of its non-existence (like horn of a hare). It is not reasonable (to hold) that it is existent and non-existent. Hence knowledge is not a thing that can be produced.



It cannot be said that perception, etc., are valid by giving rise to the knowledge of objects.

[ 112 ]

न शक्यमुत्पाद्यमिति प्रशस्यते तदा हि शक्तेरपि जन्यतापत्तेत् ।  
अशक्यमुत्पाद्यमितीष्यते यदि द्रुतं नमश्चूर्णय मुद्रादिभिः ॥

It is not commendable to hold that 'knowledge' which is capable of being produced is originated (by perception, etc.); for, then there would arise the contingency of 'capability' being produced (and so on *ad infinitum*). If it is admitted (by one) that 'knowledge' which is not capable of being produced is generated, then one may very well be asked to powder ether immediately by means of a club, etc. (which is impossible).

What is originated (*utpādya*) is an entity which possesses or which is associated with the *śakti* or the capability of being produced. The entity which is associated with such *śakti* is termed *śakya*.

Now, the point of criticism is the origination of *śakya* or the entity which is associated with *śakti* would not be possible, if *śakti* which is adjectival is not originated. If *śakti* also is originated, then it must be admitted that this *śakti* possesses or is associated with another *śakti* or the capability of being produced. Exactly similar consideration applies to the third *śakti* which is admitted; and thus we are led to the fallacy of infinite regress.

[ 113 ]

जडप्रमाणस्य फलानिरूपणाज्जडस्य तत्त्वं न निरूपणक्षमम् ।  
अतो न मानान्तरमर्थतोऽपि नस्त्रयोशिरोवस्तु निराकरिष्यति ॥

As the result of the proofs of the insentient objects cannot be determined, (the proofs are not valid) and hence the true nature of the insentient objects is indeterminable.



Therefore perception, etc., do not contradict even through their objects the sense of the Upaniṣads.

*arthato'pi—viśayato'pi, TB.*

See Introduction, p. 63.

[ 114 ]

आत्मन्येव समस्तमस्तु यदि वा मानान्तरं तेन च  
 स्पष्टं वेदशिरोविरुद्धमिति च स्वीकुर्महे कामतः ।  
 एवं सत्यपि पूर्वभावि सकलं मानान्तरं बाधते  
 पश्चात्कस्यचिदेव वेदशिरसो जाता परब्रह्मधीः ॥

Or else, let all the proofs be valid in respect of the self (which is cosmic). And we deliberately admit that the Upaniṣads are clearly in conflict with them. Even then, the knowledge of the self arising later from the Upaniṣads in the case of an aspirant, sublates perception, etc., which have arisen earlier.

*ātmanyeva-sapraṇācūtmani ityarthah, S.*

THE MAXIM THAT THE ANTECEDENT ONE IS  
INEFFECTIVE

[ 115 ]

पूर्वोत्पन्नमृगाम्बुविभ्रमधियो बाधं विना नोत्तरं  
 विज्ञानं समुदेतुमृषभुवो याथात्म्यमावेदयत् ।  
 शक्नोतीति यथा मृगाम्बुधिषणामुन्मृद्यदुत्पद्यते  
 तद्वद्वेदशिरोवचोजनितधीर्भेदभ्रमं ब्रह्मणि ॥

The subsequent knowledge revealing the true nature of a barren land cannot arise without sublating the erroneous knowledge of mirage which arose earlier. Just as it arises



only by sublating the knowledge of mirage, similarly only by sublating the knowledge of duality the knowledge of the self arises from the Upaniṣads.

[ 116 ]

पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यमाह षष्ठेऽध्यायेऽवस्थितो जैमिनिर्यत् ।  
वक्ष्यामस्तत्सर्वमानीय तुभ्यं बुद्धिं स्वीयां सम्यगत्रावधत्स्व ॥

Jaimini, in the sixth chapter (of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*) has said that the antecedent one is ineffective when there is the relation of antecedence and subsequence.<sup>1</sup> We shall explain to you all the details connected with it and you fix your attention on them.

1. *vide paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam prakrtivat,*  
*Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, VI, v, 19/54.*

[ 117 ]

उद्गातृप्रतिहर्तृकतया जातौ वियोगौ क्रमाद्  
यस्मिन्कर्मविधिप्रयोगसमये तत्रैष नः संशयः ।  
किं सर्वद्रविणव्ययो भवतु वा संस्थापनं दक्षिणा-  
हीनस्येति तदा परं बलवदित्यूचे मुनिर्जैमिनिः ॥

At the time of the performance of a ritual (that is when going round the sacrificial fire), if the priests Udgātā and Pratihartā, successively let go (the waist-cloth of the priest in front), then there arises the doubt whether the sacrifice is to be concluded by giving the entire wealth (of the sacrificer as the fee) to the priests or without giving any fee. On this, the sage Jaimini has said that the latter is effective.

The section VI, v, 17/49-50 of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā sūtra* discusses the passage.

*yadyudgātū apacchindyūt adakṣiṇam tam yajñam iṣṭvā punaryajeta, yadi pratihartū sarvavedasam dadyāt.*



In the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the priests should go round the sacrificial fire by holding the waist-cloth of the priest in front. If *Udgāta* — the priest who chants the hymns of the *Sāma-veda* — lets go the waist-cloth of the priest in front of him, then to expiate this, the sacrifice should be concluded without giving any sacrificial fee to the priests. If *Pratihartā* — the priest who chants the hymns of the *Rg-veda* — does so, then the sacrifice should be completed by giving the entire wealth of the sacrificer as the sacrificial fee. If the two let go the waist-cloth successively, then the sacrificer should conclude the sacrifice by giving as fee that which relates to the later loss of grip.

This is discussed in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, VI, v, 19/54.

[ 118 ]

यद्वत्प्राकृतवैकृतावतितरामन्योन्यसंस्पर्धिनौ  
 धर्मौ बाध्यनिवर्तकावभिमतौ बुद्धौ क्रमेणान्वयात् ।  
 पाठव्यत्ययसंभवेऽपि च तयोर्बुद्धिक्रमो विद्यते  
 पूर्वा प्राकृतधर्मधीरितरधीरन्त्या तथैवोत्तिथेः ॥

When there arises a conflict between the accessories of the model sacrifice (*prakṛti-yāga*) and the accessories of the sacrifice modelled on it (*vikṛti-yāga*), the accessories of the latter supersede the accessories of the former, as the knowledge of the two sets of ancillaries arises successively. Though there may be the reversal of the order of the texts (that enjoin the *prakṛti-yāga* and the *vikṛti-yāga*), there exists the sequence in the knowledge of the accessories. The knowledge of the accessories of the model sacrifice arises earlier and the knowledge of the other arises later. It is only thus that the knowledge arises.

Jaimini has said that the subsequent one is ineffective when there is the relation of antecedence and subsequence between two cognitions; and this maxim he explains by making a reference to a model sacrifice (*prakṛtivat*).



*vide: paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam prakṛtivat, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra,*  
VI, v, 19/54.

The meaning of the expression *prakṛtivat* is explained in this verse. There are two kinds of sacrifices, one a model sacrifice (*prakṛti-yāga*) and another a sacrifice modelled on it (*vikṛti-yāga*). There is a maxim that *vikṛti-yāga* must be performed like *prakṛti-yāga*. It follows from this that the accessories prescribed in respect of *prakṛti-yāga* would exactly apply to *vikṛti-yāga*. But in certain cases the Vedic text specifically prescribes with reference to *vikṛti-yāga* an accessory different from the one prescribed in respect of *prakṛti-yāga*.

Now according to the maxim that *vikṛti-yāga* must be performed like *prakṛti-yāga*, the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga* arises first and the knowledge of *vikṛti-yāga* arises later. Even if the order of the Vedic texts which enjoin the performance of *prakṛti-yāga* and *vikṛti-yāga* is reversed, then also the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga* alone would arise first. It is because the performance of *vikṛti-yāga* depends upon the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga*.

Thus, since the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga* and its accessory arises earlier, the knowledge of the *vikṛti-yāga* with a different accessory which arises later cannot arise without sublating the knowledge of that accessory of *prakṛti-yāga*. The point that is of importance here is that the subsequent one sublates the antecedent one.

[ 119 ]

सापेक्षावदितौ यदा तु भवतः पूर्वापरप्रत्ययौ  
पूर्वस्तत्र निवर्तको भवति तत्रान्यो निवर्त्यो यथा ।  
वेदोपक्रमजा मतिर्वलवती नर्गादिसंहारजा  
वेदोपक्रममुख्यभागभवति तत्रर्गादिवाणी गुणात् ॥

When the earlier and later cognitions are inter-dependent, then the earlier one is the sublating factor and the later one is sublated. The knowledge arising from the word *veda* found in the beginning is powerful and not the



one arising from the word *ṛk* found at the end of the passage. And, the word *veda* found in the beginning is taken in its primary sense, while the word *ṛk* is taken in its secondary sense.

In the section dealing with *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice there exists the passage — *trayo veda asṛjyanta, agne ṛgvedaḥ, vāyoryajurvedaḥ, ādityā sāmavedaḥ* — where the word *veda* is present. In the end there is the passage — *uccaiḥ ṛcā kriyate, upānīṣu yajuṣā, uccaiḥ sāmna* — where the words *ṛk*, *yajus*, and *sāman* are found. Now there arises the doubt whether the word *ṛk* signifies the *Ṛg-veda* or the metrical hymns found in any *veda*. It is said that as the knowledge of the word *ṛk* found in the end is related to the knowledge of the word *veda* in the beginning, the meaning of the word *ṛk* is determined by the *Ṛg-veda* that occurs at the beginning. The word *ṛk* is, therefore, taken in its secondary sense of the *Ṛg-veda*.

This is discussed in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, III, iii, 1/1-9.

[ 120 ]

ब्रह्म पुच्छमिति वाक्यगामिनो ब्रह्म पुच्छमिति शब्दयोर्द्वयोः ।  
ब्रह्मशब्दबलवत्तारत्वतः पुच्छशब्दपरिपीडनं मतम् ॥

As regards the two words *brahma* and *puccha* present in the sentence *brahma puccham (pratisthā)*,<sup>1</sup> the word *brahma* (occurring at the beginning) is more powerful than the other word *puccha* and hence it is accepted<sup>2</sup> that the word *puccha* should be taken in its secondary sense.

1. *Taitt.* II, v, 1.

2. *vide: BSB.* I, i, 19.

[ 121 ]

अथ यद्युपक्रमणमल्पतरं भवति प्रभूतमुपसंहरणम् ।  
बलवत्तादा चरममेव भवेदुभयोर्विरोधसमये नितराम् ॥



If the beginning portion contains a few particulars, while the concluding one many, and if there arises conflict between the two, then the concluding portion alone is powerful.

The *Chāndogyo'paniṣad* — *asya lokasya kā gacirīti, ākāśa iti hovāca, sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāni ākāśādeva samutpadyante, ākāśaṁ pratyastaṁ gacchanti* (I, ix, 1) is considered in *BS* - *ākāśastallīngāt* (I, i, 22). Here the word *ākāśa* which means 'ether' is taken to signify the self in accordance with the concluding portion which mentions all the prominent characteristics of the self as existing in *ākāśa*. Here the concluding portion is more powerful than the beginning one.

[ 122 ]

अथ यद्युपक्रमणमल्पमपि प्रतिपाद्यवस्तुविषयं भवति ।

अविवक्षितार्थविषयं चरमं भवति प्रभूतमपि बाध्यमदः ॥

The beginning portion containing a few particulars but conveying the intended sense is the sublating factor, while the concluding portion containing many particulars but conveying the unintended sense is sublated.

The *Aitareyo'paniṣad* texts *ātman vā idameka eva agre āsit* (I, i,) and *sa imān lokān asṛjata* (I, 2) are considered in *BS* - *ātmagrhitiritaravaduttarāt* (III, iii, 16).

Here the beginning sentence conveys the oneness of the self which is the intended sense. The concluding portion which conveys the creation of the universe by the self refers to the qualified self and hence it is sublated. Though the concluding portion contains many details, still, as the beginning containing a few details happens to contain the chief import, it supersedes the end which contains many details.

[ 123 ]

आसन्नवस्तुविषयेण यथाक्षजेन बाधो भवत्यनुमितेर्व्यवधानयोगात् ।

प्रत्यक्त्वमात्रविषयेण तथागमेन युक्तोऽक्षजादिविषयावगमस्य बाधः ॥



Just as an inferential cognition, the object of which is mediate, is contradicted by perception, the object of which is immediate, even so the knowledge arising from perception is contradicted by the knowledge from the Upaniṣads that has for its content the inner self (which is the most immediate).

The object of perception is immediate, while the object of inferential knowledge is mediate. But the self which is the object of the knowledge arising from the Upaniṣads is the most immediate. Hence the Upaniṣadic teaching stultifies perception.

[ 124 ]

किंचाम्नायवचः प्रमेयबलतः सर्वं प्रमाणान्तरं  
स्वार्थं साधयतीति तत्सकलमेवायत्तामस्मिन् भवेत् ।  
यद्यत्रायतते विरोधसमये तेनास्य तद्वाधने  
सामर्थ्यं न च विद्यते श्रुतिवचोबाधो यथा हि स्मृतेः ॥

Moreover, all the proofs (other than Vedānta) reveal their objects only on the strength of the content of the Upaniṣads, namely, the self, and hence they are dependent on the self. The object which depends on a particular thing is not capable of sublating the latter, that is, the thing on which it depends, when there arises conflict between the two, just as the *smṛti* text is not authoritative when it is in conflict with scripture.<sup>1</sup>

- (1) *vide: virodhe tvanapekṣyaṁ syāt asati hi anumānam, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I, iii, 2.*

[ 125 ]

ब्रह्माज्ञानसमुद्भवं ग्रहणं सातिग्रहं ब्रह्मणः  
स्वाकारग्रहणेन वेदशिरसो जाता मतिर्बाधते ।  
विद्या वस्तुबलेन जन्म लभते माया तु निर्वस्तुका  
सा तामुद्भवमात्रतः क्षपयति ध्वान्तं यथा भास्करः ॥



The mental state arising from the Upaniṣads, on the strength of the reflection of the self in it, annihilates the group of senses and their objects that arise from *avidyā* abiding in the self. The knowledge arises (from the Upaniṣads) by having the absolutely real object as its content. But *avidyā* is devoid of reality, and hence the knowledge of the self, by its mere rise annihilates it (that is, *avidyā*), just as the sun, by its very rise, dispels darkness.

*grahagaṇam* — *indriyāṇi*; *atigrahāḥ* — *viśayāḥ*, AP.

*vide*: *Brh.*, III, ii, 2 and 5.

[ 126 ]

रागद्वेषप्रशाखं विषयगुणसमुद्भासिधिवृत्तिशाखं  
धर्माधर्मप्रवृत्तिप्रचुरसुखसमुद्भोगभोगप्रवालम् ।  
छिन्द्याः संसारवृक्षं निशितमतिमहाशस्त्रनिक्षेपदक्षः  
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वस्थलीगं निबिडतमतमोमूललब्धप्ररोहम् ॥

You, being an expert in applying the great weapon in the form of firm knowledge of the self, shall cut down the tree of *samsāra* which has put forth shoots from the root-cause, namely, dense *avidyā* abiding in the self, and to which passion and hatred are the two principal branches; the mental states that reveal the qualities of excellence (and defect) as present in the external objects are the subsidiary branches; and the varied experiences of happiness and misery arising from the performance of the deeds leading to merit and demerit are the sprouts.

[ 127 ]

प्रत्यग्वस्तुन एव तत्र विषये माया तमः कारणं  
ध्वान्तं बीजमबोध इत्यपि गिराविद्यैव संकीर्त्यते ।  
तस्या एव विलास एष भवता गुर्वादिभेदान्वितः  
संक्लृप्तो न तु विद्यते पृथगसौ संध्ये यथा धामनि ॥



*Avidyā* which has the self as its locus and object is termed illusion, darkness, material cause (of the universe), pitch darkness, root-cause (of the universe), and ignorance. The universe characterised by the difference of preceptor, etc., is its transformation and is fancied by you (that is, the aspirant). The universe has no independent existence apart from the self like the objects of the dream state.

*pratyagvastunaḥ pratyakcāitanyāśritā, SS.*

### THE DISTINCTION OF RELEASE AND BONDAGE ACCORDING TO THE EKA-JĪVA-VĀDA

[ 128 ]

मुक्तामुक्तौ विद्वदज्ञौ त्वदन्यावाकाशादि क्षमावसानं च विश्वम् ।  
स्वाविद्योत्थस्वान्तनिष्पन्दनं तद्विज्ञातव्यं मा ग्रहीरन्यथैतत् ॥

The released and bound souls, the mystic and the ignorant, and the universe from ether to the earth are different from you and should be understood to be the transformation of your intellect which has arisen from your *avidyā*. Do not take them otherwise.

Sarvajñātman advocates the theory of only one individual soul (*eka-jīva-vāda*) in this and the following verses. He maintains the theory of many individual souls (*aneka-jīva-vāda*) also.

[ 129 ]

कालोऽतीतोऽनादिरेष्यन्ननन्तो मुक्तामुक्तौ तत्र पूर्वं तथोर्ध्वम् ।  
तस्मादेतद्दुर्घटं शङ्कसे चेन्मा शङ्किष्ठाः स्वप्नदृष्टान्तदृष्टेः ॥

The time that had passed is beginningless and the future is endless. The released and ignorant souls existed before and will exist hereafter. (As this view is correct) if you doubt that it is not reasonable, do not disbelieve (what I have said); for it holds good when viewed in the light of dream experience.



[ 130 ]

सुप्तो जन्तुः स्वल्पमात्रेऽपि काले कोटीः पश्येद्वृत्तसंवत्सराणाम् ।  
पश्येत्कोटीरेवमागामिनां च जाग्रत्काले योजयेत्सर्वमेतत् ॥

A person who is asleep (that is, who is dreaming) perceives, within a short time, innumerable years that had passed and innumerable years that are yet to come. And this experience should be applied to the waking state.

[ 131 ]

कालोऽनादिस्तत्र मुक्तः शुकादिः  
कालोऽनन्तो मोक्ष्यते तत्र चान्यः ।  
इत्येवं ते बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था-  
संसिद्धिः स्यादापरात्मप्रबोधात् ॥

The time (that had passed) is beginningless and there (the sage) Śuka and others attained release. The time (that is yet to come) is endless and some others will attain release. Thus, (on the lines of dream experience) the distinction of release and bondage would exist till the realization of the self.

[ 132 ]

अज्ञानं सकलभ्रमोद्भवनकृत्पिण्डेषु सामान्यवत्  
जीवानां प्रतिबिम्बकल्पवपुषां बिम्बोपमे ब्रह्मणि ।  
विद्वांसं पुरुषं जहाति भजते विद्याविहीनं नरं  
नष्टानष्टमिवात्मपिण्डमधुना जातिस्तथैके जगुः ॥

Some hold shus: just as a generic attribute is present in the individual souls, so also *avidyā* which is the cause of

1. त्मत्वबोधात् — T.,



all appearances and which has for its object the self that is viewed as the original, abides in the individual souls that are viewed as the reflections of the self. Just as a generic attribute which leaves out the individual body that is lost and abides in the one that exists, this *avidyā* also leaves out the sage and abides in the ignorant person.

Sarvajñātman in this and the following verses states seven different views regarding the distinction of the released and the bound souls; and later, he criticises all the seven views. The view set forth in this verse is examined in *SS*, II, 139-141.

[ 133 ]

अज्ञानानि बहून्यसंख्यवपुषो जीवान्मुमुक्षून्पि  
ज्ञानाज्ञानसमाश्रयाननुयुगं तेषां च निःश्रेयसम् ।  
मायामीश्वरसंश्रयामनुगमात्संसारसंवर्तिनीं  
केचिद्वैवविघातनिघ्नमनसः स्वीचक्रुर्लपश्रुताः ॥

Some men of little learning whose intellect is oppressed by ill-fate hold thus: there are plurality of *avidyā* and also many individual souls consisting of the wise, the ignorant and those desirous of release. They (severally) attain liberation in each cosmic age (provided they have the knowledge of the supreme self). *Māyā* abides in the supreme self; and being dependent on it, it is the cause of the universe.

Those who advocate the view set forth in this verse maintain that nescience (*ajñāna*) and illusion (*māyā*) are different.

The view set forth in this verse is examined in *SS*, II, 142 ff.

[ 134 ]

आकाशे विहगोऽस्ति नास्ति च यथा तद्वत्परब्रह्मणि  
स्वच्छे चिद्वपुषि स्वभावविमलेऽसङ्गे शिवे शाश्वते ।  
निर्भेदेऽनुदयव्ययेऽनवयवेऽविद्या भवेन्नो भवे-  
दित्येवं निरवद्यमाहुरपरे पक्षव्यवस्थार्थिनः ॥



Some desirous of maintaining the distinction (of release and bondage) hold the (following) view as faultless: just as there is the existence as well as the non-existence of a bird in the ether, so also there is the existence as well as the non-existence of *avidyā* in the self which is free from any impurity, which is of the form of consciousness and hence free from agency, which is unassociated with anything, and which is attributeless, eternal, absolute, free from origination, and destruction, and partless.

One perceives a bird in the ether and at the same time another person does not perceive it in another region of the ether. As the ether is partless, it should be held that the existence and the non-existence of the bird are present in one substratum, namely, ether. Similarly, *avidyā* exists and does not exist in the partless self.

The view set forth in this verse is examined in ŚŚ, II, 152.

[ 135 ]

शुद्धे वस्तुनि यद्यपि प्रविशति ध्वान्तं मनः कारणं

स्वीकृत्यैव तथाप्युपाधिमपरं ब्रह्मस्वरूपे विशेत् ।

तच्चान्तःकरणं सुसूक्ष्मवपुषा तिष्ठद्बहिः सर्वदा

चैतन्ये तमसो नियामकमिति स्वीचक्रुर्न्ये पुनः ॥

Some, however, hold: though *avidyā* which is the material cause (of the universe) abides in the pure self, yet it is present only through the mind which is an adventitious condition. The mind always remains subtle and extraneous to the self; and it is determinative of (the existence of) *avidyā* in the self.

The view set forth in this verse is examined in ŚŚ, II, 159 ff.



[ 136 ]

अज्ञानि ब्रह्म बुद्धीरनुसरति ततः स्थावरं जङ्गमं च  
 स्वाज्ञानादेव भूत्वा क्वचिदवगतितो मुक्तमन्यत्र बद्धम् ।  
 तच्चाज्ञानं विनष्टं स्थितमथ च तदेवांशभेदोपपत्ते-  
 रेवं सर्वव्यवस्था परमपुरुषगा जायतीतीति केचित् ॥

Some (however) hold : the self which is the locus of *avidyā* is reflected in the intellect. Then by its own *avidyā*, it becomes the immovable and the movable objects, and it attains release in some cases (due to the knowledge of the self) and in other cases it remains bound (due to lack of the knowledge of the self). And *avidyā*, being possessed of parts, is annihilated in the self and yet remains in it. Thus the distinction (of release and bondage) relating to the supreme self very well holds good.

The view set forth in this verse must be taken as refuted in *SS*, II, 156-158. See *TB*, on *SS*, II, 162.

[ 137 ]

बाह्याध्यात्मिकवस्तुजातजननी माया हरेर्बन्धनी  
 शक्तिर्दाशकजालवत्प्रसरणं प्राप्नोत्यविद्यावतः ।  
 जीवान्संकुचतीच्छया भगवतः सत्यास्तु मिथ्याथवा  
 संकोचश्च विलक्षणश्च भवतः स्वाभाविकावित्यपि ॥

*Māyā* which causes bondage (in respect of the individual souls) which is the power of Lord Viṣṇu, and which gives rise to the external as well as the internal elements, like the net of a fisherman is expanded with reference to the ignorant souls and contracted from the mystics, at the will of God. It is real; or, let it be unreal. Its contraction and expansion depend on the will of the Lord.

*svābhāvikaḥ* — *īśvarecchānibandhanau*, *AP*.



[ 138 ]

संस्कारभ्रमसंततिं प्रतिनरं भिन्नां परब्रह्मणि  
 स्वीचक्रविषये प्रवाहवपुषानादिं तमः केचन ।  
 तामुच्छिद्य समुच्चयेन घटते मोक्षाय कश्चिन्नरः  
 कश्चित्द्विरहेण संसरति ना जीवाश्रया सेति च ॥

Some others hold: the series of erroneous cognitions and their mental impressions constitute *avidyā* which, being of the nature of a continuous stream, is beginningless. (This *avidyā*) has the supreme self as its object, and it is different in each individual soul. By annihilating *avidyā* by the combination of knowledge and action an aspirant becomes released; while the other being devoid of knowledge and action, undergoes transmigration. And *avidyā* is present in the individual soul.

The view set forth in this verse, according to *TB* and *AP* is advocated by Maṇḍanamiśra. See *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 10-11.

[ 139 ]

अज्ञस्तावत्प्रत्यगात्माहमज्ञ इत्येवं नः सिध्यति स्वप्रकाशात् ।  
 अज्ञातं तु ब्रह्म सिध्येत्कुतो वः सम्यग्ज्ञानद्भ्रान्तितः स्वप्रकाशात् ॥

From the self-luminous knowledge in the form "I am ignorant" it is established that the inner self is the locus of *avidyā*. But how is it established that the supreme self is the object of *avidyā*? Is it established by valid knowledge or by erroneous knowledge or by self-luminosity (of the self)?

Now Sarvajñātman begins to examine critically the first four views. And, in this and the following twelve verses he examines the first two views.



[ 140 ]

सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मणः सिद्धिपक्षे जाड्यं तस्य स्याद्धटादेर्यथैव ।  
सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानसिद्धौ तस्यापि स्यात्सत्यता तद्देव ॥

If it is held that the supreme self as the object of *avidyā* is established by valid knowledge, then it would become insentient, like a pot. If it is held that *avidyā* as having the self as its object is established by valid knowledge, then it (namely, *avidyā* would be real like the supreme self.)

*jāḍyam tasya, etc. — jñānaviśayasya jaḍatvaniyamūt brahmaṇo'pi  
tathātvam, SS.*

*tasyāpi syāt satyatā — brahmaṇo'jñānasiddhau tasyājñānasyāpi  
pramāṇasiddhatvāt satyatā syāt, SS.*

[ 141 ]

भ्रान्तिज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मणः सिद्धिपक्षे तस्यापि स्यात्कल्पितत्वं तमोवत् ।  
अज्ञातं चेद्ब्रह्म नः स्वप्रकाशं मा भाषिष्ठा नानुभूतिस्तथा नः ॥

If it is held that the supreme self (as the object of *avidyā*) is established by erroneous knowledge, then the supreme self would become a superimposed entity like *avidyā*. If you say that the supreme self as the object of *avidyā* is self-luminous, then do not assert like this; for we do not have any such experience (in the form: the supreme self is ignorant).

[ 142 ]

अज्ञातत्वे यानवोचाम दोषान् मायावित्त्वे ब्रह्मणस्तानवेहि ।  
मिथ्याज्ञानात्स्वप्रकाशात्प्रमाणात् संसिद्धिः स्यात्तस्य तत्कथ्यतां नः ॥

Understand that the defects which we pointed out in the view that the supreme self is the object of *avidyā* are applicable to the view that the self is the locus of *māyā* (which is accepted by you as different from nescience).



Explain to us whether the self as the locus of illusion is established by erroneous knowledge or self-luminosity or valid knowledge.

The view put forth in *ŚŚ*, II, 133 is examined here.

[ 143 ]

मिथ्याज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मणः सिद्धिपक्षे माथेव स्यात्कल्पितं तच्च 'तद्वत् ।  
मानादिष्टं ब्रह्म मायावि चेद्वो मायायाः स्यात्सत्यता जाड्यमस्य ॥

If it is held that the supreme self as the locus of *māyā* is established by erroneous knowledge, then the self also, like *māyā* would become a superimposed entity. If it is held that the supreme self as the locus of *māyā* is established by valid knowledge, then *māyā* would become real and the supreme self would become insentient.

See notes on *ŚŚ*, II, 140.

[ 144 ]

तन्मायावि ब्रह्म चेत्स्वप्रकाशं मायापि स्याद्ब्रह्मवत्स्वप्रकाशः ।  
मायां पश्येद्ब्रह्म चेत्स्वप्रकाशं तत्रापि स्यात्स्वानुभूत्या विरोधः ॥

If the supreme self as the locus of *māyā* is self-luminous, then *māyā* also, like the supreme self would become self-luminous. If it is held that the supreme self alone is self-luminous and it reveals *māyā*, then this view is contrary to experience.

There is no such experience to the effect that the supreme self as different from the inner self is self-luminous. See the following verse.

[ 145 ]

आत्मा मूढः स्वप्रकाशो यथायं नैवं मायि ब्रह्म नः स्वप्रकाशम् ।  
अज्ञान्यद्ब्रह्म चेत्स्वप्रकाशं द्वे विस्पष्टे स्वप्रकाशे स्फुरेताम् ॥



The supreme self as the locus of *māyā* is not self-luminous unlike the inner self which is the locus of *avidyā*. If the supreme self, different from the inner self which is the locus of *avidyā*, is also self-luminous, then two self-luminous entities would manifest themselves.

*vide : pratyagbhinnasya brahmaṇaḥ svaprakāśatayā anubhavābhāvādeva virodhaḥ, TB.*

[ 146 ]

ज्ञायन्ते चेद्ब्रह्मणा जीवभेदा जाड्यं तेषां कुड्यवन्निर्विवादम् ।  
न ज्ञायन्ते ब्रह्मणा चेत्तादानीं सर्वज्ञत्वव्याहतिर्दुर्निवारा ॥

If it is held that the individual souls which differ among themselves (and from the supreme self) are known by the supreme self, then indisputably the individual souls are insentient, like a wall. If, on the other hand, it is held that the individual souls (being different from themselves and from the supreme self) are not known by the supreme self, then the contradiction to the omniscience of the supreme self is inevitable.

[ 147 ]

जीवा एते स्वप्रकाशस्वभावा निर्भासन्ते ब्रह्मणश्चेद्विभक्ताः ।  
तेषां भेदः स्वप्रकाशो न वा स्यादोषं ब्रूमो दुर्निवारं द्विधापि ॥

If it is held that the individual souls are self-luminous and as such they manifest themselves as different from the supreme self, then (we ask) whether the difference from the supreme self present in the individual soul is self-luminous or not. We point out irrefutable defects in both the alternatives.

[ 148 ]

तेषां भेदः स्वप्रकाशो यदीष्टः सत्यत्वं स्यात्तस्य तेषां तथैव ।  
वेद्योऽभीष्टस्तद्विभागो यदि स्यात्तानज्ञात्वा तद्विभागो न वेद्यः ॥



If the difference from the supreme self present in the individual souls is admitted to be self-luminous, then 'difference' also like the individual souls would become real. If it is held that the 'difference' is to be known and not self-luminous, then (it is said that) it is impossible to know it without knowing the individual souls and the supreme self (which are the correlatives and the counter-correlative respectively).

[ 149 ]

जीवाः सर्वे त्वां प्रति प्रस्फुरन्तः सम्यग्ज्ञानात् प्रस्फुरन्ति स्वतो वा ।  
यद्वा मिथ्याज्ञानसामर्थ्यतोऽमी पक्षः कस्ते रोचते ब्रूहि तन्मे ॥

Are all the individual souls revealed to you by valid knowledge, or self-luminosity, or by erroneous knowledge? Tell me which one of these views is acceptable to you.

[ 150 ]

सम्यग्ज्ञानाज्जीवभेदप्रसिद्धावद्वैतत्वं ब्रह्मणो न प्रसिध्येत् ।  
जीवाः सर्वे मां प्रति स्वप्रकाशा इत्युक्तिस्ते स्वानुभूत्या विरुद्धा ॥

If the difference among the individual souls is established by valid knowledge, (then it is real) and hence it cannot be established that the supreme self is absolute. The assertion that the individual souls are known to me by self-luminosity (of the individual souls) is contradicted by one's own experience.

[ 151 ]

मिथ्याज्ञानाज्जीवभेदप्रसिद्धौ सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्वाध एवाभ्युपेयः ।  
मिथ्याज्ञानाद्रज्जुसर्पः प्रसिद्धः सम्यग्ज्ञानात्तस्य बाधोऽपि सिद्धः ॥

If the difference among the individual souls is established by erroneous knowledge, then it should be admitted



that difference is sublated by valid knowledge. The snake appearing in a rope is known by erroneous knowledge and its sublation is effected by the valid knowledge (of the rope).

[ 152 ]

एकोपाधावेकवस्तुप्रसिद्धौ भावाभावौ नेक्षितौ क्वापि लोके ।  
पक्ष्यादीनामस्तिता नास्तिता च व्योमन्येकस्मिन्नप्यवच्छिन्न एव ॥

Existence and non-existence in one substratum are never seen in ordinary experience, as only one thing can be present in one substratum. The existence and the non-existence of a bird, etc., are spoken of in one unitary ether; still they are present only in the different delimited parts of the ether.

The view set forth in SŚ, II, 134 is refuted in this and the following six verses.

[ 153 ]

सोऽवच्छेदोऽप्यस्ति नास्त्यम्बरे चे-  
त्तत्रान्वेष्यः कोऽप्यवच्छिन्नभावः ।  
सोऽवच्छेदोऽप्यस्ति नास्त्यम्बरे चेत्  
बाढं तस्मिन् सोऽप्यवच्छिन्न एव ॥

If the limiting adjuncts also exist and do not exist in the ether, then it should be admitted that (the existence and the non-existence of the limiting adjuncts are present in the parts of the ether) delimited by some other limiting adjuncts. If the latter limiting adjuncts also exist and do not exist in the ether, then certainly they do so in the ether delimited by some other limiting adjuncts.



[ 154 ]

नन्वेवं स्यादुर्निवारानवस्था बाढं का नो हानिरिष्टैव सापि ।  
कर्मोद्भूतं नः शरीरं शरीरात् कर्मोद्भूतिस्तत्र किं नेष्यते सा ॥

(If the *pūrvapakṣin* says that) in this case, the defect of *infinite regress* cannot be avoided, then we say, 'Yes'. It is acceptable to us and it does not amount to any defect. Do we not accept *infinite regress* in this case, namely, the living body arises as a result of past actions, while the latter arises from the living body in the previous birth?

[ 155 ]

किं चाज्ञानं ब्रह्मणोऽप्यस्ति नास्ती-  
त्येतत्कस्मात्त्वं विजानासि हेतोः ।  
मूढोऽस्मीति प्रत्ययादस्तिबुद्धि-  
मुक्ते दाहान्मोहनास्तित्वबुद्धिः ॥

(The *Siddhāntin* asks): moreover, on what grounds do you understand the existence and the non-existence of *avidyā* in the self? (The *Pūrvapakṣin* replies): the knowledge of the existence of *avidyā* is established by the experience in the form 'I am ignorant'; and the knowledge of its non-existence is established from the knowledge of its annihilation in the case of a released soul.

[ 156 ]

मुक्तेऽज्ञानं दग्धमित्येतदेवं कस्माद्धेतोर्वैत्ति तत्कथ्यतां नः ।  
मिथ्याज्ञानात्स्वप्रकाशात्प्रमाणान्मुक्तेऽज्ञानं दग्धमित्यस्य सिद्धिः ॥

(The *Siddhāntin* asks): tell me on what grounds do you understand that *avidyā* is annihilated in the case of a



released soul. Does the knowledge that '*avidyā* is annihilated in the case of a released soul' arise from valid experience, or from erroneous experience, or by self-luminosity?

[ 157 ]

सम्यग्ज्ञानान्मुक्तिसिद्धिर्यदीष्टा नूनं मुक्तः कुडचवत्तो जडः स्यात् ।  
मिथ्याज्ञानान्मुक्तिसिद्धिर्यदीष्टा स्रक्सर्पादिप्रख्य एवैष मुक्तः ॥

If it is held that (the knowledge that *avidyā* is annihilated in the case of a soul at the time of) release is established by valid experience, then indeed in your view the released soul would become insentient like a wall. If the knowledge relating to release is established by erroneous experience, then the released soul would become similar to the snake appearing in a garland (that is, indeterminate).

[ 158 ]

मुक्तो मह्यं स्वप्रकाशश्चकास्तीत्येषा वाणी स्वानुभूत्या विरुद्धा ।  
न ह्यश्रुत्वा शास्त्रमेतन्मनुष्यः कश्चिज्ज्ञानात्येष मुक्तः शुकादिः ॥

The assertion that the released soul is revealed to me by my self-luminosity is contrary to experience. Without studying the scripture (dealing with the released souls) no person could know that sage Śuka and others are released.

If it is said that the experience that *avidyā* is annihilated in the case of a released soul is self-luminous, it amounts to saying that the released soul is known to me by my self-luminosity. And this is contrary to experience.

[ 159 ]

ताटस्थ्येनोपाधिमादाय मोहश्चैतन्येऽस्मिन् स्वप्रकाशे प्रविष्टः ।  
तेनेह स्याद्वन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थेत्युक्तं यत्प्राग्दूषणं तस्य विद्धि ॥



It has been said before that *avidyā* gets into the self-luminous consciousness through the adventitious limiting adjunct (the intellect) and thereby there exists the distinction of bondage and release. And you understand that the afore-mentioned defects (are applicable) to this view also.

The view put forth in *SS*, II, 135, is restated in this verse and refuted in the following verses.

[ 160 ]

ताटस्थेनोपाधिरङ्गं यदि स्यान्मोहाविष्टे ब्रह्मणि स्वप्रकाशे ।  
अग्निक्षेपस्योल्मुकं यद्वदेवं मोहस्य स्यान्न प्रदेशस्थितत्वम् ॥

If it is said that just as fire-brand is the medium through which fire gets into (a house, etc.,) even so if the adventitious limiting adjunct is the medium through which *avidyā* gets into the self-luminous self, then *avidyā* would not exist only in a part (that is, it would pervade the whole self and consequently it cannot be said that *avidyā* exists and does not exist in the self).

[ 161 ]

अग्निः क्षिप्तो ह्युल्मुकेन प्रदेशमात्रव्याप्तिं वर्जयित्वा समस्तम् ।  
वेश्म व्याप्नोत्येवमेवेह कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म व्याप्नोत्याधिनास्तं तमोऽपि ॥

Just as fire which is thrown into a house through a fire-brand not only pervades the whole fuel but also the whole house, even so *avidyā* which gets into the self through the limiting adjunct pervades the entire self.

*ādhinā* — *upādhinā*; *astam* — *kṣiptam*, *S*.

[ 162 ]

तस्माद्ब्रह्माविद्यया जीवभावं प्राप्यासित्वा तावके तु स्वरूपे ।  
त्वच्चित्तेन स्पन्दितं जीवजातमाकाशादि क्षमावसानं च पश्येत् ॥



Hence the supreme self attains the state of the individual soul due to *avidyā* and it remains as your true nature and it perceives the group of individual souls and the universe from ether to the earth which are superimposed by your *avidyā*.

*tvaccittena — atra cittasābdena avidyā ucyate, AP.*

The view which holds that *māyā* is the power of Viṣṇu and which is set forth in *SS*, II, 137, is untenable on the grounds mentioned in verses II, 139-141. And, the view which maintains that the series of erroneous cognitions and their mental impressions constitute *avidyā* and which is set forth in *SS*, II, 138, is also untenable on the ground that the series of erroneous cognitions and their mental impressions cannot exist without a material cause; and, that cause should be *avidyā* which is positive in nature.

For details see *AP*, on *SS*, II, 163.

[ 163 ]

स्वीयाविद्याकल्पिताचार्यवेदन्यायादिभ्यो जायते तस्य विद्या ।  
विद्याजन्मध्वस्तमोहस्य तस्य स्वीये रूपेऽवस्थितिः स्वप्रकाशे ॥

The knowledge of the self arises to the aspirant (who is the only individual soul) from the preceptor, the Upaniṣads and the principles of interpretation which are the illusory appearances of one's *avidyā*. The aspirant whose *avidyā* is annihilated by the rise of the knowledge of the supreme self remains in his own self-luminous nature.

*nyāyāḥ — brahmamīmāṃsā, SS.*

[ 164 ]

अज्ञानि ब्रह्म जीवो भवति भवति च स्पष्टमज्ञानमस्य  
प्रागस्पष्टं सदन्तःकरणनिपतितज्योतिराभासयोगात् ।  
चैतन्यैकप्रतिष्ठं स्फुरति न हि तमस्तादृशं यादृशं त-  
द्बुद्धिस्थाभासनिष्ठं स्फुरति तदुचितं जीवमौढ्याभिधानम् ॥



The supreme self (that is, the pure consciousness) being the locus and the object of *avidyā* attains the state of an individual soul. *Avidyā* (present in the pure consciousness) not being perceptible in the state of deep sleep becomes clearly manifest (in the waking state), owing to its relation to the reflection of the pure consciousness in the intellect. *Avidyā* when present in the pure consciousness is not so clearly perceptible, as it is when the pure consciousness is reflected in the intellect. (And as the reflection of the pure consciousness in the intellect is the individual soul), that statement that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā* is reasonable.

For details see Introduction, p. 78.

[ 165 ]

अज्ञानं जडशक्तिमात्रवपुषा जीवाद्बहिः सिध्यति

जीवारूढमहं न जान इति तु ज्ञानापनोद्यात्मना ।

संसिद्धिं प्रतिपद्यते तदुचितं जीवाज्ञाताभाषितं

द्वैरूप्ये सति रूपमेकमनिशं भात्येवमन्यन्न हि ॥

*Avidyā* in its aspect of projection<sup>1</sup> is present outside the individual soul (that is, in God); and, in its aspect of being removable by valid knowledge, it appears in the individual soul in the experience 'I am ignorant.' Hence the statement that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*, is reasonable. Of the two aspects of *avidyā*, one (namely, the aspect of being removable by valid knowledge) always manifests in the individual soul, while the other aspect is not so.

1. See note on the following verse.

*Avidyā* is active in its aspect of projection only in the case of God.  
See notes on SS, II, 188.



[ 166 ]

जडशक्तिमात्रवपुषा गगनश्चसनादिकार्यजननी भवति ।  
पुरुषोत्तमस्य वशवर्तितया प्रकृतिः परस्य जगदेकगुरोः ॥

In its aspect of insentience (*vikṣepa*), *avidyā* which is the (transformative) material cause of the universe, and which depends on the supreme self that is the sole (transfigurative) material cause of the universe, gives rise to the effects, namely, ether, air, etc.

*Avidyā* in its *vikṣepa* aspect misrepresents the supreme self as the unreal universe.

*jadaśaktimātravapuṣū — vikṣepaśaktipradhānākāreṇa, AP.*

[ 167 ]

इयमेव सर्वजननी प्रकृतिर्वशिनी शरीणिमिमं पुरुषम् ।  
अधिरुह्य जीवमहमज्ञ इति स्फुरणैकगोचरवपुः स्फुरति ॥

This very same *avidyā*, which is the cause of the entire universe and which influences the individual soul and which is of the nature of being revealed by the witness-self, manifests itself in the form 'I am ignorant' in the case of the individual soul which is conditioned by the gross and the subtle body.

For details see Introduction, p. 78.

*śarīṇam — sthūladehāvacchinnaṃ; puruṣam — liṅgadehāvacchinnaṃ, TB.*

*sphuraṇaīkagocaravapuḥ — sākṣimātraviśayarūpā, AP.*

[ 168 ]

चितिशक्तिबाधितवपुः परमं पुरुषं प्रति स्फुरति सा प्रकृतिः ।  
चितिशक्तिबाधकवपुः पुरुषं पुरवर्तिनं प्रति पुनः स्फुरति ॥

In the case of God, *avidyā* manifests as one deprived of reality by the consciousness that is (figuratively spoken



of as) the power. But in the case of the individual soul which is delimited by the gross and the subtle body, it manifests as one concealing (the true nature of the individual soul, that is,) the consciousness.

[ 169 ]

दृश्यत्वजाड्यपरतन्त्रचिदाश्रयत्वैर्मयेश्वरस्य तमात्मतयानुमेया ।  
स्वप्नप्रपञ्चरजतभ्रमलिङ्गदेहदिकचन्द्रविभ्रममरीचिजलोपमानैः ॥

*Māyā* relating to God should be inferred as of the nature of *avidyā* on the grounds that it is perceptible, insentient, dependent, and abiding in the consciousness, and on the strength of the examples such as the objects of dream, the illusory silver, the intellect,<sup>1</sup> the erroneous cognitions of quarters, and the moon (as two) and mirage.

The insentient power abiding in the pure consciousness when related to God is termed *māyā*, and when related to the individual soul is termed *avidyā*. *Māyā* and *avidyā* are identical. See SŚ, II, 190.

1. *liṅgadehaḥ* — *antaḥkāraṇam*, TB.

[ 170 ]

एकाज्ञानविकल्पितं सकलमेवाकाशपूर्वं जगत्  
बाध्यत्वादिह यद्यदीदृशमदस्तादृशं स्वप्नवत् ।  
बाध्यं चेदमभीप्सितं भवति वस्तुस्मादिदं तादृशं  
शुद्धं धूमवदेव साधनमिदं तत्पाञ्चरूप्यान्वयात् ॥

The entire universe beginning with ether is assumed to be created from the single *avidyā*; for, whichever is sublated (later) is assumed to be created from *avidyā* like the dream state. This universe is accepted by you to be sublated (*bādhya*) and hence it is the creation of *avidyā*. The *probans* (that is *bādhya*) is free from fallacies, as it



possesses the five characteristic features<sup>1</sup> like the *probans* smoke (in the syllogism: The mountain has fire; for, it has smoke).

1. A *probans* would give rise to valid inferential knowledge only when it possesses the five characteristic features, namely, (i) *pakṣe sattvam*, (ii) *sapakṣe sattvam*, (iii) *vipakṣādvyāvṛttatvam*, (iv) *a-sat-pratipakṣitatvam*, and (v) *abādhitatvam*.

These may be explained as follows:

- i. A *pakṣa* is that in which there is no certainty of the thing to be inferred; and, the *probans* must exist in the *pakṣa*. The existence of the *probans* in the *pakṣa* is known as *pakṣe sattvam*.
- ii. A *sapakṣa* or a similar instance is what is definitely known to be possessed of the thing to be inferred; and, the *probans* must exist in the *sapakṣa*. The existence of the *probans* in the *sapakṣa* is known as *sapakṣe sattvam*.
- iii. A *vipakṣa* or a contrary instance is what is definitely known to be devoid of the thing to be inferred, and the *probans* must not exist in the *vipakṣa*. The non-existence of the *probans* in the *vipakṣa* is known as *vipakṣādvyāvṛttatvam*.
- iv. A *probans* which establishes a particular thing that is to be inferred is said to be *sat-pratipakṣita* or counterbalanced if there is another *probans* which seeks to establish the absence of that thing which is to be inferred. e.g.

(i) Sound is eternal, *because it is audible*.

(ii) Sound is non-eternal, *because it is a product*. In these two syllogisms, the *probans* are *sat-pratipakṣita* as each one is faced with another *probans* that seeks to establish the absence of the thing which it aims to establish as the thing to be proved. If the *probans* is not faced with another *probans* of the above mentioned nature, then the former one is known as *a-satprati-pakṣita*.

- v. A *probans* in a syllogism is said to be *bādhita* if the *pakṣa* in that syllogism is devoid of the thing to be inferred; and it is *abādhita* if the *pakṣa* consists of the thing to be inferred.



Now, the *probans* — smoke — in the syllogism 'The mountain has fire, because it has smoke' possesses the five characteristic features explained above. In the same way, the *probans* — *būdhyatva* — in the syllogism 'The universe is the effect of *avidyā*, because it is sublated (*būdhyatva*)' also possesses the five characteristic features and hence there would arise valid inferential cognition from this *probans*.

[ 171 ]

अनुमानमागमविरुद्धमिदं प्रतिवादिनो यदि मतं तदसत् ।  
न तमोऽतिरिच्य जगतो जनकप्रतिपादकं वचनमस्ति यतः ॥

If the disputants hold that the (aforesaid) inference) is contradicted by the (import of the) Upaniṣads, then it is wrong; for there is no Upaniṣadic statement which teaches the material cause of the universe to be other than *avidyā*.

THE SELF — THE LOCUS OF AVIDYĀ

[ 172 ]

विषयकरणदोषान्न भ्रमः संविदि स्या-  
दपि तु भवति मोहात्केवलादेवमेव ।  
भगवति परमात्मन्यद्वितीये समस्त-  
द्वयमतिरियमस्तु भ्रान्तिरज्ञानहेतुः ॥

The erroneous cognition arises regarding the consciousness, not owing to the defects present in the object and sense organ, but only owing to *avidyā*. Similarly, the cognition of all duality in the illustrious absolute self is erroneous and is caused by *avidyā*.

This verse is found in the first *adhyāya* of this work. See I, 30.

[ 173 ]

अज्ञानिनो भवति दुःखमनेन क्लृप्तं  
सर्वेश्वरस्य न खलु प्रतिभासतोऽपि ।  
सर्वज्ञतादिगुणजातममुष्य नास्य  
संसारिणः स्फुरति मोहसमन्वितस्य ॥



The misery born of *avidyā* pertains to the individual soul which is devoid of knowledge of its true nature. But it (namely, the misery) is not even seemingly present in God. The group of qualities such as omniscience, etc., belongs to God and not to the individual soul whose true nature is concealed by *avidyā* (in its aspect of concealment).

[ 174 ]

जीवन्मुक्तिगतो यदाह भगवान् सत्संप्रदायप्रभु-  
 जीवाज्ञानवचस्तदीदृगुचितं पूर्वापरालोचनात् ।  
 अन्यत्रापि तथा बहुश्रुतवचः पूर्वापरालोचना-  
 न्नैतव्यं परिहृत्य मण्डनवचस्तद्वचन्यथा प्रस्थितम् ॥

Lord Kṛṣṇa who is the master of the hoary tradition has said in the topic dealing with a person liberated while embodied<sup>1</sup> that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*. And that too is to be viewed in the light of what is mentioned before,<sup>2</sup> and considering the earlier and later portions (of the *Gītā*). Similarly, the statements of Śrī Śaṅkara (regarding the individual soul being the locus of *avidyā*)<sup>3</sup> found in different texts should be interpreted in the aforesaid manner by examining the prior and the later portions. But the view of Maṇḍana<sup>4</sup> (that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*) should be rejected, as it presents a different viewpoint.<sup>5</sup>

1. *Bh. G.*, II, 52,

2. See *SS*, II, 164.

3. See Introduction, p. 77.

4. Maṇḍana advocates the view that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* while the self is its content.

See *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 10.

5. See Prof. Kuppaswami Śāstri's Introduction to the *Brahmasiddhi* for details regarding the divergent views on Advaita held by Maṇḍana, pp. xxvi ff.



## DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JĪVA AND ĪŚVARA

[ 175 ]

जीवस्य कार्यकरणाधिपतेरविद्यादोषान्वितस्य तमसावृतमूढदृष्टेः ।  
ज्ञानं निरावरणमैश्वरमित्यपीदं भाष्याक्षरं कथितनीतिवशेन योज्यम् ॥

The *bhāṣya* text "The nescience abides in the individual soul which is delimited by the gross and the subtle body, which is associated with passion, etc., and which is ignorant of its true nature by being concealed by nescience. And the true knowledge belongs to God who is free from the veil of nescience,"<sup>1</sup> should be interpreted in the manner mentioned before.

1. *avidyāviśiṣṭaḥ kār্যakaraṇopādhirātmā jīva ucyate, nityaniratiśayajñānaśaktiutpādhirātmā antaryāmi īśvara ucyate, ŚB on Brh., III, viii, 12.*

[ 176 ]

स्पष्टं तमःस्फुरणमत्र न तत्र तद्वत् सर्वेश्वरे तदिति तत्र निषिध्यते तत् ।  
बिम्बे तमोनिपतिते प्रतिबिम्बके वा देहद्वयावरणवर्जितचित्स्वरूपे ॥

There is the clear manifestation of *avidyā* (in the form of 'I am ignorant') in the case of the individual soul, while there is no such manifestation in the case of God. Hence it (namely, *avidyā*) is denied in respect of God who stands as the original or as the reflected image of the supreme self in *avidyā*,<sup>1</sup> and who is pure consciousness that is free from the veil in the form of the subtle and the gross body.

See Introduction, pp. 102-3.

[ 177 ]

किञ्चिज्ज्ञतास्य तमसावृतनित्यदृष्टेः सर्वज्ञता पुनरमुष्य परस्य पुंसः ।  
अज्ञानतज्जकरणादिविवर्जितत्वादित्येतदेवमुपपन्नतरं हि भाष्यम् ॥

1. तमन्धदृष्टेः — P<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>.



The individual soul, whose eternal true nature has been veiled by *avidyā*, possesses finite knowledge, while God, being free from *avidyā* (in its concealing phase) and its effects such as intellect, etc., possesses infinite knowledge. Thus in this light the *bhāṣya* text<sup>1</sup> is quite appropriate.

1. See note on SŚ, II, 175.

[ 178 ]

अज्ञोऽहमित्यवगतिर्न परस्य पुंसः सर्वज्ञतावगतिरात्मनि नास्य पुंसः ।  
अत्रापि कारणमहंकृतिवर्जितत्वं तद्वत्ताया च परमेऽल्पतरे च पुंसि ॥

God does not have the experience in the form 'I am ignorant'. And the individual soul does not have the knowledge 'I am omniscient'. Here the reason is: God is devoid of intellect while the individual soul possesses it (that is, the intellect).

[ 179 ]

बिम्बस्य नापि तमसि प्रतिबिम्बकस्य  
संघट्टनं क्वचिदहंकरणेन शक्यम् ।  
वक्तुं प्रभोः सकललोकहितावतार-  
स्वेच्छाविनिर्मितवपुर्वरमन्तरेण ॥

Except the embodied form, that is, the excellent body assumed on His own will to bring about welfare to the entire universe, it is impossible to attribute the association of the intellect to God who remains as the original or as the reflected image of the self in *avidyā*.<sup>1</sup>

1. See Introduction. pp. 102-3.

[ 180 ]

नाहंकृतिं च परिहृत्य तमास्विताधीः  
संभाव्यतेऽपहतपाप्मनि नित्यमुक्ते ।  
तामन्तरेण घटते न च मूढभाव-  
संभावनापि परमेशितरि प्रसन्ने ॥

1. तद्वद्भूता— B1.



Without the association of the intellect, the experience of *avidyā* (in the form 'I am ignorant') is not possible in the case of one (that is, God) who is ever released and who is free from merit and demerit. And, without the experience of *avidyā*, the concealment of the essential nature of God, who manifests in His true nature, cannot even be conceived of.

[ 181 ]

स्वेच्छाविनिर्मितवपुर्भजतोऽपि तस्य  
 नाज्ञानितावगतिरस्ति वशित्वहेतोः ।  
 वश्यत्वहेतुकमिदं स्फुरणं नराणां  
 नाहं विजान इति नास्ति तदीश्वरस्य ॥

Though God assumes the embodied form at His own will, yet in view of His control over *avidyā*, He does not have the experience of *avidyā* in the form 'I am ignorant'. In the case of the individual souls, owing to the influence of *avidyā* over them, there is the manifestation of *avidyā* in the form 'I am ignorant'. And God does not have this experience.

[ 182 ]

संकल्पपूर्वकमभूद्घुनन्दनस्य नाहं विजान इति कंचन कालमेतत् ।  
 ब्रह्मोपदेशमुपलभ्य निमित्तमात्रं तच्चोत्ससर्ज स कृते सति देवकार्ये ॥

Owing to His pre-determination in the form 'I shall remain ignorant for some period,' there was the experience of *avidyā* in the case of Śrī Rāma (an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu). And, when the purpose of the divine beings had been achieved, He cast off His assumed state of ignorance on receiving instruction from Lord Brahmā (the creator) which is only a seeming cause.



[ 183 ]

अज्ञानवर्जिततया परमेश्वरोऽसौ सर्वज्ञ एव यदहंकृतिबन्धहीनः ।  
ज्ञानं निरावरणमिष्टमुष्य यस्माज्जीवस्य सावरणमेव यतोऽनभिज्ञः ॥

God, being free from the superimposition of the intellect and being unconcealed by *avidyā*, is omniscient and his knowledge is not veiled. But the knowledge of the individual soul is veiled by *avidyā* and hence the individual soul is ignorant.

[ 184 ]

सर्वप्रमाणफलभूतसमस्तसंविज्जातं बिभर्ति परमः पुरुषो न जीवः ।  
ज्ञानं निरावरणमैश्वरमस्तु तस्माज्जैवं च सावरणमस्य विशेषहेतोः ॥

God has in Himself the aggregate of empirical cognitions which are the results of all the proofs, but not the individual soul. Hence the knowledge of God is free from concealment, while that of the individual soul is veiled in view of the specific reason (that it is limited).

[ 185 ]

अज्ञानतज्जमखिलं जगदात्मभासा  
नित्यं प्रकाशयति संनिहितः सदात्मा ।  
जीवस्तु नैवमिति सावरणं तदीयं  
ज्ञानं निरावरणमैश्वरमुच्यते हि ॥

God (as His true nature is unconcealed) is proximate to the universe) and always manifests by its own light, *avidyā*, and its effect, namely, the entire universe. But as the individual soul does not (manifest the universe), its knowledge is said to be veiled while that of God is said to be unconcealed.



[ 186 ]

ज्ञानात्मकस्यामलसत्त्वरशेपेतदोषस्य सदा स्फुटस्य ।  
किं वा जगत्त्र समस्तपुंसां अज्ञातमस्यास्ति हृदि स्थितस्य ॥

What is there unknown in this world to God who is of the form of pure consciousness, who is the reflected image of the pure consciousness in the *sattva*-predominant *avidyā*, who is free from *avidyā* (in its concealing aspect), who is always revealed, and who is immanent in the hearts of all the individual souls?

*amalasattvarāśeḥ — sattvapradhānamāyāpratibimbītya, S.*

This verse is from the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, V, xvii, 32.

[ 187 ]

मायामसौ वितनुते विभुरेवमेनां  
सर्वेश्वरः सततमेव वशीकरोति ।  
इत्यादिवाक्यमुपपन्नतरं पुराणे  
स्वाज्ञानमस्य हि वशे चिदधीनभावात् ॥

The passage from the Purāṇas, namely, 'This omnipresent God always controls the illusion and expands it in the form of universe,' is quite reasonable. [As illusion (*māyā*) and nescience (*ajñāna*) are identical] God controls His nescience which depends on the self for its existence.

[ 188 ]

जीवाज्ञतावचनमेवमिदं समस्तं सर्वत्र योज्यमितरत्र च तन्निषेधः ।  
तस्मात्समञ्जसमिदं मतमस्मदीयमाचार्यवाक्यमुपपन्नतरं हि तत्र ॥

Thus all the statements found in different contexts regarding the attribution of *avidyā* to the individual soul and its denial in God should be viewed in the light of what is



said before. Hence our view (that the inner self is the locus and the object of *avidyā*) is congruous and the statements of Śrī Śaṅkara are quite harmonious with our view.

If *avidyā* is denied in the case of God what is meant is that *avidyā* is controlled by God and it is not operative in its aspect of concealment in His case. Similarly, if it is said that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*, what is intended to be conveyed is that *avidyā* is clearly perceptible in the form 'I am ignorant' in the case of the individual soul. It influences the individual soul and it is fully active in its aspect of concealment in the individual soul by concealing the unity of the self from it.

[ 189 ]

चैतन्यमेव च तमस्वि तदप्रबुद्धं सर्वज्ञमेतदिह विश्वमिमं विभागम् ।  
जीवेश्वरौ च जगदित्यपि निर्मिमीत इत्येव वेदशिरसः प्रथितः प्रचारः॥

The pure consciousness which is the locus and object of *avidyā*, being omniscient, creates this universe which comprises the divisions, namely, the individual soul, God, and the phenomenal world. And this is the well-known settled doctrine of the Upaniṣads.

[ 190 ]

जीवेशानजगद्विभागजननी शक्तिर्जडा वैष्णवी  
मायेशानगता सती भवति सा जीवावधिर्मोहगीः ।  
जीवानीश्वर एव मोहयति ते जीवा विमुह्यन्त्यतः  
शश्वद्विश्वदृगीश्वरो भवति ते जीवा विमूढा मुहुः॥

The insentient power of the all-pervasive self gives rise to the individual souls, God, and the phenomenal world. The same power when associated with God is termed *māyā* and when associated with the individual soul is termed *avidyā*. And God deludes the individual souls, and the



individual souls are deluded. Hence God is always omniscient, and the individual souls are often ignorant.

See SŚ, II, 169.

[ 191 ]

अज्ञानिनो भवति मोहविजृम्भितं तु  
दुःखं जगज्जनकता परमेश्वरस्य ।  
मायामयी भवति तेन विलक्षणत्व-  
मेकान्ततः श्रुतिशिरस्सु तयोः प्रसिद्धम् ॥

The misery of the individual soul is born of *avidyā*. The characteristic of being the cause of the world present in God is born of *māyā*. Therefore (by virtue of *avidyā* abiding in the self), the invariable distinction between the individual soul and God is well known in the Upaniṣads.

[ 192 ]

चैतन्यस्याज्ञानशक्तेरनादेर्जीवत्वं तु व्यञ्जकं कल्पयन्तः ।  
जीवारूढं व्यक्तमज्ञानमाहुर्जीवो मूढः कथ्यतेऽतो बहुज्ञैः ॥

Wise men hold that the individual soul is the revealing medium of the beginningless power, namely, *avidyā* which abides in the self. They say that *avidyā* when related to the individual soul is clearly presented. Hence it is said (by the wise men) that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*.

*jīvatvān — jīvasvarūpam, TB.*

See Introduction, pp. 77-78.

[ 193 ]

अत्रैव वस्तुनि दृढं व्यवतिष्ठमानः प्रौढिप्रदर्शनपरः पुनरन्यदन्यत् ।  
भाषापदं किमपि निक्षिपति स्फुटं तदस्माभिरेवमुपपादितमञ्जसैव ॥



The author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, firmly holding the view (that the self is absolute and the universe is indeterminate) introduces certain sūtras intending to admit the opponent's view. And they (should be taken as) reasonably interpreted by us in the manner (set forth above).

In the light of what has been said so far, it is clear that the pure self, owing to its association with *avidyā*, appears as God, the individual soul, and the universe. But, the Pūrvapakṣin holds that this view is wrong, as the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* holds the view of transformation of the self in the sūtra — *bhoktrāpatteḥ avibhāgaḥ cet syūllokavat*, II, i, 13.

Sarvajñātman answers this objection by contending that the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* accepts the theory of transformation only from the empirical stand-point. His final view is the theory of transfiguration and he puts forth this in the sūtra — *tadananyatvam-ārambhaṇaśabdādi-bhyaḥ*, II, i, 14.

The translation and notes follow *S*.

*praudhipradarśanaparaḥ — abhyupagamavādi san, S.*

[ 194 ]

विस्पष्टमात्ममतमेव हि सर्वधर्मसूत्रेण सूत्रकृदिदं दृढमाचक्षे ।  
सर्वज्ञतादिपरिपालनतत्परः संस्तत्रैव भाष्यकृदपीदमुवाच यत्नात् ॥

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* clearly and firmly puts forth his view in the sūtra — *sarvadharmopapatteśca*. (In his *bhāṣya* on that aphorism), the author of the *bhāṣya* also who is very keen on maintaining the omniscience, etc., (of the self) propounds this view with great effort.

1. *BS*, II, i, 35.

The *bhāṣya* text kept in view by the author in this verse is:

*sarvajñān sarvaśakti mahāmāyam brahma*, *BSB*, II, i, 35.

What Śrī Śaṅkara means by this text is that the self, owing to *avidyā*, acquires the qualities of omniscience, etc., and appears as God, the individual soul, and the universe. And this is the theory of transfiguration of the self.



[ 195 ]

अज्ञानित्वं ब्रह्मणो जीवता चेन्नाज्ञानित्वं तत्र जीवस्य युक्तम् ।  
अज्ञानित्वे चान्यदप्यभ्युपेतमज्ञानित्वं यद्यहो कष्टपिष्टिः ॥

If it is said that the self by its being the locus of *avidyā* attains the state of the individual soul, then it is not reasonable to hold that *avidyā* abides in the individual soul. If it is held that *avidyā* (which abides in the self and which gives rise to the state of the individual soul) is different from *avidyā* (that abides in the individual soul), then alas! there is the stained assumption (of plurality of *avidyā*).<sup>1</sup>

1. *vide: ekājñānenaiva nikhilavyavahāropapaltau anekājñānakalpanam kaṣṭamityarthah, TB.*

[ 196 ]

अज्ञानित्वं ब्रह्मणश्चानभीष्टमस्मिन्पक्षे दुर्निवारं प्रसक्तम् ।  
अज्ञानित्वं ब्रह्मणश्चेदभीष्टमस्मत्पक्षस्त्यज्यते कस्य हेतोः ॥

In the view (that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā*) there is the contingency of the pure self becoming the locus of *avidyā*. This is not acceptable (to you), but this cannot be avoided. If the pure self also is admitted to be associated with *avidyā*, then on what grounds do you abandon our (that is, the Siddhāntin's) views?

Those who advocate the view that the individual soul is the locus of *avidyā* hold thus: The pure self, owing to its association with *avidyā* attains the state of individual soul, and *avidyā* abides in the individual soul.

This view is objected to on two grounds. In the first place, if the pure self, by its association with *avidyā*, attains the state of individual soul, then *avidyā* which is prior to the individual soul cannot abide in the individual soul which is later. In the second place, the advocates of this view hold that the pure self by its association with *avidyā* attains the state of the individual soul. This association is false and it is only



the relation of being the substratum and the superimposed between the self and *avidyā*. So they have to admit that the pure self also is the locus or the substratum of *avidyā*. When such is the case, how can they reject the Siddhāntin's view that the pure self is the locus of *avidyā*?

[ 197 ]

शुद्धत्वार्थं ब्रह्मणस्त्यज्यते चेदस्मत्पक्षेऽप्यस्ति शुद्धत्वमस्य ।  
अस्मत्पक्षे शुद्धता वास्तवी चेत् युष्मत्पक्षे कल्पिता शुद्धता किम् ॥

If it is said that (the Siddhāntin's view that the self is the locus of *avidyā*) is abandoned in order to maintain the pure nature of the self, then it is said that in our (Siddhāntin's) view also the self is pure (even if it is the locus of *avidyā*). If it is said that (though) in our (Siddhāntin's) view the purity of the self is real (yet there is impurity owing to the superimposition of *avidyā*), then (it is asked): is the purity of the self fancied in your view?

It is said by the Pūrvapakṣin that though the self is pure, yet owing to the superimposition of *avidyā* there is the contingency of impurity. The Siddhāntin replies that in the Pūrvapakṣin's view also the self is really pure and the purity is not fancied. Yet there arises some impurity by its being the substratum of the universe. And the Pūrvapakṣin maintains that this impurity is merely fancied and this does not conflict with the purity of the self. Sarvajñātman argues that this line of argument can be extended to the Siddhāntin's view. The impurity which is said to be present in the self, owing to the superimposition of *avidyā* on it, is fancied and it does not conflict with the purity of the self.

[ 198 ]

कष्टः कष्टः कल्पितब्रह्मवादः श्रेयोमार्गाद्भ्रश्यतो भ्रान्तबुद्धेः ।  
त्यक्तव्यस्ते सज्जनैरस्मदीयः श्रेयोमार्गः श्रेयसे चाभ्युपेयः ॥



The doctrine of the self (not being the locus of *avidyā*) fancied by one who is of confused mind and who swerves from the path that leads to liberation, is very inappropriate. Hence it should be abandoned by the wise men and our view (that the self is the locus of *avidyā*) which leads to liberation should be accepted by those who (long for) liberation.

[ 199 ]

एकोपाधावस्तिता नास्तिता च मूढत्वस्य स्वीकृता चेत्परस्मिन् ।  
व्योमन्येकस्मिन्नस्तिता नास्तिता च पक्ष्यादीनां यद्वदिष्टा तथैव ॥

If it is said: just as it is admitted that bird, etc., are existent and non-existent in one substratum, that is, in the unitary ether, so also nescience is accepted to be existent and non-existent in one substratum (that is, the unitary self).

The view put forth in *ŚS* II, 134, is restated here and is refuted in the following verses.

[ 200 ]

नैतत्सारं 'सख्यमिष्टं यदि स्यादस्तित्वादेरिष्टहानिः प्रसक्ता ।  
एकोपाधावस्तिता नास्तिता चेत् स्यादित्येवं स्वीकृतेऽस्मिन् हि पक्षे ॥

[The *Siddhāntin* refutes:] this is not sound. If the view that the existence and the non-existence (of the same object) in one substratum is accepted, then this view in which the association of existence and non-existence (in one substratum) is intended, involves the rejection of your accepted view.<sup>1</sup>

1. See the following verse.

<sup>1</sup> सत्त्वमिष्टं — B<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>.



[ 201 ]

धूमे सत्ता स्यादसत्ता च तस्मिन् धूमस्यैवं कारणं कल्प्यते किम् ।  
कादाचित्कं कारणं नान्तरेण स्यादित्येवं तस्य क्लृप्तिः कुतो वः ॥

If smoke is existent and non-existent in the mountain, then is the (existence of the) cause of the smoke (that is, fire) inferred in the mountain? And without the effect (that is, the *probans*), there cannot be the inference of the cause (that is, the *probandum*). When such is the case, how could there be the inference of the cause in your view which (affirms the existence and the non-existence of smoke which is the *probans*)?

[ 202 ]

कादाचित्कात्कल्पनां कारणस्य प्रत्याचक्षीताविरोधं ब्रुवाणः ।  
एकोपाधावस्तिनास्तित्वयोर्हि तस्मादेषा कष्टक्लृप्तिर्न कार्या ॥

One who advocates that the association of existence and non-existence (of the same object) in one substratum is consistent, (has to) deny the inference of 'cause' from its 'effect'. So one should not advocate this strained assumption.

[ 203 ]

ननु चैकरूपचितिवस्तुगतं स्फुरणं तदस्फुरणमेव च वः ।  
अविरुद्धमभ्युपगतं द्वितयं तदिवास्ति नास्ति युगलं भवतु ॥

(The *Pūrvapakṣin* objects:) just as it is accepted in your view that though in the unitary consciousness there is manifestation (owing to its self-luminosity) and non-manifestation (owing to *avidyā*) yet there is no contradiction, so also let both the existence and the non-existence (of *avidyā* in the unitary consciousness) be (compatible).



[ 204 ]

न तदात्मनः स्फुरणमेव निजं परतोऽप्रकाशनमबोधवशात् ।  
न च किञ्चिदन्यदनयोरुभयोरविरोधसिद्धिकृदुदाहरणम् ॥

But it is not so. The manifestation of the self is intrinsic; while the non-manifestation is extrinsic and it arises from *avidyā*. There is no other example that can be cited to establish the association of the existence and the non-existence of *avidyā* (in one substratum).

See the following verse.

[ 205 ]

स्फुरणास्फुरणे च नात्मनः सदसद्भावतया मनीषिते ।  
स्फुरणं चित्तिरात्मवस्तुनस्तदविद्यास्फुरणं च कथ्यते ॥

The manifestation and the non-manifestation of the self are not considered as existent and non-existent (entities). For the consciousness constituting the self is manifestation and *avidyā* which has the self as its locus and object is said to be non-manifestation.

[ 206 ]

अज्ञानित्वं जीवभावो न तस्माज्जीवत्वादेः कारणं युक्तमेतत् ।  
प्राणोपाधेर्वाचको जीवशब्दश्चैतन्यस्य स्यात्प्रसिद्धो हि तत्र ॥

The self's being the locus of *avidyā* does not give rise to the state of the individual soul. (But) it is reasonable that *avidyā* contributes to the states of individual soul (and God). The word *jīva* is well known to be denotative of the consciousness associated with the subtle body.

*prāṇopādheḥ — prāṇasabdena jñānakriyāśaktyātmakam prāṇendriyāntah-  
karaṇasaṅghātarūpam ajñānasya prathamakāryam līṅgaśarīram vivakṣyate*  
AP.



[ 207 ]

अज्ञानजन्यकरणप्रतिबिम्बवाचि  
 जीवाभिधानमिह वृद्धजनप्रसिद्धम् ।  
 अत्रैव निर्वचनमस्ति च तस्य तस्मा-  
 ऽजीवो भवेत्करणपूगवशीकृता चित् ॥

It is well known among the learned that the word *jīva* signifies the reflected image of the self in the subtle body, which is the product of *avidyā*. And etymologically also the word *jīva* denotes this same sense.<sup>1</sup> Hence the consciousness conditioned by the subtle body is the individual soul.

1. *jīva prāṇadhāraṇe iti dhātvanusārāt karaṇātma kalīṅgapahitacaitanyameva jīvaśabdārthaḥ*, S.

[ 208 ]

ब्रह्मैवाज्ञानि तस्मादिह भवितुमलं नापरं वस्तु किञ्चित्  
 तस्याज्ञानात्मकत्वान्न च तमसि तमस्तन्निवृत्तोरयोगात् ।  
 नाज्ञानोत्थस्य विद्याजनिरिह घटते तां विना तन्न नश्ये-  
 न्न ह्यज्ञानं विनश्येदवगतिजनकज्ञानजन्मान्तरेण ॥

Hence the self alone is capable of being the locus and object of *avidyā* and none else, as they are insentient. And *avidyā* cannot abide in itself (or its products). Moreover, as *avidyā* cannot be annihilated except by the knowledge of the self and as the latter cannot arise in the case of the objects that are the products of *avidyā*, there cannot be the annihilation of *avidyā* (if it resides in its products which are insentient). And in the absence of the rise of the mental state that could reveal the self, there cannot be the removal of *avidyā*.



*avagati..... janmāntareṇa :—*

*avagatiḥ — viśayābhivyaktiḥ, tajjanakam yat antahkaraṇavṛttirūpaṁ  
jñānam tasya janma vinū ityarthah.*

[ 209 ]

अज्ञानात्मकवस्तु नाश्रयतयाज्ञानस्य संभाव्यते

नाज्ञानात्मकताबहिःकृतमिदं जीवत्वमङ्गीकृतम् ।

नाज्ञानाश्रयमध्यपाति घटते जीवत्वमेतेन व-

श्रैतन्याश्रयमेतदस्तु घटते तत्रैव हीदं तमः ॥

The object which is of the nature of *avidyā* cannot be the locus of *avidyā*. And the self in the aspect of *jīva* is not accepted to be external to the form of *avidyā*. Hence in your (namely, the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s) view the individual soul is not fit to fall within the range of the locus of *avidyā*. Let *avidyā* abide in the pure consciousness; and indeed it is fit to be present only there.

If the self in its aspect of *jīva* is admitted to be the locus of *avidyā* then it amounts to admitting that the self associated with the intellect is the locus of *avidyā*. The result of this argument is that intellect also becomes the locus of *avidyā*. But this cannot be, as the intellect itself is the effect of *avidyā*. And, *avidyā* cannot abide in its effect.

[ 210 ]

ननु चाद्वयाश्रयतमःस्फुरणं न कथंचिदत्र न हि तत्स्फुरति ।

स्फुरदाश्रयस्य तमसः स्फुरणं घटते न चाद्वयमिह स्फुरति ॥

(The *Pūrvapakṣin* objects:)

The manifestation of *avidyā* as having the supreme self as its locus is never possible, because the supreme self is not experienced. The manifestation of *avidyā* would hold good, only when its locus is experienced. But here



the supreme self (which is considered to be the locus) is not experienced.

[ 211 ]

नाज्ञानमद्वयसमाश्रयमिष्टमेवं नाद्वैतवस्तुविषयं निशितेक्षणानाम् ।  
नानन्दनित्यविषयाश्रयमिष्टमेतत् प्रत्यक्त्वमात्रविषयाश्रयतानुभूतेः ॥

As it is experienced that the inner self alone is the locus and object of *avidyā*, philosophers of keen intellect do not accept that the self in its non-dual aspect is the locus and object of *avidyā*; nor do they accept that the self in its form of eternal bliss is its locus and object.

[ 212 ]

प्रत्यक्त्वमात्रविषयाश्रयमोहहेतोः  
प्रत्यक्त्तिरोहित इति प्रतिपादयामः ।  
प्रत्यञ्चमेव खलु वेद्मि न वेद्मि चेति  
प्रत्यक्षमस्ति ननु वेदनमस्य पंसः ॥

As *avidyā* has the inner self as its locus and object, we hold that the inner self is veiled. Indeed in the case of the ignorant person there is the immediate experience in the form 'I know' and 'I do not know' which points to the inner self (as the locus and object of *avidyā*).

There is the universal experience in the form 'I do not know myself'. This experience points to the existence of *avidyā*. (See Introduction, p. 69). Here the expression 'I' conveys the inner self which serves as the locus of *avidyā*; and, the expression 'myself' also conveys the inner self as the object of *avidyā*. Thus there is the manifestation of the inner self in the form 'I'; and the same inner self is known to be not manifested or veiled as known from the usage or experience 'I do not know myself'.



[ 213 ]

संवित्परिस्फुरति न स्फुरतीति तस्यां  
 'वैयात्यदूषितधि' यस्तु विसंवदन्ते ।  
 अज्ञानतस्तदपि तद्वदिहाद्वयत्वं  
 भादप्यभादिव विमूढधियो वहन्ति ॥

Those whose intellect is spoiled by immodesty argue out of ignorance that the empirical knowledge reveals itself and does not reveal itself. Similarly here though the absolute consciousness is always luminous, the ignorant hold that it is not luminous.

The inner self is admitted to be self-revealing and at the same time veiled. This point is explained by a reference to the empirical knowledge. The Prābhākara school holds that the empirical knowledge is self-luminous. This means that it manifests without the aid of any external factor. Yet, there arises the contrary notion that the empirical knowledge does not manifest. This contrary notion presumptively implies that the empirical knowledge is the object of ignorance. The point that is to be noted in this connection is: the empirical knowledge which manifests itself of its own accord becomes the object of ignorance also. In the same way, the inner self which is self-revealing becomes the object of *avidyā*.

[ 214 ]

अव्युत्पत्तिं बिभ्रती भाति संवित् तद्वद्ब्रह्मण्यद्वितीयस्वरूपम् ।  
 अव्युत्पत्तिं नाशयद्भाति वेद्यं तस्मादेतच्चोद्यमस्मासु नास्ति ॥

The empirical knowledge reveals itself, though it is the object of ignorance. Similar is the case with the absolute self also. And the pure consciousness reflected in the mental state arising from the study of the Upaniṣads manifests it-

1. वैयात्यदू — P.

2. यस्त्वविसं — P.



self by annihilating *avidyā*. Hence the objection (advanced before)' cannot be raised against our view.

1. *vide*: SŚ, II, 210.

## DISTINCTION BETWEEN RELEASE AND BONDAGE

[ 215 ]

नन्वेवं चेद्वन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाशास्त्रं कुप्येन्नाप्रबोधात्प्रवृत्तोः ।  
बद्धो मुक्तो ज्ञानवानज्ञ इत्यप्येतत्सर्वं यावदज्ञानमिष्टम् ॥

(The *Pūrvapakṣin* holds:)

In this case, the scripture dealing with the distinction of bound and released souls would be contradicted. (The *Siddhāntin* replies:) it would not become so; for, until the self is realized this scripture is valid. All the distinctions of the bound and the released souls and the mystic and the ignorant are admitted as long as there is *avidyā*.

[ 216 ]

किं चैतत्किं बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाशास्त्रं यत्नात्तात्परं सत्प्रवृत्ताम् ।  
किं चान्यस्मात्प्राप्तमेवानुभाष्य तस्या रूपं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं विदध्यात् ॥

Moreover, is the scripture dealing with the distinction of bondage and release strictly intent on conveying the nature of liberation? Or does it, by restating the state of liberation (which is known from the usage of elders), primarily convey it as of the nature of the self?

[ 217 ]

शास्त्रं तावत्तात्परं नेष्यते तदानर्थक्यात्तत्स्वरूपप्रतीतिः ।  
ब्रह्मात्मैक्यप्रत्ययेनार्थवत्त्वं वक्तुं युक्तं तच्च नोऽभीष्टमेव ॥

It is admitted that such scripture is not intent on conveying the liberation (of Vāmadeva and other released souls); for, the knowledge of their release is futile. Hence



it is reasonable to hold that the scripture is purposeful by giving rise to the firm belief in the identity of the supreme self and the individual soul (which is liberation). And this is acceptable to us.

[ 218 ]

नन्वन्यो मद्बन्धमोक्षादिभागी भूतो भावी वर्तते वा न कश्चित् ।  
इत्युक्तार्थं स्वानुभूत्या विरोधान्नाहं जातु प्रोत्सहे संग्रहीतुम् ॥

[The disciple says:—]

As the view that “apart from me, no person fit for bondage or release either existed or exists or would exist” is contrary to experience, I do not rejoice in accepting this view.

[ 219 ]

किं द्वैतानुभवो विरोधपदभाक् किं वा परोऽस्मीत्ययं  
यद्वा कश्चिदिहापरोऽस्त्यनुभवो यस्ते विरोधावहः ।  
नाद्वैतानुभवः क्षतिं वितनुते तस्येति युक्तं वचो  
नापि द्वैतमुपोल्लिखन्ननुभवस्तेनास्य बाधो यतः ॥

[The preceptor asks:—]

Is the experience of duality contrary (to the view that you are the only soul) or the experience “I am the supreme self? Or else, is there any experience other than these two that leads to contradiction? The statement that the experience of identity (of the supreme self and the individual soul) leads to the contradiction (of the oneness of the self) is not reasonable. And the experience pointing to duality also is not contrary to it (that is, the oneness of the self), as the former is sublated by the knowledge that there is only one soul.



[ 220 ]

द्वैताद्वैतनिवेशिनोऽनुभवनाद्धाधोऽस्येति चेत्  
 तादृङ् नानुभवोऽस्ति कस्यचिदपि स्थानत्रये जीवतः ।  
 भास्वच्छावर्गोचरं ह्यनुभवं बिभ्रज्जनो दृश्यते  
 नास्मिन् संसृतिमण्डले स न भवेत्कस्मादयं चेद्भवेत् ॥

If it is held that the view (that you are the only soul) is sublated by the experience that comprehends duality (between the supreme self and the individual soul) and identity (of the supreme self with the individual soul), then (it is said that) there is no such experience in the case of any individual soul in the three states (of waking, dream, and deep sleep). No person in this world is seen to have the experience of the association of the sun and darkness. But if one could have the experience of the association of duality and identity, then why cannot there be the experience of the association of the sun and darkness?

[ 221 ]

यत एवमत्र न विरोधलवोऽप्युपदौकते कथितनीतिवशात् ।  
 उपगृह्यतां मतमिदं सुदृढं गुरुसंप्रदायवचनानुगतम् ॥

In the light of what has been said, not even a trace of contradiction presents itself in this view (that there is only one soul). So let this view which conforms to the texts accepted by the tradition of the teachers be admitted with faith.

[ 222 ]

तव गाढमूढतमंसा रचितं जगदीशजीवपुषा सकलम् ।  
 प्रतिभाति तावददृढं दृढवत् समुदेति यावदवबोधरविः ॥



This entire universe is fancied in the form of God and the individual soul by *avidyā* firmly superimposed on your self. Though the universe is indeterminable, it appears as if real, until the rise of the sun in the form of the knowledge of the self.

*tava — svaprakāśacaitanyasvarūpasya*

*ūdghena — tādātmyādhyāsaprāptena, TB.*

*adr̥dham — anirvacanīyam, S.*

[ 223 ]

प्रभुरेष सर्वविदहं कृपणो जगदेतदद्भुतवितानमिति ।  
प्रतिपत्तायस्तिमिरलुप्तदृशो यदिहोद्भवन्ति न तदद्भुतकम् ॥

There is nothing strange that in the case of the persons whose true nature is concealed by *avidyā*, there arise the cognitions that, 'God is omniscient', 'I am miserable', and 'The universe is a wonderful creation'.

[ 224 ]

अभयं सनातनमनातुरधीरवलोकयन्निजमनन्तसुखम् ।  
न मुनिः प्रपश्यति किमप्यसुखं सकलं जिघत्सति जगत्स्वचिता ॥

The sage of self-control who realizes his true nature which is free from transmigration, which is eternal and is of the form of unconditioned bliss, does not experience any misery; for, he annihilates the entire universe by the knowledge of his (true) nature.

INDETERMINABLE ENTITY COULD CONVEY  
THE REALITY

[ 225 ]

तव चित्तामात्मतमसा जनितं परिकल्पयत्यखिलमेव जगत् ।  
तव कल्पनाविरचितः स गुरुस्तव रूपमद्वयमुदाहरति ॥



Your intellect arisen from *avidyā* abiding in the self falsely creates the entire universe. The teacher (also) is your false creation. And he teaches you your absolute nature.

[ 226 ]

न हि चित्तदृश्यमपि सत्यमिति प्रतिपन्नमस्ति भुवि किञ्चिदपि ।  
रशनाभुजङ्गसदृशं सकलं जगदिन्द्रजालमिति सिद्धमतः ॥

No object which is knowable by the intellect is found to be real in this world. The entire universe is like the snake appearing in a rope. Hence it is established that it is illusory.

[ 227 ]

परिकल्पितोऽपि सकलज्ञतया गुरुरेव पूर्णमवबोधयति ।  
परिकल्पितोऽपि मरणाय भवेदुरगो यथा न तु नभो मलिनम् ॥

The preceptor, though fancied, is (fancied as) omniscient and (hence) he himself imparts (the knowledge of) absolute self. The serpent, though superimposed, causes death but not the impurity (superimposed on the ether).

It might be said: if the preceptor who is fancied could impart the knowledge of the self, then the pot, etc., also could impart the knowledge of the self because they are also fancied.

To this the author replies that though all the objects are fancied, yet there is difference among them. The serpent is superimposed on the rope, like impurity on the ether. But the unreal serpent sometimes causes death, while impurity on the ether never causes death.

[ 228 ]

यदि सत्यमित्यवगतिं कुरुते घटते पटादपि हुताशनश्रीः ।  
यदि चानृतं न जनयेत्प्रमितिं ननु चोदनापि जनयेन्न धियम् ॥



If it is held that an object could impart knowledge only as being real, then the knowledge of fire can well arise even from the cloth (as the cloth is real). If it is held that an unreal object cannot give rise to (any) knowledge, then indeed (according to the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* school) the (unreal) injunctive text<sup>1</sup> also could not convey the true knowledge (of the means to heaven, etc.).

1. See the following verse.

[ 229 ]

जनयत्यसाविह मृषावपुषा करणीयवस्तुनि मतिं सुदृढाम् ।  
ध्वनिधर्मभेदवटितो हि मृषा स्वरसेन सन्नपि तु वर्णगणः ॥

Here the injunctive text, being unreal, gives rise to the valid knowledge of "the thing to be achieved" (that is, sacrifice). The group of articulate sounds is naturally real, but when associated with different qualities of tone, they are unreal.

The injunctive text is real in so far as it is made up of the articulate sounds. But it is unreal when viewed from the stand-point of the particular order in which the several articulate sounds occurring in it are placed, and the qualities of tone like accents with which it is associated. And it is in this capacity alone that the injunctive text gives rise to the valid knowledge of 'the thing to be achieved'. Thus the unreal injunctive text gives rise to the real knowledge of 'the thing to be achieved'.

[ 230 ]

मन्त्रो हीनः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा मिथ्याप्रयुक्तो न तमर्थमाह ।  
स वाग्वज्रो यजमानं हिनस्ति यथेन्द्रशत्रुः स्वरतोऽपराधात्

A Vedic text uttered falsely without the particular accent or letter does not convey the intended sense. The false utterance of the text is (like) a thunderbolt and it



destroys the sacrificer, just as the word *indra śatru* did by the wrong use of accent.

Sarvajñātman cites this verse to prove that a sentence, only as associated with the qualities of tone like accents, could convey the intended sense.

Tvaṣṭā, a divine being desirous of a son who would kill Indra, performed a sacrifice by uttering the text *indraśatruṣvardhasva*. The word *indraśatru*, if it is taken as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, means who kills Indra. In this case, the *udātta* accent should fall on the final syllable. If the *udātta* accent falls on the first syllable, then the word is a *bahuvrīhi* compound and it means 'one who is killed by Indra'.

Tvaṣṭā used the *udātta* accent on the first syllable, by mistake, and so Indra killed the son born to him.

This verse is from *Pāṇiniya-śikṣā*, 52.

[ 231 ]

न च वर्णपूगमपहाय भवेदिह चोदनेत्यभिमतं विदुषाम् ।  
यदि सत्यमेव गमकं भवति स्फुटमप्रमाणमियमप्युदिता ॥

Wise men do not accept that the injunctive text could exist without the group of letters. If it is held that the real object alone could convey the knowledge, then it clearly amounts to saying that the injunctive text also is not valid.

The injunctive text, as associated with the accents which are the qualities of tone, is unreal.

See ŚŚ, II, 229.

[ 232 ]

श्रवणेन्द्रियं च किल कर्णगतं परिकल्पनोपचरितं नभसः ।  
बलयं प्रकाशयति शब्दगणं परमार्थमित्यपि कणादमतम् ॥

In the view of Kaṇāda, the sense of hearing is the erroneously assumed part of ether present in the auricular orifice; and it reveals the group of words that are real.



The ether is accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas to be unitary, all-pervasive and eternal, and it does not have parts. Yet the sense of hearing is accepted to be the part of ether conditioned by the auricular orifice. Thus the sense of hearing is the erroneously assumed part of the ether present in the auricular orifice and it gives rise to the real knowledge of words.

[ 233 ]

त्वमतः स्वमोहरचितं गहनं भवसागरं तर परावगतेः ।  
परिकल्पितद्वयनिबन्धनतः परमार्थसंविदुदये सति भोः ॥

Oh! dear, when there arises the knowledge of the self by means of the two (namely, the teacher and the scripture) fancied (by your *avidyā*), there is the realization of the self and by this you cross this unfathomable ocean of transmigration which is the (false) creation of your *avidyā*.

[ 234 ]

भ्रान्तं तथोपचरितं च यथाविभाग-  
मङ्गीकृतं कणभुगादिमुनीन्द्रमुख्यैः ।  
यन्नास्ति तत्फलनिबन्धनमस्मदीये  
तन्त्रे तमोविरचितं न फलाय कस्मात् ॥

The great sages like Kaṇāda and others (that is, Jaimini) hold as their tenets the mistaken thing (that is, the injunctive texts consisting of letters associated with accents, order, etc.) and the erroneously assumed thing (that is, the sense of hearing). Though these two are unreal, yet they are accepted to be giving rise to the result (in the form of correct knowledge). When such is the case, why should not the objects created by *avidyā* give rise to some (real) result in our view?

See the following verse.



[ 235 ]

असदपि फलवत्तामश्नुते युष्मदिच्छा-  
 मनुसरदथ कस्मान्मायया निर्मितं सत् ।  
 न भवति फलवत्ताभाजनं चित्रमेत-  
 द्वयमिह न समर्था यूयमत्यन्तशक्ताः ॥

According to your desire, when an unreal object could give rise to some (real) result, why cannot an entity created by *avidyā* (which is different from unreal objects)<sup>1</sup> produce some real result? It is really wonderful (to say that it cannot produce any real result). And you are highly qualified to assert so, while we are not competent.

1. The objects created by *avidyā* are neither real nor unreal, but different from both.

[ 236 ]

परमेव तत्त्वमगृहीतमभूदखिलस्य कारणमनर्थकरम् ।  
 परमेव तत्त्वमवबुद्धमतः परितृप्तये भवति पुष्कलतः ॥

The pure consciousness itself when concealed by *āvidyā* is the cause of the entire universe and hence it is the source of misery. The pure consciousness itself when fully realized leads to the highest bliss.

[ 237 ]

तव रूपमेव तव दुःखकरं यदि तन्न पश्यसि बहिर्मुखधीः ।  
 तव रूपमेव तृप्तिकरं यदि तत्प्रपश्यसि निवर्त्य तमः ॥

By engaging your intellect on external objects, when you do not realize your nature, your form itself is the source of misery to you. And when you realize your nature by annihilating *avidyā*, it itself is a source of bliss to you.



[ 238 ]

तव बोधमात्रमुपनेयमतस्तव मोहमात्रमुपनेयमपि ।

तव बोधमोहजनिहानिकरं वचनं त्रयीशिरसि तत्त्वमिति ॥

Mere knowledge of your true nature is to be acquired and mere *avidyā* is to be annihilated. And the Upaniṣadic text *tat tvam asi* gives rise to the knowledge of your true nature and the annihilation of *avidyā*.

[ 239 ]

तव बोधजन्मनि पुरा न पुनस्तव कश्चिदप्यतिशयो भवति ।

तम एव पूर्वमभवन्न भवत्यवबोधजन्मनि ततो न परम् ॥

There is no change in your form (that is, the self) either before or after the rise of the realization of the self to you. Before the rise of your realization of the self, there existed *avidyā* and after that it is annihilated. And apart from *avidyā*, there did not exist any other thing.

[ 240 ]

न तमोऽपि पूर्वमभवन्न भवत्यवबोधजन्मनि तमोभिभवः ।

तम एव केवलमिदं सकलं न तमो विनात्मनि किमप्यभवत् ॥

*Avidyā* also did not exist (really in the self) before the realization of the self; and so there is no (real) annihilation of *avidyā* at the time of the realization of the self. And the cognitions (that *avidyā* existed and *avidyā* is annihilated) are merely owing to *avidyā*. And without the (illusory existence of) *avidyā* nothing existed in the self.

[ 241 ]

न तमः परिहृत्य लभ्यते तमसो हानिगता निरूपणा ।

इति सा तम इत्युदीरिता न निवृत्तिस्तमसस्तमोमयी ॥



The explanation of the removal of *avidyā* cannot be had without *avidyā*; and hence it is (figuratively) spoken of as *avidyā*. But (in fact) the annihilation of *avidyā* is not of the form of *avidyā*.

The annihilation of *avidyā* points to the substratum, namely, the self on which *avidyā* is superimposed.

### SCOPE OF THE TEXTS ENJOINING SACRIFICE, ETC.

[ 242 ]

विधयश्च कर्मविषयाः स्वतमःपटलावृते त्वयि बहिर्मनसि ।  
कुत एव सम्यगवबोधहते तमसि प्रवृत्तिरिति संभवति ॥

The injunctive texts concerned with religious rites are addressed to you whose true nature is veiled by your own *avidyā* and whose intellect is engaged in external objects. When *avidyā* is annihilated by the true knowledge of the self, how could (you) engage (yourself) in the religious rites.

cf: *avidyāvadvīṣayāṇyeva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni sūstrāṇi ca.*  
*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*

[ 243 ]

विदिते पदे भगवतः परमे परिपुष्कले परमतृप्तिमतः ।  
तव तृष्णया विरहितस्य कथं विधिषु पवृत्तिरपवर्गवतः ॥

When the supreme status of the lord which is absolute (that is, free from any difference) is realized, you attain liberation and (hence) you enjoy the highest bliss and you are free from any desire. (When such is the case) how could you engage yourself in the religious rites?



[ 244 ]

अभिचारकर्मविधयो हि यथा फलभागबाधमनु बाधयुजः ।  
करणादिभागनिरुपाख्यतया विधयस्तथैव परमात्ममतेः ॥

The injunctive texts prescribing the black-art are stultified following the prohibition of its result (by the other texts).<sup>1</sup> Similarly, in the case of one who has realized the self, the injunctive texts are contradicted, as the instrument, etc., (of volitional activity) cease to exist (that is, they are annihilated by the realization of the self).

1. The Vedic text — *śyenena abhicaran yajeta* — does not prompt one to activity, as the result of the sacrifice, namely, injury to enemy, is prohibited by the Vedic text — *na hiṁsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*. And nobody can act without some result in view.

[ 245 ]

यदि भाव्यभागविलये न भवेत् फलभावना कथमिहोत्सहते ।  
करणादिभागविलये भवितुं विधिरन्तरेण घटते न च ताम् ॥

If volitional activity does not hold good in the absence of its result, how can it hold good in the absence of its means, etc.? And the sense of injunction is not appropriate without volitional activity.

[ 246 ]

अधिकारिणं च विषयं च विना न नियोगबुद्धिरुपपत्तिमती ।  
न विना तमस्तदुभयं घटते विदितात्मनश्च न तमो घटते ॥

The knowledge of *niyoga* is not reasonable without a competent person (to execute it) and a content. And both these are not possible without *avidyā*. And *avidyā* is not possible in the case of one who has realized the oneness of the self.



[ 247 ]

व्यवहारगोचरमतः सकलं विधिवाक्यमित्यवगतिं मनसि ।  
उपनीय वेदशिरसो विधिभिर्न विरोध इत्यपि समाकलय ॥

Having borne in mind that all the injunctive texts point to empirically real objects, conclude that the Upaniṣadic texts are not in conflict with the injunctive texts.

[ 248 ]

एवं वेदान्तवाक्यैरवगतिपदवीमद्वये नीयमाने  
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वे समस्तद्वयकृति तमसि क्षीयमाणे च सद्यः ।  
स्वाराज्यं त्वय्यवाप्ते परमसुखभुजि स्वच्छचैतन्यमात्रे  
'लेशो मानान्तरणामपि' दुरवगमस्तत्र दूरे विरोधः ॥

Thus when the identity of the absolute self and the inner self is realized through the Upaniṣadic sentences, when *avidyā* which is the cause of all duality is annihilated immediately, when you remain as the pure consciousness and have attained liberation and are experiencing the highest bliss, even the trace of the other proofs is hardly known. Hence there is no occasion for their conflict with the Upaniṣadic teaching.



## ॥ तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥

### MEANS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF

[ 1 ]

श्रुत्वाऽविरोधमुपपन्नसमन्वयोत्थ-

ब्रह्मात्मतामतिरयं पुनरप्युवाच ।

ब्रह्मात्मताफलशिरस्कमतिं प्रसूते

यत्साधनं तदखिलं प्रतिपित्समानः ॥

After ascertaining the non-stultification by the other proofs of the Upaniṣadic teaching, and also knowing that the knowledge of the identity of the supreme self and the inner self arising as the import of the Upaniṣads is reasonable, the aspirant who is desirous of knowing the entire means that would give rise to the knowledge of the self whose immediate result is liberation, asks thus:

*brahmātmatāphalaśiraskamati: — brahmātmata — mokṣaḥ, AP,*

[ 2 ]

ऐदंपर्यमखण्डवस्तुविषयं वेदान्तवाक्यस्य यत्

पूर्वं वर्णितमस्य भूदपहतिर्मा नाम मानान्तरैः ।

किं त्वस्याः परिनिष्ठितस्वविषयध्वान्तच्छिदो जन्मने

विद्याया वचनादृते किमपरं कृत्यं भवेत्साधनम् ॥

Let the partless self, which has been elucidated before as the import of the Upaniṣadic passages, be not sublated by the other proofs. But is there any other means apart from the Upaniṣadic texts that can be pursued for the rise of the knowledge which would annihilate *avidyā* that has for its object the existent self?



*pariniṣṭhitasvaviṣayadhvāntacchidaḥ — siddhabrahmaviṣayāvidyāni-  
vartikāyāḥ, TB.*

[ 3 ]

वैराग्यस्य दृढत्वमेकमपरं तत्त्वंपदार्थज्ञता  
वाक्ये निर्गुणनिष्ठिते च सकले न्यायादियत्तामतिः ।  
सम्यग्ज्ञानसमीपदूरभवयोर्हेत्वोर्विवेकज्ञता  
वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिसाधनमिदं यत्नेन कृत्यं यतेः ॥

Intense detachment (from desire for enjoyment here or hereafter), the knowledge of the import of the terms *tat* and *tvam*, the knowledge of the exact extent of all the sentences pointing to the attributeless self on the basis of the arguments (mentioned in the third *pāda* of the third *adhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra*), and the discriminative knowledge of the proximate and the remote means (helpful) to the (rise of the) correct knowledge — all these are the means to know the import of the sentence and they should be pursued by the ascetic.

This verse summarizes the subject-matter of the four parts of the third *adhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra*:

*vide: anena tṛtīyādhyāyapādacatuṣṭayārthaḥ samkṣiptaḥ V, p. 147a*

*vide also: pādacatuṣṭayena pratipādyamānaṁ vairāgyādisūdhana-jatam  
yatnena mumukṣuṇā saṃpādanīyam, tena vinā na vākyādeva tadbuddhiḥ saṃ-  
bhavati, Ved. p. 300.*

[ 4 ]

संसारदोषमवधारयतो यथाव-  
द्वैराग्यमुद्भवति चेतसि निष्प्रकम्पम् ।  
वैराग्यजन्मनि दृढे च सति प्रवृत्ति-  
स्तत्त्वंपदार्थपरिशोधनकर्मणि स्यात् ॥



By truly ascertaining the defects of transmigration, there arises unswerving renunciation in your mind. And when renunciation becomes intense, it leads to the examination of the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* (in the sentence *tat tvam asi*).

*niṣprakāśam — niścalam*

*rūgākrāntacittasya padārthadvayatattvādvadhāraṇāsaṁbhavāt vairāgye  
sati tu tatsaṁbhavāt padārthajñānāpūrvakavākyārthādvadhāraṇānukūle  
śravaṇādau pravṛttiḥ, vairāgyākṛta-upakāraḥ, AP.*

## TRANSMIGRATION

[ 5 ]

संसाररूपमवगच्छ विविच्यमानं

यस्मिंश्च ते भवति तद्विषया जुगुप्सा ।

वेदः प्रकाशयति संसरणं यथास्य

जीवस्य जन्ममरणे व्रजतः क्रमेण ॥

You be convinced of the nature of transmigration, on hearing which there would arise revulsion towards it and which will be explained (by me) in the manner in which the scripture<sup>1</sup> conveys the transmigration of the individual soul who is gradually subjected to birth and death.

I. See *Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 35; *Chānd.*, V, ix, 1.

[ 6 ]

शुद्धः परो न खलु वाङ्मनसव्यतीतः

संसारदुःखमतिदुःसहमश्नुवीत ।

स्वाविद्यया हि पर एव स जीवभाव-

'मागत्य संसरति लिङ्गसमागमेन ॥

1. मापद्य — T<sub>1</sub>. मागम्य — T<sub>2</sub>.



The supreme self, which is free from any defect and which transcends both speech and mind does not (naturally) experience the intolerable misery of transmigration. But, associating itself with the subtle body owing to its *avidyā*, the supreme self attains the state of the individual soul and undergoes transmigration.

[ 7 ]

ब्रह्मैव संसरति मुच्यत एतदेव  
 दौवारिकं भवति संसरणं तु तस्य ।  
 मुक्तिः पुनर्भवति चिद्वपुषैव तस्य  
 स्वाज्ञानतः स्वमहिमप्रतिबोधतश्च ॥

The supreme self itself undergoes transmigration and attains release. There is the transmigration of the self by having (the subtle body) as the operating condition. And the state of remaining in the pure consciousness constitutes its liberation. The transmigration is caused by its own *avidyā*, and liberation by the knowledge of its true nature.

[ 8 ]

स्वाज्ञानान्वयिनि चिदेव भवति स्वज्ञानमस्याः पुनः  
 नास्त्यन्तः करणोपरागशबलीभावं विना युक्तिः ।  
 कूटस्थे न तमस्विता न घटते नो विक्रिया तत्र न-  
 स्तस्मादेष विशेष ईषदुचितः स्वीकर्तुमेते प्रति ॥

The pure consciousness itself is the locus and content of its *avidyā*. Its knowledge, however, cannot reasonably abide in the pure consciousness, unless the latter becomes a blend of the nature of its association with intellect. It is not that *avidyā* cannot abide in the immutable consciousness.



And in our view there arises no change in the consciousness (owing to the existence of *avidyā*). Hence it is proper to accept this subtle distinction between them (namely, knowledge and *avidyā*).

Knowledge is the attribute of a knower. And to be a knower is to be the substratum of knowledge. The self which is immutable consciousness cannot become the knower, unless it is associated with intellect. Hence knowledge which is the attribute of a knower abides in the self associated with intellect.

But *avidyā* exists in the self itself and not in the self associated with intellect. For, intellect is the effect of *avidyā* and as such it is posterior to *avidyā*. So the latter cannot abide either in the intellect or in the self associated with intellect. It is, therefore, said that *avidyā* is present only in the self — the pure consciousness.

*vide: anādisiddhājñānasya tatkāryalingatadupahita-*

*cidāśrayatvūnupapatteḥ śuddhā cideva tadāśrayo viśayaśca, SS.*

[ 9 ]

पुर्यष्टकं भवति तस्य परस्य मोहा-  
 चोन्नान्वितस्य तु नभोमलवद्व्यलीकम् ।  
 दुःखं त्रिधा भवति संसरणाभिधानं  
 नान्यः परादधिकरूपभृदस्ति जीवः ॥

*Avidyā* abiding in the pure consciousness gives rise to an aggregate of eight factors.<sup>1</sup> When associated with them, there arises the three-fold misery<sup>2</sup> (to the pure consciousness) which is termed 'transmigration' and which is indeterminable like colour in the sky. The individual soul does not have different nature from that of the pure consciousness (that is, the supreme self).

1. The eight factors are explained in *SS*, III, 16.

2. For the three-fold misery see *SS*, I, 342.



[ 10 ]

नांशः परस्य न च तस्य विकार एष  
 नात्यन्तमेव च विभिन्नवपुः परस्मात् ।  
 जीवोऽयमभ्युपगतः कुत एतदेवं  
 ब्रह्मात्मतावचनजातविरोधहेतोः ॥

The individual soul is not accepted to be either a part of the supreme self or its transformation or different from it. Why is it so? It is so accepted, as otherwise there would arise conflict with the group of (Upaniṣadic) statements<sup>1</sup> conveying the identity of the supreme self and the individual soul.

1. *vide*: *Bṛh.*, III, vii, 23.

[ 11 ]

अपि च विश्वमनुप्रविवेश तत् परममेव पदं परमात्मनः ।  
 इति वदन्तु सुहृत्स्विव तत्परश्रुतिवचस्सु कथं स ततोऽधिकः ॥

How could the individual soul be different from the supreme self when there are the Upaniṣadic passages such as 'The supreme form of the self itself has entered the universe',<sup>1</sup> which like true friends, convey the identity of the self as their import.

1. *Taitt.*, II, vi, 1; *Chānd.*, VI, iii, 2.

[ 12 ]

प्रच्यावि वस्तु यदिहास्ति निजस्वरूपा-  
 दप्रच्युतैकरससंविदधीनमस्य ।  
 प्रच्या'वितास्फुरणमित्य'वगत्य तत्र  
 तत्कल्पितं सकलमाकलयानुमानात् ॥

1. च्याविनः स्फु — T<sub>1</sub>.

2. वगम्य — T<sub>1</sub>.



The manifestation of the object which is other than the self, as different from the self depends on the immutable unitary consciousness. On the basis of this inference,<sup>1</sup> conclude that everything (different from the self) is superimposed on it.

1. *vide: vipratipannam pratyakcinmātrūdadhikarūpani pratyakcidekarasūdinaparakūśam, pratyakcidatiriktatvāt, āgamāpūyitvādvā buddhādivat, V, p. 148a. pracyāvi vastu — pracyotum śīlam asyeti pracyāvi, brahmasvarūpātiriktamiti jīvāt, TB.*

[ 13 ]

चैतन्यवस्तुविषयाश्रय एव मोहो

नाद्वैतवस्तुविषयाश्रयकोऽप्रतीतेः ।

बुद्ध्यादिवेष्टितचितो न तमस्वितेति

ब्रह्माश्रयत्वमुदितं तमसःपुरस्तात् ॥

The pure consciousness alone (as the inner self) is the locus and content of *avidyā*; and (the pure consciousness as) the absolute self is not the locus and content of *avidyā*. Previously it has been said<sup>1</sup> that the absolute self is the locus of *avidyā*, with a view to affirm that the consciousness associated with intellect is not the locus of *avidyā*.

1. *vide: SS, III, 7.*

The view set forth in this verse has been discussed in *SS, II, 11-14.*

[ 14 ]

ब्रह्माश्रयं नहि तमोऽनुभवेन लभ्यं

नाप्यागमान्न च किमप्यपरं प्रमाणम् ।

ब्रह्माश्रयत्वविषयं तमसस्ततश्च

प्रत्यक्प्रकाशविषयाश्रयमेतदस्तु ॥

It is not known either from experience or from scripture or from any other proof that (the pure conscious-



ness as) the absolute self is the locus of *avidyā*. Hence, let the inner self be the locus and content of *avidyā*.

[ 15 ]

जीव वमेव तु तदाश्रयमध्यपाति  
नेच्छन्ति युक्तिकुशला नहि' युज्यते तत् ।  
अज्ञानमेव खलु तन्न तमस्तमस्वि  
चैतन्यवस्तु पुनरस्तु न तद्विरोधः ॥

Those adept in reasoning do not admit that pure consciousness in its aspect of *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*; for, it is not reasonable. The state of the self associated with the intellect (is the effect of *avidyā*, and hence it) is (of the form of) *avidyā* itself, and *avidyā* cannot abide in *avidyā*. So let the consciousness be the locus of *avidyā*, and there is no contradiction to it.<sup>1</sup>

1. See note on SŚ, II, 209.

[ 16 ]

कर्मेन्द्रियाणि खलु पञ्च तथा पराणि  
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि मनआदिचतुष्टयं च ।  
प्राणादिपञ्चकमथो वियदादिकं च  
कामश्च कर्म च तमः पुनरष्टमी पूः ॥

The eight factors are: the five senses of action; the five senses of knowledge;<sup>2</sup> the four modes of internal organ like mind, etc.;<sup>3</sup> the five vital airs;<sup>4</sup> (the five elements) ether, etc.;<sup>5</sup> desire, action, and *avidyā*.

It is said in SŚ, III, 9 that *avidyā* abiding in the self gives rise to an aggregate of eight factors. And the eight factors are explained in this verse.

1. न च — M.,.



1. *karmendriyāṇi* — *vāk-pāṇi-pāda-pāyūpasthākhyāni*
2. *buddhindriyāṇi* — *śrotra-tvak-cakṣur-jihvā-ghrāṇākhyāni*
3. *mano buddhirahaṅkāraḥ cittāni ityetanmana-ādicatuṣṭayam*
4. *prāṇāpānāvṛtyāno'dānasamānāḥ pañcaprāṇāḥ*
5. *ākāśavāyutejobannākhyam, TB.*

[ 17 ]

विद्या च विश्वविषयानुभवोत्थपूर्वप्रज्ञा च कर्मवचसैव तु संगृहीते ।  
बन्धप्रयोजकतया सदृशत्वहेतौरेकत्र च श्रुतिवचस्युपसंग्रहेण ॥

The knowledge of the universe and the reminiscent impressions arisen from the enjoyment of worldly objects are included in the sense of the word 'action', as they are similar in being the source of bondage and as they are mentioned side by side in the same *śruti* text.<sup>1</sup>

1. The *śruti* text is referred to in the next verse.

[ 18 ]

तं विद्येति हि वाक्यमेकमिह च स्पष्टं त्रयं कीर्तितं  
तस्मात्कर्मवचस्तयोरपि भवेत्संग्राहकं कारणात् ।  
विद्या चात्र चतुर्विधाप्यभिमतैवारम्भिका कर्मवत्  
संस्कारोऽपि तथा चतुर्विध इति ज्ञेयस्तथा संभवात् ॥

In the same sentence *tam vidyeti*<sup>1</sup> these three are clearly mentioned. And on this ground, the word 'action' includes the other two. Here (in this sentence) knowledge of the world which is the cause of transmigration is accepted to be four-fold like 'action'. Similarly it should be known that the reminiscent impression also is four-fold,<sup>2</sup> as it is quite possible.

1. *vide: tam vidyākarmāni samanvārabhete pūrvaprajñā ca,*  
*Bṛh., IV, iv, 2.*



2. *kācana vidyā śāstravīhitā devatādyupāsanaṁ pāpānāṁ aparā tanniśiddhā asacchāstraviśayā, anyā vihitasamā vidhiṁ vināpi yadṛcchayā upapannā gaṅgādidarśanaṁ pāpānāṁ śreyaskarī, kācinniśiddhasamā bībhatsitasavādiviśayā sadyo duḥkhakaritī vidyāyāḥ cāturvidhyam. evaṁ karmaṇāṁ yāgavadhā-hārādirūpāṇāmapi vihitaṁ pratiśiddhā vihitaṁ pratiśiddhabhedena cāturvidhyam draṣṭavyam, SS.*

3. *evaṁ pūrvaprajñāṁ khyasāṁskāro'pi mūlānubhavādyanurodhena caturvidho bandhahetuḥ ityarthah. SS.*

[ 19 ]

पुर्यष्टकं तदिदमप्यभवद्भि लिङ्गं  
तेनोच्यते तदपि लिङ्गगिरा क्वचित्तु ।  
पुर्यष्टकं न खलु लिङ्गगिरोऽभिधेयं  
मुख्यं तु सप्तदशकं प्रथितं हि लिङ्गम् ॥

The subtle body is included in the 'eight factors' and hence the latter also are termed 'subtle body' in some places. Indeed the 'eight factors' are not the primary sense of the word 'subtle body'. It is well known that the (word) 'subtle body' primarily means the seventeen factors.

*abhavat — antarbhūtaṁ abhavat, TB.*

[ 20 ]

इह तावदक्षदशकं मनसा सह बुद्धितत्त्वमथ वायुगणः ।  
इति लिङ्गमेतदमुना पुरुषः खलु संगतो भवति जीव इति ॥

Here the subtle body consists of ten senses, mind, intellect, and the group of (five) vital airs. And the supreme self associated with this becomes the (sense of the word) 'individual soul'.

*puruṣaḥ — cidātmā, SS.*



[ 21 ]

न पुराष्टकेन रहितस्य तव क्वचिदस्ति संसरणदुःखयुजा ।  
न पुराष्टकेन सहितस्य तथा क्वचिदस्ति दुःखविगमश्च तव ॥

There is no association of misery in the form of transmigration to your nature, if the latter is free from any relation to the eight factors. And there is no escape from misery if your nature is related to the eight factors.

This verse is based on the Upaniṣadic text —

*aśarīram vā va santam na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ*, Chand., VIII, xii, 1.

It should be noted here that, though the supreme self attains the state of an individual soul by its association with the subtle body, yet it undergoes transmigration only when it is associated with the eight factors in which the subtle body also is included.

*vide: yadyapi līngasambandhena jīvatvaṁ, saṁsaraṇam tu na puryaṣṭakam vinū ityarthah*, S on SŚ, III, 20.

[ 22 ]

तव नित्यमुक्तसुखचिद्वपुषो न कदाचिदस्ति पुरसंगमनम् ।  
तव मायया विरचितं सकलं पुरसंगतिप्रभृतिकं वितथम् ॥

Never is there the association of the (eight) factors to your nature which is ever released and is of the form of bliss and consciousness. And the association of the (eight) factors is the creation of *avidyā* and (hence) indeterminable (either as real or as unreal).

*vitatham — mithyā, sadasadvilakṣaṇam anirvacanīyam ityarthah*, TB.

[ 23 ]

मलिनं नभो नहि कदाचिदभूद्विमलं कदाचिदभवन्न नभः ।  
उभयं नभस्यभवदेवमिह त्वयि नित्यमुक्तचिति संसरणम् ॥



At no time the ether was impure and never was it pure. Both (purity and impurity) are (superimposed) on the ether. Similarly, the transmigration is (superimposed) on the ever free consciousness which is your true nature.

[ 24 ]

नहि कल्पनाविरचितं वितथं परमात्मवस्त्वितथं स्पृशति ।  
परमात्मवस्तु च तथा तमसा परिकल्पितं न किमपि स्पृशति ॥

A thing erroneously created and (hence) indeterminable is not associated with the absolutely real object (namely, the self). Similarly, the absolutely real object does not associate itself with any object that is falsely created by *avidyā*.

[ 25 ]

नहि भूमिरूषवती मृगतृड्जलवाहिनीं सरितमुद्रहति ।  
मृगवारिपूरपरिवारवती न नदी तथोषरभुवं स्पृशति ॥

The barren land does not contain the river full of water that is superimposed on it by deer out of thirst. Similarly the river full of water that is superimposed (on the barren land) by deer out of thirst does not come into contact with the barren land.

*mṛgatṛḍjalavāhinīm — mṛgaiḥ tṛṣṭvāśāt ūropitajalaprāpanīmītyarthah, SS.*

cf: *yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tatkr̥tena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumūtreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate, Adhyāsa-bhāṣya.*

[ 26 ]

न तव क्वचिद्गमनमस्ति विभोर्न पुराष्टकस्य जडरूपभृतः ।  
न च मध्यवर्ति जडचिद्गुणोर्गमनक्षमं किमपि संभवति ॥



There cannot be transmigration either to your true nature, which is all-pervasive self, or to the eight factors which are insentient. Nor is there any entity which is composed of the form of sentience and insentience and which is capable of transmigration.

This verse is based on the following Upaniṣadic text:

*na tasya prāṇā utkrānti, brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti,*

*Bṛh., IV, iv, 6.*

[ 27 ]

पुरवेष्टितं न खलु चिद्बलयं परलोकमार्गमनुसर्तुमलम् ।  
घटवेष्टितं नहि नभोवलयं व्रजति व्रजत्यपि घटेऽवितते ॥

The consciousness associated with the (eight) factors is not capable of proceeding through the path towards the other world. The ether delimited by a pot does not move, when the pot which is of limited size moves.

*avitata — avyāpi; ghaṭasya avitatvaṁ avyāpitvam, ŚŚ.*

[ 28 ]

घट एव गच्छति नभस्त्वचलं व्रजता घटेन तु ततश्च ततः ।  
परिवेष्टनेन घटखं क्रियते घटखानि तत्र सुबहूनि ततः ॥

The pot alone moves and the ether is immovable. But by the association of the pot that moves, there arises the ether delimited by the pot. In this way, (when one proceeds by taking the pot) there arise many delimited ethers.

[ 29 ]

पुरमेव गच्छति चित्तिस्त्वचला व्रजता पुरेण यदि सापि चित्तिः ।  
परिवेष्टयते तु सुबहूनि तदा वलयानि पूर्ववदुपाश्रयसे ॥

1. तव — M<sub>1</sub>.

2. घटे चित्ते — B<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>.



Let it be said (by the *pūrvapakṣin*): 'On the lines indicated above, the eight factors alone move and the consciousness is immovable. The consciousness is delimited by the eight factors that move, and hence there are many delimited consciousnesses.

*valayāni — cidvalayāni, purāvacchinnāni caitanyāni TB.*

The view set forth in this verse is untenable. See the following verse.

[ 30 ]

अकृतागमश्च कृतनिष्फलता फलतः समापतति 'कर्त्रगतेः ।  
अपरस्य भोक्तुरुदयाच्च दिवि व्यसनस्य संततिरहो विषमा ॥

(In the view held by the *pūrvapakṣin*), as the soul which is the agent of actions (here) does not go (to the other world), and as there arises another soul as enjoyer in the other world, there results, in effect, the attainment of religious merit for the action which the soul (in the other world) has not performed, and the non-attainment of the religious merit for the action which the soul (in this world) has performed. Alas, the unavoidable series of difficulties!

[ 31 ]

चलने ह्युपाध्यभिमतस्य भवेज्जनितस्य तेन विगमः सुदृढम् ।  
ननु कण्डलापसरणे पुरुषादथ न प्रणश्यति न कुण्डलिता ॥

When a thing which is admitted to be a limiting adjunct moves, then certainly there is destruction of the thing (previously) delimited by it. Indeed when ear-rings are removed from a person, then certainly the state of one wearing the ear-rings is destroyed.

*calane — gamane; vigamaḥ — nāśaḥ, TB.*



[ 32 ]

न पुरान्वयश्च तव चिद्वपुषः परमार्थतो भवति तर्कसहः ।  
नभसो यथा घटसमागमनं न ततोऽपि लिङ्गघटितो ब्रजसि ॥

Just as the association of pot with ether cannot stand logical examination and hence is unreal, so also the association of the 'eight factors' to you, who are of the nature of pure consciousness, does not bear logical scrutiny, and hence is unreal. And for this reason also, you do not proceed to the other world by being associated with the eight factors.'

1. *lingaghaṭitaḥ* — *puraviśiṣṭaḥ*, TB.

The world *linga* which signifies the 'subtle body', conveys the sense of 'eight factors' also. See SS, III, 19.

[ 33 ]

नभसः प्रदेशविरहान्नभसो न घटः प्रदेशपरिवेष्टनकृत् ।  
न नभः समस्तमपि वेष्टयते नभसोऽवशेषविरहापतनात् ॥

As the ether is devoid of parts, the pot is not associated with a part of the ether. Nor does the pot delimit the whole of ether, as otherwise there would arise the contingency of the absence of ether (outside the pot).

[ 34 ]

परमात्मभागपरिवेष्टनकृन्न पुरं तथान्वयवो हि परः ।  
न च कृत्स्नमेव परमं पुरुषं पुरवस्तु वेष्टयितुमुत्सहते ॥

As the supreme self is partless, the 'eight factors' do not delimit its part. Nor is the 'eight factors' capable of delimiting the whole of the supreme self.



[ 35 ]

यदि कृत्स्न एव परमः पुरुषः पुरवेष्टितो भवति जीवतया ।  
न तदेश्वरो भवितुमुत्सहते न च जीवजातमपरं सकलम् ॥

If the whole of the supreme self is delimited by the 'eight factors' and (thereby it) becomes the individual soul, then there cannot be God and also the group of other individual souls.

[ 36 ]

गुरुशिष्यसंगतिरतो न भवेन्न च बन्धमोक्षनियमो धटते ।  
विषयं विना सकलमापतति स्फुटमत्र वेदवचनं च वृथां ॥

Hence the relation of preceptor and disciple will not exist; and the distinction of liberation and bondage would not hold good. (Moreover) the Upaniṣads would clearly become futile in the absence of the preceptor and disciple.

[ 37 ]

न पुरान्वयोऽत उपपत्तिसहः परमार्थतोऽस्ति परमात्मदृशेः ।  
वियतो घटान्वयवदेव ततः परिकल्पितं पुरसमागमनम् ॥

Hence, like the relation of pot to ether, the relation of the 'eight factors' to the supreme self is not reasonable and (hence) it is not real. So the association of the 'eight factors' (with the supreme self) is non-real.

*parikalpitam — na paramārtham, AP.*

[ 38 ]

यत एवमेतदुपपत्तिपथं न तव प्रयाति विरह्य तमः ।  
परलोकमार्गागमनं स्वतमःपरिकल्पितं चलनवन्नभसः ॥



In this way, as the association of the eight factors with your (true) nature is not reasonable without *avidyā*, the movement (of consciousness delimited by the subtle body) in the path towards the other world is fancied by your *avidyā* like the movement (of ether delimited by pot).

*etat upapattipatham — etat purasaṅgamanam, TB.*

[ 39 ]

पुरधर्ममात्मनि विकल्प्य तथा स्वचिदात्मतां च पुरधर्मतया ।  
स्वपुरं स्वयं च दृढमेकतया परिकल्पयन् व्रजसि मूढमतिः ॥

By superimposing the qualities of the eight factors on the self, and the nature of the self (that is, consciousness) on the qualities of the eight factors, and similarly fancying your true nature and your eight factors to be one, you, being veiled by *avidyā* undergo transmigration.

*vrajasi — saṁsāraṁ anubhavasi, AP.*

The view of mutual superimposition between the eight factors and the self is based on the following *bhāṣya* text:-

*evaṁ ahaṁpratīyinaṁ aśeṣasvapracārasākṣiṇi pratyagātmani adhyasya taṁ ca pratyagātmānaṁ sarvasākṣiṇam tadviparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiṣu adhyasyati, Adhyāśabhāṣya.*

[ 40 ]

परिपूर्णचिद्रसघनः सततं स्वमहिम्नि तिष्ठसि निरस्तमले ।  
न तथापि तत्त्वमिति वाक्यकृतां मतिमन्तरेण तव केवलता ॥

You, being the absolute and unitary consciousness, always remain in your eminence which is free from defects (such as agency, etc.). Even then, without the knowledge (of the self) arising from the sentence *tat tvam asi*, your true nature is not free from *avidyā* and its effects.

- i. *paripūrṇacidrasaghanah — paripūrṇacaitanyaikasvarūpaḥ*
- ii. *kevalatā — pralīyamānāvidyātatkāryarahitatā, TB.*



[ 41 ]

न तव प्रतीचि करणानि बहिर्विषयाणि येन करणानि सदा ।  
सहजं च गाढमतिमूढतमं तम इत्यतः पुरमनु व्रजसि ॥

As the senses always have external things as their objects, they do not function in respect of your self. *Avidyā* is beginningless and dense, and it exceedingly conceals your true nature. Hence, conditioned by the eight factors (falsely created by *avidyā*), you undergo transmigration.

- i. *sahajam* — *anādisiddham*
- ii. *atimūḍhatamam* — *atīśayena svasarūpavāṛakam*
- iii. *puramanuvrajasi* — *puroḥpādhikagamanādisaṁsāraṁ*  
*prāpnoṣi, TB.*

[ 42 ]

स समान इत्युपनिषद्वचनं प्रतिपादयत्युदितमर्थमतः ।  
स्वमनीषिकेति न कदाचिदपि प्रतिपत्तिरत्र भवतो भवतु ॥

The Upaniṣadic text *sa samāna*<sup>1</sup>, etc., propounds the view put forth so far. Hence, let there never arise any thought in your mind that what has been said is merely conceived by me.

1. The Upaniṣadic text *sa samānaḥ san ubhau lokau anusañcarati dhyāyati va lelāyati va* (*Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 7) declares that the self being identified with intellect undergoes transmigration. And the transmigration of the self is attributable to its identification with intellect, and it is not the natural state of the self.

[ 43 ]

पुरहेतुकं यदभवच्च विभोः परिकल्पितं किमपि चित्सदृशम् ।  
जलपात्रहेतुकमिव द्युमणेस्तदसंततं भवति तद्व्रजति ॥



Just as the reflection of the sun in a vessel (filled) with water is indeterminable, so also the reflection of the absolute consciousness in the eight factors is indeterminable (either as sentient or as insentient), and being delimited, it goes to the other world.

*citsadr̥śam — cidābhāsanam, AP.*

[ 44 ]

जडशक्तिरस्ति च परस्य विभोः परमात्मनस्तम इति प्रथिता ।  
पुरमष्टकं तव यथा भवति श्रुतितः प्रसिद्धमिदमप्यखिलम् ॥

Just as the eight factors' form your limiting adjunct, the insentient power well known as *avidyā* constitutes the limiting adjunct of God who is all-pervasive. And, all this is well known from the Upaniṣads.<sup>2</sup>

1. See ŚŚ III, 16.

2. *vide Śvet.*, IV, 10.

[ 45 ]

पुरहेतुकं तव यथा च वपुर्भवतीह जीववचसो विषयः ।  
जडशक्त्युपाधिकममुष्य तथा 'परमेश्वरत्ववपुरुद्भवति ॥

Just as your (true) nature (that is, consciousness), when delimited by the 'eight factors' becomes the sense of the word 'individual soul', so also the pure consciousness becomes God by being delimited by the insentient power (namely, *avidyā*).

[ 46 ]

पुरहेतुरूपघटितस्य दृशेर्जडशक्त्युपाधिपरमेश्वरतः ।  
भयमुद्भवत्यनवबोधवशादिति च त्रयीशिरसि राजपथः ॥

1. परमेश्वरस्य वपु — P<sub>2</sub>.



According to (the will of) God whose limiting adjunct is the insentient power (that is, *avidyā*), the consciousness associated with the 'eight factors' undergoes transmigration, owing to its *avidyā*. And this is the right course (taught) in the Upaniṣads.

[ 47 ]

परमेश्वरेण विभुना रणयन् परिवृंहितः शकटवद्ब्रजसि ।  
शकटं हि शाकटिकयोगवशाद्ब्रजति स्वयं न परतन्त्रतया ॥

Being controlled by the all-pervasive God, you move along, groaning, in the path of the other world, like a cart (which moves along, creaking). And the cart, being dependent, does not go by itself, but by being directed by the driver.

This verse is based on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, IV, iii, 35.

[ 48 ]

पुरवेष्टितः पुरवशानुगतः पुरतन्त्रचिन्निभविभिन्नवपुः ।  
दिवि यातनाभुवि च कर्मफलान्यनुभूय भूय इह 'संभवति ॥

The individual soul which is delimited by the 'eight factors' and dependent on them and whose form is identical with the reflected image of the pure consciousness in the eight factors, experiences the result of his actions in the heaven and in the hell, and is again born in this world.

*puratantracinnibhavibhinnavapuḥ* — *cinnibhaḥ cidābhāsaḥ*

*tadabhinnaśvarūpo jīvaḥ*, SS.

*yātanābhuvī* — *narakabhīmau*, TB.



[ 49 ]

सुकृतदुष्कृतकर्मवशादयं दिवमथो यमसादनमेव वा ।  
अनुभवेन समाप्य पुनर्महीतलमबोधवशादवरोहति ॥

The individual soul goes to heaven or hell according to his meritorious or sinful deeds, exhausts those deeds by experiencing their result and again owing to *avidyā* descends to the earth.

This verse is based on the *Chāndogya* text, V, x, 7.

[ 50 ]

यदि वा समुच्चयवशात्पुरुषः कमलासनं व्रजति कामुकधीः ।  
पुनरेव मानवमिमं तु विना परिवर्तमाव्रजति मूढमतिः ॥

Or else, the aspirant who aspires for enjoyment (in the world of Hiranyagarbha) reaches the abode of Hiranyagarbha by performing sacrifice and meditative worship (on *saguṇa*-Brahman). Ignorant as he is, he again undergoes transmigration after the expiry of the present cosmic age.

This verse is based upon the following Upaniṣadic text —  
*imaṁ māṇavaṁ āvartaṁ nāvartante*, *Chānd.*, IV, xv, 6.

[ 51 ]

अथवा स तत्र परमात्ममतिः परिमुच्यते सकलबन्धनतः ।  
क्रमयोगमुक्तिरुदिता श्रुतिषु प्रतिशाखमेवमुपपन्नतरा ॥

Or else, the individual soul who attains the knowledge of the supreme self (in the world of Hiranyagarbha) is freed from all bondage. And this is (known as) 'gradual liberation' propounded in the Upaniṣads of all the Vedic recensions and it is quite reasonable.



If the individual soul who reaches the world of Hiranyagarbha pursues the Vedāntic study, reasoning, and meditation there, then he is liberated along with Hiranyagarbha at the time of cosmic dissolution. This is known as *krama-mukti* or gradual liberation.

[ 52 ]

देवयानपितृयानयोः पथोर्ज्ञानकर्मरहितत्वकारणात् ।  
नैकमप्यनुसरन्ति ये पुनः क्षुद्रजन्तव इहोद्भवन्ति ते ॥

Those who do not perform either sacrifice or worship, and, on that account, do not proceed (after death) along the path of the gods or the manes are born as lower animals in this world.

This verse is based on the *Chāndogya* text, V, x, 8, which is discussed by Śrī Saṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on *BS*, III, 1, 7.

For details regarding *devayāna* and *pitryāna* see *Chānd.*, V, x, 8.

[ 53 ]

इति कामुकस्य तव संसरणं शतशो बभूव 'बत मूढमतेः ।  
इह विप्रजन्मनि विरक्तमतिः कुरु साधनं यदपवर्गकरम् ॥

Alas! you, who desire enjoyment (here and hereafter) and who are ignorant, have undergone numerous transmigrations. And with a mind free from desire, you pursue the means to liberation in this spiritual birth.

## MEANS TO LIBERATION

[ 54 ]

श्रवणादिकं शमदमादिपरः परमात्मनः परमभागवतः ।  
कुरु तावता परममेव पदं परमात्मनस्त्वमवलोकयसि ॥



Being devoted to God and possessing control of the mind and the external senses, you pursue Vedāntic study, etc., relating to the self. By this alone, you (shall) realize the transcendental state of the supreme self.

[ 55 ]

यदि तन्न पश्यसि हरेः परमं पदमम्बुशीतलमिवेद्वशिराः ।  
न खलु प्रदीप्तशिरसोऽस्ति सुखं तव दुःखपावकशिखाभिरहो ॥

Just as there is no happiness to a person whose head is scorched by the burning fire except from cool water, so also, if you do not realize the supreme status of Viṣṇu, alas! there is no happiness to you whose mind is tormented by the flame of fire in the form of the misery (of transmigration).

[ 56 ]

एवं विज्ञाय तापत्रयमतिगहनं मोहमूलं परस्मिन्  
आत्मन्यात्मप्रकाशे त्वयि परमसुखे निष्कले निष्कलङ्के ।  
सत्ये नित्यस्वभावे परिहृतसकलद्वैतकूटानुषङ्गे  
सम्यग्ज्ञानानुरागं कुरु विषयगतं भिन्धि निर्बन्धमेनम् ॥

Thus knowing the insuperable three-fold misery which has *avidyā* as its root-cause, you pursue the means to the true knowledge of your nature which is (identical with) the supreme self, which is self-luminous, highest bliss, partless, free from any defect, absolutely real, eternal, and free from any association with the group of (objects characterized by) duality. And, you give up all the attachment to the worldly objects.

*nirbandham* — *sukhasāadhanatvābhiniवेशam*, TB.

SS takes the word *nirbandha* to mean *nitarāṇi bandhakam*.

But the meaning given by TB seems to be more acceptable.



## CLARIFICATION OF THE SENSES OF THE TERMS *TAT* AND *TVAM*

[ 57 ]

इत्युक्तोपरते गुरौ पुनरयं जिज्ञासया प्रेरित-  
स्तत्त्वशब्दनिगद्यलक्ष्यविषयं शिष्यो गुरुं पृच्छति ।  
वैराग्येऽतिदृढीकृते सति यतः प्राज्ञो यतिर्मन्यते  
संदीप्तं शिरसीव पावकमिदं संसारदुःखं महत् ॥

When the preceptor concluded by saying so, the disciple, prompted by the desire to know (the secondary senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam*) enquires about the secondary senses conveyed by the terms *tat* and *tvam*; for, when renunciation (from worldly enjoyment) becomes intense the wise ascetic considers the great misery of transmigration to be a blazing fire on his head.

1. *tattvaṁśabdanigadyalakṣyaṁviśayaḥ* — *tattvaṁśabdābhyāṁ nigadyaḥ  
pratipādyāḥ yaḥ lakṣyaṁviśayaḥ lakṣyapadārthaḥ*, TB

[ 58 ]

वैराग्यं विषयेषु पूर्वमपि मे जातं हरेरर्चना-  
द्यज्ञादिक्रियया निरस्तफलया किं त्वद्य दाढर्यं गतम् ।  
संसारस्य निरूपणेन धिगिदं कर्मादिजन्यं फलं  
विश्वं नश्वरमम्बुबुदबुदसमं पद्मासनान्तं जगत् ॥

Even before (examining the nature of transmigration), abnegation from (enjoyment of) worldly objects has arisen to me from the worship of Lord Viṣṇu by the performance of sacrifices without any expectation of fruit. But after investigating the nature of transmigration, it (that is,



abnegation) has become resolute. Fie upon the universe upto the abode of Hiranyagarbha which is the result of sacrifices (and worship), as the whole universe is (transient) like a bubble of water.

### THE SECONDARY SENSE OF THE TERM *TVAM*

[ 59 ]

किं तु त्वंपदलक्ष्यमर्थमधुना कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वयो-  
जाग्रद्भूगतयोरपोहमुखतो वाञ्छावगन्तुं मम ।  
कर्तृत्वादिकमस्य किं निजमभूत् स्वाभाविकं जाग्रतः  
किं वा तत्परतः कुतश्चिदभवच्चैतन्यधातोरिति ॥

Now I desire to know the secondary sense of the term *tvam* by abandoning agency and enjoyment present (in the self) in the waking state. Are agency, etc., natural to the consciousness in the waking state or do they arise from some extraneous factors?

[ 60 ]

यावत्त्वंपदलक्ष्यवस्तुविषयो बोधो न मे वर्तते  
तावन्मे बधिरेषु गीतमिव तच्छ्रौतं वचोऽनर्थकम् ।  
तस्मात्त्वंपदलक्ष्यवस्तुविषयः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वयो-  
जाग्रद्भूगतयोरपोहमुखतो बोधो ममोत्पाद्यताम् ॥

As long as I do not have the knowledge of the secondary sense of the term *tvam*, so long the Vedic text (*tat tvam asi*) is futile in my case, like music to a deaf man. Hence let me be enlightened on the secondary sense of the term



*tvam* by abandoning agency and enjoyment which pertain to (the self in) the waking state.

[ 61 ]

कर्त्रादेवभासकत्वमगमः शुद्धः स्वयंभास्वर-

श्चैतन्येन निजेन तेन भवतः कर्त्रादिबुद्धिर्भ्रमः ।

कूटस्थस्य चिदात्मनस्तव कुतः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वयोः

शङ्का जागरितेऽपि कारकगणं कर्त्रादिकं पश्यतः ॥

You have become one who manifests (the qualities such as) agency, etc., by your self-luminous consciousness which is devoid of agency, etc. Hence your cognition of agency, etc., is an error. As you are immutable consciousness and as you reveal the group of productive factors of action like agency, etc., wherefore could there arise, even in the waking state, the doubt that you are an agent and enjoyer?

[ 62 ]

व्यापारं सकलस्य भासयति यो भास्वत्करो भास्करो

नासौ कर्तृतया जनस्य विदितो भूमौ द्युलोकस्थितः ।

एवं स्वे महिमन्यवस्थितवतः संघातमुत्पश्यतः

स्वव्यापारसमन्वितं तव कुतः कर्तृत्वमुत्प्रेक्ष्यते ॥

The sun who has brilliant rays and who remains in the sky manifests the activities of all the persons. But he is not considered to be an agent by the people on the earth. Similarly, by remaining in your eminence, as you manifest the aggregate of the body and senses which are associated with their own activities, how could you be conceived of as an agent?



[ 63 ]

भूतानि पञ्च तव मोहसमुद्भवानि  
 संघातरूपपरिणाममुपागतानि ।  
 कुर्वन्ति कर्म फलमश्नुवते च तेषां  
 साक्षी त्वमन्तरविलुप्तचिदेकरूपः ॥

The five elements, arising out of your *avidyā*, are transformed as the subtle and gross bodies, and these are engaged in the (sacred and secular) activity and enjoy its fruit. But you, being the eternal consciousness, are the inner witness (of the subtle and gross bodies and their activities).

*saṅghātarūpapariṇāmanī upāgatāni — dehadvayākāreṇa pariṇatāni,*  
 TB

[ 64 ]

क्षीरस्य पूर्णे चषके निरस्तो मणिर्यथा मारकतो महार्हः ।  
 क्षीरं समस्तं क्षणमात्रतस्तत्करोति तच्छायमनूनतेजाः ॥

[ 65 ]

तथा तमःसंभवमच्छमन्तर्बहिर्जडिस्नान्वितमन्तरात्मा ।  
 जगच्चिदेकच्छवि चित्स्वरूपः करोति सांनिध्यवशेन विश्वम् ॥

Just as the invaluable precious stone of emerald having unsurpassed lustre, when placed inside a vessel filled with milk, makes the entire milk have its (green) hue in a moment, so also the inner self which is of the nature of consciousness, by its proximity, makes the universe as if possessed of the nature of consciousness, the universe which (appearing as intellect) in the body is transparent and is insentient outside the body.

*vide :* Śrī Saṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brh.*, IV, iii, 7.



[ 66 ]

तान्येव कार्यकरणानि बहुप्रकारं  
 भेदं च बिभ्रति भवानपि तत्र लग्नः  
 भेदेन भाति जलपात्रनिविष्टमूर्ति-  
 मार्तण्डमण्डलवदन्वयमन्तरेण ॥

The subtle and gross bodies are different in manifold ways (as divine beings, human beings, and lower animals). Just as the disc of the sun is reflected in a vessel filled with water without having any (real) association with it, similarly your consciousness, without having any real relation, is reflected in the subtle and gross bodies and appears as different.

[ 67 ]

अध्यात्ममेवमधिभूतमथाधिदैवं  
 सूत्रं विराजमपि पश्यसि साक्षिभूतः ।  
 साक्षित्वकारणमशेषजगन्निदान-  
 मज्ञानमात्मचिदवज्ज्वलितं सदैव ॥

Remaining as the witness, you see the human body and its attributes, the ether and other elements, the gods, the self delimited by the aggregate of the subtle bodies and the self conditioned by the aggregate of the gross bodies. *Avidyā* which is inspired by the reflection of consciousness and which is the cause of the entire universe always brings about the characteristic of being the witness in respect of the self.

- i. *adhyātmam* — *aham iti ātmatayā bhāsamānam śarīrādikam taddhar-  
maśca.*
- ii. *adhibhūtam* — *idaṁtayā parāktvena bhāsamānāni savikārāṇi ākāśa-  
dibhūtāni.*



- iii. *adhidaivam—ādhyātmikakaraṇādyaugrāhakoḥ saparikaram*  
*ādityādivatājātam*
- iv. *sūtram—prāṇapradhānasamaśīlingo'pūdhikam.*
- v. *virājam—sthūlasamaśīyupūdhikam.*

[ 68 ]

देहव्यक्तिर्विप्रतीत्यास्पदत्वं याता सर्वा तावकी तावकीव ।

देहव्यक्तिर्देहताकारणेन तस्मादात्मा सर्वभूतस्थ एकः ॥

Each and every human body is the subject of controversy, and in view of its being a body, it belongs to you like your own body. Hence the self immanent in all bodies is one.

There is plurality of the individual souls—the self *as associated with minds*. The true nature of all the individual souls is only the pure consciousness. Sarvajñātmā, in this and in the following six verses, states that the spiritual element, that is, the pure self, which is present in the blend of mind and the self, that is, the individual soul, is one in all physical bodies, although the self *as associated with mind* is different in each and every body.

The following verses also are to be understood in this light. See S.

[ 69 ]

संविद्यक्तिर्विप्रतीत्यास्पदत्वं याता सर्वा तावकी तावकीव ।

संविद्यक्तिः संविदात्मत्वेतोस्तस्मादात्मा सर्वभूतस्थ एकः ॥

Knowledge present in everybody is the subject of controversy; and, in view of its being of the nature of knowledge, it belongs to you like your own knowledge. Hence the self immanent in all the bodies is one.

See Notes on SŚ, III, 68.

[ 70 ]

बुद्धिव्यक्तिर्विप्रतीत्यास्पदत्वं याता सर्वा तावकी तावकीव ।

बुद्धिव्यक्तिर्बुद्धिताकारणेन तस्मादात्मा सर्वभूतस्थ एकः ॥



The intellect present in everybody is the subject of controversy, and in view of its being an intellect, it belongs to you like your own intellect. Hence the self immanent in all bodies is one.

See Note on SŚ, III, 68.

[ 71 ]

अक्षव्यक्तिर्विप्रतीत्यास्पदत्वं याता सर्वा तावकी तावकीव ।  
अक्षव्यक्तिस्त्वक्षताकारणेन तस्मादात्मा सर्वभूतस्थ एकः ॥

All individual sense-organs present in everybody are the 'subject of controversy'; and in view of their being sense-organs, they belong to you like your own sense-organs. Hence the self immanent in all bodies is one.

See Notes on SŚ, III, 68.

[ 72 ]

ज्ञानव्यक्तिर्विप्रतीत्यास्पदत्वं याता सर्वा तावकी तावकीव ।  
ज्ञानव्यक्तिर्ज्ञानताकारणेन तस्मादात्मा सर्वभूतस्थ एकः ॥

The cognition present in everybody is the subject of controversy; and, in view of its being a cognition, it belongs to you like your own psychosis. Hence the self immanent in all bodies is one.

See Notes on SŚ, III, 68.

[ 73 ]

रागव्यक्तिर्विप्रतीत्यास्पदत्वं याता सर्वा तावकी तावकीव ।  
रागव्यक्ती रागताकारणेन तस्मादात्मा सर्वभूतस्थ एकः ॥

All individual 'desire' present in everybody is the subject of controversy; and, in view of its being of the nature of desire, it belongs to you, like your 'desire'. Hence the self immanent in all bodies is one.

See Notes on SŚ, III, 68.



[ 74 ]

द्वेषव्यक्तिर्विप्रतीत्यास्पदत्वं याता सर्वा तावकी तावकीव ।  
द्वेषव्यक्तिर्द्वेषताकारणेन तस्मादात्मा सर्वभूतस्य एकः ॥

All individual 'hatred' present in everybody is the subject of controversy; and, in view of its being of the nature of hatred, it belongs to you like your 'hatred'. Hence the self immanent in all bodies is one.

See Notes on ŚŚ, III, 68.

[ 75 ]

एवं सतीदमविवेकनिबन्धनं ते  
कर्तृत्वमात्मनि विभाति न वस्तुभूतम् ।  
बालेन कल्पितमतीव विशुद्धरूपे  
व्योम्नीव भूम्नि मलिनत्वमबोधहेतोः ॥

When such is the case, just as impurity (that is, blue colour) is superimposed, owing to *avidyā*, by the ignorant on the all-pervasive and pure ether, so also agency appears in your self, owing to the mutual superimposition of the self and the intellect. And the agency (appearing in your self) is not real.

[ 76 ]

बाह्यैरसौ रविनिशाकरवह्निवाग्भि-  
र्योतिर्गणैरुपकृतोऽपि कर्मजातम् ।  
निर्वर्तयन्न खलु तावकमन्तरेण  
चैतन्यसंनिधिबलं पुरुषः करोति ॥

The person, who, aided by the group of outward luminaries such as the sun, the moon, the fire, and the speech,



carries out the (sacred or secular) activities, does not do so without the strength of the reflection of your consciousness (in the aggregate of his subtle and the gross body).

This verse is based upon the *Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniṣad* text, IV, III, 6.

[ 77 ]

ज्योतिर्द्वयान्तरित एव हि कर्मजातं  
सर्वं करोति पुरुषोऽन्नमयः सदैव ।  
कर्मादिकारणविनिर्मितमस्य बाह्यं  
ज्योतिस्त्वनित्यमनिमित्तकमान्तरं चित् ॥

Aided by the two kinds of luminaries<sup>1</sup> the self delimited by the gross body<sup>2</sup> always performs the group of actions. The outward luminary is produced by the causes like past deeds, etc.,<sup>3</sup> (of the self delimited by the gross body) and (hence) it is transient, while the inner consciousness is not produced by any cause (and hence it is eternal).

1. *jyotirdvayāntaritaḥ*—*bāhyābhyantaralakṣaṇajyotirdvayavyāptāḥ*
2. *annamayaḥ*—*sthūladeho'pādhikaḥ*, TB.
3. *karmādikāraṇavinirmitaṁ*—*prāṇīnaḥ yat karmajñānapūrvaprajñādi tena nirmitaṁ bāhyajyotiḥ*, AP.

[ 78 ]

श्रोत्रादिजन्यमतिवृत्तिषु बाह्यशब्दा-  
द्यथाकृतिर्विशति कर्मवशेन कर्तुः ।  
बोधाकृतिस्तु तव संनिधिमात्रहेतु-  
धीवृत्तिषु प्रविशति स्वरसेन नित्यम् ॥

Owing to the unseen merit of the embodied soul, the reflection of external objects like sound, etc., is presented in the mental modifications arising through the sense of hearing, etc. But your consciousness is always reflected



naturally in the mental modifications owing to its (that is, consciousness') proximity.

1. *arthākṛtiḥ*—*arthapratibimbah*, SS.
2. *karmavaśena*—*adr̥ṣṭavaśena*, TB.
3. *bodhākṛtiḥ*—*bodhasvarūpam*, TB.

[ 79 ]

स्वाभाविकी हि वियदन्वितता घटादेः

क्षीरादिवस्तुघटना पुनरन्यहेतुः ।

एवं धियामपि चिदन्विततानिमित्ता

शब्दादिवस्तुघटना खलु कर्महेतुः ॥

The relation of the ether to pot, etc., is intrinsic; while the relation of milk, etc., to them is extrinsic. Similarly the reflection of consciousness in the mental modification is natural; while the reflection of sound, etc., in it depend on one's past deeds.

*ghaṭanā*—*anvitatā*, SS.

*anyahetuḥ*—*bhoktuḥ karmahetuḥ*, SS.

*dhiyām*—*buddhivṛttinām*, TB.

[ 80 ]

संवेदनं यदिह मानफलं प्रसिद्धं तच्च प्रमातरि विकारिणि निष्ठितं नः ।

तस्य प्रमातुरपि साक्षितयान्तरात्मा सर्वस्य तिष्ठति भवानविकाररूपः ॥

Knowledge which is well known to be the result of proof is rooted in the knower (that is, the intellect inspired by the reflection of the self) which is mutable. You are the immutable inner self and you remain as the witness of all including the knower.

*yadyapi antahkaraṇam kevalam jaḍam, tathāpi caitanyavyūptam sat pramāṇaphalapramityāśrayo bhavatyeva*, TB.

*saṁvedanam*—*ātmacaitanyameva buddhivṛttyavacchinnaṁ sat*

*saṁvedanam*, AP



[ 81 ]

कर्त्रादिसंनिधिबलेन तवापि कर्तृ-  
 भोक्तृप्रमातृवपुरापतति <sup>1</sup>क्रमेण ।  
 तद्बुद्धिसंश्रयमनात्मगतं प्रतीचि  
 शुद्धेऽपि पश्यसि तमः पटलावृताक्षः ॥

On the strength of the presence of (the intellect which is) the agent, etc., there arises erroneously the forms of agent, enjoyer, and knower, in your true nature. But they are present in the intellect, that is, in the insentient object. And as your true nature is veiled by *avidyā* you perceive them (agency, etc.) in the pure inner self.

*tamaḥ paṭalāvṛtākṣaḥ—tamasāvṛtāsaṅgānandasvarūpacaitanyaḥ, TB.*

[ 82 ]

कर्तृत्वादि च दृश्यवर्गपतितं द्रष्टुः स्वभावः कथं  
 संभाव्येत तव प्रसन्नविमलस्वच्छप्रकाशात्मनः ।  
 यद्यद् दृश्यतया जगत्यभिमतं सर्वस्य तत्तद्भवेत्  
 दूरं द्रष्टुरिति प्रसिद्धमखिलं भूभृत्समुद्रादिकम् ॥

How could agency, etc., which are objects be the nature of the witness-self which is immutable, beginningless, unrelated, and self-luminous? It is well known that whichever is accepted to be objects of knowledge like mountain, ocean, etc., in this world is remote from the seer.

[ 83 ]

एतस्माच्च न जाग्रतस्तव भवेत्स्वाभाविकी कर्तृता  
 यद्येषा स्वत एव किं न भवति स्वप्नेऽपि ते तिष्ठतः ।  
 यत् स्वप्ने परिपश्यसि त्वमखिलं तन्मायया निर्मितं  
 कर्तृत्वादि न सत्यमत्र घटते कात्स्न्यानिभिव्यक्तितः ॥



If agency, etc., are natural to your form, then why are they not present in your form which exists even in the dream state? For this reason agency, etc., are not natural to your nature in the waking state. And what you perceive in the dream state like agency, etc., are created by *avidyā*. It is not appropriate that they are real, for they are not fully manifested (at a time and a place necessary for the manifestation of a real object).

*kārtsnyānabhivṛtyatā—paramārthavastūcitadeśakūlasādhanaśāmpattiḥ  
kārtsnyam tatpūrvikā yā abhivṛtyatā tadrahitatvāt, SS.*

[ 84 ]

कात्स्न्यं हीष्टमबाधनं न खलु तत्स्वप्नस्य जाग्रद्विया  
बाधाद्बाधितमेव सत्यमिति चेन्नै विरोधान्मिथः ।  
सत्यत्वे न हि बाधितत्वघटना बाधे च सत्यं कुतः  
सत्यं बाधितमित्यतीव पदयोः संबन्धिता दुर्घटा ॥

The meaning of the word *kārtsnya* is intended to be 'absence of sublation' which is not applicable indeed to the dream state; for the dream state is sublated by the knowledge of the waking state. If it is held that (the dream state) which is sublated is real, then it does not hold good in view of contradiction between the two (namely, sublation and reality). Sublation is not possible to a real thing and how could there be the association of reality to a sublated thing. And the syntactic relation between the words in the sentence 'A real thing is sublated' is thoroughly incompatible.

See Notes on the previous verse.

[ 85 ]

मायामेतां जागरे लोकसिद्धां उक्त्वा तद्वत् स्वप्नमायां विविच्य ।  
शक्तिव्याप्ती तत्र सिद्धे गृहीत्वा मायासिद्धं जागरं साधयामः ॥



After affirming that *māyā* known in waking state in ordinary experience and similarly *māyā* which is the root-cause of dream state are of the nature of *avidyā* and comprehending the signification of the word *māyā* to be *avidyā* and (observing) the invariable concomitance (between the state of being an effect and the nature of having *avidyā* as the cause), we establish that the universe in the waking state is the effect of *avidyā*.

It is said: etheric space, etc., which are real are known to be effects of *avidyā* from the Upaniṣadic text — “Know *māyā* to be the primal cause,” etc. (*Śvet.*, IV, 10.) From this we can conclude that the effect of *māyā* is real. It follows from this that when the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* states that the dream world is the effect of *māyā* or *māyāmaya*, he means that it is also real like the waking state.

Sarvajñātman in this and in the following verses refutes the above contention. He proves that what is known in ordinary experience as *māyā* relating to a juggler is only *avidyā*, and *māyā* which is said to be the cause of the dream world is also identical with *avidyā*. He further proves that there exists the significative relation between the word *māyā* and the sense of *avidyā*. There also exists the invariable relation that whichever is an effect, it proceeds from *avidyā*. So the waking state also being an effect proceeds from *avidyā* and is therefore indeterminate.

Sarvajñātman in the following verses establishes the identity of *māyā* and *ajñāna*. This verse sets forth the thesis which the author proposes to establish in the subsequent verses.

[ 86 ]

लोके हि मायाविगता न माया तमोऽतिरिक्तास्ति निरूप्यमाणा ।  
व्याप्तिश्च शक्तिश्च निरूप्यमाणा भविष्यतीहैव तु नेतरत्र ॥

When examined it is found that *māyā* present in a juggler in ordinary experience is not different from *avidyā*. Similarly on careful analysis it is found that nothing else



than *avidyā* is the signification of the term *māyā*, and there is invariable concomitance (between the state of being an effect which is the *probans* and the state of having *avidyā* as the cause which is the *probandum*).

[ 87 ]

मायाविनो न मणिमन्त्रमथौषधं वा  
 मायेति शक्यमिह वर्णयितुं कुतश्चेत् ।  
 सस्य हि तत्सकलमिष्टमियं त्वसत्या  
 माया ततोऽन्यदिह किञ्चन वर्णनीयम् ॥

The jewel, spell, and the herbs used by a juggler cannot be termed *māyā*. Why so? All these are admitted to be real, while *māyā* is unreal (that is, indeterminable). Hence something other than these should be described as *māyā*.

In this verse, Sarvajñātman refutes the contention that since in ordinary experience the word *māyāvin* is used with reference to a person who possesses jewel, charm, herbs, etc., the word *māyā* refers to jewel, etc. And jewel, etc. are real.

Sarvajñātman states that in ordinary experience, the word *māyā* is used with reference to non-real objects like elephant, etc., that are made to appear by a juggler. Since such objects are many and since each one is associated with its generic attribute, they cannot be conveyed by one word *māyā*. So it must be admitted that there exists one entity which pervades all such effects as their material cause, and it is the sense of the word *māyā*. The material cause also must be non-real like the effects and that is *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. The word *māyā* is used in respect of the effects of *ajñāna* only by courtesy. Jewel, etc., are only useful to make this *avidyā* manifest as elephant, etc., which are termed *māyā*. And so one who has jewel, etc., is figuratively spoken of as *māyāvin*.



[ 88 ]

सामर्थ्यमस्य मणिमन्त्रनिमित्तमस्ति  
 माया भविष्यति जनभ्रमहेतुरेषा ।  
 इत्युच्यते यदि तदप्यतिफलं कस्मात्  
 सामर्थ्यमप्यवितथं हि तदिष्टमस्य ॥

If it is said that *māyā* which deludes the onlookers is the (particular) capacity of a juggler owing to his possession of the jewel and spell, then it is very trifling. Why so? His capacity also is admitted to be real.

It might be said: *māyā* is the particular capacity of a juggler to give rise to the appearance of elephant, etc. Sarvajñātman refutes this contention by saying that the effects that ensue from such a capacity which is real must also be real. But it is not so. The objects like elephant, etc., presented by a juggler are not real.

[ 89 ]

न च शक्तिरस्य सहजा यदि वा जनितास्ति केनचिदिति ब्रुवतः ।  
 परिपुष्कलं स्वमतनिर्वहणं भवितुं क्षमं तदनिरूपणतः ॥

It is asked whether the (particular) capacity of a juggler is natural to him or is produced by some other factor. As the two alternatives cannot be proved, he (the objector) cannot maintain his view well (even) if he accepts either of these alternatives.

1. See the following two verses.

[ 90 ]

न च शुक्रशोणितसमागमने न च गर्भशायिन इयं विदिता ।  
 न च मातृयोनिविवरादुदरादपसर्पतो बहिरियं घटते ॥



(It is not natural as) it does not hold good either at the time of the association of virility and blood, or when he lies in the uterus, or when he comes out of the womb of his mother.

[ 91 ]

मणिमन्त्रमौषधमितीदृशकं विरह्य नापरमिहार्पयति ।  
पुरुषोऽपि कश्चिदत एवमियं परतोऽपि नास्य 'घटनामटति ॥

Even the preceptor does not give the juggler anything else than the jewel, charm, and herbs. Hence the (particular) capacity of the juggler is not acquired by him from someone else (that is, through the preceptor).

It must therefore be admitted that *avidyā* is the cause of the effects like elephant, etc., which are known as *māyā*, and a juggler uses jewel, etc., to make the *avidyā* manifest as elephant etc.

[ 92 ]

अन्यस्य विभ्रमकरी पुरुषस्य शक्ति-  
राकारमन्यमनपेक्ष्य मनीषिता चेत् ।  
वाच्येह लौकिकजनव्यवहारभूमौ  
मायागिरस्तदपि दुर्घटमिष्टहानेः ॥

If it is held that in the plane of empirical usage the sense of the term *māyā* is the power of God which presents erroneous objects without depending upon other objects similar to them, then it is incompatible; for there would be the loss of the accepted view.

It is said: on the basis of the Upaniṣadic text—*māyinaṁ tu mahesvaraṁ* (*Śvet.*, IV, 10), the power of *māyā* must be admitted in the case of *Īśvara*. And, *māyā* cannot be taken to be identical with *ajñāna* or



*avidyā*. It is because *avidyā* is that which deludes its abode and which could give rise to erroneous cognition of objects such as snake, silver, and the like only by depending upon objects such as rope, shell, etc., that are similar to snake, silver, etc. *Māyā*, on the other hand, does not delude its abode and it gives rise to erroneous cognition of objects like etheric space without depending upon objects that are similar to them. This *māyā* is directed by *Īśvara* when He is worshiped with jewel, charm, etc., and it comes under the control of the worshipper and it deludes others. This view advocated by a section of the Advaitins emphasizes the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*.

Sarvajñātman refutes this objection by stating that *māyā* admitted as distinct from *ajñāna* or *avidyā* could either be indetrminable or real. To either of the views there are difficulties.

If *māyā* were said to be indeterminable, then as indeterminability is the characteristic of *avidyā*, *māyā* does not differ from *avidyā*. Thus there is the loss of the accepted view of a section of Advaitins that *avidyā* and *māyā* are different.

[ 93 ]

मायामयत्ववचनादखिलं मृषेति

यद्भाष्यकारवचनं 'तदसंगतं स्यात् ।

प्रत्यक्षमुत्सृजसि कारणमन्यदन्य-

द्यत्किञ्चिदानयसि कष्टमतः किमन्यत् ॥

The statement of the author of the *bhāṣya* (on the basis of the *sūtra* — *māyāmātram*, etc.) that everything (in the dream state) is illusory would be contradicted. And abandoning the one (that is, *avidyā*) which is directly experienced to be the cause (of the erroneous knowledge) you maintain something else (namely, *māyā*) to be the cause (of the erroneous knowledge of the spectators). Is there anything worse than this?



If the second alternative, namely, that *māyā* is real is maintained then the effect of *māyā* must inevitably be real. In that case, the statement of Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the aphorism *BS, III, ii, 3* that everything in the dream state is illusory and there is not even a trace of reality in respect of the objects of the dream state would be contradicted. *vide: māyaiva sandhye sṛṣṭiḥ, na paramārthagandho'pyasti, BSB, III, ii, 3.*

Moreover it is a matter of ordinary experience that those who perceive the objects presented by a juggler do have ignorance about the true nature of those objects. That ignorance is *avidyā*. By the knowledge of method of agreement and difference in the form "when *avidyā* is there, there is the presentation of objects by a juggler and when *avidyā* is not there, there is no such presentation", we can conclude that *avidyā* is the cause of the illusory presentation of objects by a juggler. There is, therefore, no necessity to assume *māyā* as distinct from *avidyā* as the cause of the illusory presentation of objects by a juggler.

[ 94 ]

अज्ञानमेव च भविष्यति शक्तिरेषा  
 सर्वप्रपञ्चजननी परमेश्वरस्य ।  
 माया श्रुतिस्मृतिवचोभिरुदीर्यमाणा  
 शक्तिग्रहो हि परविभ्रमहेतुशक्तौ ॥

*Māyā* which is the power of God, which is the cause of the entire universe and which is stated in the scripture and in the code of law, is only *avidyā*; for, the signification of the word (illusion) is known to be the power which deludes others, that is, *avidyā*.

It might be said: If *avidyā* is operative in respect of *Īśvara*, then, *Īśvara* would be ignorant. *Īśvara*, however, is omniscient; and this suggests that *avidyā* is not operative in His case. So *māyā* which is known from the Upaniṣads in respect of *Īśvara* must be different from *avidyā*.



Sarvajñātman in this verse refutes the above contention by stating that *avidyā* which is present in the pure consciousness is operative in respect of Īśvara only in its *vikṣepa*-phase and not in its *āvaraṇa*-phase. So the truth of non-duality is never concealed from Īśvara and He is always omniscient. This *avidyā* is termed *māyā*; and, it is not different from *māyā*.

[ 95 ]

न च प्रसिद्धार्थपदान्तराणां प्रयोगसान्ध्यवशेन शक्तिः ।  
ग्रहीष्यतेऽस्येति समञ्जसं स्यादलौकिके शब्द इदं हि युक्तम् ॥

It is not reasonable to hold that the signification of the word *māyā* is comprehended by its being used in proximity to the other words<sup>1</sup> whose meanings are well known; for, this is reasonable only in the case of the words that are not current in ordinary usage.

1. It might be said: though in ordinary usage the word *māyā* conveys the sense of *avidyā* which deludes its abode, yet in the scripture it conveys a different sense. In the scriptural text — *māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt māyinaṁ tu mahēśvaram* the word *māyā* is used in proximity to the words *prakṛti* and *Īśvara*, whose meanings we already know. With the aid of these words, the sense of the word *māyā* is known to be the power of God which is the source of the universe and not *avidyā* which deludes even its own abode. And this verse refutes this contention.

[ 96 ]

अयं तु मायेति न शब्द एवमलौकिको लौकिक एव तस्मात् ।  
यदर्थवाची जगति प्रसिद्धस्तमेव वेदेऽपि स वक्ष्यतीह ॥

And this word *māyā* is current in ordinary usage and hence it is not extra-ordinary. In the scripture too, the word conveys the same sense which is conveyed by it in ordinary usage.<sup>1</sup>



1. cf: *loka-vedādhikaraṇanyāya*, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*,

I, iii, 10/30—35.

[ 97 ]

ननुद्धिददिर्यदि नाम लोके प्रसिद्धमर्थान्तरवाचकत्वम् ।  
तथापि भावार्थनिपीडितस्य विजानते कर्मणि शक्तिमस्य ॥

Though the word *udbhid* is well known to convey one sense (that is, spade) in ordinary experience, yet (men of intellect) determinethat (in the scriptural text-*udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*) this word signifies the particular ritual when its sense (that is, spade) is superseded by (the usage of the word in co-ordinate relation with) the sense of the root.

The word *udbhid* leaves out its ordinary sense of spade and conveys the sense of a ritual when it is used along with the word *yaj* which is the root and which conveys the sense of sacrifice.

*vide: bhāvārthanipīḍitasya — bhāvārthavācīyajisāmīnādhikaraṇyena tyājita laukikārthasya, SS.*

[ 98 ]

सत्यं न गत्यन्तरमस्ति तत्र ततस्तथा निश्चितमत्र नैवम्  
मायागिरोऽज्ञाननिवेदनेऽपि न काचिदत्रानुपपत्तिरस्ति ॥

It is true. (In the case of *udbhid*) there is no other course left and hence it is decided in that manner. But here it is not so. There is nothing unreasonable here if the word *māyā* conveys the sense of *avidyā*.

[ 99 ]

अज्ञानं जडशक्तिमात्रवपुषा सर्वेश्वरस्येष्यते  
सर्वज्ञत्वविरोधि तन्न च भवेदुक्तप्रकारेण नः ।  
सर्वज्ञेश्वरसंश्रया भवति सैवाज्ञानमाया श्रुतौ  
तस्मादुद्धिदिवेति वर्णनमिदं वैषम्यदुष्टं तव ॥



*Avidyā* in its aspect of projection is admitted in the case of God. And in our view, as set forth before,<sup>1</sup> it is not contrary to the omniscience of God. Hence *māyā* which is said in the *śruti* texts<sup>2</sup> as belonging to God, is of the nature of *avidyā*. Hence your assertion that the word *māyā* is similar to the word *udbhid* is inconsistent.

1. See *SS*, II, 165-6.

2. *māyinaṁ ityādiśrutau*, *SS*.

*jaḍaśakti mātra vapuṣā — vikṣepaśaktiprādhānyena*, *AP*.

The word *udbhid* conveys the sense of sacrifice in the scripture, while it signifies a spade in ordinary usage. The word *māyā*, on the other hand, conveys the same sense both in the scripture and in ordinary usage, unlike the word *udbhid*.

[ 100 ]

मायानिर्वचनीयमेव तु तमो मायाविनो गीयते  
 द्रुणां भ्रमकारणं विषयता मायाविता तस्य तु ।  
 तं हस्त्यादिविकल्पनाघटितवन्मूढाशया जन्तवो  
 रज्जुं 'सर्पतयेव तद्विरहितं जानन्त्यबुद्धत्वतः ॥

[Some maintain thus]: *Avidyā* which is indeterminable and which is the cause of the delusion of the onlookers is said to be *māyā* in the case of a juggler. And the state of being a juggler or *māyāvin* is the state of being the content of *avidyā*. Like mistaking a rope for a serpent, the ignorant take the juggler as having the forms like elephant, etc., as they are not aware that he is devoid of any such form.

See the following verse also.

1. सर्पधियेव — M<sub>1</sub>.      2. न्यबुद्धत्वत् — P<sub>2</sub>.



[ 101 ]

सम्यग्ज्ञानबलेन तं विरहितं हस्त्यादिभिर्यत्क्षणे  
 जानीयुस्तदनन्तरं न स भवेद्धस्त्यादियुक्तः पुमान् ।  
 तेनास्मत्तम एव तत्र विषये मायास्तु मायाविनः  
 सोऽज्ञातो वयमज्ञकोटिपतिता मायी स तेनोच्यते ॥

The moment that the people know on the strength of correct knowledge that he (the juggler) is devoid of the forms like elephant, etc., then the person is no longer associated with the forms like elephant, etc. Hence let *avidyā* present in us be termed *māyā* when it has for its content the juggler. We are ignorant and the juggler is the content of *avidyā* and hence he is said to be a juggler.

The view set forth in this verse and in the previous one is refuted in the following verse.

[ 102 ]

नन्वेवं सति रज्जखण्डलकमप्यज्ञातमज्ञानिभिः  
 मायावीति गिरोच्यतां न तु तथा लोके प्रसिद्धिः क्वचित् ।  
 तेनाज्ञातविलक्षणत्वमुचितं मायाविनो लौकिका  
 मायावीति पुमांसमेव निपुणं येनाहुरत्यादरात् ॥

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* objects]:-

When such is the case, indeed a piece of rope also is unknown (that is, the content of *avidyā*) by the ignorant and let it be described as a juggler. But it is never known as such in ordinary experience. And since the people, with the sense of discrimination, call the cunning person alone as the juggler, it is reasonable to state that the juggler is one different from being the content of *avidyā*.

*nanu evaṁ sati — ajñānaviśayasya māyāvitve sati, TB.*

*nīpūṇaṁ — paravañcanakuśalam, S.*



[ 103 ]

नैवं भ्रान्तिनिमित्ताकारणमयं संगृह्य 'सर्वक्षणे  
मन्त्रादि 'प्रचुरप्रयत्नजनितं' तज्जीवनो वर्तते ।  
तेनात्रैव तु लोकरूढिरभवन्मायावितागोचरा  
यद्वद्ब्रह्मणताप्रसिद्धिरभवन्मुक्त्वा परिव्राजकान् ॥

[ Sarvajñātmā sets forth his own view ] :

What has been said<sup>1</sup> is not correct. The juggler always has as his means of living the spell, etc., which are acquired with great effort and which are the efficient cause of erroneous cognition of others. Hence the word *māyāvin* is conventionally used to signify the juggler (by leaving God) like the word 'brahmin' which signifies the brahmin householder by leaving the ascetic.

1. The view set forth in SŚ, III, 100-1 is referred to here.

The material cause of illusory presentations of elephant, etc., is only *avidyā* present in the pure self. God who is free from the *āvaraṇa*-phase of *avidyā* illusorily presents the entire world and deludes the individual souls. He is, therefore, the primary sense of the word *māyāvin*. In ordinary experience, however, a particular person is said to be a *māyāvin*. It is because that person uses jewel, etc., and thereby makes *avidyā* manifest as elephant, etc., he is not deluded by the illusory presentations of *avidyā*, and in this he is similar to God, who is the primary sense of the word *māyāvin*. This word secondarily signifies a juggler in ordinary experience.

[ 104 ]

एवं तावल्लोकमिच्छा न माया मिथ्याज्ञानाद्विद्यतेऽतश्च तत्र ।  
शक्तिव्याप्तिप्रत्ययौ वर्णयित्वा वेदाल्लिङ्गान्यमायात्वसिद्धिः ॥

1. पूर्वक्षणे — T<sub>3</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>.

2. प्रचुरं प्रयत्नजनितं — B<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>.

3. जीवने — P<sub>3</sub>.

प्रचुरं प्रयत्नगुणितं — B<sub>1</sub>.



Thus what is known in ordinary experience as *māyā* does not differ from the indeterminable *avidyā*. And by knowing the signification (of the term *māyā* to be *avidyā*) and the invariable concomitance (between the *probans* - the state of being an effect, and the *probandum* - the nature of causality existing in *avidyā*), one should establish through scripture and inference that the other things (namely, ether, etc,) are of the nature of *avidyā*.

The Upaniṣadic text "Know *māyā* to be the material cause" states *māyā* as the cause of the world, or the world as the effect of *māyā*. From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that *māyā* is identical with *avidyā* and whichever is the effect is of the nature of *avidyā*. So the word *māyā* found in the scriptural text conveys the sense of *avidyā*, and the world which is the effect is of the nature of *avidyā* or *avidyāmāya*. *Māyā* being identical with *avidyā* and the world being *avidyāmāya* are *mithyā* or indeterminable.

*anyamāyātvāsiddhiḥ — anyasya - dvaitasya, AP.*

[ 105 ]

जाग्रद्भूतौ या प्रसिद्धेह माया निर्णीता सा तावदज्ञानमेव ।  
तस्यां शक्तिव्याप्तिविज्ञानसिद्धेर्विज्ञातव्या सैव वेदानुमानात् ॥

*Māyā* well-known in the waking state has been determined to be *avidyā*. As the knowledge of the signification (of the term *māyā* to be *avidyā*) and of invariable concomitance (between the state of being an effect and the nature of causality existing in *avidyā*) is established, *māyā* is to be known as identical with *avidyā* from scripture and inference also.

The word *māyā* found in the scriptural text is identical with *avidyā*. And, from the inferential argument "The world is of the nature of *māyā*,



because it is the effect" there arises the inferential cognition that the world is of the nature of *māyā*. Since there exists the invariable concomitance between the state of being an effect and the nature of causality existing in *avidyā*, it should be concluded that the world is of the nature of *avidyā*.

[ 106 ]

स्वप्नेऽप्येवं स्वप्नदृष्टमोहमात्रादन्या काचिन्न प्रसिद्धास्ति माया ।  
तत्रैवायं सूत्रकारस्य तस्मान्मायाशब्दो वर्तते नापरत्र ॥

Similarly *māyā* which is (said to be) the material cause of the dream state also is not different from *avidyā* (present in the pure self) of the one who has the dream. Hence the word *māyā* used by the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* denotes only *avidyā* and nothing else.

1. The author of the *Brahma-Sūtra* uses the word *māyā* in BS., III, ii, 3

*vide* : (i) *svapne'pi — tadupādānabhute'pi*, SS.

(ii) *mohamātrāt — śuddhacaitanyā-jñānaṁ mohamātraśabdārthaḥ*.

[ 107 ]

शक्तिव्याप्तिप्रत्ययौ कारयिष्यन् स्वप्ने स्थित्वा प्रत्यगज्ञानमात्रे ।  
मायावाचा लोकवत्सूत्रकारो वेदे लिङ्गं चोपनेतुं प्रवृत्तः ॥

By imparting the knowledge that the signification of the word *māyā* is *avidyā* existing in the inner self and that there is invariable concomitance (between the state of being an effect and the nature of causality existing in *avidyā*), the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, with reference to the dream state, uses the word *māyā*, in order to prove that, as in ordinary experience, in the scripture also the word *māyā* conveys *avidyā* and there is invariable concomitance between the state of being an effect and the nature of causality existing in *avidyā*.



[ 108 ]

अज्ञानमावरणमावरणं च माया सर्वेश्वरेण हरिणा दृढमभ्यधायि ।  
चैतन्यवस्तुन इति प्रतिपद्यमानास्तत्त्वं तदेकमिति निश्चयतः प्रतीमः ॥

Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the supreme Lord has definitely said that *avidyā* is the veil of consciousness<sup>1</sup> and (similarly) *māyā* conceals consciousness<sup>2</sup>. Knowing this definition, we understand that these two are of identical nature.

(1) *vide* : Bh. G., V, 15.

(2) *Ibid.*, VII, 25.

[ 109 ]

ज्ञानं निवर्तकमपि द्वितयस्य तस्य गीतागतः करुणया भगवानुवाच ।  
तेनापि तत्त्वमिदमेकमिति प्रतीतिरानीयते कथितलक्षणतुल्यभावत् ॥

The supreme Lord has with compassion said in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* that the realization (of the self) annihilates these two (*avidyā* and *māyā*)<sup>1</sup>. As the definition set forth is similar to both, it is known that they are of identical nature.

(1) *vide*: Bh. G., VII, 14 and V, 16.

[ 110 ]

नाहं प्रकाश इति तावदनेन मायाऽ-  
ज्ञानेन चावृतमितीतरदप्यभाणि ।  
मामेव ये तु परमं पुरुषं प्रपन्ना  
ज्ञानेन तु प्रभृतिना च धिया निवृत्तिः

Lord Kṛṣṇa has mentioned *māyā* in the sentence 'I am not revealed'<sup>1</sup> and *avidyā* in the sentence 'knowledge is veiled by *avidyā*'.<sup>2</sup> And in the sentences such as 'Those who resort to Me get over this *māyā*' and '*Avidyā* is destroyed



by the realization of the self'. He affirms that the realization of the self annihilates *avidyā* (which is identical with *māyā*.)

The following verses from the *Bhagavad-gītā* are referred to in this verse :

vide 1. *Bh. G.*, VI, 25.

2. *Ibid*, V, 15.

3. *Ibid.*, VII, 14.

4. *Ibid*, V, 16.

[ 111 ]

ज्ञानस्य प्रागभावादपरमभिहितं प्रत्यगज्ञानमेतत्  
संसारव्याधिबीजं कथितनयवशादेव बुध्यस्व बुद्ध्या ।  
ज्ञानेनाज्ञाननाशं कथयति भगवानेष गीतागतः सन्  
न ज्ञानात्प्रागभावक्षय इति घटते तत्क्षये तत्प्रसूते ॥

In the light of the arguments sets forth, you understand that *avidyā* which is the root-cause of transmigration is stated to be other than antecedent negation of knowledge. And the Lord in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* says<sup>1</sup> that knowledge annihilates *avidyā*. (If *avidyā* is the antecedent negation of knowledge) then annihilation of the antecedent negation of knowledge by knowledge is not appropriate; for knowledge could arise only subsequent to the annihilation of its antecedent negation.

1. vide *Bh. G.*, V, 16.

2. *jñānasya svaprāgabdhāva-nāśarūpatayā taddhetutvāyogāt*, SS.

[ 112 ]

मायामात्रमतः समस्तमभवत्स्वप्ने प्रसिद्धं दृशः  
कर्तृत्वादि तमोमयं वितथमेवाज्ञानमात्रं यतः ।  
तस्माज्जागरितेऽपि चैतदभवत्स्वाभाविकं यत्पुन-  
स्तादृक्षं तव सर्वदैव तु भवेत्स्वप्नेऽपि चैतन्यवत् ॥



(As *māyā* and *avidyā* are identical) agency, etc., which are known to be present in the self in the dream state and which are illusory, are of the form of *avidyā* and hence unreal. And since the dream state is of the form of *avidyā*, (agency, etc., present in the self in the waking state do not exist in the dream state, and hence) agency, etc., are not natural to the self in the waking state. If agency, etc., are natural to the self, then they would always exist even in the dream state, like consciousness.

Agency, etc., found as existing in the self in the dream state are different from those existing in the self in the waking state.

See SŚ, III, 115.

[ 113 ]

सत्यप्यलुप्तचिति यत्त्वयि नास्ति कर्तृ-  
 भोक्तृप्रमातृमुखमन्यदपीह किञ्चित् ।  
 जाग्रदशावगतमप्यखिलं न तत्ते  
 स्वाभाविकं भवितुमुत्सहते विरोधात् ॥

Your immutable consciousness alone remains (in the state of deep sleep) and none else like the characteristics of being an agent, enjoyer, and knower. Hence, in view of contradiction, the characteristics of being an agent, etc., found as existing in the self in the waking state cannot be natural to you (that is, the inner self).

[ 114 ]

स्वाभाविकी हृतभुजः खलु नोष्णता तं  
 जातु प्रमुञ्चति न तामपि जातवेदाः ।  
 एवं भवन्तमपि जागरितोपलब्धं  
 स्वप्ने भवानपि च जागरितं न मुञ्चेत् ॥



Heat is indeed natural to fire. It never leaves the fire, nor does fire leave it out. And agency, etc., found in the waking state (if they are natural to your form) then they would not abandon you (that is, pure consciousness) in the dream state; and you (the pure consciousness) also would not (at any time) abandon agency, etc., present in the waking state.

*bhavantam—aviluptacaitanyasvarūpam, TB.*

[ 115 ]

स्वप्ने न जागरितमस्ति मृषात्वहेतोः  
 स्वप्नस्य सत्यमिति जागरितं वदन्ति ।  
 स्वप्नस्य बाधनबलादनृतत्वमुक्तं  
 तस्माच्चिदेव तव रूपमतोऽन्यदार्तम् ॥

In view of the indeterminability of the dream state, agency., etc, present (in the self) in the waking state do not exist in the dream state. And the waking state is said to be (empirically) real while the dream state is admitted to be indeterminable, on the strength of its (subsequent) sublation. Hence consciousness alone is your true nature and apart from this everything else is indeterminable.

[ 116 ]

स्वप्नोपलब्धमखिलं वितथं तथापि तत्सूचयत्यवितथं परमार्थवस्तु ।  
 जाग्रदशावगतमप्यनृतं तथापि तद्वत्तादप्यवगतिक्षममेव भूम्नः ॥

Everything experienced in the dream state is indeterminable, yet it indicates the real entity that subserves practical purposes.' The things found in the waking state



also, like those of the dream state, are indeterminable, and they are capable of giving rise to the knowledge of the self.

1. *vide*: BS, III, ii, 4.

*vide* also notes on SS, I, 337-8.

*paramārthavastu* - *arthakriyāsamartha-iṣṭavastu*, SS.

[ 117 ]

स्वप्नभ्रमोऽपि सुकृतादिनिबन्धनत्वात्  
तावत्परिस्फुरति यावददृष्टमस्ति ।  
क्षीणे तु तत्र लयमेति जगन्निदाने  
गाढे तमस्यनुभवावगते प्रतीचः ॥

And as the erroneous cognition of dream also, is caused by religious merit, etc., it manifests itself as long as the unseen merit lasts. When it is exhausted, the dream state merges in the dense *avidyā* which abides in the inner self, which is the source of the universe and which is known through experience (in the form 'I am ignorant').

*pratīcaḥ tamasi* - *pratyagviśayatamasi*, TP.

[ 118 ]

निष्पादिता सकलकारकवर्गसाध्या  
सर्वेण कारकगणेन सहैव तावत् ।  
तिष्ठेत्क्रिया परमसूक्ष्मतयेक्ष्यमाणा  
सर्वेश्वरेण पुरुषः फलमेति यावत् ॥

Until the person experiences the result (that is, dream), the action which had been achieved by all the productive factors remains in its very subtle form (that is, unseen



merit) along with the group of productive factors, by being directed by God.

1. *ikṣyamāṇā - adhiṣṭhitaiva, TB.*
2. *atisūkṣmatayā - apūrvārūpeṇa, AP.*

[ 119 ]

स्यप्नश्च जागरितमप्युभयं तवैव मोहप्रसूतमपि कर्मफलं विभाति ।  
कर्मक्षये तदखिलं परमात्ममायामाश्रित्य सूक्ष्ममवतिष्ठत एव लीनम् ॥

Though the waking and dream states belonging to you (that is, the inner self) arise from *avidyā*, yet they are the effects of (your) past actions. When (the unseen merit of) the past actions are exhausted, the waking and dream states merge in the *avidyā* of the self and remain in their subtle forms.

[ 120 ]

उत्थानलिङ्गकृतकल्पनयैतदेवं विज्ञायते न तु तथावगतं तदानीम् ।  
अज्ञानलीनमखिलं जगदस्ति सूक्ष्मं तत्रैव नानुभवनादवगम्यते हि ॥

From the inference on the basis of (a person's) reversion to empirical life (from deep sleep) what is known is that the entire universe is merged in *avidyā* in its subtle form. But this is not known in deep sleep state as there is no such experience at that time.

[ 121 ]

अज्ञानमेव तु तदावगतं त्वदीयं  
येनोत्थितो वदसि नावगतं मयाद्य ।  
सुप्तेन किञ्चिदपि गाढतमस्यभूवं  
क्षिप्तः समस्तविषयावगमासमर्थः ॥



Your *avidyā* alone is experienced then (that is, in deep sleep), for on waking up you say 'I did not know anything when I was asleep'; and 'Being enveloped by *avidyā*, I was incapable of understanding any object'.

See Introduction, p. 76.

[ 122 ]

अज्ञानमत्र यदि नानुभवात्प्रसिद्धं  
नाज्ञासिषं त्विति कुतस्तव निश्चयोऽभूत् ।  
अज्ञानमस्त्यवगतं च सुषुप्तिकाले  
तेनेति निश्चिनु तवानुभवप्रमाणत् ॥

If *avidyā* is not known in deep sleep through experience, then how could there be the (later) reminiscence (in the form) 'I did not know anything'. So be certain on the authority of experience that *avidyā* exists and is experienced in deep sleep.

[ 123 ]

स्पष्टानुभूतिविषयो न तमस्तदानीं  
आसीदहंकरणहीनतयाधुना तु ।  
निष्पाद्य कार्यमिदमंशमहं न जाने  
मूढोऽस्मि चेत्यवगतेर्विषयत्वमागात् ॥

As the state of deep sleep is devoid of (the function of) intellect, *avidyā* is not determinately perceived then. But, having given rise to intellect in the waking state, *avidyā* becomes the object of experience such as 'I do not know' and 'I am ignorant.'



[ 124 ]

एतावता तव तमोऽपि सुषुप्तिकाले  
 नास्तीति बुद्धिरुदितं गुरुभिश्च कैश्चित् ।  
 स्थाने क्वचित् क्वचिदतो द्वयमुच्यमानं  
 ग्राह्यं विविच्य भवता विषयं विभज्य ॥

By this (namely, in view of the absence of determinate perception of *avidyā* in the state of deep sleep) it is said at some places by Śrī Śaṅkara and other preceptors that even *avidyā* does not exist in your state of deep sleep. (But they affirm the existence of *avidyā* in that state at other places). Hence these two views should be examined and understood by you after elucidating them.

[ 125 ]

नाज्ञानमस्ति सुषुप्तिगतस्य पुंसो  
 गाढे तमस्ययमभूत्पुरुषः सुषुप्तः ।  
 इत्युच्यमानमविरुद्धतया विचिन्त्य  
 ग्राह्यं त्वयानुभवयुक्तिनिरूपणेन ॥

The two views, namely, 'There is no *avidyā* in his deep sleep state', and 'The person was under the effect of *avidyā* when he was asleep' should be understood by you in a consistent way, by considering them on the basis of experience and reasoning.

The following statements of Śrī Śaṅkara are referred to in this verse.

1. *anyatvapratyupasthāpakahetoḥ avidyāyāḥ abhāvāt āptakāmam*, Ś B on Brh., IV, iii, 21.

2. *anṛtena hi ..... yasmāt pratyūdhāḥ hrīḥ svarūpāt avidyādi doṣaiḥ bahiḥ apakṛṣṭāḥ*, ŚB on Chānd., VIII, iii, 2.

See Introduction, p. 78.



[ 126 ]

एवं तमोऽपि न बभूव सुषुप्तिकाले

भाषान्तरेण पुरुषः पर एव जीवः ।

निर्बीजतामुपगतः स निरन्वयेन

न स्पष्टमत्र तमसोऽनुभवोऽस्ति यस्मात् ॥

As there is no determinate perception of *avidyā* in the deep sleep state, it is said that even *avidyā* does not exist in that state, in different statements, namely, 'The individual soul has become the supreme self.' and 'The individual soul not being associated with passion, etc., is devoid of *avidyā*.'

*vide:*

1. *suṣuptikāle ca pareṇa brahmaṇā jivah ekatām gacchati*, BSB, I, iv, 18.

2. *yatrāsya jīvasya niḥsambodhatā svacchatārūpaḥ svāpaḥ upādhi-jānitaviśeṣavijñānarahitam svarūpam*, *ibid.*

[ 127 ]

अज्ञानतज्जमतिहीनतया सुषुप्ते

शुद्धः परोऽसि भगवानसि नित्यमुक्तः ।

कामश्च कर्म सकलं च तदा कुतस्त्यं

चित्सागरेऽनवकरे त्वयि तायमाने ॥

Being devoid of *avidyā* and its effect, namely, intellect, in the state of deep sleep, you are the supreme and the ever free pure self. Then how could desire and action



(which are the effects of *avidyā*) exist in you — the ocean of consciousness which is devoid of *avidyā* and is absolute.'

1. *yatra avidyākāmakarmāṇi na santi tadetat prastutam yatra supto na kāmāna kāmāni kāmāyate iti, Ś B on Brh., IV, iii, 21.*

*anavakare—ajñānādyupādhiśūnye.*

*tāyamane—paripūrṇe, TB.*

[ 128 ]

आसीदहंकरणमात्मतमोनिमित्तं

तज्जाग्रतश्च भवतः स्वपतश्च दुःखम् ।

आनीय दर्शयति तन्न सुषुप्तिकाले

बीजक्षयादिति भवानतिनिर्मलोऽभूत् ॥

The intellect which is caused by the *avidyā* abiding in the inner self is present in the waking and the dream state, and it brings forth misery to you. And misery does not exist in the state of deep sleep as its cause, namely intellect, is merged (in *avidyā*). Hence you are quite pure in the state of deep sleep.

[ 129 ]

सद्रूपमावरणतानुभवादभीष्टमज्ञानमात्मचिति नैशतमोवदेतत् ।

ज्ञानं दिवाकरवदस्य जडप्रकाशरूपं निवर्तकमिति प्रवदन्ति धीराः ॥

The *avidyā* abiding in the self, that is, consciousness is admitted to be an existent entity, as it is experienced that it veils the inner self, like the nocturnal darkness (veils the objects). Wise men hold that just as the sun removes darkness, so also the knowledge in the form of mental state associated (with the reflection of the self) annihilates *avidyā*.

*jadaprakāśarūpaṁ - mahāvākyaajanitasābhāsāntaḥkaraṇavṛttilakṣaṇam.*  
AP.

See ŚŚ, I. 320.



[ 130 ]

प्रावादुकैरपि तथैव तदेषितव्यं संवेदनेऽस्फुरणमभ्युपयद्भिरग्रे ।  
संवेदने न खलु संविदभावरूपमज्ञानमभ्युपगतं न च बुद्ध्यभावः ॥

The opponents (that is, the Prābhākaras) who hold (nescience or ignorance in the form of) non-manifestation in knowledge before its rise, should admit that non-manifestation is of that form (that is, a positive entity). They do not accept (nescience in the form of) non-manifestation to be 'absence of knowledge' in 'knowledge', as there does not exist 'absence of knowledge' in it.

Negation of an object always presupposes the existence of the knowledge of that object. If nescience in the form of non-manifestation is admitted to be 'absence of knowledge' in 'knowledge', then 'absence of knowledge' presupposes the existence of knowledge of 'knowledge'. But, as the latter is self-luminous, the Prābhākaras do not admit any other knowledge in respect of the self-luminous knowledge.

Hence, in the Prābhākara system also, nescience in the form of non-manifestation in knowledge is not 'absence of knowledge' but a positive entity.

[ 131 ]

तस्मादशेषजगदेकनिदानभूत-  
मज्ञानमात्मविषयं न विरुद्धमूचुः ।  
वेदावसानवचनानि मुनीश्वराश्च  
स्थानेषु भूषिषु ततोऽवकरो न कश्चित् ॥

Hence *avidyā* which abides in the inner self and which is the source of the entire universe, is not contrary (to the pure nature of the self). Similarly the Upaniṣads and the great sages have spoken about the pure nature of the self in



many places. Thus there is no conflict (in respect of the pure nature of the self).

[ 132 ]

साक्षित्वमात्मतमसा मतिकञ्चुकेन  
मातृत्वमेतदपि नेह सुषुप्तिकाले ।  
यद्धेतुकं भवति यन्न हि तद्विना तत्  
संभाव्यते न च तदत्र सुषुप्तिकाले ॥

The self is viewed as the witness (of all) owing to *avidyā* abiding in it and as a knower owing to the limiting adjunct—intellect. And the characteristic of being a knower is not present (in the self) in the state of deep sleep. For, anything which arises owing to some adjunct does not arise in the absence of that adjunct. And in the state of deep sleep intellect (which is the limiting adjunct) is not present and hence the characteristic of being of knower also is not possible.

*kañcukarī - upādhiḥ, TB.*

[ 133 ]

अज्ञानमस्ति सकलं च सुषुप्तिकाले  
तत्र प्रलीनमिति यद्यपि नास्ति पुंसः ।  
स्पष्टानुभूतिरपवर्गविलक्षणत्वा-  
देष्टव्यमेव तु सुषुप्तिभुवस्तथात्वम् ॥

At the time of deep sleep, *avidyā* is present and everything is merged in it. Though there is no determinate perception of *avidyā* to any person (in the state of deep



sleep), yet as that state is different from liberation it should be admitted to be so (namely, that it possesses *avidyā*).

The only difference between 'liberation' and the state of deep sleep is that in the former only the pure self is present, while in the latter, the self is present with its *avidyā*.

[ 134 ]

एवं सतीह तमसो न विविच्य वस्तु  
साक्षान्निवेदयितुमस्ति निदर्शनं चेत् ।  
नैतत्परागवगतेर्विषयो विभाति  
गाढं तमो न तु तथावगतिः प्रतीचि ॥

If it is held that in that case (that is, if *avidyā* exists even in the state of deep sleep) there is no proof in the three states which could establish the self by differentiating it from *avidyā*, then (it is said that) it is not so. The dense *avidyā* is experienced as an object, while there is no such experience in the case of the self.

[ 135 ]

प्रत्यक्पराग्विषयवस्तुविवेचनाय  
क्लेशो न संभवति कस्यचिदत्र जन्तोः ।  
दृश्यं तमो घटपटादिवदेष तस्य  
द्रष्टा सुषुप्तिभुवि चिद्धनविग्रहोऽभूत् ॥

Here there is no difficulty for any person in discriminating the phenomenal element from the inner self. In the state of deep sleep, *avidyā* is known like pot, jar, etc., and the self is its witness and it remains in the form of pure consciousness.



[ 136 ]

तिस्रोऽपि चिद्धनतनोस्तव दृश्यभूता  
 दूरे चकासति मतेर्बहिरेव तावत् ।  
 आविस्तिरोभवनधर्मतया ह्यवस्थाः  
 कः संकरो विमलचिद्वपुस्तवाभिः ॥

These three states<sup>1</sup> of intellect are known by your true nature — the pure consciousness; and hence they are manifested as external to you. (Moreover) as these states possess the attributes of appearance and disappearance, how could there be any (real) relation of these three states to your nature — the pure consciousness.

1. The states of waking, dream, and deep sleep.

[ 137 ]

त्वय्येव कल्पितमहंकरणं बिभर्ति  
 तिस्रोऽपि ताः सहितमेव तु तच्च ताभिः ।  
 त्वच्चित्प्रकाशविषयत्वमुपेत्य भाति  
 स्वाज्ञानवत्ताव न रूपमतश्चतुष्कम् ॥

The intellect superimposed on you (the self) sustains the three states. And the intellect associated with them is manifested, by being the object of the light of your consciousness. Hence these four factors (namely, three states and intellect), like *avidyā* do not constitute your nature.

[ 138 ]

नान्वेति तत्ताव चिता व्यतिरेकिता च  
 दूरे न संभवति तस्य चतुष्टयस्य ।



नाभावरूपभजनाय समर्थमेत-

देवं चिदेव तु चतुष्टयमेतदासीत् ॥

These four things are not related to the self (either as its nature or as its attribute). They can never be independent of the self (as they are insentient). They are not also capable of remaining as void (as they are perceived). So the consciousness itself (illusorily) appears as these four.'

1. These four are the intellect and the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep mentioned in the previous verse.

[ 139 ]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिमूर्छिततनूनिष्क्रान्त्यवस्थासु य-

चैतन्यं व्यभिचारिणीष्वनुगतं तत्सत्यमेवात्मनः ।

यत्किञ्चिद्व्यभिचारि तन्ननु मृषा स्रक्स्पर्षदण्डादिवत्

नानुस्यूतचिदात्मवस्तु वदितुं शक्यं मृषा रज्जुवत् ॥

The conscious self which is uniformly present in the states of waking, dream, sleep, swoon and death which are variable is real. Whichever is variable is indeed indeterminate like garland, snake, and stick (that appear on the rope). The conscious self which is present in all the states like the rope cannot be said to be indeterminate.

*tanūniṣkrāntiḥ—sthūlaśarīrānnirgamanam, maraṇam iti yāvāt, SS.*

[ 140 ]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिधर्मकमिदं चित्तं त्वदज्ञानतः

प्रादुर्भूतमतस्त्वमेव सततं त्वत्तो न तद्विद्यते ।



स्वाज्ञानं च तवानुभूतिबलतः सिद्धं मृषा तत्त्वतो  
नासीदस्ति भविष्यतीति भवतः पूर्णा चितिः शिष्यते ॥

The intellect which has the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep as its attributes has arisen from your *avidyā*. And it always pertains to you (that is, the inner self) and so it is not different from you in reality. *Avidyā* established on the strength of your experience is indeterminable. But in fact it neither existed, nor exists, nor will exist. And your absolute consciousness alone remains.

*tvatto na tat bhidyate— na tvatto vastuto bhidyate, TB.*

[ 141 ]

ज्योतिर्ब्राह्मणवाक्यमानबलतः संपूर्णरूपा चिति-  
र्जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिधर्मरहिता मोक्षाय निश्चीयते ।  
तस्मादस्मदुदीरितं स्वकवपुः श्रद्धत्स्व मानं विना  
नास्माभिः प्रतिपादिता चितिरियं वाक्यार्थसंबन्धिनी ॥

On the strength of the authority of the passage in the section named *jyotirbrāhmaṇa*,<sup>1</sup> the absolute (inner) consciousness free from the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep and their attributes is determined for getting at (the knowledge of the sense of the sentence *tat tvam asi* that leads to) liberation. Hence, have faith in what is said by us about your nature. The (inner) consciousness which is a part of the import of the sentence (*tat tvam asi*) is set forth by us not without any proof.

1. *Brh*; IV, iii, 2-32.

*mokṣāya—taddhetuvākyārthabodhāya, SS.*

*vākyārthasāmbandhinī — vākyārthajñāno'payogitvaṃpadalakṣyabhūtā  
iyam citiḥ, TB.*



[ 142 ]

‘एवं त्वंपदलक्ष्यवस्तु भवता यत् पृष्ठमासीत्पुरा  
 तन्निर्णीतमतोऽन्यदस्ति यदि ते चित्तास्थितं पृच्छ तत् ।  
 बुद्धिस्थं कुरु पूर्वमुक्तमखिलं यद्वक्ष्यमाणं च तद्  
 बोद्धुं धारय ते मनः स्थिरतरं श्रद्धाधनाद्याश्रयः ॥

Thus the secondary sense of the term *tvam* which you inquired previously is determined. If you have any other (doubt) in your mind, you ask about that. You also bear in mind everything that has been explained before. Be attentive having the wealth of faith and having your mind very firm in order to understand the subject - matter that will be dealt with.

[ THE SECONDARY SENSE OF THE TERM TAT ]

[ 143 ]

इत्युक्ते गुरुणा स पृच्छति पुनस्त्वंशब्दलक्ष्यं मम  
 ज्ञातं न्यायबलेन पूर्वमुदितावस्थात्रयापोहनात् ।  
 तच्छब्देन तु लक्ष्यमर्थमधुना बोद्धुं मनो मामकं  
 धावत्याशु तमप्यपोह्य सकलद्वैतप्रपञ्चं वद ॥

When thus stated by the preceptor the disciple again enquires thus: the secondary sense of the term *tvam*, which has been explained before on the basis of reasoning by eliminating the three states is understood by me. Now my mind is keen on knowing immediately the secondary sense of the term *tat*. Please enlighten me on this point by discarding the universe of duality.

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1. एतत्त्वंपद — B<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>2</sub>.



[ 144 ]

किं सप्रपञ्चमिदमस्त्वथवा समस्त-  
 द्वैतप्रपञ्चरहितं परिपूर्णरूपम् ।  
 यद्वोभयात्मकमिदं परमार्थतोऽस्तु  
 विष्णोः परं पदमितीह विचारणीयम् ॥

Is the supreme status of Viṣṇu really characterized by the universe, or really devoid of the universe of duality and hence absolute? Or else is it possessed of these two forms? And this is to be examined here.

[ 145 ]

वेदान्तवाक्यगतिरत्र बहुप्रकारा  
 काचित् कथंचिदिति संशय उत्थितो मे ।  
 तत्त्वं प्रकाशय निवर्तय मोहमूलं  
 मत्संशयं मम हिताय भव प्रसीद ॥

The course of the Upaniṣadic texts is manifold. Some texts<sup>1</sup> declare the self (to be characterized by the universe), others<sup>2</sup> declare it (to be devoid of duality). Hence there has arisen the doubt in my mind. Be pleased and remove the doubt caused by the notion of improbability (about the true nature of the self). And explain the truth for my edification.

1. *Chānd*; III, xiv, 2.

2. *Bṛh*; II, iii, 6.

*gatiḥ* — *pravṛttiḥ*

*mohaḥ-asambhāvanādbuddhiḥ*, SS.



[ 146 ]

न स्थानतोऽप्यस्ति परस्य कश्चिद्विशेषयोगः परमार्थरूपः ।  
स्वतः पुनर्दूरनिरस्त एव परस्य तत्त्वस्य विशेषयोगः ॥

There is no relation of qualities of real nature to the self even through a limiting adjunct. And so (the possibility of) intrinsic relation of qualities to the self is far removed

*sthānataḥ — upādhitāḥ, SS.*

This verse is based upon the *BS*, III, ii, 11.

[ 147 ]

स्वभावतश्चिद्धनविग्रहस्य मृषा ह्युपाधिप्रभवा विशेषाः ।  
यथा जपापुष्पनिबन्धनः स्यान्मृषा मणेरलोहितिमा तथैत ॥

Just as redness in a crystal caused by a china-rose (placed by its side) is indeterminable, so also the distinctive qualities in the self which is naturally of the form of pure consciousness, are caused by the limiting adjunct (that is, *avidyā*) and hence they are indeterminable.

[ 148 ]

मायोपाधेरद्वयस्येश्वरत्वं कार्योपाधेर्जीवता च प्रतीचः ।  
मिथ्यैव स्याद्बन्धुजीवप्रसूनसंपर्कोत्था रक्ततेवाभ्रकादेः ॥

The form of God in the absolute self is caused by the limiting adjunct *avidyā*, while the form of the individual soul in the inner self is caused by the limiting adjunct 'intellect' which is an effect (of *avidyā*). These two forms are indeterminable like redness in mica, etc., which arises owing to the contact (of the latter) with a red flower.

*bandhujīva* — The red flower of a particular tree.



[ 149 ]

भल्लातकादिरसयोगनिबन्धनं च

वस्त्रे कलङ्कितमनेन पथा निरस्तम् ।

तस्यापि पक्षपतितत्वमभीष्टमेव

तस्मादसौ न भवति व्यभिचारभूमिः ॥

(The contention that) black colour in a white cloth caused by the juice of marking nut (is real) is refuted in the manner mentioned above. It is accepted that the black colour also is similar to the minor term (*Īśvaratva*)<sup>1</sup> and hence it is not a place where the *probāndum* is not present.

1. The inferential argument is :

*īśvaratvaṁ mithyābhūtam, aupādhikatvāt.*

The form of God is indeterminable, because it is caused by the limiting adjunct — *avidyā*. Similarly, the black colour in a white cloth is not real, as it is caused by the limiting adjunct—the marking nut.

[ 150 ]

यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वा-

नपो भिन्ना बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन् ।

उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपो

देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा ॥

As the one luminous sun when reflected in the water (placed) in different vessels appears as manifold owing to the limiting conditions, so also the one divine, eternal self when reflected in many bodies appears as manifold.

This text is identical with the *śruti* passage cited by Śrī Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the *BS*, III, ii, 18.



[ 151 ]

ऐश्वर्यमस्य परमात्मन उक्तमन्यैः

साक्षात्स्वरूपमवबोधसुखादितुल्यम् ।

तेनेशते किल यथायथमीशितव्यान्

भृत्यान् प्रतीश्व रतया जगतीभृतोऽपि ॥

Some, however, hold thus : like consciousness, bliss, etc., lordship also is the essential nature of the self. Hence kings, as lords, according to the manifestation of lordship (which is natural to the self) in them, rule over their servants who are to be controlled.

See SS, III, 153.

[ 152 ]

नित्यं प्रियादिषु सुखं प्रतिबिम्बितं सत्

लोके वदन्ति विषयेन्द्रियसंप्रयोगात् ।

उत्पन्नमन्यदिति तद्वदिहेश्वरत्वं

मायातदुत्थमतिषु प्रतिबिम्बितं सत् ॥

When bliss (which is of the nature of the self and) which is eternal is reflected in the mental states like joy, etc., ordinary men say that it is produced by the contact of senses with objects and it is different (from the eternal bliss). Similarly, here, when lordship (which is natural to the self is reflected in *avidyā* and its effect, namely, intellect, (it is viewed as produced and different from the lordship which is natural to the self).

[ 153 ]

मायानिविष्टवपुरीश्वरबोध एष

सर्वेश्वरो भवति सर्वमपेक्षमाणः ।



बुद्धिप्रविष्टपुरेष तथेश्वरः स्या-  
दात्मीयभृत्यजनवर्गमपेक्षमाणः ॥

The supreme self when reflected in *avidyā* becomes the supreme lord of every being. And the supreme self when reflected in the intellect (is the individual soul and it) becomes the lord only in respect of its own servants.

[ 154 ]

सम्यग्ज्ञानध्वस्तसर्वप्रपञ्चः स्वीये रूपे निर्गुणे निर्विशेषे ।  
पूर्णैश्वर्ये स्वप्रकाशस्वभावे स्वराज्येऽस्मिन् स स्वराडेव तिष्ठेत् ॥

The universe being annihilated by the true knowledge of the self, the released soul, realizing his self and having unconditioned lordship, remains in his own nature which is attributeless, free from any difference, absolute lordship and self-luminous.

[ 155 ]

ज्ञात्वा देवं सर्वपाशापहानिः क्षीणैः क्लेशैर्जन्ममृत्युप्रहाणिः ।  
तस्याभिध्यानात्तृतीयं देहभेदे विश्वैश्वर्यं केवल आप्तकामः ॥

By realizing the supreme self through profound meditation on it (as identical with the inner self), there is the annihilation of *avidyā* and *dharma* and *adharma*. Then, by the annihilation of these, there is the cessation of birth and death. Thus when the present body is destroyed, the released soul, attaining lordship over the universe which is the third stage (that is, the stage next to the cessation of birth and death) remains being free from any qualities and pleased with its own self.

*abhidhyānāt - ābhimukhyena pratyaktoena dhyānāt, SS.*

This verse is from *Svet.*, I, 11.



[ 156 ]

स स्वराडिति च विद्यते श्रुतिर्वर्णितेश्वरवपुःप्रकाशिनी ।  
तेन सत्यसुखबोधवद्भवेदीश्वरत्वमिति केचिदूचिरे ॥

Some hold thus: there is the Upaniṣadic text—*sa svarāt* which teaches 'lordship' (of the self) described (in the previous verse). Hence lordship also is the (essential) nature of the self like existence, consciousness, and bliss.

1. *vide* : *Chānd*, VII, xxv, 2.

[ 157 ]

तन्न भाति चतुरस्रमुच्चकैस्तत्प्रमाणविरहादिह श्रुतौ ।  
सत्यबोधसुखवन्न तत्परा सत्युवाच यत ईश्वरश्रुतिः ॥

As there is no proof, it does not seem to be quite proper. Like the text which is intent on conveying existence, consciousness, and bliss as the essential nature of the self, the text describing lordship is not intent on conveying it (as the essential nature of the self).

*caturasraṁ — samīcīnam*, TB.

[ 158 ]

तत्परश्रुतिवचः प्रमाणकं सत्यबोधसुखविग्रहं परम् ।  
ब्रह्म तद्वदिह नेश्वरत्वभाक् तत्परश्रुतिवचःप्रमाणकम् ॥

The self having the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss has as its authority the text which has that (that is, such a self) as its import. But the self as having lordship does not have as its authority a Vedic text which has that (that is, the self as having lordship) as its import.



[ 159 ]

या फलश्रुतिरिहोपवर्णिता सा न तत्परतयावगम्यते ।  
तत्त्वमादिवचनं हि तत्परं तत्परा न तु फलश्रुतिः क्वचित् ॥

The sense conveyed by the recommendatory passage<sup>1</sup> described here is not known to be its purport. But the sentence *tat tvam asi* has as its import the sense conveyed by it. Never does the sense signified by the recommendatory text become its true import.

1. *Chānd*, VII, xxv, 2.

*phalaśruti* is only a recommendatory text and this is known from the *Jāimini-sūtra*, IV, iii, 1.

[ 160 ]

सामगानमपि तत्स्वरूपतां जक्षणं च जगतश्च सर्जनम् ।  
अश्नुवीत फलवाक्यतः श्रुतं तत्स्वरूपमिति यद्युपेयते ॥

If the forms conveyed by the recommendatory passages are accepted to be the essential nature of the self, then singing *sāman*<sup>1</sup>, eating<sup>2</sup>, and creation of the universe<sup>3</sup>, (all these known from the *śruti* texts) should become the essential nature of the self.

1. *Taitt.*, III, x, 5.
2. *Chānd.*, VIII, xii, 3.
3. *ibid.*, VIII, ii, 10.

[ 161 ]

अर्थवादगतमभ्युपेयते न प्रमान्तरविरोधि यन्मतम् ।  
सामगानमथ जक्षणादि वा तत्परश्रुतिविरुद्धमिष्यते ॥



The sense conveyed by the recommendatory passage also is admitted, only when it is in conflict with the other proofs. Here, eating and singing *sāman* are in conflict with the texts<sup>1</sup> whose import is the unembodied nature of the released soul.

1. *Mund.*, III. ii, 8

[ 162 ]

ईश्वरत्वमपि तत्परश्रुतिर्नेति नेति परिदुःखिता सती ।  
वारयत्यवशिनष्टि केवलं चित्स्वरूपमनवद्यविग्रहम् ॥

The *śruti* text, *neti neti*<sup>1</sup>, whose import is the attributeless self, worrying itself over the lot of the individual souls rejects the lordship also, and lets the faultless consciousness alone remain.

1. *Brh.*, II, iii, 6.

[ 163 ]

सोपाधीश्वरतानिषेधनपरा सा नेति नेति श्रुतिः  
साक्षाद्भागवतं निरस्तनिखिलोपाधिस्वरूपं पुनः ।  
विश्वैश्वर्यमिहोच्यमानमधुना मोक्षे ततस्तत्परै-  
र्वाक्यैरस्य विरुद्धतानवसरो मुख्यं ततो गृह्यताम् ॥

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* objects :]

The *Śruti* text, *neti - neti*, is intended to deny secondary lordship. And the lordship over the universe declared in the *śruti* text with reference to the state of liberation<sup>1</sup> is free from any condition (that is, it is primary) and it is natural to the self. Hence there is no occasion for the contradiction of the *śruti* text that declares the primary



lordship of the self by the texts whose import is the attributeless self. Hence let the primary lordship be taken with reference to the state of liberation.

See ŚŚ, III, 155 and also the Introduction, p. 26.

[ 164 ]

सामगानमथ जक्षणं जगत्सर्जनं च निरुपाधि गृह्यताम् ।  
नेति नेति वचसा निषिध्यते जक्षणादिकमुपाधिसंश्रयम् ॥

[The *siddhāntin* replies :]

Let singing *sāman*, eating, and the creation of the universe (stated in the Upanisads) be taken as primary; and, let it be held that eating, etc., which are secondary are denied by the words *neti neti*.

[ 165 ]

सामगानमथ जक्षणं जगत्सर्जनं च न खलु द्विधेयते ।  
तत्प्रमाणविरहादिहेति चेदीश्वरत्वमपि न द्विधा भवेत् ॥

If it is held that in view of the absence of any proof, it is not admitted that the act of singing *sāman*, eating, and the creation of universe are not two-fold, then it is said that lordship also is not two-fold.

[ 166 ]

ज्ञानमस्ति खलु बाह्यगोचरं निर्विशेषमविनाशि च द्विधा ।  
बाह्यगोचरमपोह्य केवला स्वापमोक्षसमये चित्तिः स्थिता ॥

And 'knowledge' (which is the essential nature of the self) is two-fold : knowledge of the external objects and knowledge which is eternal and which does not depend on



objects and senses. At the time of deep sleep and liberation, the knowledge which does not depend upon objects and senses remains without the external objects.

*nirviśeṣa—viśayakaraṇādyanapekṣam, SS.*

See Introduction, p. 29.

[ 167 ]

पश्यन्न पश्यतिगिरा कथयांबभूव साक्षादनश्वरविनश्वरचिद्विभागम् ।  
तात्पर्यतः श्रुतिवचः स्फुटमेव नैवमैश्वर्यवस्तुनि विभागवचःश्रुतिर्नः ॥

The Upaniṣadic text directly and clearly conveys as its primary import the distinction between the eternal and the evanescent knowledge in the words *paśyanna paśyati*<sup>1</sup>. But, in our view, there is no passage bringing forth the distinction of eternal and transient lordship.

1. *vide : Brh., IV, iii, 23.*

For details, see Introduction, p. 29.

[ 168 ]

एवं न वा अर इति श्रुतमेव तावत्  
पुत्राद्युपाधि पुरुषस्य सुखं विनाशि ।  
नित्यं निरन्तरमनन्तमपारमुक्तं  
ब्राह्मं सुखं वचनकोटिशतैश्च यत्नात् ॥

Similarly it is learnt from the *śruti* text - *na vā are*<sup>1</sup> that bliss having son and others as external conditions is transient, while it has been primarily stated by numerous texts that bliss which is the essential nature of the self is eternal, unitary, and unconditioned by time and space.

1. *Brh., II, iv, 5.*

*nirantaram—ekarasam, TB.*

*anantam—kālato'ntarahitam, AP.*

*apūram—desato'pyantarahitam, AP.*



[ 169 ]

ऐश्वर्यवर्णनमिह द्विविधं न वेदे  
 नित्यं कचित्कचिदनित्यमिति प्रतीमः ।  
 ऐश्वर्यमात्रकथनं पुनरस्ति मोक्षा-  
 दर्वाक्षु मोक्षसमये च न तत्परं तत् ॥

We do not find in the Upaniṣads that lordship is stated to be two-fold as eternal as regards the self and transitory in respect of other objects. But the description of lordship (with reference to the self) is found in the Upaniṣads' (without mentioning whether it is eternal or transient), and that is prior to the attainment of liberation. The *Śruti* text which mentions lordship to the self at the time of liberation does not have that as its import.

1. *vide*: *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22.

2. *Svet.*, I, 11.

This Upaniṣadic text merely extols the state of liberation and hence it is only commendatory.

[ 170 ]

प्रियशिरस्त्वकथा खलु यादृशी  
 भवति तादृशमेव तदीरणम् ।  
 तदनु नेति च नेति वचः श्रुते-  
 र्यदपि मोक्षगतं स्तुतये हि तत् ॥

The saying that lordship is the nature of the self is similar to the saying that joy is the head (of the self)<sup>1</sup>. Lordship is merely superimposed on the self; for after stating lordship there is the text *not this, not this*, (which rejects it). And the lordship declared (by the scripture) with reference to the state of liberation is only to praise it.

1. *vide*: *Taitt.*, II, v, 1.



[ 171 ]

स्वातन्त्र्यमीश्वरगिरा गुणमार्गवृत्ति-

माश्रित्य पूर्वगुरवः प्रतिपादयन्ति ।

सिंहस्य शौर्यगुणवत् परमेश्वरस्य

स्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणगुणोऽव्यभिचारिरूपः ॥

Resorting to signification based on similarity, earlier preceptors hold that the word 'supreme lord' signifies (the supreme self through) the quality of independence. Just as the quality of valour is invariably present in the lion, so also the quality of independence is invariably present in the supreme lord.

The quality of valour is present in the lion. So the word 'lion' is used to signify a person having valour, as in the case of *siṃho deva-dattaḥ*. Similarly the quality of independence is invariably present in the supreme lord. Hence the word 'supreme lord' is used to signify the supreme self which has the quality of independence.

The word 'lion' is used in respect of a person to signify the quality of valour present in him. Similarly the word 'supreme lord' used to denote the supreme self signifies the quality of independence present in it.

*vide : yathā siṃha ityukte śauryaṃ lakṣyate, tathā īśvara ityukte svātantryaṃ lakṣyate, AP.*

Śrī Śaṅkara uses the word *īśvara* with reference to the source of the universe — the supreme self — in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I, iv, 14, with the view that the supreme self independent of any external cause is the source of the universe.

*vide : the bhāṣya text on the sūtra cited above:*

*atra tūvat jñānaśabdena pareṇa ca tadviśayeṇa kāmāyitṛtvavacanena cetanaṃ brahma nyarūpayat aparaprayojyatvena īśvaraṃ kāraṇaṃ abravīt.*

For further details see Introduction, pp. 31-2.



[ 172 ]

ऐश्वर्यवस्तु परिगृह्य तदप्यनन्ते  
 सामर्थ्यसिद्धिमुपपादयितुं कचिच्च ।  
 सर्वेश्वरश्रुतिवचः समुदाहरन्ति  
 स्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणगुणस्य तमस्वितायाम् ॥

In order to convey through presumption the quality of independence in the absolute self, earlier preceptors at some places cite the text—‘He is the supreme lord’ etc.,<sup>1</sup> by comprehending the quality of lordship present in the supreme self in the state of *avidyā*.

1. *vide* : *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22.

*tadapyanante* — All the commentators adopt the reading — *tadatya-jantah*, and take it to mean *tadanirākṛtya*.

*TB* notes the variant reading *tadapyanante* which is interpreted as follows :

*tat* — *āvidyakaiśvaryaavastuparigrahaḥpūrvaka-sarveśvaraśrutivākyo'dāharaṇam*; *anante* — *nirupādhikabrahmaṇi svātantryalakṣaṇaguṇasya sāmartyasiddhiṁ upapādayitum ityarthah*, *TB*.

The reading *tadatyajantah* is not adopted here; for, otherwise there would arise the necessity for taking the sense — *nirupādhikabrahmani* as understood.

[ 173 ]

सिंहश्रुतिर्न घटते यदि शूरास्य  
 न स्यात्तथैव परमेश्वरताश्रुतिश्च ।  
 नैश्वर्यलक्षणगुणः परमात्मनश्चे-  
 दित्यर्थलब्धिमभिसंदधते महान्तः ॥

The word ‘lion’ used to signify a person would not hold good, if the person does not have valour. Similarly



the *Śruti* text describing the supreme self as the highest Lord would not hold good if the supreme self is not possessed of independence' indicated by lordship.

1. *aiśvaryaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ jñāpakam yasya svātantryagūṇasya*, S.

For further details see Introduction, pp. 31-2.

[ 174 ]

श्रौतार्थवृत्तिबलभ्यमपीह वस्तु

श्रौतं वदन्ति निकटत्वमनुस्मरन्तः ।

आसन्नवृष्टिमपि देवमुदीरयन्ति

वर्षन्तमेव हि जना भुवि तादृगेतत् ॥

The sense (namely, *apūrva*) presumptively known from the expressed sense (namely, the sacrifice is the means to the desired end), is also held by great men to be expressed, in view of its proximity (to the expressed sense). On seeing the cloud which is about to rain, people say that the cloud rains.<sup>1</sup>

Independence also is held to be verbally expressed in view of its close relation to lordship which is verbally expressed.

1. *vide: vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavadvā, Pāṇini-sūtra*, III, iii, 131. *devaṁ — parjanyaṁ*, SS.

[ 175 ]

ऐश्वर्यमज्ञानतिरोहितं सद् ध्यानादभिव्यज्यत इत्यवोचत् ।

शरीरिणः सूत्रकृदस्य यत्तु तदभ्युपेत्योदितमुक्तहेतोः ॥

The author of the *sūtras* has said that lordship, veiled by *avidyā* becomes manifest (at the time of liberation) to the individual soul, by meditation (on the supreme self). This is said by admitting the opponent's view-point and this is not his final conclusion for the reason cited before (that is, lordship is denied by the Upaniṣadic text *neti, neti*).



The import of the BS, III, ii, 5 is discussed in this verse.

For further details see Introduction, pp. 29-30.

[ 176 ]

अथ वा चितिवत्प्रतीयतां पुरुषस्येश्वरतापि वास्तवी ।  
यदि किञ्चन कारणं भवेन्न विना सा तदिहाभ्युपेयते ॥

Or else, let lordship be manifested in the self like consciousness, if it is real and if there is any proof. And without any proof, lordship is not admitted to be the essential nature of the self.

[ 177 ]

कामादि तत्र च भवेदितरेत्र चेति  
यत्सूत्रकारवचनं तदुदीक्षमाणाः ।  
कामादिकेन दहरस्थगुणेन तुल्यं  
सर्वेश्वरादिगुणजातमिति प्रतीमः ॥

By examining the statement of the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*, namely, qualities like possession of desire, etc., are to be combined with the other text and (the qualities like possession of control over others are to be combined) with that text,<sup>1</sup> we understand that the qualities like lordship, etc., are similar to the qualities like possession of desire, etc., found in the passage dealing with *dahara-vidyā*.<sup>2</sup>

1. BS, III, iii, 39.

2. *Chānd.*, VIII, i, 5.

For details see Introduction, pp. 36-31.

[ 178 ]

दहरस्थगुणोपसंहृतेः स्तुतिमात्रं विरह्य नापरम् ।  
फलमस्ति परात्मनिष्ठिते वचने वाजिभिरादृते महत् ॥



The collection of qualities found in the passage dealing with *dahara-vīdyā*<sup>1</sup> in the text which conveys the supreme self and which is studied by the followers of the white *yajurveda* gives forth no great result except glorifying the self.

1. *vide: Chānd.*, VIII, i, 5.

[ 179 ]

दहरादुपसंहतैर्गुणैः सदृशाश्चेद्विशितादिलक्षणाः ।

न तदा परमात्मरूपतां प्रतिपत्तुं कलयापि 'शक्नुयुः ॥

When the qualities like control over others are similar to the qualities (like possession of desire) gathered from (the Upaniṣadic passages dealing with) *dahara-vidyā*, then, those (who hold that lordship is real) cannot maintain in the least that the quality of possession of control over others is natural to the self.

*śaknuyuḥ* — *pūramūrthikaiśvāryavādinaḥ iti śeṣaḥ, S.*

[ 180 ]

परमेश्वरतागुणोऽप्यतः स्तुतये तस्य परस्य वस्तुनः ।

परिकीर्तित इत्युपेयतां अविशेषाद्विशितादिलक्षणैः ॥

As the quality of supreme lordship does not differ from the quality of possession of control over others, let it be accepted that the former also is intended for praising the supreme self.

[ 181 ]

कारणत्वमपि चित्सुखादिवत्तत्स्वरूपमिति किं न गृह्यते ।

ईश्वरत्वविषये विपश्चितां पक्षपातकरणे न कारणम् ॥

1. शक्नुमः — T,



Why is not causality existing in the self considered as the essential nature of the self like existence and bliss? And the learned men have no ground for having any predilection in respect of lordship alone.

[ 182 ]

साक्षितापि परमात्मनो भवेदीश्वरत्ववदियं न संशयः ।

नित्यसिद्धनिजबोधरूपवद्रूपमेव निरुपाधिकं विभोः ॥

If it is held that lordship is the essential nature of the supreme self, like its eternal knowledge, then the nature of being a witness also would doubtless be the essential nature of the supreme self.

The supreme self is viewed as 'witness' owing to its association with *avidyā*. vide: *SS*, III, 132.

[ 183 ]

एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।

कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥

The self is one, self-luminous, the self of all beings, veiled by *avidyā*, unconditioned (by time, space, and objects), the inner ruler of all beings, the witness of all actions, the substrate of all beings, the witness, knower, immutable, and attributeless.

*gūḍhaḥ* — *ajñānāvṛtaḥ*, *S*.

*sarvavyāpī* — *paricchedatrayaśūnyaḥ*, *TB*.

*sarvabhūtādhipāsaḥ* — *sarvāśrayaḥ*, *AP*.

This verse is from *Śvet.*, VI, 11.

[ 184 ]

न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।

परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥



The supreme self does not have either the gross or the subtle body. There is none equal or superior to it. And it is known that it has the supreme power (*avidyā*) capable of creating manifold objects. It has the inherent power of creation by virtue of its consciousness.

i. *kāryam — sthūlaśarīram*

ii. *kāraṇam — sūkṣmaśarīram*

iii. *jñānabalakriyā ca — kriyā — māyāpravartanarūpā, S.*

This verse is from the *Svet.*, VI, 8.

[ 185 ]

न तस्य कश्चित्पतिरस्ति लोके

न चेक्षिता नैव च तस्य लिङ्गम् ।

स कारणं वै करणाधिपाधिपो

न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः ॥

The supreme self has no master and also no controller. It does not have the subtle and the gross body. It is the source of the universe and also the lord of the presiding deities of all the sense organs. It neither proceeds from anything nor has any lord.

This verse is from the *Svet.*, VI, 9

[ 186 ]

इति श्रुतिः कारणसाक्षिभावमैश्वर्यवद्वक्ति परस्य पुंसः ।

अतत्परत्वाच्च तदिष्यते चेद्द्वयं तृतीयं न तथैषितव्यम् ॥

The *śruti* texts convey that the supreme self is the witness and the cause of the universe, like being a controller. If the (first) two are not accepted (as natural to the self) on the ground that the *śruti* texts do not have them as their import, then likewise the third one also should not be admitted (as natural to the self).



[ 187 ]

अतत्परत्वं श्रवणस्य तुल्यं त्रिषु त्रयं तेन विवर्जनीयम् ।  
अथेष्टमेकं त्रयमेषितव्यं विशेषहेतोरनिरूपणेन ॥

These three<sup>1</sup> are similar in this that they are not the import of the *śruti* texts. Hence these three should be left out (that is, should not be taken as natural to the self). If one is admitted, then all these three should be accepted, as there cannot be maintained any specific reason (for taking any one of them as natural to the self).

1. The qualities of being a lord, witness, and cause set forth in the previous verse are referred to here.

*śravaṇasya* — *śruteḥ*, TB.

[ 188 ]

ईशितव्यमनपेक्ष्य नेश्वरो नेशितव्यमपि तद्वदीश्वरम् ।  
अन्तरेण घटते ततो मृषा मोहमात्रपरिकल्पनं द्वयम् ॥

The nature of being a lord cannot be thought of except in relation to the controlled beings. And the state of being controlled is not intelligible without relation to a controller (that is, lord). And so these two are the creations of mere *avidyā* and hence indeterminable (either as real or as unreal).

*mṛṣā* — *anirvacanīyam*, SS.

[ 189 ]

कार्यवस्तु विरह्य कारणं न क्वचिद्घटयितुं क्षमेमहि ।  
नापि कारणमपोह्य केवलं कार्यवस्तु परिकल्पयेमहि ॥

We cannot understand the nature of being a cause by leaving aside the effect. (Similarly) we do not assume a mere effect in the absence of a cause.



[ 190 ]

साक्ष्यवस्तु परिहृत्य साक्षिता साक्षिणं च परिहृत्य साक्ष्यता ।  
नेष्यते न घटते च तेन तत् सव्यपेक्षमुभयं परस्परम् ॥

The nature of being a witness and the nature of what is witnessed are neither admitted nor intelligible without reference to the witnessed objects and the witness (respectively). Hence these two are interdependent.

[ 191 ]

न प्रमेयमपहाय मातृता नापि मातृविरहे प्रमेयता ।  
मातृमेयरहिता न च प्रमा न प्रमाणरहितं प्रमाफलम् ॥

The nature of being a cognizer without an object, and the nature of being an object without a cognizer are incompatible. Similarly, a proof without a cognizer and an object, and the result in the form of valid knowledge without a proof do not hold good.

[ 192 ]

कर्तृ कर्म परिहृत्य नेष्यते कर्म कर्तृरहितं न च कचित् ।  
कर्तृकर्मरहिता न च क्रिया न क्रियाविरहितं क्रियाफलम् ॥

Agency without an object and an object without an agent are incompatible. Similarly action without an agent and an object, and the result in the form of an effect without action do not hold good.

[ 193 ]

सामान्यं न विशेषवस्तुविरहे तस्माद्विना तन्न च  
स्वातन्त्र्येण घटामुपाञ्चति ततः सापेक्षमेतद्द्वयम् ।  
यत्सापेक्षमिहेक्षितं भवति तन्मायामयं स्वप्नवत्  
तस्मादीश्वरतादि कल्पितवपुः स्वीकुर्महे न्यायतः ॥



The universal and the individual object cannot exist on their own accord. Hence these two are interdependent. And whichever is interdependent, is illusory like dream. So on these grounds we accept that the characteristics of being a lord, etc., are illusory.

[ 194 ]

अभिन्नता भिन्नतया विरुद्धा विभिन्नता भिन्नतया तथैव ।  
उपाधिभेदे परिकल्पितेऽपि विना पुनस्तं किमुदीरणीयम् ॥

Even when it is assumed that difference is due to a limiting adjunct, then also identity is opposed to difference, and difference is opposed to identity. Then should it be stated that difference and identity are mutually opposed in the absence of a limiting adjunct?

*parikalpita'pi — anīkṛta'pi, TB.*

It is asked by the disciple whether the supreme self is absolute and at the same time characterized by duality. [See SS', III, 144] Sarvajñātman answers this point by refuting the theory of *bhedābheda*

[ 195 ]

स्वभावतो यन्मिथुनं विरुद्धं न तन्निमित्तान्तरतः कदाचित् ।  
उपैति सख्यं परमार्थवृत्त्या भ्रमादलभ्यं न च किञ्चिदस्ति ॥

Two objects which are naturally opposed to each other can never attain real relation even through an extraneous condition. (But they can attain unreal relation) as there is nothing unattainable through error.

[ 196 ]

न रविशर्वरसख्यकृदीक्ष्यते जगति कश्चिदुपाधिरमोहतः ।  
यदि भवेत्स भवेद्भवतो मतः स न भवेद्यदि सोऽपि न संभवेत् ॥



In ordinary experience, we do not find any cause except *avidyā* to relate the sun and darkness. If there is any other cause (except *avidyā*) then your view (namely, the relation of identity and difference) would hold good. If there is none, then your view also cannot stand.

*amohataḥ — mohādatirekeṇa, SS.*

[ 197 ]

खमपि खादति खण्डितमीक्षते निजशिरो नयनेन करार्पितम् ।  
किमपि दुर्घटमस्य न विद्यते यदि विमूढमतिर्भवति स्वयम् ॥

One being ignorant (in the dream state) eats ether and visually perceives one's own head as cut and placed in one's own hand. There is nothing incompatible to the ignorant.

[ 198 ]

इतश्च निर्भेदकमात्मतत्त्वं निरूपणे कारणकार्यतादेः ।  
अनादिमायैकनिबन्धनत्वादसंभवादस्य तु वस्तुवृत्त्या ॥

When carefully examined it is found that the characteristics of being a cause, effect, etc., are not absolutely real, as they are brought about by the beginningless *avidyā*. And, on account of this the self is absolute.

See the following verses.

ĀRĀMBHA - VĀDA, PARINĀMA - VĀDA,  
AND VIVARTA - VĀDA.

[ 199 ]

असन्नं कार्यं गगनप्रसूनवन्ध्यासुतादेः करणाप्रसिद्धेः ।  
न प्रागस्तत्कार्यमिति प्रवादः प्रशस्यते तस्य विरोधहेतोः ॥

There cannot be the rise of a non-existent object; for the origin of the flower of the sky and the son a barren



woman is nowhere seen. And the view of the Vaiśeṣika that an object not existing before its origin is produced, is not favoured, in view of contradiction.

*karaṇāprasiddheḥ — karaṇam utpādanam, tadāprasiddheḥ, S.*

The Vaiśeṣika holds that the effect is a new product and it was not in existence before its production. It has come into being as a new creation from its prior non-existence. And hence the Vaiśeṣika theory of causation is called *asat-kārya-vāda*. This theory is refuted in the second half of the verse.

[ 200 ]

विशेषणानामसति प्रवृत्तिर्न दृश्यते क्वपि न युज्यते च ।

युधिष्ठिरात्प्रागभवन्नेन्द्रो बन्ध्यासुतः शूर इतीह यद्वत् ॥

The use of attributes in the case of non-existent objects is neither seen anywhere, nor intelligible also. (If the attributes were admitted) then it would be similar to saying that 'before Yudhiṣṭhira there was a valiant prince born to a barren woman.'

In the statement that 'the object is non-existent prior to its origin', the term 'prior' refers to the relation of time which appears as an attribute to the 'object'. And this attribute cannot hold good, if the object is non-existent; for non-existent objects are not found to have any attribute.

[ 201 ]

उत्पत्तिरप्यस्य निरूप्यमाणा न काचिदागच्छति युक्तिमार्गम् ।

स्वसत्ताया स्वैः समवायिकारणैरपीह या स्यात्समवायितास्य ॥

[ 202 ]

असज्जनिः सेत्युपवर्ण्यमानं सुदुर्घटं न ह्यसतो युजैभिः ।

सदेव सद्भिः सह सर्ववस्तु संगच्छते न त्वसदेव सद्भिः ॥



And when the rise of the object non-existent (before its origin) is examined, it does not stand to reason. It is described as the inherent relation of the object to its existence and inherent cause. And this is incompatible, for the latter cannot have any relation with the non-existent entity. All the objects, only by being real, are related to the real entities (existence and inherent cause). And the non-existent entity, is not related to the real entities.

*asataḥ — janmanaḥ prāk asataḥ, SS.*

[ 203 ]

सतीह सत्तास्य पटस्य दृष्टा तथैव सन्तः पटतन्तवोऽपि ।

<sup>1</sup>तथा च तैश्चास्य कथं पटस्य संबन्धिता स्यादसतो वदैतत् ॥

The existence of a cloth is real; and the threads (that is, its inherent cause) also are real. Tell me how there can be any relation of the existence and the inherent cause to the cloth not existing (before its origination).

[ 204 ]

स्वकारणैस्तन्तुभिरेवमस्य स्वसत्ताया चान्वय एव जन्म ।

तवेष्टमेवं सति जन्म तस्य न शक्यते वर्णयितुं पटस्य ॥

The relation of the object not existing (before its rise) to its inherent cause or its existence is accepted (by the Vaiśeṣika) to be the origination of the object. When such is the case, it is impossible to explain the rise of the cloth.

[ 205 ]

तदन्वयात्प्रागसतः कथं स्यात्तदन्वयो न ह्यसदन्वयाय ।

सता समर्थं न हि बन्ध्यया तत्पुत्रः समन्वेति कदाचिदत्र ॥



How could there be the relation of existence and inherent cause to the object not existing? For indeed the non-existent object is not capable of being related to real entities. Never is there any relation of a son to a barren woman.

[ 206 ]

न च किञ्चिदन्यदसतो वदितुं पटवस्तुनोऽत्र शकनीयमितः ।  
जनिशब्दवाच्यमनवद्यतया तदयुक्तमेवमसदुद्भवनम् ॥

It is impossible to give any other correct definition than this to explain the sense of the word *jani*, that is, origination of a non-existent object 'cloth'. (As this is untenable) the origin of a non-existent object is unreasonable.

[ 207 ]

न च वर्णितादपरमत्र भवाननुमन्यते जनिवचो'र्थमितः ।  
यदि वर्ण्यते किमपि तत्र भवेत्स्वमतप्रहाणमलिनीकरणम् ॥

If you give any other sense of the term *jani*, (namely, rise), than the one stated so far, then there would arise the defect of discrediting (the final conclusion of) your own system.

[ 208 ]

समवायिकारणगणेन तथा सह सत्ताया च पठवस्त्वह यत् ।  
समवैति तत्कणभुगिच्छति तज्जनिशब्दवाच्यमिति नान्यदितः ॥

The sage Kaṇāda (the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*) accepts the sense of the word *jani*, that is, origin, to be the relation of existence and inherent cause to the object 'cloth' (not existing before its rise). He does not put forth any other sense.



[ 209 ]

न तदत्र संभवति युक्तिवशादुपवर्णितं तदतिविस्तरतः ।  
न च किञ्चिदन्यदुचितं भवतो वदितुं स्वपक्षमपरित्यजतः ॥

It has been elaborately explained on the basis of reasoning that the rise of an object from its prior non-existence is impossible. And you cannot properly give any other view than this, without disowning your own tenets.

[ 210 ]

निरूपणायां न यतोऽस्ति कश्चिदुत्पत्तिशब्दार्थ इह त्वदीये ।  
पक्षे ततो 'दुर्घटताप्रसिद्धिरसज्जनेरुक्तनयेन तावत् ॥

The sense of the word *jani* (that is, origin), given in your system does not stand to reason. Hence, on the grounds put forth so far, the rise of a non-existent object is proved to be incompatible.

[ 211 ]

सतोऽपि कार्यत्वमयुक्तमेव निरूपणे कारणकृत्यहानः ।  
न कारणव्यापृतिरत्र शक्या ततः स्वरूपे वदितुं फलाय ॥

The origin of an existent object also is unreasonable, for, on careful examination, the function of cause is (then found to be) futile. It cannot be said that the function of the cause brings forth the effect, namely, the existent object; (for the object, being already existent, cannot be produced).

*sataḥ svarūpe vaditum phalāya — sataḥ — vidyamānasya kṛtyasya  
svarūpe phalāya ātmaābhalakṣaṇaphalāya, TB.*

1. दुर्घटिता — P<sub>2</sub>.



Sarvajñātman, in this and the following verses, refutes the Sāṅkhya theory of the origin of an object. The Sāṅkhya school holds: the effect (that is, the object) is already found in the cause in an unmanifest form. And the causal operation manifests the object by removing the obstruction. Production is only the manifestation of what is already existent in a latent form. Hence the Sāṅkhya theory of causation is called the *sat-kārya-vāda*.

[ 212 ]

गुणं क्षिप्तकारणमर्थवत्त्वं लभेत चेन्नात्र गुणस्य भावात् ।  
न चेद्गुणोऽसत्करणं प्रसक्तं निरर्थकं कारणकर्म तस्मात् ॥

If it is said that the cause becomes fruitful by giving rise to some qualities in the object, then it is said that it is not so. For here (in *sat-kārya-vāda*) the qualities are also existent (and hence) they cannot be produced. If they are non-existent before the function of cause, then the consequence is the production of non-existent object (*asat-kārya-vāda*). So the function of cause is futile.

*asatkaraṇam — asadutpādanam*

*kāraṇakarma — kāraṇavyūpārah, TB,*

[ 213 ]

मलं निरस्यार्थवदिष्यते चेन्मलोऽपि सन्नैव निरस्य इष्टः ।  
सतो विनाशादसतोऽजनेश्च वृथा ततः कारणमत्र पक्षे ॥

If it is accepted that the cause becomes fruitful by removing some defect in the object, (then also it does not hold good). For, the defect also, being existent, cannot be removed, as the existent object is eternal. If the defect is non-existent, then as it is not (yet) produced, there is no question of removing it. So in this view also the (function of) cause is futile.



[ 214 ]

तस्मादभिव्यक्तिकरी न हेतुप्रवृत्तिरत्रार्थवती घटेत ।

न चानभिव्यक्तिनिराससृत्या तस्मान्न सत्कार्यवचः प्रशस्तम् ॥

Hence the cause cannot become fruitful either by manifesting the object or by removing the non-manifestation of the object. Hence the theory that the object (existing before its origin) is produced is not commendable.

It is said that the cause cannot become fruitful either by giving rise to some qualities in the object or by removing some defect from the object. From this it is implied that the manifestation of the object or the removal of the non-manifestation of the object is not possible.

[ 215 ]

नित्या च 'कारकगणस्य सती प्रवृत्ति-

नित्यं व्यनक्ति सकलं फलमित्यवश्यम् ।

वक्तव्यमत्र न लयो न सुषुप्तिमूर्छे

नो चेन्न सृष्टिरिति कष्टमुपस्थितं वः ॥

It should be admitted that as the function of the group of causes is existent, it always manifests the objects. Hence there can be no dissolution, and no states of deep sleep and swoon. If the function of causes is non-existent, then there can be no creation. And this difficulty has arisen in your view (*sat-kārya-vāda*).

[ 216 ]

वेदान्तवादिसमयेऽपि समानमेतत्

चोद्यं परैर्न खलु वाच्यमिहाप्रसक्तेः ।

अस्मिन्मते न खलु मन्व्यवहारमात्रे

मायामये किमपि दूषणमस्ति यस्मात् ॥

1. कारणगणस्य — T<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.

2. अस्मिन्मते — P<sub>2</sub>.



It cannot be said by others that the objections raised (against the *sāt-kārya-vāda* and the *asat-kārya-vāda*) are equally applicable to the system of Advaita; for, those defects are not possible in the view of Advaita, as the objects possess only empirical reality and (hence) are illusory. Thus there is no defect (which can be pointed out against our view, that is, Advaita).

[ 217 ]

आत्रेयवाक्यमपि संव्यवहारमात्रं  
कार्यं समस्तमिति नः कथयांबभूव ।  
सत्कार्यवादविषयो न हि दोषराशि-  
र्मायामये भवितुमुत्सहते विरोधात् ॥

The statement of Ātreya also conveys that all the objects are only empirically real. As this view is opposed to *sat-kārya-vāda*, the group of objections raised against it does not apply to this view which holds that the objects are different from being real.

*māyāmaye — sadasadvilakṣaṇakāryapakṣe ityarthah, AP.*

Brahmanandin, the descendent of the sage Atri, wrote a commentary on the *Chāndogyo'paniṣad* and he is considered to be an Advaitin. His work is not available; but his views are known from references to them in other works on Advaita. He points out the defects in the *sat-kārya-vāda* and the *asat-kārya-vāda* and holds that the objects in the world are neither real nor unreal but different from both. As the objects are thus different from being real, in this (that is, Advaitin's) view the defects pointed out against the *sat-kārya-vāda* do not apply to the Advaitins' view.

*vide* his statement :

*asataḥ anīṣpādyatvāt, sattve pravṛttyānarthakyāt, abhivyaṅgyar-  
thatve'pi aviśeṣāt, pravṛttinītyatvāt, sadā abhivyaṅgi-prasaṅgāt samvaya-  
hāramātram kāryam.*

Cited in S and with slight change in other commentaries.



[ 218 ]

काणाददर्शनसमाश्रयदोषराशि-  
 दूरान्निरस्त इह संव्यवहारमात्रे ।  
 वेदान्तभूमिकुशलो मुनिरत्रिवंश्य-  
 स्तेनाह कार्यमिह संव्यवहारमात्रम् ॥

The group of objections relating to the system of Vaiśeṣika is completely rejected in respect of the objects which are empirically real. So the descendant of the sage Atri who is an adept in the sphere of Vedānta, speaks of the objects as empirically real.

As the objects are not unreal (*asat*) in the view of Advaita, the defects pertaining to the *asat-kārya-vāda* cannot be pointed out against the Advaitin's view.

[ 219 ]

षष्ठप्रपाठकनिबद्धमुदीरितं यत्  
 तत्सत्यमेव खलु सत्यसमाश्रयत्वात् ।  
 'अत्रैव यत्पुनरुवाच समुद्रफेन-  
 दृष्टान्तपूर्वकमदो व्यवहारदृष्ट्या ॥

What has been said by him in the sixth chapter (of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*) is indeed true, as it deals with the real object (the self). But what is stated by citing the illustration of the foam of sea, is from the empirical standpoint.

Brahmanandin in his commentary on the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, states the theory of the transformation of self.

*vide : syācca bhojyabhoktr̥vibhāgaḥ, na ca anyatvam, samudra-phenormi budbudavat, pariṇāmastu syāt dadhyādivat.*



Cited in *Ved.* p. 380.

This view is stated from the empirical stand-point,

[ 220 ]

पूर्वं विकारमुपवर्ण्य शनैः शनैस्त-  
दृष्टिं विसृज्य निकटं परिगृह्य तस्मात् ।  
सर्वं विकारमथ संव्यवहारमात्र-  
मद्वैतमेव परिरक्षति वाक्यकारः ॥

The commentator (Brahmanandin) first explains the theory of transformation, and then gradually giving it up, holds the view (of transfiguration which is) nearer (to the Advaitic doctrine than the previous one), and then says that all the modifications are only empirically real. Thus he maintains the Advaitic standpoint.

[ 221 ]

अन्तर्गुणा भगवती परदेवतेति  
प्रत्यग्गुणेति भगवानपि भाष्यकारः ।  
आह स्म यत्तदिह निर्गुणवस्तुवादे  
संगच्छते न तु पुनः सगुणप्रवादे ॥

The venerable Bhāṣyakāra (Dravidācārya) also states that the adorable supreme self is of the nature of the inner self which is inward. And this holds good only in the view of Advaita and not when the theory of transformation is maintained.

- i. *atyantādvaitavāde hi sadātmikā paradevatī pratyagabhinnā bhavati, nānyathā, S.*
- ii. *paradevatī iti brahmaivocyate, SS.*
- iii. *guṇaśabdaḥ svarūpaparāḥ, SS.*
- iv. *saguṇaprawāde — vikāravāde ityārthaḥ, TB.*



Draviḍācārya is the author of the *bhāṣya* on Brahmanandin's commentary on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. His work also is not available; but his views are known from the references to them in other works on Advaita.

[ 222 ]

न खलु कारणकार्यसमन्वयो भवतु जातुचिदत्र विभिन्नयोः ।  
किमिह सागरसह्यसमाश्रयो भवति कारणकार्यसमाश्रयः ॥

Indeed there can never be the relation of cause and effect between two disparate objects. Is there the relation of cause and effect between the ocean and the mountain named *Sahya* (a part of the Western Ghats from which the cauvery takes its rise)?

[ 223 ]

न च तथायमभिन्नसमाश्रयो भवितुमुत्सहतेऽनभिवीक्षणात् ।  
न हि घटो विदधाति घटं कचिन्न च पटः पटमित्यमनीक्षणात् ॥

Similarly there cannot be the relation of cause and effect between the identical objects because it is not experienced so. Nowhere is it seen that the pot produces a pot and the cloth, a cloth.

[ 224 ]

कुर्वत्कारणपक्षमाश्रितवतः कुर्वच्च कुर्वत्कृतं  
तत्कुर्वच्च तथाविधान्यकृतमित्येषानवस्था भवेत् ।  
कुर्वद्द्रूपमकार्यमिष्टमिति चेन्नित्यं जगज्जायतां  
नित्यं मा जनि वा विशेषविरहादेतत्समस्तं जगत् ॥

If one resorts to the view that the cause that functions brings forth an effect, then function also being an effect is brought about by a cause that functions; and the latter



function also is an effect of another cause that functions; and so on *ad infinitum*. If it is said that the function is not produced (and it is present in the cause), then it (namely, the function) always exists and hence there should be the creation of the universe always. If function is not present in the cause, then the cause being devoid of function becomes a non-productive factor and so there will never be the creation of the universe.

[ 225 ]

सर्वं सर्वसमुद्भवाय घटते कुर्वन्न चेत्कारणं  
 न ह्यस्मिन् क्वचिदस्ति कस्यचिदपि व्यापारवत्ता यतः ।  
 तस्मात्कारणकार्यतादि सकलं मायामयं तत्त्वतो  
 नासीदस्ति भविष्यतीति सकलं चैतन्यशेषं 'जगत्' ॥

If it is said that the cause that does not function (brings forth effect), then anything may arise from anything; for, in this view, no cause functions in respect of a particular effect. Hence the concepts of cause and effect are illusory, and really the universe, apart from the consciousness neither existed, nor exists, nor will exist.

[ 226 ]

सकलशक्तिविकल्पनयान्वये सकलशक्यविकल्पनयान्वयः ।  
 सकलशक्यविकल्पनयान्वये सकलशक्तिविकल्पनयान्वयः ॥

The relation of a cause to a particular effect is based on the relation of the cause to a particular power. And the relation of the cause to the particular power is based on the relation of the cause to the particular effect.

The relation of a cause (say) clay to an effect (pot) in the form of 'The pot is the effect of clay', presupposes the relation of clay to a



particular power in the form 'clay has the power to produce the pot'. But the knowledge of the latter is possible only when there is the knowledge of the relation of clay to the pot in the form of 'The pot is the effect of clay'. Thus there is the defect of inter-dependence.

[ 227 ]

इति परस्परसंश्रयता यदा वद कथं जगतः परमार्थता ।

यदि पुनर्जगतोऽपरमार्थता परममस्ति पदं परमात्मनः ॥

Thus when there is the defect of inter-dependence, tell me how the universe could be real. If, on the other hand, the universe is (accepted to be) not real (that is, illusory), then the pure form of the supreme self alone remains.

[ 228 ]

चिच्छक्तिः परमेश्वरस्य विमला चैतन्यमेवोच्यते

सत्यैवास्य जडा परा भगवतः शक्तिस्त्वविद्योच्यते ।

संसर्गाच्च मिथस्तयोर्भगवतः शक्त्योर्जगज्जायतेऽ-

सच्छक्त्या सविकारया भगवतश्चिच्छक्तिरुद्रिच्यते ॥

The pure consciousness itself is spoken of as the sentient power of the supreme self and it is real. And the insentient power of the supreme self is termed *avidyā* (and it is indeterminable). Owing to the mutual relation of the two powers of the supreme self the universe is created. And the sentient power of the supreme self attains modification in the form of the universe by the insentient power (of *avidyā*).

According to the view set forth in this verse, the supreme self possesses the power of consciousness and it is not of the nature of consciousness. This power of consciousness is transformed into the form of the world by the insentient power of *avidyā*. Since consciousness is real, the world which is its transformation is also real.



The above view is refuted in the following verse.

[ 229 ]

इत्येवं कथयन्ति केचिदपरे श्रद्धालवस्तत्पुनः  
कस्यांचिद्भूवि संमतं च विदुषां नेष्टं तु भूम्यन्तरे ।  
कर्मोपास्तिविधानभूमिषु तथा तत्संमतं निर्गुणे  
तत्त्वे तत्परवेदवाक्यविषये त्वालोचिते नेष्यते ॥

Some faithful persons, however, hold thus, (namely the self has power). But this view is acceptable from a particular standpoint (that is, the transformation theory), and unacceptable from a different standpoint (that is the transfiguration theory). It is admitted in the sphere of the injunction of rituals and worship, and it is not admitted when we consider the Upaniṣadic texts' dealing with the attributeless reality.

1. See the following verses.

[ 230 ]

मूर्तामूर्ततदुत्थलिङ्गपुरुषव्यामिश्रभूता चिति-  
र्वीप्सापूर्वकनेतिनेतिवचनप्रध्वस्तसर्वद्वया ।  
संपूर्णे परमे सुखे परिहृताशेषा 'शिवे शाश्वते  
सत्ये शुद्धमहिम्नि तायिनि परे भूम्यक्षरे तिष्ठति ॥

When all the duality is annihilated by the words 'not this, not this,' which are repeated, the consciousness delimited by the subtle and the gross body arising from the elements with shape<sup>2</sup> and without shape<sup>3</sup> remains as the immutable self which is of the form of absolute and eternal bliss, and from which nescience and its products are removed, which is eternal and is always of the nature of existence, which is absolutely great, all-pervasive, and which transcends both name and form.

1. वेऽशिवे — B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.



1. *Bṛh*, II, iii, 6.
2. Earth, water, and fire.
3. Air and etheric space.

[ 231 ]

जगन्महिम्ना न जगत्प्रसिद्धि-  
 न चिन्महिम्नापि जगत्प्रसिद्धिः ।  
 न च प्रमाणाज्जगतः प्रसिद्धि-  
 स्ततोऽस्य मायामयताप्रसिद्धिः ॥

The universe is not manifested either by its force or by the force of consciousness or by any proof. Hence it is established that it is illusory.

[ 232 ]

जडत्वहेतोर्न जगन्महिम्ना  
 न चिन्महिम्ना तदसङ्गभावात् ।  
 न च प्रमाणात्तदकारकत्वात्  
 कृतस्य जाड्यादजडाजनेश्च ॥

The universe is manifested neither by itself, as it is insentient, nor by consciousness, as the latter is devoid of any relation, nor by any proof, as the latter is a non-productive factor (and hence it cannot give rise to the knowledge of the universe). And, as any product is insentient, (if knowledge is a product then it is insentient and hence it cannot manifest the universe). (In fact) knowledge being sentient, is not produced.

Knowledge is pure consciousness which when reflected in the mental state is viewed as produced while in fact, it is not.

See SŚ III, 236.



[ 233 ]

न संकरो नापि च संयुतिस्तयो-  
 नचास्ति तद्वत्समवायसंभवः ।  
 ततो न चिच्चेत्यसमन्वयं प्रति  
 प्रतीयते काचन मूलसंगतिः ॥

Between the self and matter, there is neither the relation of identity, nor of conjunction. And similarly there is not the relation of inherence also. As there is no primary relation between the self and matter there cannot be the relation (of subject and object) between them.

For details see Introduction, p. 91.

[ 234 ]

न योग्यतामात्रनिबन्धनो भवे-  
 ज्जडात्मनोरत्र विवक्षितोऽन्वयः ।  
 तदा हि तस्या 'अनपायिरूपतः'  
 'सदात्मनः स्यादन'पायिसंसृतिः ॥

The intended relation (that is, the relation of the nature of subject and object) between the self and matter cannot be caused by the fitness (existing in the self to have such a relation); for, as fitness (will last as long as the self lasts, it) is eternal, and hence there will be permanent transmigration to the self.

See Introduction, p. 91.

[ 235 ]

'ततो वियन्मुख्यमदो जगज्जडं  
 चिदात्मनोऽस्यैव विवर्त इष्यताम् ।

- 
1. अनपायरूपतः — T<sub>2</sub>, P<sub>1</sub>. 2. सदात्मनि — T<sub>1</sub>.  
 3. नपायसंसृतिः — T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, P<sub>1</sub>. 4. अतो — P<sub>1</sub>.



अनाद्यविद्यापटसंवृतात्मन-

स्तदोपलभ्यत्वममुष्य 'कल्प्यते ॥

Hence let it be accepted that the insentient universe from the ether onwards is the transfiguration of the conscious self which is concealed by the veil, namely, the beginningless *avidyā*. Then the manifestation of the universe holds good.<sup>1</sup>

1. As the universe is superimposed on the self, it has no independent reality apart from the self and hence it is manifested by the light of its substratum.

[ 236 ]

संवित्तिभेदतदभावतदीयजन्मनाशादयो न खलु मानबलेन लभ्याः ।  
न ह्यस्ति मानमिह किञ्चन तद्यदस्या धर्मस्वरूपविषयीकरणे समर्थम् ॥

The qualities such as difference, absence, origin, and destruction in respect of 'knowledge' cannot be established through any proof. There is no means of knowledge here which could prove the qualities of difference, etc., in 'knowledge'.

The pure consciousness, that is, the self when reflected in the mental states arising from the contact of senses with objects is termed 'knowledge', and as the mental states are different and as they are produced and destroyed, 'knowledge' also is viewed as different, produced, and destroyed. Really it is immutable.

[ 237 ]

तस्मान्न मानफलता निरुपाधिकस्य

संवेदनस्य घटतेऽविषयत्वहेतोः ।

एवं च मानफलसिद्धिसमन्वयेन

सिद्धिर्जडस्य जगतो न कदाचिदस्ति ॥

1. कल्पते — P<sub>2</sub>.



Hence 'knowledge' which is (really) absolute, is not the result of any proof, in view of its being not an object. When such is the case, it can never be held that knowledge is the result of a proof, and being related to the universe, it manifests it.

[ 238 ]

इतरेतराध्यसनमस्त्वनयोरुभयोरतो दृग्दृशोरनिशम् ।  
अपरस्परव्यतिकरानुभवादिह शुक्तिकारजतविभ्रमवत् ॥

As in the case of the erroneous perception of shell as silver, it is experienced that both (the self and matter) are mutually superimposed. Hence, let there be the mutual superimposition of the self and matter always (that is, till (*avidyā* exists).

[ 239 ]

संसिद्धा सविलासमोहविषये वस्तुन्यधिष्ठानगी-  
र्नाधारेऽध्यसनस्य वस्तुनि ततोऽस्थाने महान्संभ्रमः ।  
केषांचिन्महतामनूनतमसां पाण्डित्यगर्वादय-  
मन्योन्याध्यसने निरास्पदमिदं शून्यं जगत्स्यादिति ॥

The designation of 'substrate' (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is well-established not in the substance that serves as the locus (*ādhāra*) of the superimposed object, but in the substance that is the object of *avidyā* with its product. Hence the great hasty view, owing to conceit of scholarship of perverted men of utter ignorance, is improper - the view, namely, acceptance of the mutual superimposition is open to the objection that this world, being devoid of a substratum, would become a void.

This verse appears in the first *adhyāya* of this work. See SS, I, 31.



[ 240 ]

कृपणमध्यमपक्वधियां नृणां मतिविलासविधात्रितयं क्रमात् ।  
परिणतिर्बहुजीवतमस्विता परमपुंसि तमः परिकल्पना ॥

In accordance with the three-fold mental states of men, namely, lower, intermediate, and higher, there is the assumption of the theory of transformation, (the theory of transfiguration, and the notion of negation which refers to the realization of the self). (The theory of transfiguration is two-fold as the notion of) the existence of many individual souls, and the existence of *avidyā* in the supreme self.<sup>1</sup>

One who adopts the theory of transfiguration holds a two-fold notion according to his mental state. One is, that there are many individual souls longing for liberation. And the other notion is that, the supreme self alone attains the state of the individual soul owing to *avidyā* superimposed on it. Thus there is only one individual soul.

For further details see SS, II, 81 ff. The translation follows TB.

[ 241 ]

श्रुतिवचांसि मुनिस्मरणानि च द्वयविशारदगीरपि सर्वशः ।  
त्रयमपेक्ष्य विधात्रितयं विना न हि घटामुपयान्ति कदाचन ॥

The Upaniṣadic sentences, the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, and the words of Śrī Śaṅkara who is the expert in determining the import of these two, would never become appropriate without the three stages mentioned in respect of the three points of view.

This verse occurs in the second *adhyāya* of this work. See SS, II, 93.

[ 242 ]

पुरुषमेकमपेक्ष्य च भूमिकात्रितयमस्ति पुरोदितमेव तत् ।  
तदनुसारवशादखिलश्रुतिस्मृतिवचांसि वयं घटयामहे ॥



The three points of view, set forth previously, are with reference to a single person. Keeping this in view, we interpret the Upaniṣadic texts and the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.

[ 243 ]

परिणतिं च विवर्तदशाद्वयं स्थितमनुक्रमतः श्रुतिशासने ।  
अनुशशास मुनिप्रवरः सुधीः पुरुषबुद्धिमपेक्ष्य यथाक्रमम् ॥

Following the theory of transformation and the two-fold notion of transfiguration mentioned in the Upaniṣads and keeping in view the mental state of the aspirant, the pre-eminent and wise sage (Bādarāyaṇa) composed the *Brahma-sūtra*.

#### STATUS OF SCRIPTURE

[ 244 ]

यदि परिणतिर्येषा चिद्विवर्तोऽथ वा स्या-  
द्भवति ननु तदानीं वेदशास्त्रे विरोधः ।  
नहि खलु कृतकत्वेऽपौरुषेयत्वहेतो-  
र्भवितुमलमियं नो मानता स्वप्रयुक्ता ॥

If the universe is the transformation or the transfiguration of the self, then indeed, there arises contradiction to the self-validity of the scripture. In our system, its self-validity based on its impersonal origin, does not fit in, if it is produced.

[ 245 ]

कणभुगभिमतिर्वा कल्पनीया तदानीं  
सुरगुरुमतमेवोपास्यमाहोस्विदुच्चैः ।  
इति निपतति चोद्यं ब्रह्मणो विश्वसृष्टि-  
र्यदि भवति न चेद्ब्रह्मो नित्यमायाति विश्वम् ॥



If the universe is the creation of the self, then there arises the objection that (as the scripture which is a part of the universe, is not self-valid), the view of Kaṇāda (namely, the scripture has only extrinsic validity) should be assumed; or, the materialistic stand-point (namely, the scripture is not valid) should be inevitably accepted. If the universe is not the creation of self, then it is real, (and hence the Advaitic view that everything apart from the self is indeterminable does not hold good).

[ 246 ]

ननु सदृशमिदं वश्वोद्यमस्मासु कस्मा-  
 द्विनिहितमुभयेषां पूर्वमीमांसकानाम् ।  
 अवगतिकृतमेतद्वाचकत्वं पदाना-  
 मवगतिरियमिष्टा नश्वरी तत्क्षणेन ॥

[The Advaitin replies :]

As the objection equally applies to the views of both the Mīmāṃsakas, how is it raised only against our view? The words are significative of their senses only when they (that is, the words) are known; but, knowledge is accepted to be momentary.

The words convey their senses only when they (that is, the words) are known. Hence the aspect of signification present in the words is produced by the knowledge of the words. But, as knowledge is momentary, the aspect of signification present in the words also is momentary. And this leads to the momentariness of the Veda itself.

[ 247 ]

अवगतिगतमेवापेक्ष्य पूर्वापरत्व-  
 प्रतिनियममियं वो वेदता वेदराशेः ।  
 क्षणिकमभवदित्यं वेदशास्त्रं समस्तं-  
 कथमिव तदिदानीं वेदशास्त्रं प्रमाणम् ॥



The groups of words signify their senses by depending on the invariable sequence present in the knowledge of the words. Thus the whole scripture becomes momentary; and how does it serve as a proof ?

The groups of words placed in a particular order constitute the Veda. But the words as such do not have any order. Hence the particular order present in the knowledge of the words accounts for the order of the words that constitute the Veda. As knowledge is momentary, the particular order present in the words also is momentary. And this leads to the momentariness of the Veda itself.

[ 248 ]

पुरुषमतिनिवेशो नास्ति वेदप्रमेये  
विषय इति यदीष्टा मानता स्वप्रयुक्ता ।  
सदृशमिदमिदानीं कारणं मानतायां  
परमपुरुषसृष्टे वेदशास्त्रेऽप्य'भीष्टम् ॥

If the self-validity of the scripture is accepted on the ground that the sense conveyed by the scripture is independent of human intellect, then this ground for self-validity is similar when the scripture is accepted to be the creation of the supreme self.

[ 249 ]

न हि खलु मतिपूर्वा ब्रह्मणः सृष्टिरिष्टा  
निगदितुरिव सृष्टिर्वेदविद्यासु नित्यम् ।  
भवति तु पुनरेषा तस्य निश्वासकल्पा  
श्रुतिवचनमपीदं वस्तु वक्ति स्फुटं नः ॥

The supreme self, like the reciter of the Veda, recites the scripture without any pre-meditation. It comes out of the self like breathing, and the Upaniṣadic text<sup>1</sup> clearly puts forth this view.

1. भीष्टे — M<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>.



[ 250 ]

अपि च पुरुषकर्मोद्भूतिकानीन्द्रियाणि  
 स्फुटमवगमयन्ति स्वं स्वमन्यानपेक्षम् ।  
 विषयमिति हि दृष्टं तद्वदिष्टं च तस्मा-  
 दिह किमपि न चोद्यं वाच्यमेतद्वद्विः ॥

It is accepted that the senses arisen from the past deeds of a person clearly manifest their respective objects by being independent of other proofs. Similarly it is accepted in the case of the scripture also. Hence no objection should be raised by you against our view.

It might be said: the scripture would lose its self-validity, if it is composed by a person. This objection, however, is wrong, as the sense-organs which are produced by a person through his past deeds, are accepted to be self-valid.

*vide : svataḥ sarvapramāṇānām prāmāṇyamiti gamyatām,*

*Śloka-vārtika, II, 47.*

[ 251 ]

श्रुतिवचनमनेकं वक्ति तस्येक्षित्वं  
 मतिमदिति ततस्तन्नेष्यते कस्य हेतोः ।  
 इति यदि मनुषे तन्मैव मंस्थाः कुतश्चे-  
 त्सकलकरणहीनं ब्रह्म नः शास्ति शास्त्रम् ॥

If you think that as numerous Vedic texts<sup>1</sup> declare that the supreme self is a perceiver, on what basis it is not admitted that it is the author of the scripture by being an intelligent being, then, (it is said), 'do not consider so'. Why? The Upaniṣadic texts instruct us that the supreme self is devoid of any sense-organ.

1. *vide : Chānd., VI, ii, 3.*

2. *vide : Bṛh., III, viii, 8.*



[ 252 ]

चितिगतजडशक्तेराद्य इष्टो विवर्त-

श्रितिनिकटनिवेशाल्लब्धदीप्तिर्जडोऽपि ।

श्रुतिशिरसि निषण्णैरीक्षणं कथ्यते त-

न्न तु परमपदस्यापीक्षणं बुद्धिवृत्तिः ॥

The first modification of the insentient power (namely, *avidyā*) which abides in the pure consciousness, and which, though insentient, acquires the character of sentience owing to its superimposition on the consciousness, is stated to be the will of the self by the exponents of the true import of the Upaniṣadic texts. The will of the supreme self is not the modification of the intellect (as in the case of the individual soul).

[ 253 ]

ननु च डित्यडवित्थपदादिवत्सकलमेव तु सामयिकं पदम् ।

अनुमिमीमहि पूर्वनिदर्शनादनुमितिर्भवतीति किमद्भुतम् ॥

( The Vaiśeṣika contends : ) —

We infer that the significative relation of every word to its sense is formulated by an individual (that is, *Īsvara*) like that of the words *dittha*, *ḍavittha*, etc. Thus on the basis of this illustration which exists before (making the inference), there arises the inferential cognition.<sup>1</sup> And, is there anything strange about this?

1. *vimataḥ śabdārthasāmbandhaḥ sāmānyatā, śabdārthasāmbandhatvāt, ditthādisabdārthasāmbandhavat iti anumimimahi.*

[ 254 ]

अनादिवृद्धव्यवहारलक्षणे कथं प्रमाणे परिपन्थिनि स्थिते ।

गवादिशब्दे समयोऽनुमास्यते डवित्थशब्दादिवदेतदुच्यताम् ॥



(The view of the Vaiśeṣika is rejected):

Explain how it is inferred on the basis of the illustration, namely, the words *ḍavittḥa*, etc., that the significative relation of the words cow, etc., to their senses is formulated by an individual, when there exists the sublating proof (that is, the knowledge of method of agreement and difference) which is indicated by the beginningless usage of elders.'

The words cow, etc., signify their senses only when those words are employed with reference to such senses by elders. If not, they do not signify the senses. This knowledge of method of agreement and difference sublates the inferential cognition arrived at through inference set forth in the previous verse.

[ 255 ]

सतः प्रमाणाभिमतेषु पञ्चसु प्रमाणमक्षादिषु किञ्चिदीक्ष्यते ।

न हीह संबन्धरि तेन तस्य वः खपुष्पकल्पत्वमभावमानतः ॥

Among the five proofs such as perception, etc., which cognize the existent objects, there is no proof that could establish the individual (that is, *Īśvara*) who is said to formulate the significative relation of the words to their senses. Hence in your (that is, in the Vaiśeṣika) system that individual has become similar to the flower of the sky because of its non-apprehension.

*Īśvara* as the formulator of the significative relation of the words to their senses is not known through perception; nor is He known as such through inference on the ground mentioned in the previous verse. Since *Īśvara* is like nothing and unlike everything we perceive, the proof comparison also does not establish God as the formulator of the significative relation of the words to their senses. We do not find any scriptural text that affirms God as of the above nature. Presumption also does not prove God; it is because the proof presumption establishes a particular object without which something known or



heard would become unintelligible. Since nothing becomes unintelligible without Īśvara as the formulator of significative relation of the words to their senses, the latter is not known by presumption.

An object which is existent should come within the scope of any one of the above five proofs. And such an object, owing to some counter-acting factor may not come within the range of perception. Its absence then is known through the proof non-apprehension. And an object which does not come within the range of any of the above five proofs that comprehend the existent object, is an absolute nothing. Here Īśvara as the formulator of the significative relation of their words to their senses does not come within the range of any of the five proofs and so Īśvara as such is an absolute nothing.

[ 256 ]

पुरोपलब्धो विषयो न दृश्यते यदा प्रमाणैरिह भावगोचरैः ।  
तदा तु तत्रानुपलब्धिकारणं किमप्यभावादपरं हि मृग्यते ॥

If the object, which has been (previously) perceived does not (later) come within the scope of the proofs that recognize the existent objects, then something other than non-existence is presumed to be the cause of its non-apprehension.

As the object is previously perceived, it cannot be an absolute nothing like horn of a hare. Hence something other than non-existence should be the cause of its non-apprehension.

[ 257 ]

अत्यन्तानुपलब्धवस्तुनि पुनर्यः पञ्चकानुद्धव-  
स्तस्याभावादिमिहः स न पुनस्तत्रापरं कारणम् ।  
अन्विच्छन्ति मनीषिणो न हि 'शशेऽदृष्टे विषाणेऽस्तितां  
तत्रादर्शनकारणान्तरपरा हेत्वन्तरान्वेषिणः ॥



The absence of the rise of five proofs in the case of a totally non-existent object, is the cause of the (knowledge of the) non-existence of the object, and, wise men do not accept another cause. When horn is not found in the hare, those who do not see it, do not seek for another cause to account for its non-existence.

Hence Īśvara as the formulator of the significative relation of the words to their senses cannot be established.

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विषमदुर्गमदेशसहस्रगः कथमिवैष नरः समयक्रियाम् ।

सकलशब्दतदर्थनिवेशिनीं वद विधातुमलं स्वयमेकलः ॥

How can Īśvara, being unassisted, formulate the significative relation of the words to their meanings, by going into thousands of regions which are uneven and difficult to traverse.

*narah-naradr̥ṣṭāntānumitasya naraśmyamabhipretya eṣa nara ityuktam,*  
SS.

*ekalaḥ - ekāki, AP.*

[ 259 ]

अपि च किञ्चिदपि प्रतिपादकं न हि यदा पदमस्ति जगन्मुखे ।

अनभिधाय 'पदेन तदा कथं समयमेष करिष्यति शंकरः ॥

Moreover, as there is no word significative of any sense at the time of creation, how could Īśvara without pointing to a sense by a word, formulate the significative relation of the words to their senses?

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अभिनयेन करिष्यति चेदयं समयमेतदतीव हि दुर्घटम् ।

न हि पदार्थसहस्रविमिश्रिते गवि तदाभिनयात्समयो भवेत् ॥

1. पदं न तदा — B.



If it is said that Īsvara formulates the significative relation of the words to senses by gesture (that is, by pointing to the object with his finger), then this (also) is highly incompatible. There cannot be the formulation, by mere gesture, of the significative relation of the word 'cow' (for example) to its sense which is associated with thousands of things (such as limbs, qualities, activities, and generic attribute).

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अपि च लौकिकमानबलाश्रयादधिगते विषये समयो भवेत् ।  
अनुपलब्धसतत्त्वकदेवताप्रभृतिकार्थगतः समयः कुतः ॥

Moreover, there can be the formulation of the significative relation of the words to those senses which are known through perception. How could there be the formulation of the significative relation of the words to the senses such as deities, etc, whose nature is not known through perception.

*laukikamānam - pratyakṣam, TB.*

[ 262 ]

अपि च कर्तुर्नुस्मरणं भवेद्यदि चकार पुमान् समयं गिराम् ।  
न खलु कर्तृगबुद्धिबलं विना व्यवहृतिर्भवति व्यवहर्तरि ॥

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न खलु पाणिनिपिङ्गलसंज्ञया व्यवहरन्ति तयोः स्मरणं विना ।  
पदपदार्थपरस्परसंगतिं निरमिमीत ततो न जगद्गुरुः ॥

[ 264 ]

मतिमतां प्रवरो वृषभध्वजः कणभुगादिमुनिप्रवरः प्रभुः ।  
ननु धरादिजगद्रचनाबलादनुमितोऽनवखण्डितशक्तिकः ॥



Moreover if Isvara has formulated the significative relation of the word to its sense, then there would be the recollection of Isvara (when using the words). The usage of the words by one who speaks is not possible without the remembrance of the author. Wise men do not use the terms made current by Pāṇini<sup>1</sup> and Piṅgala<sup>2</sup> without remembering them. Hence Lord Śiva, the Lord of the universe, who is worshipped by the great sages like Kaṇāda and others, who is the highest of the intelligent beings, who is inferred on the strength of the creation of earth, etc., and who possesses unlimited powers has not formulated the significative relation of the words to their senses.

1. *ṛddhirūdaic, Pāṇini - Sūtra, I, i, 1.*

2. *dhīśrīstrimityādyā, SS,*

[ 265 ]

अपि तु वैदिकवाङ्मनसातिगानुदितलुप्तचिदेकरसात्प्रभोः ।

अभवदानकदुन्दुभिनन्दनादमतिपूर्वमिदं सकलं जगत् ॥

Moreover, this entire universe has originated, without any previous reflection, from the son of Vasudeva (that is, Lord Kṛṣṇa) who is of the nature of unitary consciousness which is devoid of origination and destruction and which is (secondarily) signified by the Upaniṣads and which transcends both speech and mind.

*ānakadundubhiḥ - vasudevah, TB.*

[ 266 ]

ननु लौकिकवचसां नरमतिपूर्वकरचना

परिदृश्यत इति वैदिकवचसामनुमिनुमः ।

वचनं श्रुतिशिरसामपि नरधीकृतरचनं

वचनत्वत इव लौकिकजननिर्मितवचनम् ॥

1. अपि च —M.



(The Vaiśeṣika contends:)

Indeed it is observed that the secular sentences are composed by the intelligence of a person. Similarly in the case of scripture also, we infer thus: the sentences of the Upaniṣads also are composed by the intelligence of an individual, like the sentences composed by ordinary men.

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न च मादृशजनधीकृतरचनं श्रुतिवचनं  
भवितुं क्षममिति वैदिकरचनाबलमिषतः ।  
अनुमीयत इह शूलभृदिति चेदिदमशुभं  
न हि वैदिकवचसामभिभवनास्पदमनुमा ॥

If it is said: 'the Vedic text is not capable of being similar to the sentences composed by the intelligence of persons like us; and, so Lord Śiva is inferred on the basis of the composition of the scripture, which would be inexplicable in the absence of the assumption of the Lord'. This (contention) is unsound; for, inference cannot become the sublating factor of the Upaniṣads.

*vaidikaracanābalamiṣataḥ - vedaracanānyathānupapattyā ityarthah, TB.*

[ 268 ]

ब्रह्म स्वयंभु परमात्मपदस्य वेदो  
निश्वासकल्प इति चापरमामनन्ति ।  
वाक्यं तदस्य मतिपूर्वकतानुमानं  
सद्यो निरस्यति न चेदपबाधितं स्यात् ॥

One text declares that the scripture is self-existing<sup>1</sup> and another states that the scripture is like breath of the supreme self.<sup>2</sup> These texts immediately supersede the inference that the scripture is the conscious creation of the lord. If not, the teachings of the scripture would be contradicted.

1. *parameṣṭhi brahmaṇo brahma svayarībhū, Brh., II, vi, 3.*

2. *asya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitametadyadrgvedaḥ, Brh., II, iv, 10.*



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सृजति रक्षति संहरति प्रभुः सकलमेव निविश्य नियच्छति ।  
अमतिपूर्वमिति श्रुतिशासने वद कथं मतिपूर्वकतानुमा ॥

When the Upaniṣads<sup>1</sup> declare that God unintentionally creates, protects and destroys the universe, and entering into the universe controls everything, tell me how the inference that God intentionally creates the scripture could be valid.

1. *vide* : *Taitt*, III, i, 1 and *Bṛh.*, III, vii, 1.

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आप्तोक्तत्वप्रत्यये मानभावो वेदस्यास्य ज्ञायते मानभावे ।  
विज्ञाते सत्याप्तपूर्वत्वसिद्धिरित्यन्योन्यापाश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

The scripture is known to be valid only when it is ascertained that it is uttered by a trustworthy person. But only when it is ascertained that it is valid, is it known that it is uttered by a trustworthy person (Īśvara). Thus there is the contingency of interdependence.

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तस्मादेषा स्वप्रयुक्तप्रमाणभावज्ञाना वेदविद्याभ्युपेया ।  
प्रामाण्यं स्यात् स्वप्रयुक्तं च तस्या वस्तुस्थित्याज्ञप्तिवन्नान्यतस्तत् ॥

Hence the knowledge arising from the Vedic texts should be accepted as intrinsically known.<sup>1</sup> And, like its apprehension, it is really intrinsically produced,<sup>2</sup> and not otherwise (that is, extrinsically).

1. *prāmāṇyajñānasya svaprayuktatvaṁ nāma jñānasvarūpagrāhakapramāṇādeva grāhyatvam*, TB.

2. *jñānotpādakasāmagrīmātrajanyam*, AP.



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ज्ञप्त्युत्पत्त्योर्यद्वदेव प्रवृत्तावस्या युक्ता मानता स्वप्रयुक्ता ।  
वेदोत्थाया बुद्धिवृत्तेर्न हीयमुत्पाद्यान्यत्संविदे काङ्क्षतीति ॥

Just as the validity of the knowledge arising from the Vedic texts is intrinsically known and produced, so also, its validity in manifesting the objects also is intrinsic. It does not require any other factor than its own rise in manifesting the objects.

- i. *pravṛttau - pravṛttiḥ - viśayābhivṛtyaktiḥ*
- ii. *samvide - viśayābhivṛtyaktiḥ lakṣaṇaphalāya, TB.*

[ 273 ]

विश्वं विष्णोरुत्थितं नामरूपं निश्वासादिप्रख्यमित्याह वेदः ।  
यत्तत्तथ्यं वर्त्मना वर्णितेन तस्मान्मिथ्या पौरुषेयानुमानम् ॥

What the scripture<sup>1</sup> states, namely, the rise of the universe consisting of words and objects, from Lord Viṣṇu is similar to (His) breathing, is true in the light of what is mentioned so far. Hence the inference of personal origin of the scripture is false.

1. *vide : Brh., II, iv, 10.*

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परिणामविवर्तयोरतः परिकल्पतावपि वेदगोचरः ।  
न च चोद्यत्वोऽपि विद्यते कथितेनैव पथा<sup>2</sup> नपेक्षितः ॥

Even if either of the two theories, namely, the theory of transformation and the theory of transfiguration, is accepted, there is not even a trace of objection against (the self-validity of) the scripture, as in the light of what has been said, it is independent (of human or divine intellect and hence self-valid).

1. नहि दोषत्वोऽपि — M<sub>1</sub>.
2. नपेक्षणात् — T<sub>1</sub>.



# THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SENSES OF THE TERMS TAT AND TVAM

[ 275 ]

उपाधिमौपाधिकमान्तरं चिदाभासनं चित्प्रतिबिम्बकं च ।  
चिद्विम्बमेवं चतुरः पदार्थान्विविच्य जानीहि तदर्थभाजः ॥

Understand the four senses of the words *tat* by distinguishing thus: the limiting condition, the thing limited, namely, the presence of the self in it, the reflected image of the self, and the self that remains as the original.

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तथा त्वमर्थेऽपि चतुष्टयं तद्विवेचनीयं निपुणेन भूत्वा ।  
मतिश्चिदाभासनमेवमस्यां बिम्बं तदीयं प्रतिबिम्बकं च ॥

Similarly the four senses of the word *tvam* should be carefully distinguished thus: the intellect (that is, the limiting condition), the presence of the self in it, the self that remains as the original, and the reflected image of the self.

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उपाधिरज्ञानमनादिसिद्धमस्मिंश्चिदाभासनमीश्वरत्वम् ।  
तदन्विता चित्प्रतिबिम्बकं स्यादुदीर्यते शुद्धचिदेव बिम्बम् ॥

The beginningless *avidyā* is the limiting condition; and the presence of the self in *avidyā* is the criterion for viewing the self as God. And the self present in *aviayā* is the reflected image (and it is God). The pure self is stated to be the original.



*Avidyā*, the presence of the self in *avidyā*, and the reflected image of the self in *avidyā*—all these three are the primary senses of the word *tāt*. The self that serves as the original is the secondary sense of the word *tāt*.

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उपाधिरन्तःकरणं त्वमर्थे जीवत्वमाभासनमत्र तद्वत् ।  
तदन्विता चित्प्रतिबिम्बमेवमनन्वितां तामिह बिम्बमाहुः ॥

Similarly, in the senses of the word *tvam*, the limiting condition is the intellect; the presence of the self in it is the criterion for viewing the self as *jīva*. And the self present in intellect is the reflected image (and it is *jīva*). The self unassociated with intellect is stated to be the original.<sup>1</sup>

1. The self that transcends the intellect is the original.

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उपाधिना सार्धमुपाधिजन्यमौपाधिकं सर्वमवेहि मिथ्या ।  
भागं मृषा चित्प्रतिबिम्बकेऽपि बिम्बं पुनः सत्यमशेषमेव ॥

Understand that the limited thing along with its limiting condition is completely false. In the reflected image of the self also, a part is false<sup>1</sup>. But the original self, in its entirety, is real.

1. The reflected image of the self consists of two elements: the spiritual element and the phenomenal element, namely, *avidyā* or intellect. The phenomenal element is false.

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अप्पात्रमप्पात्रगतत्वमेवमप्पात्रगोऽप्पात्रगं ताद्वहिश्च ।  
दिवाकरो दिव्यवतिष्ठमानो न शक्यतेऽपोहितुमिद्धतेजाः ॥

1. गतात्परश्च — P<sub>2</sub>.



In the four factors, namely, the vessel filled with water, the presence of the sun in it, the reflected image of the sun in it, and the sun remaining outside, that is, in the sky, the shining sun remaining in the sky cannot be denied.

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पुरं पुरःस्थत्वमतो पुरःस्थं पुराद्वहिः शुद्धमवस्थितं च ।  
तथा परं ब्रह्म सुसूक्ष्मयापि धिया निराकर्तुमशक्यमेव ॥

Similarly, in the four factors, namely, the intellect, the presence of the self in the intellect, the reflected image of the self in it, and the supreme self remaining pure outside the intellect, the latter cannot be rejected even by the keenest of intellects.

*puram - antahkaraṇalakṣaṇam. TB.*

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न स्थानतोऽप्यस्ति परस्य कश्चिद्विशेषयोगः परमार्थरूपः ।  
स्वतः पुनर्दूरनिरस्त एव परस्य तत्त्वस्य विशेषयोगः ॥

There is no relation of the qualities of real nature to the self even through a limiting adjunct. And the possibility of intrinsic relation of qualities to the self is far removed.

This verse occurs previously in this chapter. See SŚ, III, 146.

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श्रुतेश्च तात्पर्यमखण्डरूपे परे पुरस्तादुपपादितं च ।  
ततोऽपि तस्याद्वयरूपतोऽन्यद्रूपान्तरं कल्पयितुं न शक्यम् ॥

It has been explained before that the import of the Upaniṣadic sentence is the supreme partless self. For this reason also, it is impossible to attribute any form other than the absolute nature to the supreme self.



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भेदश्रुतिस्त्वन्यपरा समस्ता समस्तवेदेषु न तत्परासौ ।  
अतत्परा तत्परवेदवाक्यैर्विरुध्यमाना गुणवाद एव ॥

The Upaniṣadic texts belonging to every branch of Veda and conveying the qualified self have as their import something else and not their primary sense (namely, the qualified self). When a text which does not have as its import the primary sense it conveys comes into conflict with the text which has as its import the sense it signifies, then the former is a recommendatory passage.

[ 285 ]

न ह्यर्थवादा विधिभिर्विरुद्धा विध्यर्थसंकोचकरा भवन्ति ।  
किं तु प्रधानानुगुणं यदेषां आलम्बनं तत्खलु कल्पनीयम् ॥

When recommendatory passages come into conflict with the injunctive texts, then they do not restrict the sense of the injunctive texts. But their sense is so admitted that they would be consistent with the import of the injunctive texts.

*ālambanān - viśayaḥ, TB.*

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यथा ह्यजक्षीरविधेः समीपे यज्जर्तिलादेः परिकीर्तनं तत् ।  
प्रधानसंकोचभयादपास्य स्वमर्थमासीद्गुणवाद एव ॥

Just as the sentence which enjoins wild sesamum and which is read in the context of the injunction of the goat's milk, discards its primary sense, owing to the fear of contradiction with the principal religious rite, and is (hence)



held as the recommendatory passage, (so also the Upaniṣadic texts conveying the qualified self should be held as recommendatory passages).

With reference to the Agnihotra rite the Vedic text reads :

*jartilayavāgvā juhuyāt, gavidhukayavāgvā juhuyāt na grāmyān paśūn hinasti, na āraṇyān.*

The oblation to the *Agnihota* rite may be gruel made from wild sesamum or wild wheat. This does not involve injury to the domesticated or the forest animal.

The Vedic text further proceeds to say :

*atho khalvāhuḥ - anāhutirvai jartilāśca gavidhukāśca, ajakṣīreṇa juhoti.*  
Wild sesamum and wild wheat are not to be offered as oblations. One should offer goat's milk as the oblation.

The import of the entire Vedic passage is this : the gruel made from wild sesamum or wild wheat is prescribed as an offering in the *Agnihotra* rite. In the same way the goat's milk also is prescribed as an oblation.

Now it is contended that one can offer either goat's milk or gruel made from wild sesamum or wild wheat as oblation in the *Agnihotra* rite. This contention is wrong. It is because the Vedic text after enjoining gruel made from wild sesamum or wild wheat immediately prohibits the use of wild sesamum or wild wheat in the *Agnihotra* rite and then prescribes goat's milk as an offering.

Since wild sesamum and wild wheat are prohibited, the injunctive text which prescribes goat's milk must be taken as primary. And, the Vedic text prescribing the gruel made from wild sesamum and wild wheat must be understood as recommendatory praising goat's milk as the best offering in the *Agnihotra* rite.

For details See *Jaimini Sūtra*, X, VIII, 4/7.



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एवं सतीहापि विरुध्यमानं वचो यदद्वैतपरैर्वचोभिः ।  
तदस्तु गौणं यदि वा परस्य मायाप्रसूतद्वयवादिमुख्यम् ॥

When such is the case, here in the Vedānta also let the texts which convey the qualified self and which are in conflict with the texts that convey the partless self, be recommendatory passages. Or else, let those texts primarily convey the qualifications of the self that are brought about by *avidyā*.

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भेदश्रुतिः कल्पितमेव भेदमालम्ब्य मुख्यार्थवती भवित्री ।  
अतत्परा तत्परवाक्य'भङ्गस्त्वितोऽन्यथा याति विना निमित्तम् ॥

The Upaniṣadic text dealing with the qualified self primarily conveys it by taking into account the superimposed qualities. If the qualities are real, then the text (like *tat tvam asi*) which has as its import the sense it conveys (namely, the partless self) would be contradicted for no valid reason.

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यदपि किञ्चिदुपासननिष्ठिताद्वचनतः प्रतिभाति परात्मनः ।  
सकलगन्धरसादिमयं वपुस्तदपि कल्पितभेदसमाश्रयम् ॥

From the passages referring to the worship of the supreme self, it is known that the supreme self is of the form of smell and taste.<sup>1</sup> And those forms also are based on the qualities that are fancied.

*vide* : *sarvagandhaḥ sarvarasaḥ*, *Chānd.*, III, xiv, 2.

1. भङ्गं त्वितो — B<sub>2</sub>.



[ 290 ]

न खलु निर्गुणवस्तुपरं वचः सगुणवाक्यविरोधनिमित्ततः ।  
स्वविषयादपसारयितुं बलादतिबलिष्ठपदान्वयमिष्यते ॥

On the basis of conflict with the texts that convey the qualified self, it is not desirable to make the text discard its primary sense, the text whose import is the partless self and the syntactical relation of whose words is more powerful.

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तस्मात्तात्परवेदवाक्यगतिभिर्न्यायेन चात्मप्रभं  
सर्वद्वैतविवर्जितं विगलितध्वान्तं शिवं शाश्वतम् ।  
प्रत्यग्रूपमरूपगन्धरसकं तच्छब्दवाच्यस्थितं  
वाक्यार्थान्वयि लक्षितं भगवतो विष्णोः पदं गृह्यताम् ॥

By examining the import of the Upaniṣadic texts and by reasoning, you understand that the secondary sense of the term *tat* which is related to the sense of the sentence (*tat tvam asi*) and which is self-luminous, free from duality and nescience, existent, eternal, inward, free from any colour, smell, or taste and which is present in the primary sense of the term *tat* is the true nature of Lord Viṣṇu.

[ 292 ]

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽऽसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।  
अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचायनीयं पदमीदृशं हरेः ॥

The true nature of Lord Viṣṇu is free from sound, touch, colour, change, and taste. Similarly it is eternal, free from smell, beginningless, infinite, immutable, and it transcends Hiraṇyagarbha.<sup>1</sup> And this true nature of Viṣṇu should be realized.

1. *mahataḥ - samaṣṭibuddhirūpahiranyagarbhāt, SS.*



This verse, with slight modification in the last quarter, is taken from the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*, I, iii, 15. The last quarter in the original text is :

*nicāyya tanmṛtyumukhāt pramucyate*. The word *nicāyya* is interpreted by Śrī Śaṅkara as *avagamyā*.

[ 293 ]

भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा सर्वं प्रोक्तं त्रिविधं ब्रह्म मे तत् ।  
जीवेशानौ सृज्यमानं जगच्च शुद्धं ब्रह्मेत्याह वेदान्तवाक्यम् ॥

It has been explained to me (by the sages) that the individual soul, the phenomenal world, and God are (in essence) the supreme self. This Upaniṣadic text states that the individual soul, God, and the created universe are (in essence) the pure self.

The first half of this verse is taken from *Svet.* I, 12.

[ 294 ]

पदार्थबोधेन कृतार्थता न ते मतिः परोक्षा हि पदार्थगोचरा ।  
अतो महावाक्यनिबन्धनैव धीरबोधविच्छेदकरी भविष्यति ॥

By the knowledge of the senses of the words you do not attain the ultimate purpose, as the knowledge of the meanings of the words is only mediate. Hence the knowledge that would annihilate *avidyā* will arise only from the major texts.

*Avidyā* relates to the identity of the inner self and the supreme self. It will therefore be removed only by the direct knowledge of the identity of the inner self and the supreme self. Such a knowledge arises from the major texts only.

[ 295 ]

स्वाध्यायधर्मपठितं निजवेदशाखावेदान्तभूमिगतमादरपालितं च ।  
संन्यासिना परदृशा गुरुणोपदिष्टं साक्षान्महावचनमेव विमुक्तिहेतुः ॥

1. ह्य चैतत् — M<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>.

2. ततो — B<sub>2</sub>.



The major texts which occur in the Upaniṣad portion of one's own recension of the Vedas, which are studied in accordance with the rules prescribed for the study of one's own Veda and which are kept in mind with faith, when instructed by a preceptor who is an ascetic and who has realized the self, are the direct cause of liberation.

[ 296 ]

नावेदविद्धि मनुते पुरुषं बृहन्तमित्याह वेदवचनं कथमन्यथैतत् ।  
वाक्यान्तरं च कथमाह पुमांसमेनं साटोपमौपनिषदत्वविशेषेण॥

The Upaniṣadic text declares that 'one who has not studied the Veda does not realize the absolute self'.<sup>1</sup> How would this text be reasonable if it is otherwise (that is, if the knowledge of the self can be had even without the major texts)? And how could the other text<sup>2</sup> zealously characterize the self with the qualification that it could be known only from the Upaniṣads?

1. *nāvedavinmanute taṁ brhantam, Śāthyaṇiyopaniṣad, 4.*
2. *taṁ tvaupaniṣadaṁ puruṣaṁ prcchāmi, Brh., III, ix, 26.*

[ 297 ]

उपनिषदिति वेद इत्यपीदं  
समभिवदन्ति महावचो महान्तः ।  
फलवदवगतिः स्यादन्तरेणैतदेकं  
वचनमिति न शक्यं वक्तुमित्यादरोऽस्मिन् ॥

Philosophers declare the major texts to be 'Upaniṣad' and 'Veda'. As it cannot be said that the realization of the oneness of the self that leads to the ultimate goal can be had even without these major texts, they are termed 'Upaniṣad' and 'Veda' with great faith.



[ 298 ]

उपनिषदिति शब्दो वेदशब्दश्च तस्मात्  
 श्रुतिशिरसि निविष्टो योज्यतामत्र वाक्ये ।  
 अपरमखिलमस्यैवाङ्गभूतत्वहेतो-  
 रिह समभिनिविष्टं तद्विरो वाच्यमासीत् ॥

Hence let the words 'Upaniṣad' and 'Veda' present in the *Śruti* texts be employed to signify these major texts. As all the other statements uttered along with the major texts are subsidiary to the latter, they are also designated by the words 'Upaniṣad' and 'Veda'.

*vide* the Upaniṣadic texts cited in the notes on *SS*, III, 296.

*vide* also :

*vedyate jñāpyate'nena param brahma iti vedaḥ mahāvākyaṃ,  
 tadevopanayati ātmānam brahmatvena ityupaniṣad. S.*

[ 299 ]

पित्रा तत्त्वमसीति बोधनमनु स्पष्टं विजज्ञाविति  
 छान्दोग्ये यदवोचदेतदिह नो लिङ्गं भवेज्ज्ञापकम् ।  
 सर्वत्रैव महागिरामुपनिषच्छब्दो भवेद्ग्राहको  
 वेदश्चायमतोऽन्यदस्य निकटं तेनात्र वेदादिगीः ॥

The sentence 'He has realized the oneness of the self,' which occurs in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, following the instruction of the father in the form 'Thou art that',<sup>3</sup> is the characteristic mark indicating the (following) sense. The words 'Upaniṣad' and 'Veda' are ever significative of the major texts. As all the sentences other than the 'major texts' are proximate (by being subsidiary) to the latter, they are also designated by the words 'Upaniṣad' and 'Veda'.



1. *taddhāsyā vijajñau*, *Chānd.*, VI, xvi, 3.

2. *tat tvam asi*, *Chānd.*, VI, ix, 4

[ 300 ]

उपनिषद्ब्रह्मसा परमात्मधीः सहजशक्तिवशेन निगद्यते ।

तदुपचर्य महागिरि वर्तते निकटभावमपेक्ष्य तु मुख्यगीः ॥

The word *Upaniṣad* signifies the knowledge of the supreme self by its natural significative power; and it refers to the major texts by figuratively identifying the knowledge of the self (with the major texts). In view of the proximity (of the major texts to the knowledge of the self), (it has been previously said<sup>1</sup> that) the word 'Upaniṣad' primarily conveys the major texts.

1. See *SS*, III, 298.

[ 301 ]

उपनिषद्ब्रह्मसाभिहितात्मधीः निकटवर्तिमहागिरि मुख्यवत् ।

उपनिषद्ब्रह्मचनं तदवान्तरे वचसि गौणवदत्र विवक्ष्यते ॥

The knowledge of the self is conveyed by the word 'Upaniṣad'. In scripture and in ordinary experience, the word is used primarily in respect of the major texts, which are proximate (to the knowledge of the self by being its cause); and secondarily with reference to the other texts subsidiary to the major texts.

[ 302 ]

यतो महावाक्यत एव पुत्रो विजज्ञिवांस्य पितुः सकाशात् ।

इति श्रुतं तेन स एव वेदस्तथैव सैवोपनिषच्च सिद्धा ॥

- 
1. पचरय्य — *M*<sub>1</sub>, *P*<sub>2</sub>.      2. चनाभिहिता सती निकट — *P*<sub>2</sub>.  
चनाभिहिता — *B*<sub>1</sub>.



As it is known (from the *Śruti* texts)<sup>1</sup> that the son has realized the oneness of the self from the major text through his father, it is established that the major text alone is the 'Upaniṣad' and the 'Veda'.

1. The *Śruti* texts are referred to in *SS*, III, 299.

[ 303 ]

विना महावाक्यमतो न कश्चित् पुमांसमद्वैतमवैति जन्तुः ।  
ततः पदार्थावगमान्न मुक्तिर्घटिष्यते तस्य परोक्षभावात् ॥

No person realizes the absolute self without the major texts. Hence the knowledge of the senses of the terms (*tat* and *tvam*), being mediate, liberation is not attained by it.

[ 304 ]

पदार्थबोधं परिहृत्य वाक्यं न शक्तमात्मानुभावसानाम् ।  
धियं समानेतुमपेक्षितत्वादतः स यत्नेन निरूपितोऽभूत् ॥

The major text is not capable of giving rise to the knowledge culminating in the realization of the self, without the knowledge of the senses of the individual words. As the latter is thus required, it is explained with great effort.

[ 305 ]

तच्छब्दादवगतमद्वितीयमासीत् प्रत्यक्त्वं समधिगतं त्वमित्यनेन ।  
प्रत्यक्त्वं न खलु विनाद्वितीयमेवं नाद्वैतं भवितुमलं विना प्रतीचा ॥

The absolute is known from the term *tat* and the inner self is ascertained from the term *tvam*. The self cannot be inward unless it is absolute and it cannot be absolute without being inward.



[ 306 ]

तर्कप्रतीतिसमयेऽपि तदद्वितीयं

प्रत्यक्परिस्फुरति तत्प्रतिबिम्बितं सत् ।

वेदान्तवाक्यजनिताद्वयबुद्धिभूमि-

निष्ठं पुनः स्फुटतरं भवतीति भेदः ॥

The inner self as absolute manifests by being reflected in the mental state arising from 'reasoning'. But it becomes immediate when reflected in the unconditioned mental state arising from the Upaniṣads. And this is the difference (between the two mental states).

1. *tarkapratītisamaye - vicārajanyabuddhivṛttidaśāyām, TB.*

2. *sphuṭataram - aparokṣam, TB.*

[ 307 ]

अधममध्यमशुद्धिनि दर्पणे परमशुद्धिनि चाननमात्मनः ।

तरतमक्रमतः प्रतिभासते तदिव तत्त्वमिह प्रतिपत्तिषु ॥

Just as one's face is reflected, according to the degree of clarity in the mirror which is not clear, partially clear and very clear (at different times), so also the self is reflected in the mental states (arising from the Vedānta and the reasoning severally).

*pratipattiṣu - buddhivṛttiṣu, S.*

[ 308 ]

एकदेशमुपलभ्य धर्मिणश्चैकदेशमपरं विजानते ।

धर्मिधीव्यवधिकारणादतो नानुमा ह्यनुभवाय वस्तुनः ॥

Perceiving that part of the subject<sup>1</sup> (which is associated with the *probans*),<sup>2</sup> (people) infer its other part (as associated with the *probandum*)<sup>3</sup>. As there is the intervention of the knowledge of the subject, inference is not capable of giving rise to the immediate knowledge of the (partless) self.



It may be objected that the senses of the two terms *tat* and *tvam* which are clarified could be known as identical through the following inferential argument.

“The sense of the term *tat* is identical with the sense of the term *tvam*; because the two are not of diverse nature.”

The result of this argument is that the knowledge of identity between the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* can be arrived at by inferential argument and not by the major texts of the Upaniṣads.

This contention is refuted in this verse; the sense of the term *tat* is only mediate and so the inferential cognition referring to the identity of the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* could only be mediate and not immediate. Since only the immediate knowledge of identity between the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* could remove *avidyā*, the knowledge of identity arising from inferential argument is not efficacious in dispelling *avidyā*.

[ 309 ]

एवं तावत्तत्त्वमर्थो विशुद्धौ बोद्धव्यं चेदन्यदप्यस्ति पृच्छ ।  
यद्यद्बुद्धं तत्तदादाय तिष्ठेर्यच्चाबुद्धं तत्र चाधत्स्व चेतः ॥

Thus the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* are pure by nature. If anything should be known, enquire about that. Remember all the things you learnt, and direct your mind to what has not been known so far.

#### EXTENT OF THE SUBSIDIARY UPANIṢADIC TEXTS

[ 310 ]

बुद्ध्वा तत्त्वंपदार्थावनुभवविषयं कर्तुकामस्तदैक्यं  
वाक्याद्वाक्यार्थनिष्ठाच्छ्रुतिशिरसि गतादञ्जसा तत्त्वमादेः ।  
तच्छेषापन्नमस्मिन् श्रुतिशिरसि वचोजातमन्यद्यदस्ति  
तस्येयत्ताबुभुत्साकुलितनिजमतिः पृच्छति स्मैष भूयः ॥



Thus knowing the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* and desiring to realize quickly the oneness of the self through the sentence *tat tvam asi* which is present in the Upaniṣads and whose import is the partless self; and with a mind zealous to know the exact extent of the group of sentences subsidiary to it (that is, the sentence *tat tvam asi*), the aspirant again enquired thus.

[ 311 ]

अद्याप्यवान्तरवचः परिमाणबोधवैकल्यमस्ति मम तेन महावचोऽपि ।  
वाक्यार्थबुद्धिमनुभूतिफलावसानां नोत्पादयत्यहरहः श्रुतमप्यशक्तेः ॥

Even now I am devoid of the knowledge of the extent of the subsidiary sentences. Hence the major texts though reflected every day are incapable of giving rise to the knowledge of the sense of the sentence which has realization (of the self) as its result.

[ 312 ]

विधिमुखेन परस्य निवेदकं वचनजातमवान्तरसंज्ञितम् ।  
यदपि भेदनिषेधमुखेन तत्परिमितिं प्रतिपादय मे प्रभो ॥

The group of sentences which conveys the self in the affirmative manner and that which signifies it by negating the duality — these are termed subsidiary sentences. Oh lord! explain to me the extent of the subsidiary sentences.

[ 313 ]

सकलवेदशिरःसु परात्मधीपरवचःसु परापरबोधतः ।  
अपुनरुक्तपदान्युपसंहरन् परिमितिं स्वयमेव तु वेत्स्यसि ॥



By distinguishing between the texts that point to the supreme self and the qualified self, and by gathering the unrepeatd words in the sentences of all the Upaniṣads, which give rise to the knowledge of the self, you can understand yourself the extent of the texts (pointing to the supreme self).

[ 314 ]

अपुनरुक्तपदानि विना यतो न परिपुष्कलबुद्धिसमुद्भवः ।  
अपुनरुक्तपदानि ततस्तत्स्त्वमुपसंहर तत्त्वबुभुत्सया ॥

As there cannot arise the knowledge of the absolute self without gathering the unrepeatd words from the other Upaniṣadic texts, bring together all those unrepeatd words, out of desire for the knowledge of the truth.

*tatastataḥ - tattacchākhātāḥ, TB.*

[ 315 ]

कुरु परापरवाक्यविवेचनं तदनु शब्दसमाहरणं कुरु ।  
प्रियशिरःप्रभृतीनि च यत्नवानुपचितापचितानि परित्यज ॥

First distinguish between the texts conveying the supreme self and those signifying the qualified self. And then gather the (unrepeatd) words. Then (from the texts conveying the supreme self) leave out with effort such qualities as joy being its head and so on, as they are qualities liable to increase and decrease.

See the following verse.

[ 316 ]

उपचितापचितानि न निर्गुणे प्रियशिरःप्रभृतीनि कदाचन ।  
निपुणधीरपि कश्चन योजयेदपि तु कोशगुणाः कथिता ह्यमी ॥



A wise man will never relate to the attributeless self the attributes like joy being its head and so on, which are the qualities prone to increase and decrease as they are said to be the qualities of the sheath (of bliss).

This verse is based on the *BS - priyaśīrastvūdyaprāptirupacayā - pacayau hi bhede*, III, iii, 12.

[ 317 ]

इति वचःपरिमाणमुदीरितं विधिवचःसु निषेधगिरां शृणु ।  
बहु निषेध्यममूष्वपि तेन तास्वपि समाहर पूर्ववदेव तत् ॥

Thus the extent of the affirmative sentences is explained. Listen to the extent of the negative sentences. As there are many things that are to be negated, gather the unrepeatd words (conveying the things to be negated) from the other texts as done previously (in the case of the affirmative sentences).

[ 318 ]

अपुनरुक्तनिषेध्यनिषेधकृद्बहुपदाहरणं कुरु तास्वपि ।  
यदि पुनर्न समाहरणं भवेत् परिमितप्रतिषेधनमापतेत् ॥

In the negative sentences also, gather many words which are unrepeatd and which negate the things that are to be negated in the self. If those words are not gathered, then there is the contingency of negation of only limited objects (in the self). (Hence the self cannot be established as free from all duality)

[ 319 ]

विधिवचस्युभयं तु पदे पदे भवति संग्रहवर्जनरूपकम् ।  
स्वकवपुः परिकल्पितरूपयोर्न तु निषेधवचस्सु तथा मतम् ॥



Each word in the affirmative statement has two functions, that is, it conveys the essential nature of the self and (presumptively) negates the superimposed form. But it is not accepted so in the case of the negative sentences.

[ 320 ]

यदिह किञ्चिदबोधसमुद्भवं तदखिलं प्रतिषेधति केवलम् ।  
न तु किमप्युपगृह्य परे पदे भगवतो निविशेत निषेधगीः ॥

The negative statements merely negate the forms in the self which have arisen out of *avidyā*. They do not (like affirmative ones) refer to some form and convey it (as the essential nature of) the supreme status of God.

[ 321 ]

इति विशेष इह प्रतिपादितो विधिनिषेधगिरोरुभयोरपि ।  
अपुनरुक्तपदाहरणं पुनर्विधिनिषेधवचस्व<sup>1</sup>विशेषितम् ॥

Thus the difference between the affirmative and the negative statement has been explained. But the gathering of the unrepeatd words is similar to both the affirmative and negative statements.

[ 322 ]

<sup>2</sup>श्रुतपदैरुपसंहृतिशालिभिर्यदवशिष्टनिषेधनम् ।  
तदपि <sup>3</sup>पूर्वमिहाभिमतं श्रुतेः <sup>4</sup>श्रुतपदान्युपलक्षणमेव हि ॥

The thing which is not negated by the words which are gathered together should be negated; and for that purpose the word which would convey the negation (of the thing which is not yet negated) also must be added to the negative statements. This is accepted by the *śruti* text

- 
1. स्वविशेषतः — B<sub>1</sub>, स्वविशेषितः — B<sub>2</sub>.
  2. श्रुतिपदैः — B<sub>2</sub>, M<sub>1</sub>. 3. पूर्व — P<sub>2</sub>. 4. श्रुतिपदान्यु — B<sub>2</sub>.



also. The words found in the *śruti* text merely indicate the things to be negated (and they are not exhaustive).

[ 323 ]

समुपसंहतशब्दसमन्वितैः श्रुतिपर्विदैधिवाक्यगतैः पुनः ।

समुपलक्ष्यतया न परात्मनः किमपि रूपमिहाभ्यधिकं मतम् ॥

But in the case of the self no additional form is accepted, apart from the forms conveyed by the words, which are mentioned in the affirmative statements and which are associated with the words gathered (later).

[ 324 ]

न खलु संश्रुतसंहतशब्दयोरविषयः परमात्मन इष्यते ।

किमपि रूपममुत्र हि नास्ति नः किमपि मानमतो न तदस्ति नः ॥

It is not accepted that in the case of the self there is any form which is not signified by the words that are either studied (in the texts) or later gathered; for there is no proof to establish such a form. Hence there is no form of the self' (apart from those signified by the words studied or grouped).

1. "Form of the self" means the essential nature of the self and not qualities.

[ 325 ]

गुणतया हि पदानि परात्मनो विधिनिषेधवचस्ववतस्थिरे ।

गुणगणो गुणितन्त्रतया गुणी भवति यत्र हि तत्र भवत्यसौ ॥

In the affirmative and the negative statements, the words stand as subservient to the self (by giving rise to its knowledge). Wherever there is the principal thing, there the group of subsidiary things is present as dependent on the principal thing.



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विधिनिषेधवचः परिमाणतस्तव मया कथितं नयवर्त्मना ।  
यदपरं तव वस्तु बुभुत्सितं तदिह नः पुरतः प्रकटीकुरु ॥

[The preceptor says]:-

On the basis of the arguments, the extent of the affirmative and the negative statement has been explained. If there is any other thing you desire to know, reveal that in our presence (by putting questions).

### THE PROXIMATE AND THE REMOTE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

[ 327 ]

अन्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गसाधने भेदतः कथय तद्बुभुत्सितम् ।  
ज्ञानजन्मत इदं जिघृक्षितं हेयमेतदिति चोपपत्तिभिः ॥

Explain to me through reasoning the means to the knowledge (of the self), namely, the proximate and remote means (by mutually) distinguishing them in the form 'this one should be observed' and 'this one is to be abandoned'.

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अन्तरङ्गमपवर्गकाङ्क्षिभिः कार्यमेव यतिभिः प्रयत्नतः ।  
त्याज्यमेव बहिरङ्गसाधनं यत्नतः पतनभीरुभिर्भवेत् ॥

The proximate means should be observed with effort by the ascetic who longs for the knowledge of the self. And the remote means should be abandoned with effort



by the ascetics who are afraid of a fall (from the stage of an ascetic).

*apavargah - jñānam, SS.*

[ 329 ]

उच्यते शृणु विविच्य साधनं ज्ञानजन्मनि यदूचिवान् गुरुः ।  
अन्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गभेदतः शब्दशक्तिमनुसृत्य वैदिकीम् ॥

This is the reply: listen, I shall elucidate to you the means to the knowledge (of the self), the means which have been explained by the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* by distinguishing them as proximate and remote.

[ 330 ]

यच्छ्रुतं विविदिषोदयाय तत् सर्वमेव बहिरङ्गसाधनम् ।  
अन्तरङ्गमवगच्छ तत्पुनर्यत्परावगतिसाधनं श्रुतम् ॥

All that which is heard (that is, taught) as the means to the rise of the desire for knowledge,<sup>1</sup> is remote means (to the knowledge of the self). And that which is heard (that is, taught) as the means to the knowledge of the self is proximate means.<sup>2</sup>

1. *Brh.*, IV, iv, 22.

2. *Brh.*, IV, iv, 23.

[ 331 ]

यद्धि कारकतयावगम्यते दूरतस्तदिह साधनं धियः ।  
अन्तरङ्गमखिलं तु तत्पुनर्व्यञ्जकं भवति यत्परात्मनः ॥

The remote means to the knowledge of the self are known to be the productive factors (that is, sacrifice, penance, etc). The proximate means, on the other hand,



are those which are the revealing media of the supreme self (that is, Vedāntic study, reasoning, and meditation).

[ 332 ]

कारकस्य करणेन तत्क्षणाद्विक्षुरेव पतितो भवेद्यथा ।  
व्यञ्जकस्य परिवर्जनात्तथा सद्य एव पतितो भवेदसौ ॥

Just as the ascetic swerves from his state the moment he observes the productive factors, so also he falls from his state the moment he fails to pursue the media revealing the self.

[ 333 ]

प्रत्ययार्थविषयं हि कर्मणामुच्यते विविदिषेयुरित्यतः ।  
न प्रकृत्यभिहितार्थवेदने वेद'वाचि विनियोगशासनम् ॥

The Vedic text *Vividiṣanti*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> declares that the acts (sacrifice, penance) have for their object (the desire for the knowledge of the self, which is) the sense of the (desiderative) suffix. The acts are not employed with reference to the knowledge of the self (that is, the sense of the root *vid*).

1. *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22.

The desiderative suffix is used in the sense of desire on the basis of the *Pāṇini-Sūtra* :-

*dhātōḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkādicchāyām vā*, III, i, 7.

[ 334 ]

न प्रधानमपहाय वेदनेनान्वयं व्रजति कर्मसाधनम् ।  
संगतिर्भवति वेदनेच्छया वेदनेन न तु कर्मणां क्वचित् ॥

1. वादविनि — P<sub>2</sub>.

2. वादविनि — P<sub>2</sub>.



The religious acts which are the means do not have any relation with 'knowledge' (that is, the sense of the root *vid*) by leaving out the primary sense (that is, the desire for knowledge which is the sense of the suffix). The religious acts are related to the desire for knowledge and never with knowledge.

[ 335 ]

न प्रधानमिह वेदनं भवेत्प्रत्ययार्थविषयां प्रधानताम् ।  
उत्समर्जं भगवान्निरङ्कुशं येन पाणिनिरलङ्घ्यशासनः ॥

Venerable Pāṇini, whose rules (on grammar) cannot be disregarded, states as a general rule that the sense of the suffix is primary (to that of the root). Hence here, knowledge (being the sense of the root *vid*) is not primary.

1. *vide* the *Pāṇini-Sūtra*:

*pradhānapratyayārthavacanamarthasyā nyāpramāṇatvāt*, I, ii, 56.

*utsasarja* — *utsargeṇa jñāpitavān*, SS.

[ 336 ]

प्रत्यये सनि न चापवादकं किञ्चिदप्युदितवानसौ मुनिः ।  
येन तत्र गुणभावमुद्बहेत् प्रत्ययाभिहितमर्थवस्तुनः ॥

The sage (Pāṇini) has not stated any exception in the case of the desiderative suffix, in which case the sense of the suffix would become secondary to the sense of the root.

*arthavastunaḥ* — *dhātvarthasya*, S.

*Arthavastunaḥ* is the reading adopted in S. Others, however, prefer the reading *arthavastu naḥ* and construe the word *arthavastu* with *pratyayābhihitam* and take it to mean *icchākhyam vastu*. This reading is not adopted, as we have to take the sense — "the sense of the root" (which is got by adopting the reading *arthavastunaḥ*) as understood.



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धातोः कर्मण इत्युवाच भगवान् यत्पाणिनिस्तत्पुन-  
 र्धात्वर्थस्य न वेदयत्यभिमतं प्राधान्यमायुष्मतः ।  
 किं त्वार्थं न तु शब्दगम्यमवदत्तानापि तद्योक्ष्यते  
 नोत्सर्गस्य विना निमित्तमपरं संकोचनं युज्यते ॥

Oh Long lived one! The *Sūtra* - *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ*, etc., stated by Pāṇini does not verbally convey the primary nature of the sense of the root (that is, knowledge) which is required for the relation of religious acts to it (that is, the sense of the root - knowledge). But the primary nature of the sense of the root is presumptively known and it is reasonable. And the restriction of (the scope of) the general rule without any (valid) reason is not appropriate.

It is objected: the sense of the root, being the object of desire that is, the sense of suffix, is primary and hence the religious acts are related to the sense of the root, that is, knowledge, which is primary and not to the sense of the suffix, namely, the desire for the knowledge of the self. And the primary nature of the sense of the root is known from the *Pāṇini-Sūtra* —

*dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkādicchāyām vā*, III, i, 7.

This objection is refuted in this verse. Sarvajñātman points out that the sense of the root is primary only by being the object of the sense of the suffix and hence its primary nature, is presumptively known. The religious acts could have relation with the sense of the root, namely, knowledge, only when the primary nature of the latter is verbally expressed. But here, as its primary nature is only presumptively known, religious acts cannot have relation with it, that is, they cannot be subordinated to it.

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धातोः कर्मण इत्युदीरणमिदं साधारणं दृश्यते  
 शब्दार्थत्वविशेषसूचकतया न ह्यत्र सूत्रे पदम् ।



धात्वर्थस्य तु कर्मतावचनमत्रोच्चारितं केवलं  
तत्त्वार्थेऽप्युपपद्यमानमधुना नोत्सर्गपीडाकरम् ॥

The *Sūtra* - *dātoḥ karmanah*, etc., is general (that is it does not point out whether the primary nature of the sense of the root is presumptively known or verbally expressed); for, in this *Sūtra* there is no word that could indicate whether it (that is, the primary nature of the sense of the root) is verbally expressed or presumptively known. Here the word that signifies the sense of the root to be the object, is alone used. And this, being reasonable even when it is presumptively known that it is primary, does not supersede the general rule (that the sense of the suffix is primary).

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इच्छायामिति सूत्रकारवचनं प्राधान्यपक्षे भवे-  
दिच्छार्थस्य समञ्जसं न खलु तत्सम्प्रत्ययार्थे गुणे ।  
धात्वर्थे ननु सन् भवेदिति वदेदिच्छा गुणश्चेद्ववे-  
दिच्छायामिति वक्ति तेन वदति प्राधान्यमिच्छागतम् ॥

The word *icchā* used by the author of the *Sūtra* (Pāṇini) would be reasonable, only if the sense of desire is primary, and not indeed when the sense of the desiderative suffix (that is, desire) is secondary. If desire is secondary, then he would have said that the desiderative suffix should be used in the sense of the root. But he says that it should be used in the sense of desire and hence he means that the sense of desire is primary.

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तस्मात्कर्म समस्तमेव तु भवेदिच्छाजनेः साधनं  
शास्त्रेणोक्तमतः समस्तमपि तद्यत्नेन हेयं यतः ।  
दृष्टव्यत्वमनद्य साधनतया यत्तत्प्रतीचः श्रुतं  
वेदान्तश्रवणादिकं भवति तत्कर्तव्यमावश्यकम् ॥



Here all the rituals stated by the scripture are the means to the rise of the desire for the knowledge of the self. Hence all of them should be carefully abandoned (by one who is already having the desire for the knowledge of the self). And that which has been stated in the *Śruti* text as the means to the knowledge of the self such as Vedāntic study, etc., should be necessarily observed.

1. *Bṛh*, II, iv, 5.

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वेदान्तवाक्यमिह कारणमात्मबोधे-  
हेत्वन्तराणि परिपन्थिनिबर्हणानि ।  
यज्ञादिकानि दुरितं क्षपयन्ति बुद्धेः<sup>aptive</sup>  
स्तत्त्वंपदार्थविषयं तम उत्तराणि ॥

And here the Upaniṣadic text is the (direct) cause of the knowledge of the self. And the other means are meant to overcome the obstacles. The performance of sacrifices, etc., eliminates all sins from the mind, while the latter ones (proximate means such as Vedāntic study, etc.) remove *avidyā* regarding the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam*.

[ 342 ]

तत्त्वंपदार्थविषयं तम इत्यपीदं  
मर्वागवस्थजनदृष्टिमपेक्ष्य गीतम् ।  
अज्ञानमुत्तमदृशां पुनरेकमेव  
संसारमूलमपवर्गफला च विद्या ॥

From the standpoint of ordinary men, it is said that nescience has the senses of terms *tat* and *tvam* as its content. But from the standpoint of those who know the true import of the terms, there is only one *avidyā* which is the root-cause of transmigration. And the knowledge of the self has liberation as its result.



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अज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययरूपकाणि ब्रह्मात्मबुद्धिजननप्रतिबन्धकानि ।  
तत्त्वंपदार्थविषयाणि निवर्तयन्ति ह्यावृत्तिमन्ति मननश्रवणादिकानि ॥

Ignorance, doubt, and erroneous notion regarding the senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* are the obstacles in the way of realization of the oneness of the self. And the repeated (Vedāntic) study, reasoning and meditation (upon the self) remove all these obstacles.

*ajñānaṁ—tātparyādiññānābhāvāḥ*

*saṁśayaḥ—aham brahma vā na vā ityevamādirūpaḥ*

*viparyayaḥ—aham kartetyevamādirūpaḥ, TB.*

[ 344 ]

शब्दशक्तिविषयं निरूपणं युक्तिः श्रवणमुच्यते बुधैः ।  
वस्तुवृत्तिविषयं निरूपणं युक्तितो मननमित्युदीर्यते ॥

Wise men hold that the 'ascertainment of the import of the Upanisads by the six-fold means' is known as 'study'. And the determination of the unity of Being by arguing (within oneself) is stated to be 'reasoning'.

1. *yuktitaḥ — upakramādibhiḥ*

*upakramo'pasamhārāvabhyāso'purotā phalam*

*arthavādapapattī ca liṅgaṁ tātparyanirṇaye, TB*

[ 345 ]

चेतसस्तु चित्तिमात्रशेषता ध्यानमित्यभिवदन्ति वैदिकाः ।  
अन्तरङ्गमिदमित्यमीरितं तत्कुरुष्व परमात्मबुद्धये ॥

Those who believe in the Veda hold that 'meditation' signifies the resting of the mind (in an intense manner) on the pure consciousness. Thus the proximate means have been stated; and pursue them for attaining the realization of the supreme self.



[ 346 ]

श्रवणमननबुद्धयोजातयोर्यत्फलं तत्  
 निपुणमतिभिरुच्चैरुच्यते दर्शनाय ।  
 अनुभवनविहीना यैवमेवेति बुद्धिः  
 श्रुतमननसमाप्तौ तन्निदिध्यासनं हि ॥

It is stated by wise men that the result of the knowledge arising from Vedāntic study and reasoning leads to the realization (of the self). And the knowledge in the form (I am the supreme self) which arises after Vedāntic study and reasoning and which is devoid of immediacy is indeed 'meditation'.

In this view 'meditation' need not be pursued like Vedāntic study and reasoning, as it is the result of the latter two. The view set forth in this verse, according to SS is advocated by Sureśvara.

*vide* : also SLS, p. 35.

[ 347 ]

पूर्वाप्यदृष्टपरिपन्थिनिबर्हणानि दृष्टं हरन्ति च विरोधिनमुत्तराणि ।  
 वाक्यं निरस्तसकलप्रतिबन्धकं सदात्मानमद्वयमखण्डमबुद्धमाह ॥

The former (means, that is, sacrifice etc.) remove the obstacle in the form of unseen (demerit). And the latter (means, that is, Vedāntic study, etc.) eliminate the obstacle in the form of erroneous notion, etc. (regarding the import of the Upaniṣads). When all these obstacles are removed, the sentence imparts the knowledge of the absolute partless self which is not so far realized.

[ 348 ]

यज्ञादिक्षपितसमस्तकल्मषाणां पुत्रादित्रयगतसङ्गवर्जितानाम् ।  
 संशुद्धे पदयुगलार्थतत्त्वमार्गे प्रायेणोद्भवति हि जन्मनीह विद्या ॥



To those whose mind is free from all demerits by the performance of sacrifices, and who are devoid of any attachment to the three, namely, son, (wealth and world),<sup>1</sup> and who have clarified the concepts of the two terms (*ta* and *tvam*) which are the means to the knowledge of the self, there gradually arises the knowledge of the self in this life itself.

1. *vide* : *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 22.

[ 349 ]

अत्रैव जन्मनि भवेदपवर्गदायि वाक्यप्रसूतमनुभूतिफलावसानम् ।  
ज्ञानं निवारकनिमित्तवशादमुष्मिञ्जन्मन्यपीति वचनादवगम्यते हि ॥

The intuitive knowledge of the self leading to liberation would arise from the (Upaniṣadic) sentence in this life itself. But, owing to some causes which obstructs its rise, knowledge would arise in the next life; and this is known from the *śruti* (and *smṛti*) statements.<sup>1</sup>

1. See the following verse.

[ 350 ]

ज्ञानोत्पत्तिं वामदेवस्य गर्भे श्रुत्वा विद्वः साधनं प्राच्यमस्य ।  
योगभ्रष्टस्येत्यवष्टम्भतोऽपि विज्ञातव्यं साधनं प्राच्यमस्य ॥

After studying (the scripture declaring) the rise of knowledge to Vāmadeva when he was in his (mother's) womb, we understand that he should have adopted the means to knowledge in his previous life. Similarly on the basis of the *smṛti* text *Yogabhraṣṭa*, etc., we should know that Vāmadeva pursued the means to knowledge in his previous life.

The *śruti* and *smṛti* texts referred to here are :

1. *Ait* , II, i, 5.                      2. *Bh. G.*, VI, 41.



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चित्रादिवद्भवति साधनजातमस्य ज्ञानप्रसूतिकरमित्यवगच्छ सर्वम् ।  
अभ्यग्रशुष्यदखिलौषधिकस्य पुंसो वृष्टिप्रदेष्टिरधिकारवशादिहैव ॥

Understand that the entire means give rise to knowledge (either in this life or in the next life) like the ritual named *Citrā*. But the ritual which has rain as its fruit gives its fruit here itself, owing to the competence of the sacrificer whose crops have become dry for want of rain at the time of performing the sacrifice.<sup>1</sup>

1. One who wants rain to the crops which are dry is to perform the ritual named *Kārīri*. The ritual, when performed according to the prescribed rules, invariably gives rise to rain immediately.

The Vedic texts kept in view in this verse are :

- i) *citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*
- ii) *kārīryā yajeta vṛṣṭikāmaḥ*.

[ 352 ]

बहिरङ्गसाधनमशेषगुरोः परमेश्वरस्य चरणाम्बुजयोः ।  
नियमात्समर्पितमशेषमधं विनिहन्ति बुद्धिनिलयं महत् ॥

The remote means, when dedicated, according to the prescribed rules, to the lotus-like feet of God, who is the sovereign of the universe, remove (even) the horrid defects present in the mind.

[ 353 ]

न तथान्तरङ्गमुपलब्धिजनैरुपकारकं शमदमप्रभृति ।  
तदनुष्ठितं परमहंसजनैः परमात्मतत्त्वमुपलम्भयति ॥

But the proximate means such as control of mind and external senses which are useful in giving rise to the knowledge (of the self) are not so (that is, they need not be dedicated to God). When pursued by the ascetics, they give rise to the knowledge of the supreme self.



[ 354 ]

भगवाननादिनिधनः कृपया हरितदाह जगदेकहितः ॥  
सकलं समर्प्य मयि युक्तमनाः कुरु कर्म शुद्धिकरमित्यसकृत् ॥

Lord Kṛṣṇa who is devoid of origin and destruction, and who is keen on the welfare of the universe, frequently says with compassion (thus): "Being attached towards me, do the religious acts that purify (the mind) by dedicating (their fruit) to me."<sup>1</sup>

1. *vide*: Bk. G., III, 30; XII, 10.

[ 355 ]

न तथान्तरङ्गफलसंन्यसनं कचिदूचिवानत इदं विदितम् ।  
अनपेक्ष्य तत्फलपरित्यजनं परमात्मनिश्चयफलं तदिति ॥

Nowhere does he state the renunciation of the fruit of the proximate means. Since the latter has the knowledge of the supreme self as its fruit, it is known that it should be pursued without renouncing its fruit.

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अपि च बन्धनहेतुतया श्रुतं <sup>1</sup>समसमीक्षणकौशलशालिनः ।  
<sup>2</sup>भवति शुद्धिकरं न च बन्धकृ<sup>3</sup>द्ववति कर्म तथा घटते हि तत् ॥

Moreover, the religious rites which are known to be the cause of bondage, purify the mind of one who performs them by dedicating their fruit to God. Then they do not become the cause of bondage, but only purify the mind.

[ 357 ]

यदिह साधनमात्मधियः श्रुतं न च फलान्तरहेतुतया श्रुतम् ।  
शमदमादिकमत्र तु कौशलं किमपि काङ्क्षितमस्ति न सिद्ध्ये ॥

1. सकलमीक्षण — B<sub>1</sub>.      2. भवतु — P<sub>2</sub>.      3. भवतु — M<sub>1</sub>.



But the means to the knowledge of the self such as control of mind and external senses are not known to be the cause of any other fruit. It does not require any other factor (that is, dedication of its fruit to the Lord) to give rise to the knowledge of the self.

[ 358 ]

उक्तं साधनजातमत्र सकलं विद्यासमुत्पत्तये  
यस्मिन्कर्मणि वैदिकेन विधिना नुन्नः परिव्राजकः ।  
कर्तृत्वाद्युपमर्दनेन भवता विद्यानुकूलात्मना  
कर्तव्यं तदशेषतस्तदनु ते विद्या विपाकं व्रजेत् ॥

So far the group of the means for the rise of the knowledge has been stated. And the ascetic is prompted towards the means (that is, Vedāntic study, etc.,) by the Vedic injunction.<sup>1</sup> The entire means should be pursued by you through the annihilation of the feeling that you are an agent, which (that is, annihilation) is contributory to the rise of the knowledge. Then the knowledge will become fully ripened.

1. *vide Brh.*, II, iv, 5.

[ 359 ]

वानप्रस्थगृहस्थनैष्ठिकजनैरन्यैश्च वर्णाश्रमैः  
कर्मव्यध्वनिषेवितं भवति वै जन्मान्तरे पाचकम् ।  
विद्यायाः श्रवणादिलक्षणमिदं न ह्येतदेषां क्वचित्  
शास्त्रेण प्रतिषिद्धमीक्षितमिदं शूद्रस्य दृष्टं यथा ॥

When the means in the form of Vedāntic study, etc., are pursued by the hermits, householders, one who has taken the vow of celibacy and by others belonging to any class or stage of life, at the time they are free from obligatory rites, they give rise to the knowledge of the self in the



next life (when they take up the ascetic stage of life). There is no scripture prohibiting them from Vedāntic study, like the one prohibiting the Śūdras.

[ 360 ]

सर्वश्रुतिस्मृतिवचोभिरयं परिव्राण्मुण्डः शुचिः परमहंस इति प्रसिद्धः ।  
ज्ञानाय साधनधनेषु नियुज्यमानः प्रायेण बुद्धिपरिपाकमवाप्स्यतीह ॥

The ascetic who is having his head shaved, who is pure and well-known to be a *paramahansa*,<sup>1</sup> and who is directed towards the means (namely, Vedāntic study, etc.,) for the rise of the knowledge (of the self) by numerous *śruti* and *smṛti* texts, generally attains the ripened knowledge in this life itself.

1. *vide* the *Jābālopaniṣad*, 5.

[ 361 ]

जन्मान्तरेषु यदि साधनजातमासीत्  
संन्यासपूर्वकमिदं श्रवणादिरूपम् ।  
विद्यामवाप्स्यति जनः सकलोऽपि यत्र  
तत्राश्रमादिषु वसन्न निवारयामः ॥

If one adopted the means in the form of Vedāntic study, etc., in the previous life by being an ascetic (and if knowledge did not arise owing to some impediment in that life), we do not gainsay that one would attain the knowledge (of the self) in the next life irrespective of the stage of life which one leads then.

*Sannyāsa*, according to Sarvajñātman, becomes the means of the knowledge of the self by giving rise to unseen merit. The impediments

1. गणेषु — B<sub>2</sub>.



present in the mind of the aspirant are too many; some are removable by the unseen merit that arises from the performance of *karma* without any attachment towards its fruit, and others are removable by the unseen merit that arises when one adopts *sannyāsa-āśrama* and pursues the duties relating to that stage. If one pursues *śravaṇa*, etc., by remaining a *sannyāsin* and if the knowledge of the self does not arise in this birth because of certain impediments, then the knowledge of the self will definitely arise to one in the next birth. If one pursues *śravaṇa*, etc., without being a *sannyāsin*, then the knowledge of the self will not arise in this birth because the impediments which are removable by the unseen merit that would arise from adopting *sannyāsa-āśrama* exist since the aspirant has not taken up *sannyāsa*. To such an aspirant the knowledge of the self would arise in a next birth, and that too, after he adopts *sannyāsa-āśrama*.

Other preceptors hold that the unseen merit arising from adopting *sannyāsa-āśrama* is one of the qualifications of an aspirant who pursues *śravaṇa*, etc.

For details see *SLS*, pp. 427-8.

[ 362 ]

वेदान्तविज्ञानमुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।  
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ॥

Those who have pure mind and who have become ascetics then, and who pursue (the Vedāntic study, etc.,) by renouncing everything, ascertain the nature of the self by the knowledge arising from the Upaniṣads. (And because the knowledge is not ripened), they remain in the world of *Hiraṇyagrābha* and having the ripened knowledge they attain liberation.

This verse is from *Mund.*, III, ii, 6.



## RENUNCIATION FROM ACTIVITIES — A PROXIMATE MEANS TO MOKṢA

[ 363 ]

नैतादृशं ब्राह्मणस्यास्ति वित्तं यथैकता समता सत्यता च ।  
शीलं स्थितिर्दण्डनिधानमाजैवं ततस्ततश्चोपरमः क्रियाभ्यः ॥

There is no other wealth in the case of a Brahmin, than solitude, evenness of mind (in success and in failure) truthfulness, good conduct, keeping within bounds of morality,<sup>1</sup> abstention from injury to any being,<sup>2</sup> rectitude, and renunciation from all activities.

This verse is from the *Mahābhārata* [*Mokṣadharmā*, 169, 35].

1. *sthitih* - *maryādānatikramah*
2. *daṇḍanidhānam* - *himsānivṛttiḥ*.

[ 364 ]

यतो यतो निवर्तते ततस्ततो विमुच्यते ।  
निवर्तनाद्धि सर्वतो न वेत्ति दुःखमण्वपि ॥

One gets released from the thing which one renounces. By refraining from all activities one does not experience even an iota of misery.

[ 365 ]

किं ते धनेन किमु बन्धुभिरेव वा ते  
किं ते दारैर्ब्राह्मण यो मरिष्यसि ।  
आत्मानमन्विच्छ गुहां प्रविष्टं  
पितामहास्ते क्व गताः पिता च ॥

Oh ! brahmin, as you are going to die (at one time), what is the use of wealth, relatives or wife ? Where have



your forefathers and father gone ? (Hence) you enquire into the nature of the self that dwells in the intellect.

*guhāṁ praviṣṭam - buddhyantaranupraviṣṭam, AP.*

[ 366 ]

अर्थस्य मूलं निकृतिः क्षमा च कामस्य रूपं च वयो वपुश्च ।  
धर्मस्य यागादि दया दमश्च मोक्षस्य सर्वोपरमः क्रियाभ्यः ॥

Fraud and patience are the sources of wealth; handsome appearance, young age and beautiful body are the sources of sensual pleasure ; and sacrifice, etc., compassion and control of senses are the basis of virtue. And the renunciation of all activities is the basis of self realization.



## ॥ चतुर्थोऽध्यायः ॥

### QUESTION REGARDING THE FRUIT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF

[ 1 ]

उक्तसाधनसमुद्भवा सती किं प्रयच्छति फलं मुमुक्षवे ।  
प्रत्यगात्ममतिरत्र मे मनस्यर्थिता समुपजायतेऽधुना ॥

[The disciple asks:]

Now, there arises in my mind the desire to know what kind of result does the knowledge of the inner self which arises from the means mentioned before, give the aspirant longing for liberation?

[ 2 ]

किं निरस्तसहकारिकारणा केवलैव फलमर्पयेन्मतिः ।  
बाह्यसाधनसहायसंपदा वान्विता फलविधायिनी भवेत् ॥

Does the knowledge of the self itself unaided by any auxiliary cause give the result? Or, does it, by being largely assisted by the external means give the result?

[ 3 ]

एतदप्यहमवैतुमुत्सहे निर्णयं कुरु कृपाविधेयधीः ।  
एतदेव हि दयालुलक्षणं यद्विनेयजनबुद्धिवर्धनम् ॥

I wish to know this also, and you, having the mind overwhelmed by compassion towards me, ascertain this (by removing my doubts). And indeed, is not developing the knowledge of the disciple alone the characteristic of a compassionate preceptor?



## THE FRUIT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF

[ 4 ]

उच्यते न तमसो निवृत्तिः किञ्चिदस्ति परमात्मधीफलम् ।  
अन्यदल्पमपि साधनान्तरं न व्यपेक्ष्य फलदायिनी च धीः ॥

It is replied thus:— The result of the knowledge of the self is none other than the annihilation of nescience. And the knowledge, without regard for the other means in the least, gives rise to its result.

[ 5 ]

शुक्तिकाविषयबुद्धिजन्मनः शुक्तिकागततमोनिवृत्तिः ।  
नापरं किमपि दृश्यते फलं नापरं च सहकारिकारणम् ॥

Apart from the annihilation of *avidyā* abiding in (the consciousness delimited by) the nacre, no other result is seen (to ensue) from the rise of the knowledge of the nacre as object. And it (namely, the knowledge of nacre) does not have any other auxiliary cause (to annihilate the *avidyā* present in the consciousness delimited by nacre).

[ 6 ]

एवमात्मनि तमोनिवृत्तितो नान्यदस्ति परमात्मधीफलम् ।  
नाप्यपेक्ष्य सहकारिकारणं किञ्चिदात्ममतिरर्पयेत्फलम् ॥

Similarly, apart from the annihilation of *avidyā* abiding in the self, no other result arises from the knowledge of the self. And the knowledge of the self gives forth its result without requiring any other auxiliary cause.

[ 7 ]

ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्रमाणं भवति दृढमिदं नात्र कश्चिद्विवादः  
ब्रह्मात्मा चैकरूपो न च बहुरसकस्तत्परत्वाच्छ्रुतीनाम् ।



एवं सत्यद्वयात्मप्रमितिफलमिह द्वैतमूलापनुत्ति-  
न ह्यज्ञानापनुत्तेरधिकमपि फलं किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणात् ॥

The knowledge of the self indisputably becomes a proof, and there is no controversy about this. The inner self identical with the supreme self is unitary and it does not have diverse forms. And the *śruti* texts have it as its import. When such is the case, the annihilation of the root-cause of duality is the result of the knowledge of the absolute self. And from this proof no other result ensues apart from the annihilation of *avidyā*.

[ 8 ]

निरभिसन्धि समर्पितमच्युते विहितमिष्टफलादपि निर्गतम् ।  
यदपि कर्म तदप्यवधीरितं यदि धिया न तया परमर्थ्यते ॥

When the prescribed rituals which are performed without any desire for the result, which are dedicated to God and which are devoid of their respective desired result, are abandoned by the knowledge (in giving rise to its result), the rituals which are performed out of desire for the result are (certainly) not required by the knowledge (in giving rise to its result).

#### REFUTATION OF JNĀNA-KARMA - SAMUCCAYA-VĀDA

[ 9 ]

समविषमसमुच्चयो न युक्तो न हि जगदस्ति धियः प्रसूतिकाले ।  
क्व नु बत विहितक्रियासमूहः कथमिव तत्र समुच्चयोपपत्तिः ॥

The combination of rituals and knowledge having equal or unequal emphasis is not reasonable; for, at the time



of the rise of the knowledge (of the self), the universe does not exist (that is, it is annihilated). Alas! wherefore can there be the (existence of the) group of the prescribed rituals and how is the combination of rituals and knowledge reasonable?

[ 10 ]

अपि च परमहंसस्त्यक्तसर्वैषणः सन्  
 अनुभवफलविद्यां साधनैर्यद्य<sup>१</sup>वाप ।  
 कथमिव पुनर<sup>२</sup>त्र प्राप्तिरस्ति क्रि<sup>३</sup>याया  
 भवतु तदपवर्गो विद्ययैवैकयास्य ॥

Moreover, if the ascetic who has renounced all desires, should attain the intuitive knowledge of the self by the (proximate) means, how could there be the requirement of the rituals for (the rise of) the intuitive knowledge (of the self)? Hence let there be liberation to the aspirant by knowledge alone.

[ 11 ]

यस्य प्रयोगविधिरस्ति परिग्रहीता द्वारैदमर्थ्यविनिवेदकमस्य सर्वम् ॥  
 श्रुत्यादिमानमिह नास्ति तदात्मबुद्धौ तस्मादियं भवतु नः पुरुषार्थभूता ॥

The significative element, etc., convey the subsidiary nature (of a particular rite) only when the latter comes within the scope of the injunction of principal rite. The significative element, etc., are not present in the case of the knowledge of the self (as the latter does not come within the scope of any injunction of the principal rite). Hence, in our system, the knowledge of the self is the cause of human goal.

1. *śrutilīṅgaṅkyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhya*, etc., *Jaimini-Sūtra*, 3—3—7/14.

1. वापः M<sub>1</sub>; 2. ऽस्य — B<sub>1</sub>; ऽस्यां — P<sub>2</sub>; 3. ऽयायां — M<sub>1</sub>.



*Prayoga-vidhi* is the injunctive text which prescribes the principal rite and which is associated with the sentences enjoining the subsidiaries to the principal religious rite.

It might be said that the knowledge of the self is subsidiary to sacrifices, by giving rise to some unseen merit to the sacrificer. This is refuted by saying that the significative element, etc., convey the subsidiary nature of being. But the latter should occur in the context of injunction of principal rite. As the knowledge of the self does not occur in the context of any injunction of the principal rite, there is no significative element which could convey its subsidiary nature.

## NATURE OF THE REMOVAL OF AVIDYĀ

[ 12 ]

सदसत्सदसद्विकल्पितप्रतिपक्षैकवपुर्निवर्तनम् ।  
तमसोऽभ्युपगम्यतेऽन्यथानुपपत्त्यापतनैकहेतुतः ॥

The removal of *avidyā* is accepted to be (of the form of an indefinable fifth kind) different from being real, unreal, real-cum-unreal, and indeterminable, on the only ground that it (namely, the removal of *avidyā*) would be inexplicable if it is otherwise.

For details see Introduction, p. 80.

*pratīpakṣam - vilakṣaṇam, TB.*

[ 13 ]

सदसत्सदसद्विकल्पितप्रतिबद्धा न भवन्ति वर्णिता ।  
परमात्मतमोनिवर्तनेऽनुपपत्तिप्रतिभासवत्तायः ॥

The difficulties present in the view that the removal of *avidyā* is (either) real, (or) unreal, (or) real-cum-unreal or indeterminable, are not present in the view described



before (that is, the removal of nescience is different from being real, unreal, real-cum-unreal, and indeterminable).

*pratibaddhāḥ - āśritāḥ, S.*

*pratibhāsavṛttayaḥ - pratibhāsāḥ, TB.*

[ 14 ]

चित्तिभेदमभेदमेव वा द्वयरूपत्वमथो मृषात्मताम् ।  
परिहृत्य तमोनिवर्तनं प्रथयन्ते खलु मुक्तिकोविदाः ॥

By rejecting (the views) that the removal of nescience is either different from the self, or identical with it, or different from and identical with it at once, or indeterminable, those who are experts in (determining the nature of) liberation hold (that it is an indefinable fifth kind).

Here the epithet *muktikovidāḥ*, refers to the author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*.

See *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 85.

[ 15 ]

अथवा चित्तिरेव केवला वचनोत्पादितबुद्धिवर्त्मना ।  
परमात्मतमोनिवृत्तिगीर्विषयत्वं समुपैत्युपाधिना ॥

Or else, the attributeless self itself becomes the sense of the word 'annihilation of nescience', through the limiting condition, namely, the mental state arising from the (Upaniṣadic) sentence (*tat tvam asi*).

This verse puts forth the Advaitins' conclusive view on the nature of the removal of *avidyā*.

*vide : avidyādhiṣṭhānabhūtātmaiva tannivṛttiḥ, kalpitānāmādhiṣṭhānānirīkṣyānirūpaṇāt, tataśca sū sadrūpaiva iti siddhāntarahasyamāha, SS.*

[ 16 ]

शुक्तिकाविषयबुद्धिजन्मना प्रत्यगात्मचित्तिरेव केवला ।  
शुक्तिकागततमोनिवृत्तिरित्युच्यते दृतिहरिः पशुर्यथा ॥



Just as the word *dr̥tiharī*<sup>1</sup> refers to a dog (through the medium, namely, the nature of being an animal), so also the pure consciousness itself is spoken of as the annihilation of nescience abiding in (the consciousness delimited by) the nacre, through the medium, namely, the mental state having nacre as its object.

1. *vide: haraterdr̥tināthayoh paśau, Pāṇini-sūtra, III, ii, 25.*

See the following verses.

[ 17 ]

वाचको हरणकर्तुरिष्यते शब्द एष हि दृतेर्मनीषिभिः ।  
केवलं तु पशुता निमित्तां बाह्यतः स्थितवती ब्रजेदियम् ॥

It is admitted by wise men that the word *dr̥tiharī* is significative of one which steals leather. And the nature of being an animal is an adventitious condition and it is the ground for the use of the word *dr̥tiharī* in the sense of an animal (which takes away leather, namely, dog).

For further details see *SS*, IV, 20.

[ 18 ]

एवमेव तु तमोनिवृत्तिगीः शुक्तिकाविषयबुद्धिजन्मना ।  
बाह्यतः स्थितवतैव हेतुना प्रत्यगात्मचिति वर्ततेऽञ्जसा ॥

Similarly the expression *annihilation of nescience*, primarily conveys the inner consciousness (delimited by nacre), through the mental state in the form of nacre which is the adventitious condition and which is the ground for the use of the word (annihilation of nescience) in that sense (inner consciousness).

*añjasū - mukhyayā vṛttiyā, SS.*



[ 19 ]

उत्पन्नशुक्तिमतिरात्मचितिर्यथैव  
 शुक्तेस्तमोहतिरिति प्रतिपन्नमेवम् ।  
 आत्मापि जातनिजबुद्धिरबोधहानि-  
 रित्युच्यतेऽमलचिदेकरसो न पूर्वम् ॥

Just as the conscious self (delimited by nacre) is termed 'annihilation of nescience abiding in the nacre', only when it has the mental state in the form of nacre as its adventitious condition, so also the faultless, unitary consciousness is termed 'annihilation of nescience' only when it has the mental state (arising from the Upaniṣads) as its adventitious condition and not before (the rise of the mental state).

[ 20 ]

दृतिहरणकरत्वं पुंसि चान्यत्र चेदं  
 दृतिहरिरिति लोके नोच्यते वर्तमानम् ।  
 अनधिकविकलं सत् कथ्यते तत्पशुस्थं  
 दृतिहरिरिति शिष्टैर्बाह्यहेतोः पशुत्वात् ॥

In ordinary experience, men and others in whom the act of stealing leather is present, are not termed *dṛtihari*. But the animal (the dog) in which the act of stealing leather is simply present is alone termed *dṛtihari*, by those learned in grammar, in view of (the presence of) the adventitious condition, namely, the nature of being an animal.

[ 21 ]

अयमपि परमात्मा प्रत्यगात्मस्वभावो  
 वचनजनितबुद्धेः प्राक्स्वरूपे स्थितोऽपि ।

- 
1. ०मेव — T.      2. ०हानिरुच्यते केवल० — B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.  
 3. ०पूर्वः० — P<sub>2</sub>      4. वान्यत्र — M<sub>1</sub>      5. ०ति शब्देः — P<sub>2</sub>.



न खलु विषयभावं ध्वान्तविच्छेदवाचो  
व्रजति हि तदुपाधेर्बुद्धिवृत्तेरभावात् ॥

Though the supreme self which is of the nature of inner self remains in its (true) nature even before the rise of the mental state from the (Upaniṣadic) sentence, yet it does not become the sense of the expression 'annihilation of nescience' then, because of the absence of the mental state which is the ground for the use of the word ('annihilation of nescience' in the sense of the self).

[ 22 ]

अज्ञानदाह इति नैकपदं समासात्  
पूर्वोत्तरे खलु पदे पदतामुपेतः ।  
ज्ञानोदयं तटगतं समुपाददान-  
स्तस्मात्तमोहतिरवोऽत्र चिति प्रवृत्ताः ॥

The expression 'annihilation of nescience' is not conventionally used in a particular sense. The prior and the latter word (*ajñāna* and *dāha*) when compounded become unitary and hence the compound 'annihilation of nescience' (*ajñāna-dāha*) signifies the self through 'the rise of the mental state' which is the adventitious ground for the use of the word in the sense of self.

See Introduction, p. 82.

[ 23 ]

अत्राप्यसौ दृतिहरिः पशुरित्यखण्डः  
शब्दो न खल्वभिमतोऽवयवार्थयोगात् ।  
धातुश्च वाचकतया हरतिः प्रसिद्धो  
हीनप्रत्ययश्च हरतेः परतः प्रसिद्धः ॥



Here also the word *ḍṛtihari* signifies an animal only when compounded, and not by the relation of the meanings of the parts (*ḍṛti* and *hari*). The root *hr* is well-known to be significative (of the sense of taking away a thing), and the suffix *in* employed after the root *hr* is significative (of the agent).

If the relation of the meanings of the parts of the words *ḍṛtihari* is intended, then the word would mean anything which carries away leather. But when two words *ḍṛti* and *hari* are compounded, they become unitary and convey only the animal - dog that takes away leather.

[ 24 ]

उद्यन्निरस्यति तमश्च तदुद्धवं च  
वेदावसानवचनादथ<sup>१</sup> वोदितः सन् ।  
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुविषयोऽनुभवोऽत एव  
कंचित्सहायमनपेक्ष्य निवर्तकोऽसौ ॥

The knowledge of the oneness of the self as it arises or after having arisen from the Upaniṣads annihilates *avidyā* and its products. Hence it annihilates *avidyā* independently of any auxiliary cause.

[ 25 ]

दीपस्तमस्तिरयतीह<sup>२</sup> भवन्नुतस्वि-  
द्धूत्वा क्षणव्यवधिमात्रमपेक्ष्य नात्र ।  
कश्चिद्विवादपदवीमुपयाति वादी  
तद्वत्प्रतीच्यवगतौ तमसोऽपहन्याम् ॥

1. ०थ चोदितः — B,

2. भवन्कुतश्चित् — P<sub>2</sub>



The disputant does not evoke controversy on the point that a light removes darkness by its mere rise; or after having arisen, it removes (the darkness) by a lapse of only one moment. Similar is the case with the realization of the self that annihilates *avidyā*.

[ 26 ]

उत्पत्तिरेव हि धिया स्वफलं प्रदातु-  
 माकाङ्क्षिता न च ततोऽपरमर्थनीयम् ।  
 यत्कारकं तदिह काङ्क्षति जन्ममात्रा-  
 दन्यन्न धीः किमपि काङ्क्षति जन्म लब्ध्वा ॥

Knowledge, in order to give its result, requires only its rise and nothing else. In ordinary experience whichever is a productive factor, requires something other than its rise to give its result. Knowledge (being a revealing medium and not a productive factor) after having arisen requires nothing else (to give its result).

[ 27 ]

प्रत्यक्षसूत्र इदमेव 'निवेदयिष्यन्'  
 न्यायेन जैमिनिरुवाच विदग्धबुद्धिः ।  
 सत्संप्रयोग इति तत्र हि बुद्धिजन्म-  
 शब्दस्य नान्यदिह किञ्चन कृत्यमस्ति ॥

Jaimini, who has keen intellect, desires to explain this point through reasoning in the aphorism - *sat-samprayoge*<sup>1</sup>, etc., which deals with (the definition of) perception. In that aphorism, the expression - 'the rise of the knowledge' has no other function except this (namely, it conveys that knowledge does not require any other thing than its own rise to manifest the objects).

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1. निरूपयिष्यन् — B.



1. *satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhijanma*  
*tatpratyakṣamanimittān vidyamānopalambhanatvāt, Jaimini-sūtra,*  
 I, i, 4.

The word *janma* in the *sūtra* does not serve any purpose. The *sūtra* would be intelligible even without this word; and the sense of the latter is presumptively known. Yet, Jaimini has used the word to show that knowledge does not require any other thing than its mere rise to manifest the objects.

[ 28 ]

वेदान्तवाक्यजनिता मतिवृत्तिरेव-  
 मुत्पत्तिः सकलमेव भवार्णवाम्बु ।  
 पीत्वा स्वयं च खलु शाम्यति दग्धलोह-  
 पीतं यथाम्बु चितिमेव तु शेषयित्वा ॥

Just as the heated iron removes the water (poured on it) and itself becomes removed of heat, so also the mental state arising from the Upaniṣads, by its mere rise, removes the water of the ocean in the form of transmigration, and itself becomes annihilated by leaving only the pure consciousness.

LIBERATION IS IDENTICAL WITH THE SELF

[ 29 ]

कूटस्थनित्यैव तु मुक्तिरेषा विद्याफलत्वादिह यद्यदेवम् ।  
 तत्तत्ताथा दृष्टमशेषमेव यथा हि शुक्त्यादिपदार्थसंवित् ॥

Liberation is certainly immutable always, because it is the result of knowledge. Whichever is so (that is, the result of knowledge) is seen to be of such a nature (that is, immutable) like the consciousness delimited by shell, etc.<sup>1</sup>

1. ०दिनिविष्टसंवित् — M.,.



1. The true knowledge of shell removes the nescience abiding in the consciousness delimited by shell; and thereby the consciousness manifests itself. The manifestation of consciousness is said to be the result of the knowledge. And the consciousness is immutable.

[ 30 ]

जन्मादिषड्भावविकारहीना शुक्त्यादिवस्तूपनिविष्टसंविद् ॥  
न प्राणभावाच्चतुर्भूतिरस्याः स्वतः प्रमाणादपि द्रव्यते हि ॥

The consciousness delimited by shell, etc., is devoid of the six-fold change of an entity, namely, origin, etc.<sup>1</sup> Indeed the knowledge of the antecedent negation, etc., of consciousness is not reasonable either by itself or by another proof.<sup>2</sup>

1. *jyotiḥ, asti, vardhate, vipariṇamata, apuṇyate, naśyati.*  
*Yinśā, I, 2.*

2. Origin of a thing presupposes the antecedent negation of the thing. As the antecedent negation of consciousness cannot be known it is devoid of origin.

See the following verse.

[ 31 ]

अवुध्यमानो नहि संविदं तत्संबन्धि किञ्चित्प्रतिपत्तमीशः ।  
न बुध्यमानोऽपि तथा तदा हि न संविदेषा विषयत्वहेतोः ॥

Without comprehending the consciousness, one cannot know the factors relating to it (that is, its antecedent negation and destruction). Similarly the latter cannot be known, if consciousness is comprehended; for, then as consciousness is known it becomes an object and (hence) ceases to be consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

1. *स्तन्यविशिष्टसंविद्* — P<sub>2</sub>.



1. If consciousness becomes an object of knowledge, then it is analogous to jar, etc., and it ceases to be consciousness.

[ 32 ]

जन्या न मुक्तिर्घटते कुतश्चिद्विद्याफलत्वादिति पूर्वहेतोः ।  
यद्यद्वि जन्यं जगति प्रसिद्धं तत्तन्न विद्याफल' मम्बरादि ॥

It is not reasonable to hold that liberation is produced. Why so? (It is) because of the aforementioned probans, namely, it is the result of knowledge. In ordinary experience, whichever is known to be produced is not the result of knowledge, like ether, etc.

[ 33 ]

मोक्ष<sup>१</sup>स्वरूपो विफलक्रियोऽसौ विद्याफलत्वादिह यद्यदेवम् ।  
तत्तात्ताथा दृष्टमशेषमेव यथैव रज्ज्वादितमोनिवृत्तिः ॥

As liberation which is of the nature of the self is the result of knowledge it is not attainable by action. Which-ever is so (that is, the result of knowledge) is seen to be of such a nature (that is, not attainable by action), like the annihilation of nescience abiding in rope, etc.

[ 34 ]

सायुज्यादि विवादगोचरपदं निश्चेयसं नो भवेत्  
कार्यत्वादिह यद्यदीदृशमदो निश्चेयसं नेक्षितम् ।  
यद्वत्कुड्यघटादि तादृशमिदं तस्मादिदं तादृशं  
युक्तं कल्पयितुं न तद्विसदृशं तादृङ् न दृष्टं यतः ॥

Intimate association (with the Lord) which is the subject of controversy cannot be the highest human goal (that

1. ०मध्वरादि — P<sub>१</sub>.

2. ०स्वरूपे — P<sub>२</sub>.



is, liberation) because it is produced. In ordinary experience, whichever is so (that is, produced) is not seen to be the highest human goal, like wall, pot, etc. Intimate association is produced and hence it cannot be the highest human goal. As a product is not seen to be of highest goal, it is not reasonable to assume that intimate association (being a product) is different (that is, it is the highest goal).

[ 35 ]

सदसदुद्भवनं न विमुक्तता सदसदुद्भवानुपपत्तिः ।

सदसतोर्नशनं न विमुक्तता सदसतोर्नशनानुपपत्तिः ॥

Liberation is not the rise of an existent or a non-existent entity; for the rise of the existent and the non-existent entity is unreasonable. (Similarly) the annihilation of an existent or a non-existent entity is not liberation; for the annihilation of the existent and non-existent entity is unreasonable.

[ 36 ]

न च तमोमयजन्म विमुक्तता नहि तदिष्टमनिष्टतरं हि तत् ।

न खलु कल्पितजन्म विमुक्तां समुपगच्छति तद्वितथं यतः ॥

Liberation is not the rise of an indeterminable entity; for it is unacceptable and indeed more undesirable. As the rise of the indeterminable object is indeterminable, liberation (being real) is not accepted to be the rise of an indeterminable entity.

[ 37 ]

अथ तमोमयविश्वविकल्पना विलयनात्मकमभ्युपगम्यते ।

सकलदूषणजातविवर्जितं तदिह मोक्षपदं न निवार्यते ॥

Or, if it is accepted that liberation consists in the annihilation of the appearance of the indeterminable uni-



verse, then this view is free from any defect and (hence) it is not objected.

## THE CONCEPT OF JĪVANMUKTI

[ 38 ]

सम्यग्ज्ञानविभावसुः सकलमेवाज्ञानतत्संभवं  
 सद्यो वस्तुबलप्रवर्तनमरुद्धयापारसंदीपितः ।  
 निर्लेपेन हि दन्दहीति न मनागप्यस्य रूपान्तरं  
 संसारस्य शिनष्टि तेन विदुषः सद्यो विमुक्तिर्ध्रुवा ॥

The fire in the form of the true knowledge of the self, set ablaze by the function of the moving wind, namely, the strength of the self, completely annihilates at once the nescience and its products. No other form of worldly existence remains in the least. Hence it is certain that one who has realized the self (is dissociated from his body and attains immediate liberation.

In this verse Sarvajñātman sets forth the view that one who has realized the self is immediately dissociated from his body and attains liberation. He holds that the scripture dealing with liberation while embodied is merely recommendatory.

For details see Introduction, pp. 138-140.

[ 39 ]

जीवन्मुक्तिप्रत्ययं शास्त्रजातं जीवन्मुक्ते कल्पिते योजनीयम् ।  
 तावन्मात्रेणार्थवत्त्वोपपत्तोः सद्यो मुक्तिः सम्यगेतस्य हेतोः ॥

The Upaniṣadic texts propounding the liberation while embodied, are to be understood as treating of one who is fancied as liberated while embodied. And, by this alone the Upaniṣadic texts become fruitful. On this basis, immediate liberation alone is reasonable.



[ 40 ]

यद्वा विद्वद्भोचरं योजनोयं तस्याविद्यालेशवत्त्वोपपत्तेः ।

तस्याभीष्टा निर्निमित्ता निवृत्तिर्यद्वा विद्यासंततिर्हेतुः लेशम् ॥

Or else, the scripture (dealing with liberation while embodied) is to be understood as treating of one who has realized the self. And, it is reasonable that the trace of nescience persists in his case. The trace of nescience is annihilated without a cause. Or else, the realization of the self which continues annihilates the trace (of nescience).

[ 41 ]

जीवन्मु<sup>२</sup>क्तिव्यापृतेः प्रापको यस्तस्याविद्यालेशगन्धादिभाषा ।

नाविद्याया नापि भागस्य तस्यास्तस्मिन् पक्षे दुर्घटत्वाद्विमुक्तेः ॥

The cause which accounts for the function of one who is liberated while living, and which is termed 'trace of nescience', 'tinge of nescience', etc., is neither nescience nor its part. For, in either of the views liberation after the final fall of the body would be incompatible.

[ 42 ]

गन्धच्छायालेशसंस्कारभाषा विज्ञातव्या भाष्यकारीयतन्त्रे ।

स्वाविद्याया बाधितायाः प्रतीतिः पौर्वापर्येणार्थमालोच्य बुद्ध्या ॥

By considering the earlier and the later portion (of Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*), it should be understood that in the *bhāṣya*, (the persistence of) the knowledge of the annihilated nescience alone is termed 'trace (of nescience)', 'shadow (of nescience)', 'tinge (of nescience)', and 'impression (of nescience)'.

The *Bhāṣya* text kept in view in this verse is as follows :

1. लेशः — T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.

2. मुक्तव्यापृतेः — P.

3. प्रतीतिः — M<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>1</sub>, P.



*bādhitamapi tu mithyājñānaṁ dvicandrajñānavat*

*saṁskāraśat kaṁcitkālamanuvartate eva, BSB, IV, i, 15.*

The view expressed in this verse is based on *BSB, IV, i, 15.*

[ 43 ]

जीवन्मुक्तिस्तावदस्ति प्रतीतेर्द्वैतच्छाया तत्र चास्ति प्रतीतेः ।

द्वैतच्छाया रक्षणायस्ति लेशस्तस्मिन्नर्थे स्वानुभूतिः प्रमाणम् ॥

The state of liberation while embodied is (admitted) because it is experienced. And as the shadow of duality is experienced, it is also accepted. And the trace of nescience is upheld to account for the shadow of duality. And these views are based on one's experience.

The view expressed in this verse is based on *BSB, IV, i, 15.*

*utde :* the *Bhāṣya* text :

*api ca naivātra vivaditavyaṁ brahmavidā kaṁcitkālam sarīraṁ dhriyate na vā dhriyate iti. katham hi ekasya svahṛdayapratyayaṁ brahmavedanaṁ dehadhāraṇaṁ ca apareṇa pratikṣeptuṁ śakyeta.*

[ 44 ]

ब्रह्मात्मत्वं सान्तरायं पुरस्तात् बोधोत्पत्तौ ध्वस्तमोहान्तरायम् ।

यद्यप्येवं द्वैतलेशानुवृत्तेः प्रत्यक्षत्वान्मोहलेशोऽभ्युपेयः ॥

The self is veiled by nescience before (its realization). And when it is realized, it becomes free from the intervention of nescience. Even then, the trace of nescience should be admitted, because it is experienced that the trace of duality continues (to exist).

[ 45 ]

तस्माज्जीवन्मुक्तरूपेण विद्वानारब्धानां कर्मणां भोगसिद्धयै ।

स्थित्वा भोगं ध्वान्तगन्धप्रसूतं मुक्त्वात्यन्तं याति कैवल्यमन्ते ॥

1. या चास्ति लेशप्रतीतेः — P<sub>2</sub>.



In order to experience the result of the fructified deeds, the mystic remains embodied though liberated. And after having completely experienced the result which is the outcome of the trace of nescience, he attains final liberation (that is, liberation after the falling off of the body).

[ 46 ]

क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।  
तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्त्वभावात् भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥

The nescience is mutable. The one, self-luminous self (when reflected in nescience) is God and it is immutable and immortal and it controls the nescience and the individual souls. By meditating, reasoning and (then, realizing the self, the illusory universe is annihilated. Nescience in its entirety is annihilated after experiencing the result of the fructified deeds.

This verse is from *Śvet.*, I, 10.

For details see Introduction, pp. 143-4.

### THE PATH OF MANES AND OF GODS NOT INTENDED FOR THE LIBERATED SOUL

[ 47 ]

ब्रह्मादीनामस्ति मुक्तिः श्रुतिभ्यस्तेषामेषा नार्चिराद्या गतिर्वः ।  
तस्मादस्या निर्गुणब्रह्मविद्यासंबन्धित्वं नैषितव्यं भवद्भिः ॥

From the scripture it is known that Hiraṇyagarbha and others attain liberation. But as they do not have the well-known path of gods (and of manes), the latter should not be related by you (the *Pūrvapakṣin*) to the knowledge of the attributeless self.



If it is urged that one who is liberated attains liberation only after reaching the other world by proceeding in the path of gods, then this contention is refuted in this verse.

The path of gods and that of manes are referred to in the *Bh.G.*  
VIII, 24-5.

[ 48 ]

प्राणोत्क्रान्तिर्नास्ति मूर्धन्ययैषां नाड्या तस्माद्यत्र यत्रैव विद्या ।  
तत्रैव स्यान्मुक्तिरित्यभ्युपेयं गत्युत्क्रान्ती तेन विद्यान्तरेषु ॥

The vital airs (of one who has realized the self) do not pass out through the vein in the head. Hence it should be held that where one realizes the self, there one attains liberation. And going to the other world and the departure of the vital airs are applicable (only) to (one who has) the other knowledge (that is, the knowledge of the conditioned self.)

KARMA — ONLY A PROXIMATE MEANS  
TO KNOWLEDGE

[ 49 ]

देवादीनां नास्ति कर्माधिकारो विद्या तेषां केवला मुक्तिहेतुः ।  
पारंपर्यात् कर्मणा मुक्तहेतोर्विद्याङ्गत्वं सर्ववर्णाश्रमाणाम् ॥

The divine beings have no competence for the religious rites and (hence) knowledge alone is the cause of their liberation. For this reason, rites pertaining to all classes and stages of life are (only) indirect aid to (the) knowledge (of the self).

If religious rites are admitted to be the direct means of the knowledge of the self then it amounts to saying that the divine beings who are not competent to perform religious rites cannot attain the knowledge of the self. Since it is known from the scriptural texts

1. णामस्य हेतोः — P<sub>2</sub>.



that they also attain the knowledge of the self, it follows that religious rites are only indirect aid to the knowledge of the self.

[ 50 ]

पारंपर्यं शुद्धिहेतुत्वहेतोर्यज्ञादीनां श्रूयते स्मर्यते च ।  
साक्षादेषां मोक्षहेतुत्वमेवमन्विच्छन्तोऽप्यागमाच्च प्रतीमः ॥

It is known from the *śruti*<sup>1</sup> and the *smṛti* passage<sup>2</sup> that sacrifices, etc., in view of their purifying character, are the indirect means to (liberation). Thus, when we carefully examine, we do not know from the scripture that sacrifices, etc., are the direct means to liberation.

1. *vide*: *Brh.*, IV, iv, 22.

2. *vide*: *Bh. G.*, VI, 3.

[ 51 ]

इति बहुश्रुतभाषितमुच्चकैः श्रुतिशिरोवचनादुगतं महत् ।  
समुपदिष्टमिदं कृपया मया प्रियमतीव हितं च सुमुक्षवे ॥

The absolute self which is set forth in the Upaniṣads, which is explained by Śrī Śaṅkara and which is highly blissful and beneficial, has been instructed out of compassion to you - the aspirant.

*bahusrutabhāṣitam*: *bahusrutah* - *bhagavān bhāṣyakārah*, TB.

IN PRAISE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF

[ 52 ]

एवं समन्वयविरोधनिरासविद्या-  
निष्पत्तिसाधनफलानि गुरोः क्रमेण ।  
विज्ञाय वेदफलमात्मनि सर्वमेव  
पश्यन्नुवाच कृतकृत्यमतिः स शिष्यः ॥

Thus knowing successively from the preceptor, the import of the Upaniṣads, the removal of conflict (of the



Upaniṣadic teaching with perception), the means to the rise of knowledge and the result of knowledge, and experiencing in himself the result of the knowledge (that is, the identity of the inner self and the supreme self), the disciple with a feeling having attained the one to be achieved, says as follows.

[ 53 ]

विद्याविग्रहमग्रहेण पिहितं प्रत्यञ्चमुच्चैस्तरा-

मुत्कृष्योत्तमपूरुषं मुनिधिया मुञ्जादिषीकामिव ।

कोशात्कारणकार्यरूपविकृतात् पश्यामि निःसंशयं

कासीदस्ति भविष्यति क्व नु गतः संसारदुःखोदधिः ॥

I certainly experience the absolute self which is inward, concealed by nescience, and of the nature of consciousness, by differentiating it, like reeds from the sedge,<sup>1</sup> with the intellect whetted by reasoning, etc., from nescience and the (five) sheaths which are its modifications. (Now) where did the ocean of misery in the form of transmigration exist, where is it present, where will it exist and where has it gone?

1. *vide* : *Kāth.*, II, iii, 17.

[ 54 ]

पश्यामि चित्रमिव सर्वमिदं द्वितीयं

तिष्ठामि 'निष्कलचिदेकवपुष्यनन्ते ।

आत्मानमद्वयमनन्तसुखैकरूपं

पश्यामि दग्धरशनामिव च प्रपञ्चम् ॥

I perceive all the phenomenal elements as if they are a mere picture. And I stand firm on the partless, unitary, and absolute consciousness. I experience the self which is absolute, unconditioned, and of the nature of bliss, and I perceive the universe as if it is a burnt rope.

1. पुष्कल — P.



[ 55 ]

अद्वैतमप्यनुभवामि करस्थविल्व-

तुल्यं शरीरमहिनिर्वयनीव<sup>1</sup> वीक्षे ।

एवं च जीवनमिव<sup>2</sup> प्रतिभासमानं

निश्चेयसाधिगमनं<sup>3</sup> च मम प्रसिद्धम् ॥

I experience the absolute (reality as clearly) as a *bilva* fruit placed in one's palm; and I perceive my body to be the slough of a snake.<sup>1</sup> Hence the appearance of my embodied nature and my attainment of liberation are established.

1. *vide* : *Brh.*, IV, iv, 7.

*niśreyasādhigamanam* :

The reading found in the printed texts and manuscripts is *niśreyaso'dhigamanam* or *niśreyaso nigamanam*. But, according to the *Pāṇini-sūtra* - *acaturavicitra*, etc., [ V, iv, 77 ] the correct grammatical reading appears to be *niśreyasādhigamanam*.

[ 56 ]

अद्वैतबाधकमभून्मम यद् द्वितीय-

मद्वैतमस्य बत बाध<sup>1</sup>कमद्य जातम् ।

मोहाद् द्वितीयमपबाधकमस्य विद्या-

सामर्थ्यतो द्वयनिवर्हणमद्वितीयम् ॥

Alas! The (experience of the) absolute (self) has now become the sublating factor of the phenomenal elements which were once the sublating factors (of the experience) of the absolute self. Owing to *avidyā*, the phenomenal elements are the sublating factors of the (experience of the)

1. वदीक्षे — M<sub>1</sub>.      2. प्रतिभासनं च — M<sub>1</sub>.

3. कमेव — B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>.



absolute self. And the absolute self, on the strength of its knowledge, annihilates the phenomenal elements.

[ 57 ]

आश्चर्यमद्य मम भाति कथं द्वितीयं  
नित्ये निरस्तनिखिलाशिवचित्प्रकाशे ।  
आसीत्पुरेति किमिमाः श्रुतयो न पूर्वं  
येन द्वितीयमभवत्तिमिरप्रसूतम् ॥

It is a wonder how duality previously appeared in the self-luminous consciousness which is free from any defect and which is eternal. Perhaps the Upaniṣadic texts were not studied before; and, because of that there was the appearance of duality brought about by *avidyā*.

[ 58 ]

त्वत्पादपङ्कजसमाश्रयणं विना मे  
सन्नप्यसन्निव परः पुरुषः पुरासीत् ।  
त्वत्पादपद्मयुगलाश्रयणादिदानीं  
नासीन्न चास्ति न भविष्यति भेदबुद्धिः ॥

Before serving your lotus-feet, the supreme self though existing appeared as not existing. Now after serving your lotus-feet, the cognition of duality neither existed, nor exists, nor shall exist.

[ 59 ]

यस्मात्कृपापरवशो मम दुश्चिकित्सं  
संसाररोगमपनेतुमसि प्रवृत्तः ।  
त्वत्पादपङ्कजरजःशिरसा दधान-  
स्त्वामशरीरपतनादहमभ्युपासे ॥



Since you have undertaken to remove my disease in the form of transmigration which is hard to cure, I shall worship you until the final fall of my body, by bearing the dust of your lotus feet on my head.

## PURPOSE OF THE COMPOSITION OF THIS TREATISE

[ 60 ]

संक्षेपशारीरकमेवमेतत् कृतं परिव्राजकमुक्तिहेतुः ।  
गुरुप्रसादात्परिलभ्य तत्त्वं त्रयीशिरस्तत्त्वनिवेदनाय ॥

This abridged treatise on the nature of the embodied soul (the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*), whose study is the cause of liberation of the ascetics, is composed in order to expound the import of the Upaniṣads, after knowing the truth through the grace of the preceptor.

## DEDICATION TO GOD

[ 61 ]

अविरलपदपङ्क्तिः पद्मनाभस्य पुण्या  
चरणकमलधूलिग्राहिणी भारतीयम् ।  
घनतरमुपघातं श्रेयसः श्रोतृमंघात्  
सुरसरिदिव सद्यो मार्ष्टुं माङ्गल्यहेतुः ॥

Let this sacred composition which contains the words weighty with sense, which bears the grace of the dust of the lotus feet of Lord Padmanābha and which gives rise to auspiciousness, immediately remove, like the Ganges, the impediments to prosperity of those who are wedded to the Vedāntic study.

*aviralapadapaṅktiḥ - gambhīrārthapadaṇḍaketyarthah, TB.*



[ 62 ]

श्रीदेवेश्वरपादपङ्कजरजस्संपर्कपूताशयः

सर्वज्ञात्मगिराङ्कितो मुनिवरः संक्षेपशारीरकम् ।

चक्रे सज्जनबुद्धिवर्धनमिदं राजन्यवंश्ये नृपे

श्रीमत्यक्षतशासने मनुकुलादित्ये भुवं शासति ॥

When the Kṣatriya king who shone like the sun of the race of Manu, who was possessed of glory and who was having supreme sovereignty over the earth was ruling, the ascetic by name Sarvajñātman, whose mind was purified by the contact of the dust of the lotus feet of Śrī Suresvara, composed the treatise *Samkṣepaśārīrakam* to develop the knowledge of the pious men.

[ 63 ]

भुजङ्गमाङ्गशायिने विहङ्गमाङ्गगामिने ।

तुरङ्गमाङ्गभेदिने नमो रथाङ्गधारिणे ॥

Salutations to Lord Viṣṇu, who is reposing on the body of the serpent Ādiśeṣa, who rides on Garuḍa, who broke the body of the demon (Kesika, who came) in the guise of a horse, and who holds the disc in his hand.



### Part III : INDEXES







## I

## INDEX OF QUOTATIONS IN THE TEXT

	Verse	Source
1. अज्ञानेनावृतं	III, 110	<i>Bh. G.</i> , V, 15.
2. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा	I, 78	<i>BS</i> , I, i, 1.
3. अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम्	I, 284	<i>Prakaranapañcikā</i> , p. 42.
4. अर्थस्य मूलं	III, 366	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
5. अहं कृत्यतृचश्च	II, 51	<i>Pāṇini-sūtra</i> , III, iii, 169.
6. अशब्दमस्पर्श	III, 292	<i>Kath.</i> , I, iii, 15.
7. अस्थूलमनणु	I, 254, 256 } 263, 264 }	<i>Brh.</i> , III, viii, 8.
8. अहं ब्रह्मास्मि	I, 293	<i>Brh.</i> , I, iv, 10.
9. एको देवः	III, 183	<i>Śvet.</i> , VI, 11.
10. एकः शत्रुः	I, 321	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
11. एवं न वा अरे	III, 168	<i>Brh.</i> , II, iv, 5.
12. औत्पत्तिकस्तु	II, 48	<i>Jaimini-sūtra</i> , I, i, 5.
13. कामादीतरत्र तत्र च	III, 177	<i>BS</i> , III, iii, 39.
14. किं ते धनेन	III, 365	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
15. क्षरं प्रधानं	IV, 46	<i>Śvet.</i> , I, 10.
16. ज्ञात्वा देवं	III, 155	<i>Śvet.</i> , I, 11.
17. ज्ञानात्मकस्य	II, 186	<i>Viṣṇupurāṇa</i> , V, xvii, 32
18. ज्ञानेन तु	III, 110	<i>Bh. G.</i> , V., 16.



19. तत्त्वमसि I, 96, 151, }  
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III, 40, }  
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20. तत्तु समन्वयात् I, 261 *BS.*, I, i, 4.
21. तदेतत् I, 354 *Śābarabhāṣya*, II, i, 1.
22. तद्ब्रह्म I, 513 *Taitt.*, III, i, 1.
23. तन्मात्रे प्रथमा I, 216 *Pāṇini-sūtra*, II,  
iii, 46.
24. द्रष्टव्यः II, 50; 51 *Brh.*, II, iv, 5.
25. धातोः कर्मणः III, 337, *Pāṇini-sūtra*, III, i, 7.  
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26. न तस्य कश्चित् III, 185 *Śvet.*, VI, 9.
27. न तस्य कार्यं III, 184 *Śvet.*, VI, 8.
28. न तावत् I, 40 *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*
29. नावेदविन्मनुते III, 296 *Śāthyāyanīyopani-*  
*ṣad*, 4.
30. नाहं प्रकाशः III, 110 *Bh. G.*, VII, 25.
31. नेति नेति I, 193, 262, }  
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32. नेह नानास्ति I, 414 *Brh.*, IV, iv, 19.
33. नैतादृशं ब्राह्मणस्य III, 363 *Mahābhārata -*  
*Mokṣadharmā*, 169, 35.
34. परास्त्रि खानि II, 13 *Kaṭh.*, IV, 1.
35. पश्यन्न पश्यति III, 167 *Brh.*, IV, iii, 23.



36. पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं II, 116 *Jaimini-sūtra*, VI, v, 54.
37. बहु स्यां प्रजायेय II, 67 *Chānd.*, VI, ii, 3.
38. ब्रह्म पुच्छं II, 20 *Taitt.*, II, v, 1.
39. ब्रह्म स्वयंभु III, 268 *Brh.*, II, vi, 3.
40. ब्रह्मैव सन् I, 307, 310, } *Brh.*, IV, iv, 6.  
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41. भूतं भव्याय I, 143, 395, *Śābarabhāṣya*, 482 III, iv, 40.
42. भोक्ता भोग्यं III, 293 *Śvet.*, I 12.
43. भोक्त्रापत्तेः II, 58, 79 *BS*, II, i, 13.
44. मन्त्रो हीनः II, 230 *Pāṇiniya-śikṣā*, 52.
45. यतो यतो निवर्तते III, 364 *Mahābhārata - Udyogaparvan*, 36, 14
46. यतो वा इमानि I, 507 *Taitt.*, III, I, 1.
47. यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा III, 150 —
48. यस्य (स्यादद्धा) I, 267 *Chānd.*, III, xiv, 4
49. यो यागं I, 472 *Śābarabhāṣya*, I. i, 2.
50. विजज्ञौ III, 299 *Chānd.*, VI, xvi, 3.
51. वेदान्तविज्ञान III, 362 *Muṇḍ.*, VIII, iii, 4.
52. श्रद्धत्स्व सौम्य I, 267 *Chānd.*, VI, xii, 2.
53. सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म I, 263 *Taitt.*, II, i, 1.
54. सत्संप्रयोगे II, 46; } *Jaimini-sūtra*, I, i, 4.  
II, 47 }
55. सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च II, 194 *BS*, II, i, 35.
56. स समानः III, 42 *Brh.*, IV, iii, 7.
57. स स्वराड् भवति III, 156 *Chānd.*, VII. xxv, 2.
58. साऽस्य देवता I, 490 *Pāṇini-sūtra*, II, iv, 24



## II

INDEX OF THE VIEWS OF OTHER AUTHORS  
REFERRED TO AND IMPLIED IN THE TEXT  
OF THE SAMKṢEPAŚĀRĪRAKA

1. *Padmapāda*

- (1) शुक्तिकेयं इत्येव निराकाङ्क्षं वाक्यं नेदं रजतमित्यनुवादः ।

See *Pañcapādikā*, p. 167, and *SS*, I, 257-8.

2. *Sureśvara*

- (1) प्रत्यक्त्वादतिसूक्ष्मत्वादात्मदृष्ट्यनुशीलनात् ।  
अतो वृत्तिर्विहायान्या ह्यहंवृत्त्योपलक्ष्यते ॥

See *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, II, 55, and *SS*, I, 170.

- (2) कूटस्थबोधः प्रत्यक्त्वमनिमित्तं सदात्मनः ।  
बोद्धताहंतयोर्हेतुस्ताभ्यां तेनोपलक्ष्यते ॥

See *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, III, 11, and *SS*, I, 190.

- (3) श्रुत्वा मत्वाय तं साक्षादात्मानं प्रतिपद्यते ।

See *Brhadāranyakavārttika*, (2.4. 220) and *SS*, III, 346.

3. *Vimuktātman*

- (1) सदसत्सदसदनिर्वचनीयप्रकारेभ्यो ह्यन्यप्रकारैवाज्ञानस्य  
निवृत्तिर्युक्ता ।

See *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 85, and *SS*, IV, 14.



## III

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3.	अज्ञावृत्ता	redundancy	I, 189
4.	अज्ञान	nescience	I, 317
5.	अतिग्रह	object	II, 125
6.	अतिनिकट	immediate	I, 1
7.	अतिरेक	difference	I, 162, 186
8.	अधिष्ठान	substrate	I, 32
9.	अध्यसन	superimposition	I, 31
10.	अनन्यमान	self-luminous	I, 125
11.	अनिर्वचनीय	indeterminable	I, 128
12.	अनुभव	self which is of the nature of experience	I, 122
13.	अन्तर	difference	I, 196
14.	अपनीति	removal	I, 166
15.	अपवर्ग	knowledge of the self	II, 328
16.	अपहत	contradicted	I, 432
17.	अबोध	nescience	I, 27
18.	अभिदा	non-difference	I, 230
19.	अभिहित	expression	I, 382, 383
20.	अर्धजरतीय	the maxim of half- way house	I, 397
21.	अवकर	conflict	III, 131
22.	अविक्रिय	immutable	I, 1
23.	अव्युत्पत्ति	nescience	II, 224



24.	अहिनिर्व्वयनी	slough of a snake	IV, 55
25.	आधार	locus	I, 32
26.	आधि	limiting adjunct	II, 161
27.	आनकदुन्दुभि	Vasudeva	III, 265
28.	आलम्बन	object	I, 340
29.	आवरणशक्ति	power of veiling	I, 20
30.	आशय	mind	IV, 62
31.	इतरेतराध्यसन	mutual superimposition	I, 37
32.	इषीका	reed	IV, 53
33.	उदर्क	later	I, 498
34.	उपचार	worldly usage	I, 39, 40
35.	उल्मुक	fire-brand	II, 160
36.	ऊर्णनाभ	spider	I, 545
37.	ऊषरभू	barren land	II, 115
38.	एकल	unassisted, single	III, 258
39.	औदासीन्य	abstinence	I, 76, 79, 415
40.	कारक	productive factor	I, 127
41.	कृशानु	fire	I, 119
42.	गन्ध	trace	IV, 42
43.	गुणवाद	commendatory text	III, 284
44.	ग्रह	sense-organ	II, 125
45.	घटना	relation	I, 382, 384
46.	चिदात्मन्	conscious self	I, 29
47.	चेत्य	phenomenal element	I, 37, 38
48.	छाया	shadow (trace)	IV, 42
49.	तीर्थ	preceptor	I, 92



50.	दूरेत्यता	incompatibility	I, 103
51.	द्विहृति	dog	IV, 20
52.	दौवारिक	operating condition	III, 7
53.	धामन्	state	II, 127
54.	धिषणा	knowledge	I, 14; II, 115
55.	द्युमणि	sun	III, 34
56.	नियोग	mandate	I, 424
57.	निर्वन्ध	attachment to worldly object	III, 56
58.	निश्चित्क	devoid of conscious- ness	II, 71
59.	निषक्ति	import	I, 491
60.	नितृष्ट	natural	II, 49
61.	परिवृढ	self	I, 485, 550
62.	पर्युदास	exclusion	I, 405
63.	प्रगत	well-known	II, 99
64.	प्रमा	proof	I, 101, 111
65.	प्राज्ञ	deep sleep state	I, 23
66.	बुद्धि	speech	I, 356
67.	धावार्थ	sense of the root ( <i>dhātvartha</i> )	I, 435
68.	मुञ्ज	sedge	IV, 53
69.	मृषा	indeterminable as either real or unreal	I, 20; III, 140
70.	लेश	tinge (trace)	IV, 42
71.	विगान	difference of opinion	I, 374
72.	विदम्बन	illusive assumption	I, 375
73.	विप्रुप्	particle	I, 302
74.	विभ्रमशक्ति	power of projection	I, 20



75.	वैयात्य	immodesty	II, 213
76.	व्यतिषक्तबुद्धि	knowledge of relation	I, 374, 375
77.	व्यध्वन्	interval	III, 359
78.	शवल	blend	I, 326, 329, 339
79.	शाकटिक	driver	III, 47
80.	श्वसन	air	III, 166
81.	संघट्टन	association	II, 179
82.	सन्ध्य	dream (state)	I, 339; II, 127
83.	संविद्	knowledge, consciousness	I, 53
84.	सायुज्य	intimate relation	IV, 34
85.	सौव	one's own	I, 170
86.	स्थायिन्	permanent being	II, 69
87.	स्थेमन्	permanence	I, 48



IV  
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### *About the Book*

Sarvajñātman occupies a place of eminence in the line of Advaita preceptors, having been ordained by Ādi Śaṅkara and nominated to succeed him and Sureśvara in the Śrī Kāmakoti Pīṭha at Kāñcī. His *Samkṣepasārīraka* is a basic work on Advaita being a full metrical summary of the central teachings of Śrī Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. The importance of the work for a student of Advaita is evident from the fact that it has eight commentaries.

This book is a critical edition and translation of the work. Part I of the book is a detailed Introduction, discussing the basic doctrines of Advaita Vedānta according to Sarvajñātman. Part II presents the text edited with an English translation and annotation.

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